Archived Part A
Introduction
UG UG Users Guide
UG-A UG-A Introduction
UG-A.1 UG-A.1 Purpose
UG-A.1.1
The Bahrain Monetary Agency ("the BMA"), in its capacity as the regulatory and supervisory authority for all financial institutions in Bahrain, issues regulations that licensees are legally obliged to comply with. These regulations are contained in the BMA Rulebook.
UG-A.1.2
The Rulebook is divided into 5 Volumes, covering different areas of financial services activity. Volume 1 (Conventional Banks) covers all conventional banks licensed by the Agency. Islamic banks are covered in Volume 2. Volume 3, covering insurance licensees, was issued in April 2005. Volume 4 is being issued in two phases, starting in April 2006. Representative offices of banks and specialised licensees are in Volume 5, which will be issued in 2007.
UG-A.1.3
This Users' Guide provides guidance on:
(a) the status and application of the Rulebook, with specific reference to Volume 1 (Conventional Banks);(b) the structure and design of the Rulebook; and(c) its maintenance and version control.UG-A.2 UG-A.2 Module history
UG-A.2.1
This User's Guide — Module UG — was first issued in July 2004 together with the rest of Volume 1 (Conventional Banks). All subsequent changes to this Module are dated with the month and year at the base of the relevant page and in the Table of Contents: Chapter UG-3 of this Module provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control.
UG-A.2.2
A list of recent changes made to this Module are detailed in the table below:
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes UG-A.2 1/2005 Update of changes to Module UG-1.2 1/2005 Clearer wording on rules and guidance UG-2.2 1/2005 Sections and paragraphs explained more fully UG-2.3 1/2005 Footers explained more fully UG-3.1 1/2005 Contents pages explained more fully UG-2.3 & UG-3.1 4/2006 Revised dating and update system UG-1 UG-1 Rulebook status and application
UG-1.1 UG-1.1 Legal basis
UG-1.1.1
Volume 1 (Conventional Banks) of the BMA Rulebook is issued by the BMA pursuant to Amiri Decree Law No. 23 of 1973 (the "BMA Law").
UG-1.2 UG-1.2 Status of provisions
UG-1.2.1
The contents of the Rulebook have the formal status either of Rules or Guidance.
UG-1.2.2
Rules have a binding effect. If a licensee breaches a Rule to which it is subject, it is liable to enforcement action by the BMA and, in certain cases, criminal proceedings by the Office of the Public Prosecutor.
UG-1.2.3
Guidance is not binding. It is material that helps inform a particular Rule or set of Rules, or provides other general information. Where relevant, compliance with Guidance will generally lead the BMA to assess that the business has complied with the rule(s) to which the Guidance relates. Conversely, failure to comply with Guidance will generally be viewed by the BMA as tending to suggest breach of a Rule.
UG-1.2.4
The status of each paragraph within the Rulebook can be identified by its text format, as follows:
(a) Rules are in bold, font size 12. The paragraph reference number is also highlighted in a coloured box.(b) Guidance is in normal type, font size 11.UG-1.2.5
The Agency's interpretation of all Rules and Guidance in this Volume is final.
UG-1.3 UG-1.3 Application
UG-1.3.1
Rules and Guidance contained in Volume 1 of the BMA Rulebook apply to all conventional licensed banks subject to the provisions of the BMA Law, except for representative offices of banks which are subject to the relevant requirements contained in Volume 5 (Specialised Firms) and Islamic banks which are covered in Volume 2.
UG-1.3.2
Where relevant, individual sections of Volume 1 may identify which specific Rules and Guidance apply to particular types of banking licensee.
UG-1.4 UG-1.4 Effective date
UG-1.4.1
Volume 1 (Conventional Banks) of the BMA Rulebook was first issued in July 2004. It replaces all regulations previously issued with respect to conventional banks.
UG-1.4.2
For reference, these superseded regulations are listed in the Rulebook, under the 'Regulation history' section of the appropriate Module in each Volume. The list includes the reference number of the previously superseded circular or regulation, its date and subject heading.
UG-2 UG-2 Rulebook structure and format
UG-2.1 UG-2.1 Rulebook structure
Rulebook Volumes
UG-2.1.1
The Rulebook is divided into 5 Volumes, covering different areas of financial services activity, as follows:
Volume 1 Conventional Banks Volume 2 Islamic Banks Volume 3 Insurance Volume 4 Investment Business Volume 5 Specialised Activities UG-2.1.2
Volume 5 (Specialised Activities) covers money changers; leasing firms; factoring firms; representative offices; finance companies; mono-line credit card companies and providers of ancillary services to the financial sector.
Rulebook contents (overview)
UG-2.1.3
Except for Volume 5, the basic structure of each Rulebook is the same. Each Volume starts with a contents page and User's Guide. Subsequent material is organised underneath the following headings:
(a) High Level Requirements(b) Business Requirements(c) Reporting Requirements and(d) Enforcement and RedressUG-2.1.4
Volume 5 is organised by the category of specialised firm concerned.
UG-2.1.5
The material in Volumes 1–4 is contained in Modules, each covering a specific area of requirements (e.g. High-level Controls). In turn, each Module is divided into Chapters, Sections and Paragraphs, as detailed below.
UG-2.1.6
Each Volume has its own appendix Volume containing relevant reporting forms and a glossary.
UG-2.2 UG-2.2 Volume structure
Modules
UG-2.2.1
Rulebook Volumes are subdivided into Modules, arranged in groups according to their subject matter, underneath the headings listed in paragraph UG-2.1.3 above.
UG-2.2.2
Each Module in a Volume is referenced using a two-letter code which is usually a contraction or abbreviation of its title. These codes are used for cross-referencing within the text.
Chapters
UG-2.2.3
Each Module consists of chapters, categorised into two types:
(a) A standard introductory chapter (referenced with a letter: e.g. UG-A); andUG-2.2.4
The introductory chapter summarises the purpose of the Module, its history (in terms of changes made to its contents) and, where applicable, lists previously issued circulars and regulations that were replaced by the Rulebook Module.
Sections and paragraphs
UG-2.2.5
Chapters are further sub-divided into Sections (numbered consecutively after the Chapter number: e.g. FC-1.1, FC-1.2, FC-1.3 etc). In turn, Sections are sub-divided into Paragraphs (numbered consecutively after the Chapter and Section numbers: e.g. FC-1.1.1, FC-1.1.2, FC-1.1.3 etc.). Where appropriate, sub-section headings may be used, to guide the reader through a Section: sub-section headings are italicised and unnumbered, and act purely as an indicator (without limitation as to the status of the paragraphs that follow.
Table of contents
UG-2.2.6
Each Volume's contents page lists all the Modules contained within it (Part A), and the information contained in the relevant appendix Volume (Part B).
UG-2.2.7
The contents page of each Module lists the chapters, section and, in some Modules, sub-sections it contains, and the latest date of each section in issue.
UG-2.3 UG-2.3 Format and page layout
Headers
UG-2.3.1
The top of each page in the Rulebook identifies the Volume, Module and Chapter in question. Each Module is a separate document. New Chapters start on a fresh page.
Footers
UG-2.3.2
The bottom of each page in the Rulebook (on the left hand side) identifies the Module in question, its section and page number. Page numbering starts afresh for each Section: the total number of pages in each respective Section is shown as well as the individual page number. The bottom right hand side shows an issue date. The Contents Page for each Module is given its own separate version number. In addition, the Contents page lists the latest issue date for each Section in that Module. The Contents page thus acts as a summary checklist of the current version in force for each section. Further explanation is provided in Section UG-3.1 below.
Defined terms
UG-2.3.3
Defined terms used in the Rulebook are underlined. Each Volume has its own glossary listing defined terms and giving their meaning. Definitions of terms used apply only to the Volume in question. It is possible for the same term to be used in a different Volume with a different meaning.
Cross-references
UG-2.3.4
Cross-references are highlighted in yellow. Two active cross-references are shown in Paragraph UG-2.3.5 below. Any cross-references given in a text state the Module code, followed by the numbering convention for the chapter and section being referred to. For example, the cross-reference FC-1.2.3 refers to the first Paragraph in the second Section of the first Chapter of the Financial Crimes Module. Many references will be quite general, referring to a Module or Chapter rather than a specific Paragraph.
Text format
UG-2.3.5
Each paragraph is assigned a complete reference to the Module, Chapter, and Section, as well as its own paragraph number, as explained in UG-2.3.4 above. The format of the paragraph reference and paragraph text indicates their status as either a Rule or Guidance, as explained in UG-1.2.4 above.
UG-3 UG-3 Rulebook maintenance and availability
UG-3.1 UG-3.1 Maintenance
Quarterly Updates
UG-3.1.1
Changes to the Rulebook are made quarterly. After the end of each calendar quarter, the BMA automatically reissues the contents page of each Module. Users can thus determine whether they have access to the latest version of these pages, by checking that they have those marked with the most recent date.
UG-3.1.2
The contents page of each Module lists the current date of each Section. The Module contents pages thus act as a checklist for users to verify that they have the current requirements.
UG-3.1.3
Where changes to the regulations are required, then the affected pages are re-issued, alongside the contents pages for each Module. Where possible, only the relevant Section or Chapter is re-issued, rather than the whole Module.
UG-3.1.4
A summary of any changes made to a Module is included in the 'Regulation history' section of each Module. The table summarises the nature of the change made, the date of the change and the Module components affected.
UG-3.1.5
The updates are posted to the BMA website, together with a summary of changes for that quarter. Licensees are in addition e-mailed the summary of each quarter's changes. Hard-copy users are required to print off the updated pages from the website to incorporate in their Rulebook in order to keep it current. The website version of the Rulebook acts at all times as the definitive version of the Rulebook.
UG-3.2 UG-3.2 Rulebook availability and ordering details
Ordering details
UG-3.2.2
Order forms for CD-ROMs and hard copies are included in an annexure to the Users' Guide (please refer to the end of this module).
UG-3.2.3
Please complete all relevant boxes on the order form, taking particular care to provide full contact and address details. The completed form should be sent (accompanied with the appropriate payment) to:
Rulebook Section
Rulebook Section — Licensing & Policy Directorate
Bahrain Monetary Agency
PO Box 27
Manama
Kingdom of Bahrain
Tel: + 973 - 17 54 7413
Fax: + 973 - 17 53 0228
E-mail: rulebook@bma.gov.bh
Web: www.bma.gov.bhUG-3.2.1
The Rulebook is available on the BMA website, on CD-ROM-and in hard copy.
ANNEXURE — BMA Rulebook Order Form
INSTRUCTIONS Please complete all relevant boxes, taking particular care to provide full contact and address details. The completed form should be sent (accompanied with the appropriate payment) to: Bahrain Monetary Agency
(Rulebook Section, Licensing & Policy Directorate)
PO Box 27
Manama
Kingdom of Bahrain
For enquiries, please contact:
Phone: +973 - 17 547 413
E-mail: rulebook@bma.gov.bhORDER REQUIREMENT Rulebook Volume Number Hard-Copy1: number required (at BD 110 each) CD-ROM2: number required (at BD 5 each) Cost: 1 — Parts A & B Conventional Banks 2 — Parts A & B Islamic Banks 3 — Parts A & B Insurance Licensees 4 — Parts A & B Investment Business Licensees (Due 2006) 5 — Parts A & B Specialised Licensees (Due 2006) POSTAGE The above prices include postage for delivery within the Kingdom of Bahrain. Postage for international orders will be charged at cost: please contact the BMA (see above) for details of rates and delivery options. 1: Hard copy subscribers are provided the latest version of the Rulebook Volume(s) ordered, which they can then keep up to date by printing off new or amended pages from the BMA website (www.bma.gov.bh).
2: CD-ROM subscribers are sent the latest available version of the complete Rulebook (i.e. the CD-ROM contains all Volumes that have been issued).Total Cost: ADDRESS / PAYMENT DETAILS Name Institution (if applicable) Full Postal Address
Contact e-mail / telephone / fax E-mail:
Telephone:
Fax:Please remember to enclose your payment with the order Payment should be by cheque drawn on a Bahraini-licensed bank, payable in Bahraini Dinars. Cheques should be made out to "Bahrain Monetary Agency". Persons ordering from outside Bahrain should contact the BMA (see above) for postage rates and payment options. High Level Standards
LR LR Licensing Requirements
LR-A LR-A Introduction
LR-A.1 LR-A.1 Purpose
LR-A.1.1
The Licensing Requirements Module sets out the BMA's approach to licensing
conventional bank licensees .LR-A.1.2
The Module builds on the legal requirements contained in Decree Law No. (23) of 1973 (the BMA Law 1973). The Module is issued under legal powers granted to the BMA under the BMA Law 1973, notably Articles 56 to 69.
Licensing Requirement
LR-A.1.3
Persons wishing to undertake
regulated banking services are required to be licensed by the BMA as aconventional bank licensee .Regulated banking services consist of two determinant activities undertaken in combination — deposit-taking and providing credit. In addition, various supplementary regulated activities may also be undertaken. These activities are defined in Rule LR-1.3.1.LR-A.1.4
In other words, persons wishing to undertake deposit taking must also undertake the activity of providing credit. In addition, they may undertake any of the other activities falling within the definition of
regulated banking services . Deposit taking may not be undertaken on its own, without the activity of providing credit also being undertaken. Persons wishing to provide credit without undertaking deposit taking may qualify as a finance company, a category of specialised licensee (see separate regulations regarding these: they will fall under Volume 5 of the BMA Rulebook, when issued in 2007).License Categories
LR-A.1.5
Conventional bank licensees are divided into two sub-categories:conventional retail bank licensees andconventional wholesale bank licensees . Certain specific regulatory requirements may differ between these two sub-categories, where appropriate to address their different risk profiles.LR-A.1.6
Conventional retail bank licensees may undertake transactions in any currency, with both Bahraini residents and non-residents. To qualify as aconventional retail bank licensee , the activity of providing credit must account for a significant portion of the institution's business (defined, broadly, as accounting for over 20% of an institution's assets).LR-A.1.7
Conventional wholesale bank licensees may also undertake transactions without restriction, when dealing with the Government of Bahrain and its agencies; BMA bank licensees; and non-residents. However, they may only undertake transactions denominated in Bahraini Dinar and/or with a resident of the Kingdom of Bahrain, if these are wholesale in nature. Wholesale transactions are defined in terms of transaction size (broadly, BD 7 million or more for a credit or deposit transaction, and US$ 250,000 or more for an investment transaction).LR-A.1.8
Collectively, licensed providers of
regulated banking services are calledconventional bank licensees . Bahrain-incorporatedconventional bank licensees are calledBahraini conventional bank licensees .Conventional bank licensees that are incorporated in an overseas jurisdiction and operate via a branch presence in the Kingdom of Bahrain are calledoverseas conventional bank licensees . The same naming convention applies to the two sub-categories of conventional bank license: thus,Bahraini conventional retail bank licensees andBahraini conventional wholesale bank licensees are those incorporated in Bahrain, whilstoverseas conventional retail bank licensees andoverseas conventional wholesale bank licensees are those incorporated in an overseas jurisdiction and operating in Bahrain via a branch presence.Islamic transactions
LR-A.1.9
Conventional bank licensees may not hold themselves out as an Islamic bank. They may nonetheless enter into Shari'a compliant transactions, subject to certain restrictions. Thus,conventional bank licensees may only undertake transactions that are based on Shari'a compliant contracts, when dealing with governments, public sector entities and other licensed financial institutions. Shari'a compliant contracts may not be undertaken with resident corporates or individuals. (See Paragraphs LR-1.2.27 to LR-1.2.30.)Licensing Conditions
LR-A.1.10
Conventional bank licensees are subject to 8 licensing conditions, mostly specified at a high level in Module LR, and further expanded in underlying subject Modules (such as Module CA). These licensing conditions are broadly equivalent to the standards applied in other Volumes of the BMA Rulebook, to other license categories, and are consistent with international good practice, such as relevant Basel Committee standards.
Retaining Licensed Status
LR-A.1.11
The requirements contained in Chapter LR-2 represent the minimum conditions that have to be met in each case, both at the point of licensing and on an on-going basis thereafter, in order for licensed status to be retained.
Information Requirements and Processes
LR-A.1.12
Chapter LR-3 specifies the processes and information requirements that have to be followed for applicants seeking a
conventional bank license , as well as existing licensees seeking to vary the scope of their license, by adding new regulated activities. It also covers the voluntary surrender of a license, or its cancellation by the BMA.Representative Offices and Ancillary Services Providers
LR-A.1.13
Representative offices ofoverseas conventional bank licensees are not covered in Volume 1 (Conventional Banks) of the Rulebook. Requirements covering Representative Offices (for all financial services firms) will instead be included in Volume 5, to be issued in 2007.LR-A.1.14
Until such time as Volume 5 (Specialised Activities) of the BMA Rulebook is issued,
representative offices ofoverseas conventional bank licensees remain subject to the requirements contained in the BMA's "Standard Conditions and Licensing Criteria" applicable to representative offices of foreign banks, and relevant existing Circulars.LR-A.1.15
Providers of ancillary services to the financial sector are not covered in Volume 1 (Conventional Banks) of the Rulebook. Requirements covering
ancillary services providers will instead be included in Volume 5, to be issued in 2007.LR-A.1.16
Until such time as Volume 5 (Specialised Activities) of the BMA Rulebook is issued,
ancillary services providers remain subject to the requirements contained in the BMA's "Standard Conditions and Licensing Criteria" applicable to providers of ancillary services to the financial sector, and relevant existing Circulars.Updating the BMA Rulebook
LR-A.1.17
Unless the context suggests otherwise, references elsewhere in Volume 1 to Full Commercial Bank(s) should be taken as referring to
conventional retail bank licensees , and references to Offshore Banking Units and Investment Bank Licensees should be taken as referring toconventional wholesale bank licensees . References to the previous bank license categories that applied prior to 1 July 2006 will be gradually updated over time, across the rest of Volume 1.LR-A.2 LR-A.2 Module History
Evolution of Module
LR-A.2.1
This Module (Module LR — "Licensing and Authorisation Requirements") was first issued in July 2004, as part of the initial release of Volume 1 of the BMA Rulebook. It was subsequently reissued in full in July 2006 (and renamed "Licensing Requirements").
LR-A.2.2
The reissued Module was one of several Modules modified to reflect the introduction of the BMA's new integrated license framework. Module LR was amended to reflect the new conventional bank licenses introduced by the framework, and to more closely align its presentation with that found in other BMA Rulebook volumes.
LR-A.2.3
The reissued Module is dated July 2006. All subsequent changes are dated with the month and year when the change was made, at the base of the relevant page and in the Table of Contents. Chapter UG-3 of Module UG provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and control.
LR-A.2.4
A list of recent changes made to this Module is provided below:
Module Reference Change Date Description of Changes LR-6 01/2005 New guidance on record keeping. Whole Module 07/2006 Whole Module reissued to reflect integrated license framework: new license categories and updated licensing conditions introduced. Superseded Requirements
LR-A.2.5
The initial July 2004 version of this Module superseded various circulars and other requirements relating to licensing. Some of these circulars were combined in 1997 into a licensing folder ("Part 1: Licensing", which formed part of the three volume information pack, "The Establishment, regulations and supervision of banks and other financial institutions in Bahrain"). The requirements contained in these circulars were transposed into the initial July 2004 version of this Module unchanged, as follows:
Circular Ref. Date of Issue Module Ref. (July 2004 version) Circular Subject 5/77 08/03/77 LR-B.1.1, LR-3.3 Permitted Business Transactions with residents OG/16/90 10/01/90 LR-2.3, LR-3.3 Dealing with Residents OG/192/98 16/06/98 LR-4 Financial Trust Regulation No reference 04/81 LR-5 Precious Metals and Commodities LR-B LR-B Scope of Application
LR-B.1 LR-B.1 General Prohibitions
LR-B.1.1
The licensing requirements in Chapter LR-1 have general applicability, in that they prevent any person from providing (or seeking to provide)
regulated banking services within or from the Kingdom of Bahrain, unless they have been licensed as aconventional bank licensee by the BMA (see Rule LR-1.1.1).LR-B.1.2
In addition, no one may use the term 'bank' in their trading or corporate name, or otherwise hold themselves out to be a bank in Bahrain, unless they hold the appropriate license from BMA (see Rule LR-1.1.2).
LR-B.1.3
The Rules referred to above are supported by statutory restrictions contained in the BMA Law 1973 (cf. Articles 60 and 61).
LR-B.2 LR-B.2 Licensed Persons
LR-B.2.1
The remaining requirements in Chapters LR-1 to LR-3 (besides those mentioned in Section LR-B.1 above) apply to all those licensed by the BMA as a
conventional bank licensee , or which are in the process of seeking such a license. They apply regardless of whether the person concerned is incorporated in the Kingdom of Bahrain, or in an overseas jurisdiction, unless otherwise specified.LR-B.2.2
These remaining requirements prescribe the types of license offered; their associated operating conditions; the licensing conditions that have to be satisfied in order to secure and retain a license; and the processes to be followed when applying or varying a license, or when a license is withdrawn.
LR-1 LR-1 Requirement to Hold a License
LR-1.1 LR-1.1 Conventional Bank Licensees
General Prohibitions
LR-1.1.1
No person may:
(a) undertake (or hold themselves out to undertake)regulated banking services within or from the Kingdom of Bahrain unless duly licensed by the BMA; or(b) hold themselves out to be licensed by the BMA unless they have as a matter of fact been so licensed.LR-1.1.2
Only persons licensed to undertake
regulated banking services (orregulated Islamic banking services ), may use the term 'bank' in their corporate or trading names, or otherwise hold themselves out to be a bank.LR-1.1.3
Licensees are not obliged to include the word 'bank' in their corporate or trading names; however, they may be required to make clear their regulatory status in their letter heads, customer communications, website and so on.
LR-1.1.4
For the purposes of Rule LR-1.1.2, persons will be considered in breach of this requirement if they attempt to operate as, or incorporate a bank in Bahrain with a name containing the word "bank" (or the equivalents in any language), without holding the appropriate BMA license or obtaining the prior approval of the BMA.
Licensing
LR-1.1.5
Persons wishing to be licensed to undertake
regulated banking services within or from the Kingdom of Bahrain must apply in writing to the BMA.LR-1.1.6
An application for a license must be in the form prescribed by the BMA and must contain:
(a) a business plan specifying the type of business to be conducted;(b) application forms for allcontrollers ; and(c) application forms for allcontrolled functions .LR-1.1.7
The BMA will review the application and duly advise the applicant in writing when it has:
(a) granted the application without conditions;(b) granted the application subject to conditions specified by the BMA; or(c) refused the application, stating the grounds on which the application has been refused and the process for appealing against that decision.LR-1.1.8
Detailed rules and guidance regarding information requirements and processes for license applications can be found in Section LR-3.1. As specified in Paragraph LR-3.1.14, the BMA will provide a formal decision on a Phase 1 license application within 60 calendar days of all required documentation having been submitted in a form acceptable to the BMA.
LR-1.1.9
In granting new licenses, the BMA will specify the specific types of
regulated banking service for which a license has been granted, and on what basis (i.e.conventional retail bank licensee orconventional wholesale bank licensee ).LR-1.1.10
All applicants for
conventional bank licenses must satisfy the BMA that they meet, by the date of their license, the minimum conditions for licensing, as specified in Chapter LR-2. Once licensed,conventional bank licensees must maintain these criteria on an ongoing basis.LR-1.1.11
Conventional bank licensees must not carry on any commercial business in the Kingdom of Bahrain or elsewhere other than banking business and activities directly arising from or incidental to that business.LR-1.1.12
Rule LR-1.1.11 is intended to restrict bank licensees from undertaking any material non-financial business activities. The Rule does not prevent a bank undertaking commercial activities if these directly arise from their financial business: for instance, in the context of Islamic contracts, such as murabaha, ijara and musharaka, where the bank may hold the physical assets being financed or leased. Nor does it restrict a bank from undertaking commercial activities if, in the judgment of the BMA, they are incidental and do not detract from the financial nature of the bank's operations: for example, a bank may rent out spare office space in its own office building, and provide services associated with the rental (e.g. office security or cleaning).
LR-1.1.13
Rule LR-1.1.11 applies to the legal entity holding the bank license. A bank may thus own subsidiaries that undertake non-financial activities, although the BMA generally does not support the development of significant commercial activities within a banking group. Capital invested in such subsidiaries by a bank would be deducted from the bank's capital base under the BMA's capital rules (see Module CA). In addition, the BMA may impose restrictions — such as dealings between the bank and its commercial subsidiaries — if it was felt necessary to limit the bank's exposure to non-financial risks.
LR-1.2 LR-1.2 License Sub-Categories
Retail vs. Wholesale
LR-1.2.1
Depending on the nature of activities undertaken,
conventional bank licensees must be licensed either as aconventional retail bank licensee or as aconventional wholesale bank licensee . The same legal entity may not hold both types of license.LR-1.2.2
The nature of activities allowed under each license sub-category is specified below (cf. Rule LR-1.2.4ff). The
conventional retail bank licensee category replaces the Full Commercial Bank (conventional principles) category that existed prior to July 2006; theconventional wholesale bank licensee category replaces the Offshore Banking Unit and Investment Bank License (conventional principles) categories.LR-1.2.3
Banks licensed prior to the introduction of these new license categories in July 2006 are not required to reapply for their license. Rather, their new license category is to be confirmed by an exchange of letters with the BMA, and the issuance of a new license certificate. Where (prior to July 2006) the same legal entity holds multiple licenses, the BMA will agree transitional measures aimed at rationalizing the number of licenses held.
Conventional Retail Banks
LR-1.2.4
Conventional retail bank licensees are allowed to transact with both residents and non-residents of the Kingdom of Bahrain, and in both Bahraini Dinar and foreign currencies.LR-1.2.5
To qualify as a
conventional retail bank licensee , the person concerned must undertake (as a minimum), the activities of deposit-taking and providing credit (as defined in Rules LR-1.3.16 and LR-1.3.18). The activity of providing credit must be a significant part of the bank's business, relative to other activities.LR-1.2.6
When assessing the significance of credit-related activities, in the context of Rule LR-1.2.5, the BMA would normally expect to see loans and other credit-related activity (such as overdraft facilities, loan commitments, letters of credit, guarantees and other activities falling under the definition of providing credit), to constitute at least 20% of the total assets of the institution. Other activities and criteria may also be taken into account, if the BMA believes they are of a credit-related nature, and that such activities constitute a significant share of the bank's overall business.
LR-1.2.7
In the case of new applicants, the above assessment is made based on the financial projections and business plan provided as part of the license application. Where existing licensees fail to satisfy the condition contained in Rule LR-1.2.5, the BMA will initiate discussion with the licensee as to the appropriateness of their license category: this may result in the licensee being required to change its license category. A branch of an overseas bank may nonetheless be allowed to hold a bank license in Bahrain, even if it fails to undertake the activities specified in Rule LR-1.2.5, providing that it undertakes other regulated banking services in Bahrain and its head office is licensed as a bank in its home country.
LR-1.2.8
The purpose of Rule LR-1.2.5 is to ensure that, besides deposit-taking, the core banking activity of providing credit forms part of the definition of
conventional retail bank licensees , and accounts for a significant share of their business, in keeping with their intermediation function.Conventional Wholesale Banks
LR-1.2.9
Conventional wholesale bank licensees are allowed to transact with residents of the Kingdom of Bahrain (irrespective of currency), and in Bahraini Dinar (irrespective of the location of the counterparty), subject to the conditions and exemptions specified in Rules LR-1.2.13, LR-1.2.16 and LR-1.2.18. Foreign currency transactions with non-residents are not subject to these conditions.LR-1.2.10
The effect of Rule LR-1.2.9 is to limit the on-shore/Bahraini Dinar customer business of
conventional wholesale bank licensees to larger transactions. By definition, their on-shore client base is therefore wholesale in nature (i.e. other banks, large corporates and high net-worth individuals).LR-1.2.11
To qualify as a
conventional wholesale bank licensee , the person concerned must undertake (as a minimum), the activities of deposit-taking and providing credit (as defined in Rules LR-1.3.16 and LR-1.3.18).LR-1.2.12
The purpose of Rule LR-1.2.11 is to ensure that the core banking activities of deposit taking and providing credit form part of the definition of
conventional wholesale bank licensees . However, unlikeconventional retail bank licensees , there is no requirement that the activity of providing credit must be a significant part of the bank's business, relative to other activities. This is to allowconventional wholesale bank licensees greater flexibility as to the nature of their activities; it also recognises that, because of the wholesale nature of their client base, there is less need to limit the scale of non-credit related risks to which their depositors may be exposed. Rule LR-1.2.11 does not in any way preventconventional wholesale bank licensees from developing the provision of credit as a major activity, should they wish to. The Guidance provided in Paragraph LR-1.2.7 with regards to overseas banks is also applicable to Rule LR-1.2.11.LR-1.2.13
Conventional wholesale bank licensees may transact with residents of Bahrain and/or in Bahrain Dinar, with respect to the activities (a) to (e) listed in Rule LR-1.3.1, only where the individual transaction is BD 7 million or above (or its foreign currency equivalent).LR-1.2.14
To comply with Rule LR-1.2.13, the initial amount taken as a deposit must be BD 7 million or above (or its equivalent in foreign currency); however, subsequent additions and withdrawals from that deposit account may be for any amount. The initial amount taken as deposit may be split between different types of accounts (e.g. call, 3-month and 6-month accounts) — providing at least BD 7 million is taken from the customer on the same day and the bank's records can demonstrate this. Where subsequent withdrawals lead to a zero balance on an account (or the aggregate of accounts where more than one was originally opened), then a further BD 7 million must be deposited to re-start the 'wholesale' relationship, before additional deposits for smaller amounts may be made.
LR-1.2.15
Similarly, with respect to credit-related transactions, the initial facility amount advised must be for BD 7 million or above (or its equivalent); but drawdowns (and repayments) under the facility may be for any amount, as may any subsequent changes to the facility amount. If the facility is fully repaid, then a further BD 7 million transaction must be agreed in order to re-start the 'wholesale' relationship.
LR-1.2.16
Conventional wholesale bank licensees may transact with residents of Bahrain and/or in Bahrain Dinar, with respect to the activities (f) to (l) listed in Rule LR-1.3.1, only where the individual transaction is US$ 250,000 or above (or its foreign currency equivalent).LR-1.2.17
With respect to activities (f) and (g) (dealing in
financial instruments as principal / agent), the threshold refers to the individual transaction size. With respect to activities (h) and (i) (managing / safeguardingfinancial instruments ), the threshold refers to the initial investment amount. With respect to activity (j) (operating aCollective Investment Undertaking ), the threshold refers to the minimum investment required for participation in the scheme. With respect to activities (k) and (l) (arranging deals in / advising onfinancial instruments ), the threshold refers to the size of the deal arranged or of the investment on which advice is being given.LR-1.2.18
Note that the threshold with respect to activities (h) and (i) applies to the initial investment amount: where a subsequent distribution to a client or a reduction in the mark to market value of the investment reduces the initial investment amount below US$ 250,000 it is still considered a wholesale transaction. The threshold in Rule LR-1.2.16 applies to a client even if the same client satisfies the BD 7m threshold in Rule LR-1.2.13, with respect to deposit/credit activities. Finally, the initial amount taken as an investment may be split between two or more investment products — providing at least US$ 250,000 is taken from the customer on the same day and the bank's records can demonstrate this.
LR-1.2.19
Conventional wholesale bank licensees may only undertake activities (m) and (n) listed in Rule LR-1.3.1, on behalf of residents of Bahrain and/or in Bahrain Dinar, where the customer concerned meets either of the thresholds specified in LR-1.2.13 or LR-1.2.16 (in which case, activities (m) and (n) may be undertaken for any amount).LR-1.2.20
Notwithstanding Rules LR-1.2.13, LR-1.2.16 and LR-1.2.19,
conventional wholesale bank licensees are allowed to transact in Bahraini Dinar (or any other currency) for any amount with the Government of Bahrain, Bahrain public sector entities (as defined in the Guidelines for completion of the Prudential Information Reports), and BMA bank licensees.Conventional wholesale bank licensees may also transact in Bahraini Dinar for any amount, where required to fund their normal operating expenses; or when investing for their own account in securities listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange.LR-1.2.21
Any transactions entered into prior to 1 July 2006 which may be in breach of the conditions specified in Rules LR-1.2.13, LR-1.2.16 and LR-1.2.19 must be notified to the BMA. These transactions will be allowed to mature.
LR-1.2.22
Since the
conventional wholesale bank licensee regime represents an easing of the restrictions on on-shore business that previously applied to offshore bank licensees (i.e. OBUs and IBLs), there should be few transactions of the type specified in Rule LR-1.2.21 — they are likely to exist only where individual ad-hoc exemptions may have been previously granted by the BMA, and these exemptions went further than those now being applied across the Board to allconventional wholesale bank licensees .LR-1.2.23
Conventional wholesale bank licensees wishing to undertake transactions of the type specified in Rules LR-1.2.13, LR-1.2.16 and LR-1.2.19 must seek prior written BMA approval.LR-1.2.24
The approval requirement in Rule LR-1.2.23 only has to be made once, prior to the licensee starting to undertake such transactions. Its purpose is to allow the BMA to monitor the initiation of such business by
conventional wholesale bank licensees , and to check that adequate systems and controls have been in place, so that such transactions are likely to be well managed. In addition, it is to allow, where relevant, for the necessary arrangements to be made to ensure thatconventional wholesale bank licensees comply with the BMA's reserve requirements (which apply to deposit liabilities denominated in Bahraini Dinars — see LR-2.5.10).Shari'a compliant transactions
LR-1.2.27
Conventional bank licensees may not hold themselves out as an Islamic bank.Conventional bank licensees may only enter into activities (c) to (e) listed in Rule LR-1.3.1, when dealing with governments, public sector entities and other licensed financial institutions.Conventional bank licensees may not undertake these activities with individual or corporate clients (whether resident or non-resident).LR-1.2.28
As an exception to the restriction in Rule LR-1.2.27,
conventional bank licensees may invest for their own account in sukuks.LR-1.2.29
Conventional bank licensees may also freely deal infinancial instruments or operate aCollective Investment Undertaking that happens to be Shari'a compliant (because of the nature of thefinancial instruments concerned).LR-1.3 LR-1.3 Definition of Regulated Banking Services
LR-1.3.1
Regulated banking services are any of the following activities, carried on by way of business:(a) Deposit-taking(b) Providing Credit(c) Accepting Shari'a money placements/deposits(d) Managing Shari'a profit/loss sharing investment accounts(e) Offering Shari'a Financing Contracts(f) Dealing infinancial instruments as principal(g) Dealing infinancial instruments as agent(h) Managingfinancial instruments (i) Safeguardingfinancial instruments (j) Operating aCollective Investment Undertaking (k) Arranging deals infinancial instruments (l) Advising onfinancial instruments (m) Providing money exchange/remittance services(n) Issuing/administering means of payment.LR-1.3.2
Upon application, the BMA may exclude specific transactions from the definition of
regulated banking services .LR-1.3.3
The BMA will normally only consider granting such an exemption when a Bahrain resident is unable to obtain a specific product in Bahrain and it would be unreasonable to require the overseas provider of that product to be licensed for that specific transaction, and the provider has no intention of regularly soliciting such business in Bahrain.
LR-1.3.4
For the purposes of Rule LR-1.3.1, carrying on a
regulated banking service by way of business means:(a) undertaking the regulated banking service of (a), plus any of the activities (b) to (n), as defined in Section LR-1.3, for commercial gain;(b) holding oneself out as willing and able to engage in such activities; or(c) regularly soliciting other persons to engage in transactions constituting such activities.LR-1.3.5
Licensees should note that they may still undertake activities falling outside the definition of
regulated banking services , such as investing in physical commodities — subject to Rule LR-1.1.11. The fact that an activity is not included in the definition ofregulated banking services does not mean that it is prohibited. In transitioning to the new licensing framework, the BMA will be closely liaising with licensees to ensure that no disruption occurs to their legitimate business activities.LR-1.3.6
Licensees should note that the same legal entity cannot combine
regulated banking services with other regulated services, such asregulated insurance services . However, different legal entities within the same group may of course each hold a different license (e.g. banking and insurance).General exclusions
LR-1.3.7
A person does not carry on an activity constituting a
regulated banking service if the activity:(a) is carried on in the course of a business which does not ordinarily constitute the carrying on of financial services;(b) may reasonably be regarded as a necessary part of any other services provided in the course of that business; and(c) is not remunerated separately from the other services.LR-1.3.8
For example, the taking of a deposit in connection with the rental of a property would not be considered a regulated banking service, since it satisfies the criteria in Rule LR-1.3.7.
LR-1.3.9
A person does not carry on an activity constituting a
regulated banking service if the person is a body corporate and carries on that activity solely with or for other bodies corporate that are members of the same group.LR-1.3.10
A person does not carry on an activity constituting a
regulated banking service if such person carries on an activity with or for another person, and they are both members of the samefamily .LR-1.3.11
A person does not carry on an activity constituting a
regulated banking service if the sole or main purpose for which the person enters into the transaction is to limit any identifiable risks arising in the conduct of his business, providing the business conducted does not itself constitute a regulated activity.LR-1.3.12
For example, an industrial company entering into an interest rate swap to switch floating-rate borrowings for fixed rate borrowings, in order to manage interest rate risk, would not be considered to be dealing in financial instruments as principal, and would not therefore be required to be licensed as an investment firm.
LR-1.3.13
A person does not carry on an activity constituting a
regulated banking service if that person enters into that transaction solely as a nominee for another person, and acts under instruction from that other person.LR-1.3.14
A person does not carry on an activity constituting a
regulated banking service if that person is a government body charged with the management offinancial instruments on behalf of a government or public body.LR-1.3.15
A person does not carry on an activity constituting a
regulated banking service if that person is an exempt person, as specified by Royal decree.Deposit-taking
LR-1.3.16
Deposit-taking is defined as receiving a sum of money paid on terms under which it will be repaid in full, with or without interest or a premium, and either on demand or in circumstances agreed by the parties involved. It excludes sums referable to the giving of security or as a fee paid in advance for goods or services. It also excludes money received by a person in consideration for debt instruments issued by the same person, or money received by a person entering into a loan or other financing agreement.
LR-1.3.17
The above definition, therefore, includes savings, current, notice, fixed and time deposits.
Providing credit
LR-1.3.18
Providing credit is defined as the provision of credit to a person in his capacity as borrower or potential borrower. This includes consumer and mortgage credit; and providing credit by way of finance leases, factoring, forfeiting, and reverse repo transactions. It also includes the issuance or endorsement of letters of credit; the issuance of letters of guarantee and other contingent credit activities (such as the underwriting of loans); the purchase on the secondary market of loans and other contracts of credit (that do not otherwise fall under the definition of
financial instruments ); and the provision of ancillary credit-related activities, such as advising on or arranging loans. It excludes money advanced to a person in consideration for debt instruments issued by the same person.Accepting Shari'a money placements/deposits
LR-1.3.19
Accepting Shari'a money placements is defined as the acceptance of sums of money for safe-keeping) in a Shar'ia compliant framework, under which it will be repaid, either on demand or in circumstances agreed by the parties involved, and which is not referable to the giving of security.
Offering Shari'a Financing Contracts
LR-1.3.20
Offering Shari'a financing contracts is defined as entering into, or making arrangement for another person to enter into, a contract to provide finance in accordance with Shari'a principles, such as murabaha, bay muajjal, bay salam, ijara wa iktina and istisna'a contracts.
Managing Shari'a profit sharing investment accounts
LR-1.3.21
Managing a Shari'a profit sharing investment account is defined as managing an account, portfolio or fund, whereby a sum of money is placed with the service provider on terms that a return will be made according to an agreed Shari'a compliant profit-sharing arrangement, based either on a mudaraba or musharaka partnership.
Dealing in financial instruments as principal
LR-1.3.22
Dealing in
financial instruments as principal means buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting anyfinancial instrument on one's own account.LR-1.3.23
Rule LR-1.3.22 includes the underwriting of equity and other
financial instruments . The underwriting of loans comes under the activity of providing credit (see Rule LR-1.3.18). It also includes the temporary sale of a financial instrument through a repo transaction.LR-1.3.24
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.22 if the activity relates to the person issuing his own shares/debentures, warrants or bonds.
Dealing in financial instruments as agent
LR-1.3.25
Dealing in
financial instruments as agent means buying, selling, subscribing for or underwritingfinancial instruments on behalf of a client.LR-1.3.26
A licensee that carries on an activity of the kind specified by Rule LR-1.3.25 does not determine the terms of the transaction and does not use its own financial resources for the purpose of funding the transaction. Such a licensee may however receive or hold assets in connection with the transaction, in its capacity as agent of its client.
Managing Financial Instruments
LR-1.3.27
Managing
financial instruments means managing on a discretionary basisfinancial instruments on behalf of another person.LR-1.3.28
The activities included under the definition of Rule LR-1.3.27 include activities such as asset management.
Safeguarding Financial Instruments (i.e. Custodian)
LR-1.3.29
Safeguarding
financial instruments means the safeguarding offinancial instruments for the account of clients.LR-1.3.30
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.29 if the person receives documents relating to a
financial instrument for the purpose of onward transmission to, from, or at the direction of the person to whom thefinancial instrument belongs; or else is simply providing a physical safekeeping service such as a deed box.LR-1.3.31
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.29 if a third person, namely a qualifying custodian, accepts responsibility with regard to the
financial instrument .LR-1.3.32
A "qualifying custodian" means a person who is:
(a) a licensee who has permission to carry on an activity of the kind specified in Rule LR-1.3.29; or(b) an exempt person in relation to activities of that kind.LR-1.3.33
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.29 if they are managing a central depository, which is part of an exchange recognised by the BMA.
LR-1.3.34
The following are examples of activities, which when taken in isolation, are unlikely to be regarded as an activity of the kind specified under Rule LR-1.3.29:
(a) providing information as to the number of units or the value of any assets safeguarded; and(b) converting currency.LR-1.3.35
A person undertaking an activity of the kind specified under Rule LR-1.3.29 may also be engaged in the administration of the
financial instruments , including related services such as cash/collateral management.Operating a Collective Investment Undertaking
LR-1.3.36
Operating a
Collective Investment Undertaking means operating, establishing or winding up aCollective Investment Undertaking .LR-1.3.37
For the purposes of LR-1.3.36, a
Collective Investment Undertaking means any arrangements, authorised by or registered with the BMA, with respect to property of any description, including money, the purpose or effect of which is to enable persons taking part in the arrangements to participate in or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding or disposal of the property or sums paid out of such profits or income.LR-1.3.38
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.36 if the activity relates to the person establishing or winding up a
Collective Investment Undertaking , and that activity may be reasonably regarded as necessary in the course of providing legal services or providing accounting services.LR-1.3.39
Collective investment undertakings of the kind specified in Rule LR-1.3.36 may be open-ended (i.e. with shares continuously issued and redeemed to meet investor demand) or close-ended (where there is a single issue of shares and investors can only realise their investments on the winding-up of the fund).Arranging deals in financial instruments
LR-1.3.40
Arranging deals in
financial instruments means making arrangements with a view to another person, whether as principal or agent, buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting deals infinancial instruments .LR-1.3.41
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.40 if the arrangement does not bring about the transaction to which the arrangement relates.
LR-1.3.42
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.40 if a person's activities are limited solely to introducing clients to
licensees .LR-1.3.43
The exclusion in Rule LR-1.3.42 does not apply if the agent receives from any person, other than the client, any pecuniary reward or other advantage, which he does not account to the client, arising out of his entering into the transaction. Thus, if A receives a commission from B for arranging credit or deals in investment for C, the exclusion in Rule LR-1.3.42 does not apply.
LR-1.3.44
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.40 merely by providing the means of communication between two parties to a transaction.
LR-1.3.45
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.40 if they operate an exchange, duly recognised and authorised by the BMA.
LR-1.3.46
Negotiating terms for an investment on behalf of a client is an example of an activity which may be regarded as an activity of the kind specified in Rule LR-1.3.40.
LR-1.3.47
The following are examples of activities, which when taken in isolation, are unlikely to be regarded as an activity of the kind specified in Rule LR-1.3.40:
(a) appointing professional advisers;(b) preparing a prospectus/business plan;(c) identifying potential sources of funding;(d) assisting investors/subscribers/borrowers to complete and submit application forms; or(e) receiving application forms for processing/checking and/or onward transmission.Advising on deals in financial instruments
LR-1.3.48
Advising on
financial instruments means giving advice to an investor or potential investor (or a person in his capacity as an agent for an investor or potential investor) on the merits of buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting a particularfinancial instrument or exercising any right conferred by such afinancial instrument .LR-1.3.49
The following are examples of activities, which may be regarded as an activity as defined by Rule LR-1.3.48:
(a) a person may offer to tell a client when shares reach a certain value on the basis that when the price reaches that value it would be a good time to buy or sell them;(b) recommendation on the size or timing of transactions; and(c) advice on the suitability of thefinancial instrument , or on the characteristics or performance of thefinancial instrument concerned.LR-1.3.50
A person does not carry on an activity specified in Rule LR-1.3.48 by giving advice in any newspaper, journal, magazine, broadcast services or similar service in any medium if the principal purpose of the publication or service, taken as a whole, is neither:
(a) that of giving advice of the kind mentioned in Rule LR-1.3.48; nor(b) that of leading or enabling persons to buy, sell, subscribe for or underwrite afinancial instrument .LR-1.3.51
The following are examples of activities, which when taken in isolation, are unlikely to be regarded as an activity as defined by Rule LR-1.3.48:
(a) explaining the structure, or the terms and conditions of afinancial instrument ;(b) valuingfinancial instruments for which there is no ready market;(c) circulating company news or announcements;(d) comparing the benefits and risks of onefinancial instrument to another; and(e) advising on the likely meaning of uncertain provisions in an agreement relating to, or the terms of, afinancial instrument or on the effect of contractual terms and their commercial consequences or on terms that are commonly accepted in the market.Providing money exchange / remittance services
LR-1.3.52
Means providing exchange facilities between currencies, and the provision of wire transfer or other remittance services.
Issuing / administering means of payment
LR-1.3.53
Means the selling or issuing of payment instruments, or the selling or issuing of stored value (e.g. credit cards, travellers' cheques, electronic purses).
LR-2 LR-2 Licensing Conditions
LR-2.1 LR-2.1 Condition 1: Legal Status
LR-2.1.1
The legal status of a
conventional bank licensee must be:(i) a Bahraini joint stock company (BSC); or(ii) a branch resident in Bahrain of a conventional bank incorporated under the laws of its territory of incorporation and authorized as a bank in that territory.LR-2.1.2
Where the
conventional bank licensee is a branch of an overseas bank, in deciding whether to grant a license, the BMA will pay close regard to its activities elsewhere and how these activities are regulated. If theconventional bank licensee is not regulated elsewhere or in a jurisdiction not substantially compliant with Basel Core Principles or FATF standards, then an application for licensing can only be considered after exhaustive enquiries into the bank's shareholders, management structure and financial position.LR-2.2 LR-2.2 Condition 2: Mind and Management
LR-2.2.1
Conventional bank licensees with their Registered Office in the Kingdom of Bahrain must maintain their Head Office in the Kingdom.Overseas conventional bank licensees must maintain a local management presence and premises in the Kingdom appropriate to the nature and scale of their activities.LR-2.2.2
In assessing the location of a
conventional bank licensee's Head Office, the BMA will take into account the residency of its Directors and senior management. The BMA requires the majority of key decision makers in executive management — including theChief Executive Officer — to be resident in Bahrain. In the case ofoverseas conventional bank licensees , the BMA requires the branch or subsidiary of a foreign owned company to have a substantive presence, demonstrated by a level of staff and other resources sufficient to ensure adequate local scrutiny and control over business booked in the Bahrain branch or subsidiary.LR-2.3 LR-2.3 Condition 3: Controllers
LR-2.3.1
Conventional bank licensees must satisfy the BMA that theircontrollers are suitable and pose no undue risks to the licensee.Conventional bank licensees must also satisfy the BMA that their group structures do not prevent the effective supervision of theconventional bank licensee by the BMA and otherwise pose no undue risks to the licensee.LR-2.3.2
Chapter GR-5 contains the BMA's requirements and definitions regarding
controllers .LR-2.3.3
In summary,
controllers are persons who directly or indirectly are significant shareholders in aconventional bank licensee , or who are otherwise able to exert significant influence on theconventional bank licensee . The BMA seeks to ensure thatcontrollers pose no significant risks to the licensee. In general terms,controllers are assessed in terms of their financial standing, their judicial and regulatory record, and standards of business and (where relevant) personal probity.LR-2.3.4
As regards group structures, the BMA seeks to ensure that these do not prevent adequate consolidated supervision being applied to financial entities within the group, and that other group entities do not pose any material financial, reputational or other risks to the licensee.
LR-2.3.5
In all cases, when judging applications from existing groups, the BMA will have regard to the reputation and financial standing of the group as a whole. Where relevant, the BMA will also take into account the extent and quality of supervision applied to overseas members of the group and take into account any information provided by other supervisors in relation to any member of the group.
LR-2.4 LR-2.4 Condition 4: Board and Employees
LR-2.4.1
Those nominated to carry out
controlled functions must satisfy the BMA'sapproved persons requirements.LR-2.4.2
The definition of
controlled functions is contained in HC-2.1, whilst HC-2.2 sets out the BMA'sapproved persons requirements.LR-2.4.3
The
conventional bank licensee's staff, taken together, must collectively provide a sufficient range of skills and experience to manage the affairs of the licensee in a sound and prudent manner.Conventional bank licensees must ensure their employees meet any training and competency requirements specified by the BMA.LR-2.5 LR-2.5 Condition 5: Financial Resources
Capital Adequacy
LR-2.5.1
Conventional bank licensees must maintain a level of financial resources, as agreed with the BMA, adequate for the level of business proposed. The level of financial resources held must at all times meet the minimum risk-based requirements contained in Module CA (Capital Adequacy), as specified for the category of banking license held.LR-2.5.2
Conventional bank licensees must maintain a minimum level of paid-up capital of BD 20,000,000 (or its equivalent in foreign currency, where legally permitted and agreed with the BMA).LR-2.5.3
Persons seeking a license as a
conventional bank licensee must submit a 3-year business plan, with financial projections. Their proposed level of paid-up capital must be sufficient to cover expected regulatory capital requirements over that period, based on projected activities.LR-2.5.4
In practice, applicants seeking a
conventional bank license are likely to be required to hold significantly more capital than the minimum paid-up capital specified in Rule LR-2.5.2.LR-2.5.5
Overseas banking applicants are required to provide written confirmation from their head office that the head office will provide financial support to the branch sufficient to enable it to meet its obligations as and when they fall due. Overseas banking applicants must also demonstrate that the bank as a whole is adequately resourced for the amount of risks underwritten, and that it and its group meet capital adequacy standards applied by its
home supervisor .LR-2.5.6
For
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , deposit liabilities must not exceed 20 times their capital and reserves. Foroverseas conventional wholesale bank licensees , endowment capital may be required.LR-2.5.7
Factors taken into account in setting endowment capital for branches includes the financial strength of the parent company, the quality of its risk management, and the nature and scale of the Bahrain operations of the branch.
Liquidity
LR-2.5.8
Conventional bank licensees must maintain sufficient liquid assets to meet their obligations as they fall due in the normal course of their business.Conventional bank licensees must agree a liquidity management policy with the BMA.LR-2.5.9
The BMA would normally expect the mark-to-market value of assets that could be readily realized at short-notice to exceed 25% of deposit liabilities at all times. Liquidity arrangements may vary, however, particularly for overseas conventional banks, as agreed with the BMA and documented in the liquidity management policy.
Reserve Requirements
LR-2.5.10
Conventional bank licensees must maintain a minimum daily cash reserve balance with the BMA, equivalent to 5% of its total non-bank Bahraini Dinar deposits and Bahraini Dinar denominated Certificates of Deposit.LR-2.6 LR-2.6 Condition 6: Systems and Controls
LR-2.6.1
Conventional bank licensees must maintain systems and controls that are, in the opinion of the BMA, adequate for the scale and complexity of their activities. These systems and controls must meet the minimum requirements contained in Modules HC and OM.LR-2.6.2
Conventional bank licensees must maintain systems and controls that are, in the opinion of the BMA, adequate to address the risks of financial crime occurring in the licensee. These systems and controls must meet the minimum requirements contained in Module FC, as specified for the category of license held.LR-2.6.3
Applicants will be required to demonstrate in their business plan (together with any supporting documentation) what risks their business would be subject to and how they would manage those risks. Applicants may be asked to provide an independent assessment of the appropriateness of their systems and controls to the BMA, as part of the license approval process.
LR-2.7 LR-2.7 Condition 7: External Auditors
LR-2.7.1
Conventional bank licensees must appoint external auditors, subject to the BMA's prior approval. The minimum requirements regarding auditors contained in Module AU (Auditors and Accounting Standards) must be met.LR-2.7.2
Applicants must submit details of their proposed external auditors to the BMA as part of their license application.
LR-2.8 LR-2.8 Condition 8: Other Requirements
Books and Records
LR-2.8.1
Conventional bank licensees must maintain comprehensive books of accounts and other records, and satisfy the minimum record keeping requirements contained in Module GR. Books of accounts must comply with IAS. Audited accounts must be submitted to the BMA within 3 months of the licensee's financial year-end.Provision of Information
General Conduct
LR-2.8.3
Conventional bank licensees must conduct their activities in a professional and orderly manner, in keeping with good market practice.Conventional bank licensees must comply with the general standards of business conduct contained in Module PB, as well as the standards relating to treatment ofcustomers contained in Modules BC and CM.License fees
LR-2.8.4
Conventional bank licensees must comply with any license fee requirements applied by the BMA.LR-2.8.5
The BMA's license fees are set out in Chapter GR-8.
Additional conditions
LR-2.8.6
Conventional bank licensees must comply with any other specific requirements or restrictions imposed by the BMA on the scope of their license.LR-2.8.7
Bank licensees are subject to the provisions of the BMA Law 1973. These include the right of the BMA to impose such terms and conditions, as it may deem necessary when issuing a license. Thus, when granting a license, the BMA specifies the regulated banking services that the licensee may undertake. Licensees must respect the scope of their license. LR-3.2 sets out the process for varying the scope of an authorisation, should a licensee wish to undertake new activities.
LR-2.8.8
In addition, the BMA may impose additional restrictions or requirements, beyond those already specified in Volume 1, to address specific risks. For instance, a license may be granted subject to strict limitations on intra-group transactions.
LR-2.8.9
Conventional retail bank licensees are subject to the deposit protection scheme of eligible deposits held with the Bahrain offices of the licensee (see Chapter CP-2).LR-3 LR-3 Information Requirements and Processes
LR-3.1 LR-3.1 Licensing
LR-3.1.1
The application process for a
conventional bank license consists of two parts: Phase 1 and Phase 2. For Phase 1, applicants for a license must submit a duly completed Form 1 (Phase 1) (Application for a License), under cover of a letter signed by an authorized signatory of the applicant marked for the attention of the Director, Licensing and Policy Directorate. The application must be accompanied by the documents listed in Paragraph LR-3.1.5, unless otherwise directed by the BMA.LR-3.1.2
If, after submission of a duly completed Form 1 (Phase 1) and associated documents, an applicant is granted a conditional (in principle) approval for a license, the applicant must submit Form 1 (Phase 2), together with the documents referred to in Paragraph LR-3.1.10.
LR-3.1.3
When referring to the applicant, reference is made to the proposed licensee seeking a conventional bank license. The applicant may choose to have an authorized representative acting on its behalf. In instances where an authorized representative is used by the applicant, the application form should provide all details regarding the authorized representative and is to be signed by both the applicant and authorized representative.
LR-3.1.4
Conventional bank licensees who were licensed prior to the publication of the new LR Module of Volume 1 Rulebook do not need to resubmit an application for a license. Their license category, and the scope of their authorization, will be confirmed in an exchange of letters, and by re-issuing their license certificate.LR-3.1.5
Unless otherwise directed by the BMA, the following documents must be provided as Part of Phase 1 in support of a license application:
(a) a duly completed Form 2 (Application for Authorisation of Controller) for each controller of the proposed licensee;(b) a duly completed Form 3 (Application for Approved Person status), for each proposed Director of the proposed licensee;(c) a comprehensive business plan for the application, addressing the matters described in LR-3.1.6;(d) for overseas banks, a copy of the bank's current commercial registration or equivalent documentation;(e) where the applicant is a registered institution, a copy of the applicant's commercial registration;(f) where the applicant is a corporate body, a certified copy of a Board resolution of the applicant, confirming its decision to seek a BMA conventional bank license;(g) in the case of applicants that are part of a regulated group, a letter of non-objection to the proposed license application from the applicant'shome supervisor , together with confirmation that the group is in good regulatory standing and is in compliance with applicable supervisory requirements, including those relating to capital adequacy and solvency requirements;(h) in the case of overseas branch applicants, a letter of non-objection to the proposed license application from the applicant's home supervisor, together with confirmation that the applicant is in good regulatory standing and is in compliance with applicable supervisory requirements, including those relating to capital adequacy requirements;(i) in the case of branch applicants, copies of the audited financial statements of the applicant (head office) for the three years immediately prior to the date of application; and(j) in the case of other applicants, copies of the audited financial statements of the applicant's major shareholder and/or group (as directed by the BMA), for the three years immediately prior to the date of application.LR-3.1.6
The business plan submitted in support of an application should explain:
(a) an outline of the history of the applicant and its shareholders;(b) the reasons for applying for a license, including the applicant's strategy and market objectives;(c) the proposed type of activities to be carried on by the applicant in/from the Kingdom of Bahrain;(d) the proposed Board and senior management of the applicant and the proposed organisational structure of the applicant;(e) an assessment of the risks that may be faced by the applicant, together with the proposed systems and controls framework to be put in place for addressing those risks and to be used for the main business functions; and(f) an opening balance sheet for the applicant, together with a three-year financial projection, with all assumptions clearly outlined, demonstrating that the applicant will be able to meet applicable capital adequacy and liquidity requirements.LR-3.1.7
The applicant's memorandum and articles of association must explicitly provide for it to undertake the activities proposed in the licensed application, and must preclude the applicant from undertaking other commercial activities, unless these arise out of its banking activities or are incidental to those.
LR-3.1.8
In the case of a new bank's capital being financed by a private placement, the Private Placement Memorandum must also be submitted to the BMA for its approval as part of the Phase 1 documentation.
LR-3.1.9
The purpose of Rule LR-3.1.8 is to allow the BMA to verify that the contents of the Private Placement Memorandum are consistent with other information supplied to the BMA, notably in the business plan, and otherwise meets any applicable regulatory requirements with respect to PPM documents. The BMA's review of the PPM does not in any way constitute an approval or endorsement as to any claims it may contain as to the future value of the proposed bank.
LR-3.1.10
As part of Phase 2 of the licensing application process, unless otherwise directed by the BMA, the following documents and information must be provided:
(a) a duly completed Form 3 (Application for Approved Person status), for each individual, (other than for Directors, submitted as part of Phase 1) applying to undertake controlled functions in the applicant;(b) a draft copy of the applicant's memorandum and articles of association, addressing the matters described in LR-3.1.7;(c) a letter of guarantee from the applicant's major shareholder, confirming its willingness to support the proposed licensee in case of need; and(d) in the case of overseas branch applicants, a letter of guarantee from the applicant's head office, confirming responsibility for all of the liabilities of the proposed branch, together with evidence of the power to give such a guarantee.LR-3.1.11
All documentation provided to the BMA as part of an application for a license must be in either the Arabic or English language. Any documentation in a language other than English or Arabic must be accompanied by a certified English or Arabic translation thereof.
LR-3.1.12
Any material changes or proposed changes to the information provided to the BMA in support of an authorisation application that occurs prior to authorisation must be reported to the BMA.
LR-3.1.13
Failure to inform the BMA of the changes specified in LR-3.1.12 is likely to be viewed as a failure to provide full and open disclosure of information, and thus a failure to meet licensing condition LR-2.8.2.
LR-3.1.14
As part of the Phase 1 review of application process, the BMA will provide a formal decision on a license application within 60 calendar days of all required documentation having been submitted in a form acceptable to the BMA. Once an "in principle" approval has been granted for Phase 1, the applicant must submit within 6 months of the "in principle" approval, all requirements for Phase 2 as outlined in Paragraph LR-3.1.10. The BMA will provide a final decision within 30 calendar days of all Phase 2 documentation having been submitted in a form acceptable to the BMA. Applicants are encouraged to approach the BMA to discuss their application at an early stage, so that any specific questions can be dealt with prior to the finalisation of the application.
LR-3.1.15
Within 6 months of the license being issued, the new licensee must provide to the BMA:
(a) a detailed action plan for establishing the operations and supporting infrastructure of the bank, such as the completion of written policies and procedures, and recruitment of remaining employees (having regard to the time limit set by Article 66 of the BMA Law 1973);(b) the registered office address and details of premises to be used to carry out the business of the proposed licensee;(c) the address in the Kingdom of Bahrain where full business records will be kept;(d) the licensee's contact details including telephone and fax number, e-mail address and website;(e) a description of the business continuity plan;(f) a description of the IT system that will be used, including details of how IT systems and other records will be backed up;(g) a copy of the auditor's acceptance to act as auditor for the applicant;(h) a copy of the Ministry of Industry & Commerce commercial registration certificate; and(i) other information as may be specified by the BMA.LR-3.1.16
Applicants issued new licenses by the BMA must start operations within 6 months of the license being issued, as per Article 66 of the BMA Law 1973.
LR-3.1.17
Applicants who are refused a license have a right of appeal under the provisions contained in Article 68 of the BMA Law 1973.
LR-3.2 LR-3.2 Variations to a License
LR-3.2.1
Conventional bank licensees must seek prior BMA approval before undertaking newregulated banking services .LR-3.2.2
Failure to secure BMA approval prior to undertaking a new regulated activity may lead to enforcement action being taken against the licensee concerned.
LR-3.2.3
In addition to any other information requested by the BMA, and unless otherwise directed by the BMA, a
conventional bank licensee requesting BMA approval to undertake a newregulated banking service must provide the following information:(a) a summary of the rationale for undertaking the proposed new activities;(b) a description of how the new business will be managed and controlled;(c) an analysis of the financial impact of the new activities; and(d) a summary of the due diligence undertaken by the Board and management of theconventional bank licensee on the proposed new activities.LR-3.3 LR-3.3 Withdrawal of a License
Voluntary Surrender
LR-3.3.1
All requests for the voluntary surrender of a license are subject to BMA approval. Such requests must be made in writing to the Executive Director of Banking Supervision, setting out in full the reasons for the request and how the voluntary surrender is to be carried out.
LR-3.3.2
Conventional bank licensees must satisfy the BMA that theircustomers' interests are to be safeguarded during and after the proposed voluntary surrender.LR-3.3.3
The BMA will only approve a voluntary surrender where it has no outstanding regulatory concerns and any relevant
customers' interests would not be prejudiced. A voluntary surrender will not be accepted where it is aimed at pre-empting supervisory actions by the BMA. Also, a voluntary surrender will only take effect once the licensee, in the opinion of the BMA, has discharged all its regulatory responsibilities tocustomers .Cancellation
LR-3.3.4
Cancellation of a license requires the BMA to issue a formal notice of cancellation to the person concerned. The notice of cancellation must describe the BMA's rationale for the proposed cancellation.
LR-3.3.5
Failure to meet the relevant conditions contained in Chapter LR-2 can lead to cancellation of a license. The BMA generally views cancellation of a license as appropriate only in the most serious of circumstances, and generally tries to address supervisory concerns through other means beforehand. Further guidance is contained in Module EN (Enforcement), regarding the BMA's approach to enforcement and on the process for issuing a notice of cancellation and the recipient's right to appeal the notice.
LR-3.3.6
Normally, where cancellation of a license has been confirmed by the BMA, the BMA will only effect the cancellation once a licensee has discharged all its regulatory responsibilities to
customers . Until such time, the BMA will retain all its regulatory powers with regards to the licensee, and will direct the licensee such that no new regulated banking activity may be undertaken whilst the licensee discharges its obligations tocustomers .PB PB Principles of Business
PB-A PB-A Introduction
PB-A.1 PB-A.1 Purpose
PB-A.1.1
The principles are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of all banks.
PB-A.1.2
This module requires banks to establish adequate systems and procedures to ensure:
(a) compliance to the guidance set forth in this module, and(b) that the personnel responsible for maintaining such systems and controls are adequately qualified and competent in discharging their duties.PB-A.1.3
This module provides support to all regulations provided in this Rulebook.
PB-A.2 PB-A.2 Module history
PB-A.2.1
This module was first issued in July 2004 as part of the conventional principles volume. All regulations in this volume have been effective since this date. All subsequent changes are dated with the month and year at the base of the relevant page and in the Table of Contents. Chapter UG-3 of Module UG provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and control.
PB-A.2.2
The most recent changes made to this module are detailed in the table below:
Summary of changes
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes PB-B PB-B Non-compliance with the principles
PB-B.1 PB-B.1 Non-compliance
PB-B.1.1
A breach of the principles outlined in this module may call into question whether the Board and management of a licensee with a BMA license are still fit and proper, and whether the licensee may continue to be licensed.
PB-B.1.2
Breaching a principle makes a licensee liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the principle in question. The BMA will determine, after collating all the relevant information required (through its regulatory reporting authority), whether a licensee is in breach of these principles.
PB-1 PB-1 Principles
PB-1.1 PB-1.1 Integrity
PB-1.1.1
All relevant persons should be straightforward and honest in their services and conduct. Integrity is not just limited to honesty but also includes fair dealing and full disclosure of all relevant information.
PB-1.2 PB-1.2 Objectivity
PB-1.2.1
All relevant persons should be fair and should not allow prejudice, bias,
conflict of interest or influence to override their objectivity.PB-1.3 PB-1.3 Competence, skill care and due diligence
PB-1.3.1
All relevant persons should perform services with competence, due care and diligence and have a continuing duty to maintain professional knowledge and skill at a level required to ensure that a client or employer receives the advantage of competent professional services based on up-to-date developments in practice, legislation and techniques.
PB-1.4 PB-1.4 Confidentiality
PB-1.4.1
All relevant persons should treat client information with the strictest of confidentiality unless disclosure is warranted under specific authority or there is a legal or professional duty to disclose.
PB-1.5 PB-1.5 Management and control
PB-1.5.1
The Board and management must take reasonable care to organise and control the affairs of the licensee responsibly and effectively with adequate risk management systems.
PB-1.6 PB-1.6 Market conduct
PB-1.6.1
All relevant persons should observe proper standards of market conduct.
PB-1.7 PB-1.7 Communications with client
PB-1.7.1
All relevant persons must pay due regard to the information needs of their clients and communicate information to them in a manner which is clear, fair and not misleading.
PB-1.8 PB-1.8 Relationship of trust
PB-1.8.1
All relevant persons must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of their advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon their judgment.
HC HC High-Level Controls
HC-A HC-A Introduction
HC-A.1 HC-A.1 Purpose
HC-A.1.1
This Module presents requirements that have to be met by
conventional bank licensees with respect to:a) the role and composition of their Boards and Board Committees; andb) related high-level controls and policies.HC-A.1.2
In addition, this Module contains requirements for the notification and pre-approval of individuals, undertaking certain designated functions with respect to
conventional bank licensees . These functions (called "controlled functions "), include Directors and members of senior management. Thecontrolled functions regime supplements the BMA's corporate governance requirements by ensuring that key persons involved in the running ofconventional bank licensees are fit and proper. Those approved by the BMA to undertakecontrolled functions are calledapproved persons .HC-A.1.3
Finally, this Module contains certain notification and approval requirements regarding the use of Special Purpose Vehicles ("SPVs"; see Section HC-1.5).
HC-A.1.4
This Module supplements various provisions relating to corporate governance contained in Legislative Decree No. 21 of 2001, with respect to promulgating the Commercial Companies Law ("Commercial Companies Law 2001"). In case of conflict, the Commercial Companies Law shall prevail. The Module also supplements (for companies listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange), Stock Exchange regulations that are relevant to corporate governance and high-level controls. Compliance with this Module does not guarantee compliance with either the Commercial Companies Law 2001 or the BSE regulations.
HC-A.2 HC-A.2 Key requirements
Corporate governance
HC-A.2.1
The Chairman of the Board should preferably be non-executive and independent. The role of Chairman and Chief Executive may not be exercised by the same person. (See Rule HC-1.3.9.)
HC-A.2.2
The Board must approve a code of conduct for itself, senior management and employees, and define the responsibilities of itself and senior management. This should include procedures for dealing with
conflicts of interest , and a prohibition oninsider trading . (See Paragraphs HC-1.2.9 to HC-1.2.13.)HC-A.2.3
The Board should meet at least four times per year. (see Paragraph HC-1.3.3).
HC-A.2.4
Boards must have an adequate number of members that are "independent" and "non-executive" to serve the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders. (See Paragraphs HC-1.3.5 and HC-1.3.6.)
HC-A.2.5
The Board should consider the setting up of committees to assist it in fulfilling its responsibilities. The setting up of an Audit Committee is mandatory. (See Paragraphs HC-1.3.10 to HC-1.3.13.)
HC-A.2.6
Conventional bank licensees are required to notify the BMA, in writing, of all major changes (regardless of type and/or effect) proposed to the strategy and/or corporate plan of the bank prior to implementation, as well as of any Special Purpose Vehicle they intend to establish as a subsidiary, or with respect to which they intend to act as sponsor or manager (see Section HC-1.5).Approved Persons
HC-A.2.7
Conventional bank licensees are required to secure prior BMA approval for those persons wishing to undertake acontrolled function . Such persons are assessed against BMA's "fit and proper" requirements. Conventional bank licensees must also notify the BMA of any changes in theirapproved persons . (See Chapter HC-2)Compliance officer/manager
HC-A.2.8
Conventional bank licensees must appoint a senior member of staff with responsibility for compliance. The Compliance Officer is acontrolled function . (See Chapter HC-3.)HC-A.3 HC-A.3 Module history
Evolution of the Module
HC-A.3.1
This Module was first issued in July 2004, as part of the initial release of Volume 1 of the BMA Rulebook. It was dated July 2004. All subsequent changes to this Module are shown with the month and year in which the change was made, at the base of the relevant page and in the Table of Contents. Chapter UG-3 provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control.
HC-A.3.2
A list of recent changes made to this Module is shown below:
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes HC-1.5 01/04/05 Transparency requirements formalised HC-1.6 01/04/05 Notification requirements formalised HC-1.1, HC-1.2 & HC-1.4 01/10/05 High level controls HC-1.5 01/10/05 New SPV requirements HC-3.1 – HC-3.2 01/10/05 Revised compliance function requirements HC-1.5.3, HC-1.5.5 & HC-4.1 01/01/06 Revised notification requirements for SPVs and dealing staff HC-2, HC-3 and HC-4 01/07/06 Requirements relating to controllers moved to Module GR; Remaining requirements relating to "fit and proper" re-drafted to ensure consistent terminology and procedures with other Rulebook Volumes (without changing the substance of the previous 'fit and proper' requirements); Requirements relating to dealers incorporated into the 'fit and proper' requirements. Superseded Requirements
HC-A.3.3
Prior to the development of this Rulebook, the BMA issued various circulars covering different aspects of corporate governance. These circulars were consolidated into the first version of this Module as shown below:
Circular Ref. Date of Issue Module Ref. (July 2004 version) Circular Subject BC/23/99 8 Nov 1999 HC-1 'Enhancing Corporate Governance in Banking Organisations' BC/904/95 24 Jul 1995 HC-1.6 Notification to, and approval from the Agency for certain matters ODG/329/03 10 Sep 2003 HC-1.6 Corporate Governance Reporting BC/11/98 27 Jul 1998 HC-2 Terms and Definitions Applying to the Management of Banks and Financial Institutions BC/8/00 24 May 2000 HC-2 Controllers of, and holdings and transfers of significant ownership or controlling interests in, Agency licensees BC/13/99 15 Jun 1999 HC-3 Compliance, Risk Management and Internal Controls BMA/1287/94 6 Nov 1994 HC-4 Foreign Exchange, Securities and Other Dealers HC-B HC-B General guidance and best practice
HC-B.1 HC-B.1 Guidance provided by other international bodies
Basel Committee: Enhancing Corporate Governance in Banking Organisations and High Level Controls for Banks
HC-B.1.1
These papers (see www.bis.org/publ/bcbs56.pdf) issued in September 1998 and September 1999 provide guidance on corporate governance and high-level controls in banks. These papers form part of an ongoing effort by the Committee to strengthen procedures for risk management and disclosure in banks.
HC-B.1.2
The papers draw on supervisory experience with corporate governance problems at banking organisations and suggest the types of practices that could help to avoid such problems. They identify a number of practices as critical elements of any financial institution's corporate governance process.
HC-B.1.3
The BMA draws banks' attention to the Basel papers as benchmarks of best practice for corporate governance standards and high-level controls to be followed by banks operating in the Kingdom of Bahrain.
HC-B.2 HC-B.2 Enforceability
HC-B.2.1
The requirements of Chapter HC-1, Sections HC-1.1–HC-1.4 are binding requirements, which banks and their Boards should follow on an "apply or explain" basis. If a Board or a bank elects not to follow these requirements, they must explain why to the Agency and document the reasons for not applying the concerned requirements in the Minutes of the Board. The remaining chapters are binding requirements except where shown as guidance.
HC-B.2.2
This Module and Chapter HC-1 in particular supplements various provisions relating to Corporate Governance contained in Legislative Decree No. 21 of 2001 with respect to promulgating the Commercial Companies Law. In any cases of potential conflict, the Commercial Companies Law shall prevail. Compliance with this Module does not guarantee compliance with the Commercial Companies Law.
HC-1 HC-1 Corporate Governance
HC-1.1 HC-1.1 Scope
HC-1.1.1
The contents of this Chapter are applicable to locally incorporated banks. Bahrain branches of foreign banks must satisfy the Agency that equivalent arrangements are in place at the parent level and that these arrangements provide for effective high level controls over activities conducted under the Bahrain licence.
HC-1.1.2
This Chapter covers the high level controls aspects of corporate governance of banks, and therefore focuses on the functions of the constituent parts of high level controls, starting with the respective roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management.
HC-1.1.3
This Chapter therefore does not cover matters of corporate governance relating to the Commercial Companies Law (e.g. General Meetings, the role of shareholders and other administrative matters) or Listing Requirements.
HC-1.1.4
The BMA has historically pursued a "best practice" guidance approach to high level controls and corporate governance, rather than a prescriptive rules-based approach. The Agency has chosen to notify licensees of international best practice standards, and allowed banks to interpret these, according to the scope of operations of the concerned bank. This Chapter blends a best practice-based approach with minimum requirements.
HC-1.1.5
Banks must satisfy the BMA that financial services activities conducted in subsidiaries and other group members including foreign branches are subject to the same or equivalent arrangements for ensuring effective high-level controls over their activities. In instances where local jurisdictional requirements are more stringent than those applicable in this Module, the local requirements are to be applied.
HC-1.1.6
Where a bank is unable to satisfy the BMA that its subsidiaries and other group members or foreign branches are subject to the same or equivalent arrangements, the BMA will assess the potential impact of risks — both financial and reputational — to the bank arising from inadequate high-level controls in the rest of the group of which it is a member. In such instances, the BMA may impose restrictions on dealings between the bank and other group members. Where weaknesses in controls are assessed by the BMA to pose a major threat to the stability of the bank, then its authorisation may be called into question.
HC-1.2 HC-1.2 The Board of Directors — Its Functions and Responsibilities
Strategy
HC-1.2.1
In most banks, shareholders, creditors, employees, depositors and investment account holders ("stakeholders") are unable to closely monitor management, its strategies and the bank's performance due to a lack of information and resources. A key responsibility of the Board is to fill the gap between uninformed stakeholders to whom it owes a duty of care, and the more fully informed executive management by monitoring management closely on behalf of stakeholders.
HC-1.2.2
The Board is ultimately accountable and responsible for the affairs and performance of the bank. The Board must establish the objectives of the bank and develop the strategies that direct the ongoing activities of the bank to achieve these objectives. The strategies should be communicated throughout the bank, and be disclosed publicly (e.g. via the website or in the annual report in an abbreviated form as applicable). In its strategy document, the Board must demonstrate that it is able to proactively identify and understand the significant risks that the bank faces in achieving its business objectives through its business strategies and plans.
HC-1.2.3
The precise functions reserved for the Board, and those delegated to management and committees will vary, dependent upon the business of the institution, its size and ownership structure. However, at a minimum, the Board must establish and maintain a statement of its responsibilities for:
a) The adoption and annual review of strategy;b) The adoption and review of management structure and responsibilities;c) The adoption and review of the systems and controls framework; andd) Monitoring the implementation of strategy by management.HC-1.2.4
In its strategy review process, the Board should:
a) Review the bank's business plans and the inherent level of risk in these plans;b) Assess the adequacy of capital to support the business risks of the bank;c) Set performance objectives;d) Review the performance of executive management; ande) Oversee major capital expenditures, divestitures and acquisitions.HC-1.2.5
The BMA expects the Board to have effective policies and processes in place for:
a) Ensuring a formal and transparent Board nomination process;b) Appointing senior managers, and ensuring that they have the necessary integrity, technical and managerial competence, and experience;c) Overseeing succession planning and replacing key executives when necessary, and ensuring appropriate resources are available, and minimising reliance on key individuals;d) Reviewing the remuneration and incentive packages of the executive management and members of the Board of Directors and ensuring that such packages are consistent with the corporate values and strategy of the bank;e) Effectively monitoring and making formal (annual) evaluations of senior management's performance in implementing agreed strategy and business plans;f) Approving budgets and reviewing performance against those budgets and key performance indicators; andg) The management of the bank's compliance risk.Risk Recognition and Assessment
HC-1.2.6
The Board is responsible for ensuring that the systems and controls framework, including the Board structure and organisational structure of the bank is appropriate for the bank's business and associated risks (see HC-1.2.3 c)). The Board must ensure that collectively it has sufficient expertise to identify, understand and measure the significant risks to which the bank is exposed in its business activities.
In assessing the systems and controls framework, the BMA expects the Board to demonstrate that the bank's operations, individually and collectively:
a) Are measured, monitored and controlled by appropriate, effective and prudent risk management systems commensurate with the scope of the bank's activities. The Board should ensure that senior management have put in place appropriate systems of control for the business of the bank and the information needs of the Board; in particular, there should be appropriate systems and functions for identifying as well as for monitoring risk, the financial position of the bank, and compliance with applicable laws, regulations and best practice standards. The systems should produce information on a timely basis; andb) Are supported by an appropriate control environment. The compliance, risk management and financial reporting functions must be adequately resourced, independent of business lines and must be run by individuals not involved with the day-to-day running of the various business areas. The Board must additionally ensure that management develops, implements and oversees the effectiveness of comprehensive know your customer standards, as well as ongoing monitoring of accounts and transactions, in keeping with the requirements of relevant law, regulations and best practice (with particular regard to anti-money laundering measures). The control environment should maintain necessary client confidentiality and ensure that the privacy of the bank is not violated, and ensure that client's rights and assets are properly safeguarded.HC-1.2.7
In its review of the systems and controls framework, the Board should:
a) Effectively make use of the work of internal and external auditors. The Board should ensure the integrity of the bank's accounting and financial reporting systems through regular independent review (by internal and external audit). Audit findings should be used as an independent check on the information received from management about the bank's operations and performance and the effectiveness of internal controls; andb) Identify any significant issues related to the bank's adopted governance framework, processes and practices and ensure that appropriate and timely action is taken to address identified adverse deviations from the requirements of this Module.The determinations under HC-1.2.6 and this paragraph might be made through the use of self-assessments, stress/scenario tests, and/or independent judgments made by external advisors. The Board may appoint supporting committees, and engage senior management to assist it in the oversight of risk management, but the Board may not delegate its ultimate responsibility to ensure that an adequate, effective, comprehensive and transparent corporate governance process is in place.
Corporate Ethics, Conflicts of Interest and Code of Conduct
HC-1.2.8
Banks are subject to a wide variety of laws, regulations and codes of best practice that directly affect the conduct of business. Such laws involve the Bahraini Stock Exchange Law, the Labour Law, the Commercial Companies Law, occupational health and safety, even environment and pollution laws, as well as codes of conduct and regulations of the Agency. The Board sets the "tone at the top" of a bank, and has a responsibility to oversee compliance with these various requirements. The Board should ensure that the staff conduct their affairs with a high degree of integrity, taking note of applicable laws, codes and regulations.
HC-1.2.9
The Board should establish corporate standards for itself, senior management, and employees. This requirement should be met by way of a documented and published code of conduct or similar document. These values should be communicated throughout the bank, so that the Board and senior management and staff understand the importance of conducting business based on good corporate governance values and understand their accountabilities to the various stakeholders of the licensee. Banks' Boards, senior management and staff must be informed of and be required to fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities to the bank's stakeholders.
HC-1.2.10
An internal code of conduct is separate from the business strategy of a bank. A code of conduct should outline the practices that Directors, senior management and staff should follow in performing their duties. Banks may wish to use procedures and policies to complement their codes of conduct. The suggested contents of a code of conduct are covered below:
a) Commitment by the Board and management to the code. The code of conduct should be linked to the objectives of the bank, and its responsibilities and undertakings to customers, shareholders, staff and the wider community (see HC-1.2.8 and HC-1.2.9). The code should give examples or expectations of honesty, integrity, leadership and professionalism;b) Commitment to the law and best practice standards. This commitment would include commitments to following accounting standards, industry best practice (such as ensuring that information to clients is clear, fair, and not misleading), transparency, and rules concerning potential conflicts of interest (see HC-1.2.11);c) Employment practices. This would include rules concerning health and safety of employees, training, policies on the acceptance and giving of business courtesies, prohibition on the offering and acceptance of bribes, and potential misuse of company assets;d) How the company deals with disputes and complaints from clients and monitors compliance with the code; ande) Confidentiality. Disclosure of client or bank information should be prohibited, except where disclosure is required by law (see HC-1.2.6 b).HC-1.2.11
The Board must establish and disseminate to its members and management, policies and procedures for the identification, reporting, disclosure, prevention, or strict limitation of potential conflicts of interest. It is senior management's responsibility to implement these policies. Rules concerning connected party transactions and potential conflicts of interest may be dealt with in the Code of Conduct (see HC-1.2.9). In particular, the Agency requires that any decisions to enter into transactions, under which Board members or any member of management would have conflicts of interest that are material, should be formally and unanimously approved by the full Board. Best practice would dictate that a Board member or member of senior management should:
a) Not enter into competition with the bank;b) Not demand or accept substantial gifts from the bank for himself or his associates;c) Not misuse the banks' assets;d) Not use company privileged information or take advantage of business opportunities to which the company is entitled for himself or his associates;e) Report to the Board any (potential) conflict of interest in their activities with, and commitments to other organisations. In any case, all Board members and members of senior management must declare in writing all of their other interests in other enterprises or activities (whether as a shareholder of more than 5% of the voting capital of a company, a manager, or other form of significant participation) to the Board (or the Nominations or Audit Committees) on an annual basis; andf) Absent themselves from any discussions or decision-making that involves a subject where they are incapable of providing objective advice, or which involves a subject or (proposed) transaction where a conflict of interest exists.HC-1.2.12
The Agency expects that the Board and its members individually and collectively:
a) Act with honesty, integrity and in good faith, with due diligence and care, with a view to the best interest of the bank and its shareholders and other stakeholders (see paragraphs HC-1.2.8 to HC-1.2.11);b) Act within the scope of their responsibilities (which should be clearly defined — see HC-1.3.7 and HC-1.3.8 below) and not participate in the day-to-day management of the bank;c) Have a proper understanding of, and competence to deal with the affairs and products of the bank and devote sufficient time to their responsibilities;d) To independently assess and question the policies, processes and procedures of the bank, with the intent to identify and initiate management action on issues requiring improvement. (i.e. to act as checks and balances on management).HC-1.2.13
All Directors whether non-executive or executive should exercise independence in their decision-making. To facilitate independence, the Board should agree procedures whereby the Board or its individual members (or committees) may take independent professional advice at the bank's expense.
HC-1.3 HC-1.3 Board Composition and The Role of Committee
Board Composition & Frequency of Meetings
HC-1.3.1
To fulfil its responsibility for the review of the systems and controls framework (HC-1.2.3 c), the Board must periodically assess its composition and size and, where appropriate, reconstitute itself and its committees by selecting new Directors to replace long-standing members or those members whose contribution to the bank or its committees (such as the audit committee) is not adequate.
HC-1.3.2
No Board member may have more than one directorship of a Full Commercial Bank and an Offshore Banking Unit or Investment Bank. This would mean an effective cap of a maximum of two directorships of financial institutions inside Bahrain. Two directorships of licensees within the same category (e.g. "OBU") would not be permitted. Banks may approach the Agency for exemption from this limit where the directorships concern banks or financial institutions within the same group.
HC-1.3.3
The Board must meet sufficiently often to enable it to discharge its responsibilities effectively, taking into account the bank's scale and complexity. The full Board should meet preferably no less than four times per year. The Agency recommends that meetings should take place once every quarter to address the Board's responsibilities for management oversight and performance monitoring.
HC-1.3.4
Board rules should require members to step down if they are not actively participating in Board meetings.
Independent and Non-Executive Directors
HC-1.3.5
Where there is the potential for conflict of interest, or there is a need for impartiality, the Board must assign a sufficient number of independent non-executive Board members capable of exercising independent judgment. The Board should outline its criteria and materiality thresholds in the annual report for the definition of "independence". The Directors should be identified in the annual report as executive, non-executive, and independent non-executive, as follows:
a) Executive Director (or "Managing Director" under the Commercial Companies Law "CCL") — A person who is involved in the day-to-day management and/or is in full-time employment of the bank and/or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries or parent companies. An executive Director may not occupy the post of "Chairman";b) Non-Executive Director — A person not involved in the day-to-day management and/or is not a full-time salaried employee of the bank and/or any of its affiliates, or subsidiaries or parent companies; andc) Independent Non-Executive Director — A non-executive Director (as defined above), who also:• Is not a "controller" of the bank (see Section HC-2.1).• Is not an Associate (see paragraph HC-2.1.4 (g)) of a Director or a member of senior management of the bank.• Is not a professional advisor to the bank or group (A partner or member of senior management of an accountancy or law firm that provides services to the bank would not be perceived by the Agency as an independent non-executive Director).• Is not a large depositor with, or large borrower from the bank (i.e. whose deposits or credit facilities exceed 10% of the capital base of the bank).• Has no significant contractual or business relationship with the bank or group which could be seen to materially interfere with the person's capacity to act in an independent manner.HC-1.3.6
Independent non-executive Directors should be permitted to meet periodically (for example at separate meetings from the main Board) without executive management present.
Checks and Balances
HC-1.3.7
To ensure a clear segregation of duties, the Board should clearly define, document and enforce its own responsibilities, including those of its Chairman, as well as the delegated authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities of the Board and management committees, the bank's Chief Executive and senior management to the stakeholders of the bank.
HC-1.3.8
In particular, the Board should issue formal letters of appointment both to senior management and Board members, outlining their specific responsibilities and accountabilities. Wherever possible, these documents or a summary of responsibilities should be disclosed publicly, for example in the annual report. Letters of appointment facilitate better understanding of the respective accountabilities of the Board and management.
Responsibilities of the Chairman
HC-1.3.9
The Chairman is responsible for the leadership of the Board, and for the efficient functioning of the Board. The Chairman is responsible for ensuring that Board members are adequately briefed in sufficient time for issues arising at Board meetings; therefore it is vital that the Chairman commit sufficient time to perform his role effectively, taking into account the points below:
a) First, the Chairman of the Board preferably should be non-executive and independent (see HC-1.3.5 for the definitions of "non-executive" and "independent");b) Also, the role of Chairman and Chief Executive may not be exercised by the same person; andc) Furthermore, there needs to be a clear division of responsibility between these two positions (see also HC-1.3.8 in this regard).The benefits and functions of committees
HC-1.3.10
In order to perform its duties more efficiently, the Board may set up committees where it feels appropriate with specific responsibilities, which must be documented. Where committees are set up, they should keep full minutes of their activities and meet regularly to fulfil their mandates. In particular, there are three areas where there is a need for checks and balances within the Board itself:
a) The nomination of Directors;b) The remuneration of Directors; andc) The audit of the bank's financial performance.In these areas, executive Directors have clear potential conflicts of interest. Nomination is all about the continuation of their own jobs and the jobs of their colleagues and potential new colleagues. Remuneration is all about the rewards that executive Directors and/or senior management receive for their services to the bank. Audit concerns the probity of the financial and non-financial reporting of the performance of the company by the very same persons who are responsible for its performance.
For larger banks that deal with the general public, committees can be a more efficient mechanism to assist the main Board in its monitoring and control of the activities of the bank. The establishment of committees should not mean that the role of the Board is diminished, or that the Board becomes fragmented. Each Committee must have a clear written mandate outlining its purpose, objectives and responsibilities, including composition, frequency of meetings and reporting relationships.
Audit Committee
HC-1.3.11
The Agency requires all banks to establish an Audit Committee. The committee members must have sufficient technical expertise to enable the committee to perform its functions effectively. Preferably, there should be at least one qualified and appropriately experienced accountant in the committee. All members of the committee must be financially literate. The CEO may not be a member of this committee.
HC-1.3.12
Responsibilities of the Audit Committee are as follows:
a) To review the integrity of the bank's financial reporting (particularly with reference to information passed to the Board — see HC-1.2.6 a). This review should include the choice of accounting policies. The information needs of the Board to perform its monitoring responsibilities must be defined in writing, and regularly monitored by the Audit Committee;
To oversee the selection and compensation of the external auditor for appointment and approval at the shareholders' meeting. The audit committee should oversee relations with the external auditors, including ensuring the external auditor's independence (in particular, making sure that the external audit firm and its partners have no other financial or business relationship without the Board's knowledge), the terms and conditions of the auditor's appointment and remuneration arrangements. The committee should monitor rotation arrangements for audit engagement partners. The audit committee should monitor the performance of the external auditor and the non-audit services provided by the external auditor. The committee should meet with the external auditor at least twice per year, and at least once per year in the absence of any members of executive management;b) To regularly review the activities and performance of the internal audit function;c) To review whether the bank complies with all relevant laws, regulations, codes and business practices, and ensure that the bank communicates with shareholders and relevant stakeholders (internal and external) openly and promptly, and with substance of compliance prevailing over form; andd) To review and supervise the implementation of, enforcement of and adherence to the bank's code of conduct.HC-1.3.13
Below the Audit Committee, the bank must set up an internal audit function, which reports directly to the Audit Committee (with a parallel reporting line to senior management for day-to-day matters as appropriate).
HC-1.4 HC-1.4 Transparency and Disclosure
Board's Responsibility for Disclosure
HC-1.4.1
The Board should oversee the process of disclosure and communications with internal and external stakeholders. The Board should ensure that disclosures made by the bank are fair, transparent, comprehensive and timely and reflect the character of the bank and the nature, complexity and risks inherent in the bank's business activities. Disclosure policies must be reviewed for compliance with the Agency's disclosure requirements (see Rulebook Chapter PD-1).
HC-1.5 HC-1.5 Notification, reporting, and approval requirements for changes to activities, personnel and ownership, strategy, Board meetings and special purpose vehicles ("SPVs")
HC-1.5.1
Banks must notify the Agency in writing of all major proposed changes to the strategy and/or corporate plan of the bank prior to implementation.
HC-1.5.2
Banks must notify the Agency in writing of any proposed changes to senior positions or ownership changes mentioned in sections HC-2.1, HC-3.2 and HC-4.1 (whether in terms of structure or identity of personnel) prior to the change. The communication should include the reason for the departure of the personnel and the Curriculum Vitae of any new persons taking up the relevant positions in the bank. See also Section BR-5.1 for notification requirements concerning contact details of senior staff.
HC-1.5.3
All locally incorporated banks, in addition to the requirements in paragraphs HC-1.5.1 and HC-1.5.2, should obtain the Agency's prior specific written approval before establishing any subsidiaries (including SPVs where the bank exercises a majority shareholding or has majority voting control by virtue of direct ownership or by proxy/nominee arrangements),
branches and/or representative offices, either inside or outside of Bahrain. In order to avoid any delays and/or disruption in implementation of banks' plans in this context, the Agency should be approached as soon as possible, even at a very preliminary stage.HC-1.5.4
All locally incorporated banks are required to submit, on an annual basis, as an attachment to the year-end quarterly PIR, a report recording the meetings during the year by their Board of Directors. For a sample report, refer to Appendix BR-10.
HC-1.5.5
All locally incorporated banks must notify the Agency if they intend to act as sponsor or manager of a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"), or if they intend to participate in the creation of an SPV, or if they intend to acquire shares in an SPV. All locally incorporated banks must notify the Agency if they are appointed as nominee shareholders of SPVs or hold votes by proxy arrangement in SPVs on behalf of other investors. In all cases listed above, the concerned bank must notify the Agency quarterly of any new commitments to, or engagements in business arrangements with SPVs. These reporting and notification arrangements apply in addition to arrangements under HC-1.5.3 where the SPV is a subsidiary.
HC-1.5.6
The Agency requires any locally incorporated bank associated with an SPV to give the background to the following points in any notification under HC-1.5.5 above:
a) the purpose of the SPV;b) the nature of the relationship between the bank and the SPV (i.e. sponsor, manager, investor, controller etc.);c) the external auditor's proposed consolidation/accounting treatment of the SPV;d) the availability of financial and other information relevant to the SPV and access to its business premises and records;e) whether the bank is providing any guarantees, warranties or financial/liquidity support of any kind to the SPV.HC-1.5.7
Where the SPV is consolidated into the accounts of a locally incorporated bank, the bank must provide separate accounting information on the SPV to the Agency on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, the annual audited financial statements of all consolidated SPVs must be submitted to the Agency within 3 months of the year end of the concerned SPV.
HC-1.5.8
Where a locally incorporated bank has a controller or majority ownership relationship with an SPV, or acts as sponsor, the bank must obtain the prior approval of the Agency for any changes to the capital, ownership, management or control of the SPV. All locally incorporated banks must also notify the Agency of any significant events in relation to the SPV. If necessary, the Agency may require that formal information exchange arrangements are put in place (e.g. a memorandum of understanding) if the SPV is located in a foreign jurisdiction and its activities are not supervised locally.
HC-2 HC-2 Approved Persons
HC-2.1 HC-2.1 BMA Notification and Approval
General Requirement
HC-2.1.1
All persons wishing to undertake a
controlled function in aconventional bank licensee must be approved by the BMA prior to their appointment (subject to the variations contained in Rule HC-2.1.3).HC-2.1.2
Controlled functions are those of:(a)Director ;(b)Chief Executive Officer orGeneral Manager ;(c)Senior Manager ;(d) Compliance officer;(e) Money Laundering Reporting Officer; and(f)Financial Instruments Trader .HC-2.1.3
Prior approval is required for
controlled functions (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). Controlled functions (d) and (e) may be combined, however (see also FC-4.1, regarding the MLRO function).Controlled function (f) does not require prior approval: instead, notification only is required, once the person concerned has accepted to undertake that function.Basis for Approval
HC-2.1.4
Approval under Rule HC-2.1.1 is only granted by the BMA, if it is satisfied that the person is fit and proper to hold the particular position in the licensee concerned. "Fit and proper" is determined by the BMA on a case-by-case basis. The definition of "fit and proper" and associated guidance is provided in Sections HC-2.2 and HC-2.3 respectively.
Definitions
HC-2.1.5
Director is any person who occupies the position of a Director, as defined in Article 173 of the Commercial Companies Law (Legislative Decree No. 21 of 2001).HC-2.1.6
The fact that a person may have "
Director " in their job title does not of itself make them aDirector within the meaning of the definition noted in Rule HC-2.1.5. For example, a 'Director of Marketing', is not necessarily a member of the Board of Directors and therefore may not fall under the definition of Rule HC-2.1.5.HC-2.1.7
The
Chief Executive Officer orGeneral Manager means a person who is responsible for the conduct of the licensee (regardless of actual title). TheChief Executive Officer orGeneral Manager must be resident in Bahrain. This person is responsible, alone or jointly, for the conduct of the whole of the firm, or, in the case of anoverseas conventional bank licensee , for all of the activities of the branch (in which case, he may hold the title of "Branch Manager").HC-2.1.8
Senior Manager means a person who, under the immediate authority of aDirector or theChief Executive Officer /General Manager , exercises major managerial responsibilities, is responsible for a significant business or operating unit, or has major managerial responsibility for maintaining accounts or other records of the licensee.HC-2.1.9
Whether a person is a
Senior Manager will depend on the facts in each case and is not determined by the presence or absence of the word in their job title. Examples ofSenior Managers might include, depending on the scale, nature and complexity of the business, a deputyChief Executive Officer ; and heads of departments such as Risk Management, or Internal Audit; or the Chief Financial Officer.HC-2.1.10
Financial Instruments Trader means a person who is engaged in buying or sellingfinancial instruments .HC-2.1.11
Where a firm is in doubt as to whether a function should be considered a
controlled function it must discuss the case with the BMA.Notification Requirements and Process
HC-2.1.12
Conventional bank licensees must obtain BMA approval before a person is formally appointed to acontrolled function ; the request for BMA approval must be made by submitting to BMA a duly completed Form 3 (Application for Approved Person status). In the case of a financial instruments trader, notification only is required (see Rule HC-2.1.3): this notification must also be made by submitting a Form 3.HC-2.1.13
In the case of license applications, the Form 3 must be marked for the attention of the Director, Licensing and Policy Directorate. When made by a
conventional bank licensee , the Form 3 must be marked for the attention of either the Director, Retail Banks Supervision or the Director, Wholesale Banks Supervision, as appropriate.HC-2.1.14
Licensees should give the BMA a reasonable amount of notice in order for an application for approval to be reviewed. The BMA aims to respond within 2 weeks of receipt of an application, although in some cases, where referral to an overseas supervisor is required, the response time is likely to be longer.
HC-2.1.15
Licensees seeking to appoint Board Directors should seek BMA approval for all the candidates to be put forward for election at a shareholder meeting, in advance of the agenda being issued to shareholders. BMA approval of the candidates does not in any way limit shareholders' rights to refuse those put forward for election.
HC-2.1.16
All refusals by the BMA to grant a person approved person status have to be reviewed and approved by an Executive Director of the BMA. A notice of intent is issued to the person concerned, setting out the basis for the decision. The person has 30 calendar days from the date of the notice in which to appeal the decision. The BMA then has 30 calendar days from the date of the representation in which to make a final determination. See also Chapter EN-5.
HC-2.1.17
Conventional bank licensees must immediately notify BMA when anapproved person ceases to hold thecontrolled function for which they have been approved, for whatever reason.HC-2.1.18
Thus, licensees are required to notify BMA should an
approved person transfer to another function within the licensee, or to another group entity; or else resign, be suspended or dismissed. BMA may require further clarification as to the reasons for the person's transfer or departure. BMA will automatically withdraw the individual'sapproved person status: should the person wish to undertake anothercontrolled function , whether within the same licensee or in another licensee, then a new application should be resubmitted.HC-2.1.19
Conventional bank licensees must immediately notify the BMA should they become aware of information that could reasonably be viewed as calling into question anapproved person's compliance with the BMA's "fit and proper" requirement (see HC-2.2).HC-2.2 HC-2.2 "Fit and proper" requirement
HC-2.2.1
Licensees seeking an
approved person authorisation for an individual, must satisfy the BMA that the individual concerned is "fit and proper" to undertake thecontrolled function in question.HC-2.2.2
To be considered "fit and proper", those nominated must demonstrate:
(a) personal integrity, honesty and good reputation;(b) professional competence, experience and expertise, sufficient for thecontrolled function for which authorisation is being applied for, and given the scale, complexity and nature of theconventional bank licensee concerned; and(c) financial soundness.HC-2.2.3
In assessing the conditions prescribed in Rule HC-2.2.2, the BMA will take into account the criteria contained in Section HC-2.3. The BMA reviews each application on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant circumstances. A person may be considered "fit and proper" to undertake one type of
controlled function but not another, depending on the function's job size and required levels of experience and expertise. Similarly, a person approved to undertake acontrolled function in oneconventional bank licensee may not be considered to have sufficient expertise and experience to undertake nominally the samecontrolled function but in a much bigger licensee.HC-2.2.4
Approved persons undertaking acontrolled function must act prudently, and with honesty, integrity, care, skill and due diligence in the performance of their duties. They must avoid conflicts of interest arising whilst undertaking acontrolled function .HC-2.2.5
In determining whether a conflict of interest may arise, factors that may be considered include whether:
(a) a person has breached any fiduciary obligations to the company or terms of employment;(b) a person has undertaken actions that would be difficult to defend, when looked at objectively, as being in the interest of the licensee; and(c) a person has failed to declare a personal interest that has a material impact in terms of the person's relationship with the licensee.HC-2.3 HC-2.3 Interpretative Guidance on "Fit and Proper" Requirement
HC-2.3.1
In assessing a person's fitness and propriety, the BMA will consider previous professional and personal conduct (in Bahrain or elsewhere) including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) the propriety of a person's conduct, whether or not such conduct resulted in a criminal offence being committed, the contravention of a law or regulation, or the institution of legal or disciplinary proceedings;(b) a conviction or finding of guilt in respect of any offence, other than a minor traffic offence, by any court or competent jurisdiction;(c) any adverse finding in a civil action by any court or competent jurisdiction, relating to fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct in connection with the formation or management of a corporation or partnership;(d) whether the person has been the subject of any disciplinary proceeding by any government authority, regulatory agency or professional body or association;(e) the contravention of any financial services legislation or regulation;(f) whether the person has ever been refused a license, authorisation, registration or other authority;(g) dismissal or a request to resign from any office or employment;(h) disqualification by a court, regulator or other competent body, as a Director or as a manager of a corporation;(i) whether the person has been a Director, partner or manager of a corporation or partnership which has gone into liquidation or administration or where one or more partners have been declared bankrupt whilst the person was connected with that partnership;(j) the extent to which the person has been truthful and open with supervisors;(k) the extent to which the person has appropriate professional and other qualifications for the controlled function in question;(l) the extent to which the person has sufficient experience, or is otherwise able to perform the functions of the controlled function in question;(m) whether the person has ever been adjudged bankrupt, entered into any arrangement with creditors in relation to the inability to pay due debts, or failed to satisfy a judgment debt under a court order.HC-2.3.2
With respect to HC-2.3.1(b), (c), (d) and (e), the BMA will take into account the length of time since any such event occurred, as well as the seriousness of the matter in question.
HC-2.4 [This section deleted 07/2006]
[This Section was deleted in 07/2006: it has been left blank.]
HC-3 HC-3 Compliance officer/manager
HC-3.1 HC-3.1 Introduction
HC-3.1.1
In order to promote best practice with respect to banks' internal systems and controls and international banking supervision, the Agency, in this chapter, outlines its requirements for the compliance function of banks. The expression "Compliance Function" in this Chapter is used to describe staff carrying out compliance duties.
HC-3.1.2
The expression 'Compliance Risk', in this chapter refers to the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material or financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, reporting requirements, standards and codes of conduct applicable to its activities, rather than compliance with a bank's internal limits or procedures.
HC-3.1.3
For further information and guidance on compliance risk and the compliance function, banks should refer to the Basel Committee publication, "Compliance and the compliance function in banks" (www.bis.org/publ April 2005). The Agency expects banks to carry out a review of their compliance with the principles in this paper on a regular basis (either by way of a self-assessment or by way of a review by the internal or external audit function).
HC-3.2 HC-3.2 Requirement for and approval of a compliance officer/manager
HC-3.2.1
All banks must appoint a senior member of staff with responsibility for the management of compliance risk as their Compliance Officer/Manager.
HC-3.2.2
The compliance function must be independent (i.e. it must not be placed in a position where its other duties or responsibilities may cause a conflict of interest with its compliance risk management responsibilities). Therefore the compliance function must be separate from the internal audit function. The compliance officer or manager may however, perform other limited related compliance roles (e.g. the MLRO or legal advisor), subject to the Agency's prior approval.
HC-3.2.3
The compliance officer/manager must be appropriately qualified and experienced and the compliance function must have adequate resources to carry out its functions effectively.
HC-3.2.4
The appointment of a compliance manager/officer requires the Agency's prior approval and the submission of the appointee's Personal Questionnaire (Appendix LR 2) and Curriculum Vitae to the Agency. The bank must also outline how the compliance function fits into the bank's senior management reporting structure, and must give details of relevant reporting lines within the bank.
HC-3.2.5
In the case of locally incorporated banks, the compliance officer/manager must have access to the Board of Directors in addition to the senior management.
HC-4 [This chapter deleted 07/2006]
[This chapter deleted 07/2006 — left blank.]
HC HC High-level Controls [versions up to October 2010]
HC-A HC-A Introduction
HC-A.1 HC-A.1 Purpose
Executive Summary
HC-A.1.1
This Module presents requirements that have to be met by
conventional bank licensees with respect to:a) The role and composition of their Boards and Board Committees; andb) Related high-level controls and policies.October 07HC-A.1.2
In addition, this Module contains requirements for the notification and pre-approval of individuals, undertaking certain designated functions with respect to
conventional bank licensees . These functions (called 'controlled functions '), include Directors and members of senior management. Thecontrolled functions regime supplements the CBB's corporate governance requirements by ensuring that key persons involved in the running ofconventional bank licensees are fit and proper. Those approved by the CBB to undertakecontrolled functions are calledapproved persons .October 07HC-A.1.3
Finally, this Module contains certain notification and approval requirements regarding the use of Special Purpose Vehicles ('SPVs'; see Section HC-1.5).
October 07HC-A.1.4
This Module supplements various provisions relating to corporate governance contained in Legislative Decree No. 21 of 2001, with respect to promulgating the Commercial Companies Law ('Commercial Companies Law 2001'). In case of conflict, the Commercial Companies Law shall prevail. The Module also supplements (for companies listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange), Stock Exchange regulations that are relevant to corporate governance and high-level controls. Compliance with this Module does not guarantee compliance with either the Commercial Companies Law 2001 or the BSE regulations.
October 07Legal Basis
HC-A.1.5
This Module contains the CBB's Directive relating to high-level controls and is issued under the powers available to the CBB under Article 38 of the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law 2006 ('CBB Law'). The Directive in this Module is applicable to
conventional bank licensees .October 07HC-A.1.6
For an explanation of the CBB's rule-making powers and different regulatory instruments, see Section UG-1.1.
October 07HC-A.2 HC-A.2 Key requirements
Corporate governance
HC-A.2.1
The Chairman of the Board should preferably be non-executive and independent. The role of Chairman and Chief Executive may not be exercised by the same person. (See Rule HC-1.3.9.)
October 07HC-A.2.2
The Board must approve a code of conduct for itself, senior management and employees, and define the responsibilities of itself and senior management. This should include procedures for dealing with
conflicts of interest , and a prohibition oninsider trading . (See Paragraphs HC-1.2.9 to HC-1.2.13.)October 07HC-A.2.3
The Board should meet at least four times per year (see Paragraph HC-1.3.4).
October 07HC-A.2.4
Boards must have an adequate number of members that are 'independent' and 'non-executive' to serve the interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders. (See Paragraphs HC-1.3.5 and HC-1.3.6.)
October 07HC-A.2.5
The Board should consider the setting up of committees to assist it in fulfilling its responsibilities. The setting up of an Audit Committee is mandatory. (See Paragraphs HC-1.3.11 to HC-1.3.14.)
October 07HC-A.2.6
Conventional bank licensees are required to notify the CBB, in writing, of all major changes (regardless of type and/or effect) proposed to the strategy and/or corporate plan of the bank prior to implementation, as well as of any Special Purpose Vehicle they intend to establish as a subsidiary, or with respect to which they intend to act as sponsor or manager (see Section HC-1.5).October 07Approved Persons
HC-A.2.7
Conventional bank licensees are required to secure prior CBB approval for those persons wishing to undertake acontrolled function . Such persons are assessed against CBB's 'fit and proper' requirements. Conventional bank licensees must also notify the CBB of any changes in theirapproved persons . (See Chapter HC-2)October 07Compliance officer/manager
HC-A.2.8
Conventional bank licensees must appoint a senior member of staff with responsibility for compliance. The Compliance Officer is acontrolled function . (See Chapter HC-3.)October 07HC-A.3 HC-A.3 Module History
Evolution of the Module
HC-A.3.1
This Module was first issued in July 2004, as part of the initial release of Volume 1 of the CBB Rulebook. It was dated July 2004. Any material changes that have subsequently been made to this Module are annotated with the calendar quarter date in which the change was made: Chapter UG 3 provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control.
October 07HC-A.3.2
When the CBB replaced the BMA in September 2006, the provisions of this Module remained in force. Volume 1 was updated in October 2007 to reflect the switch to the CBB; however, new calendar quarter dates were only issued where the update necessitated changes to actual requirements.
October 07HC-A.3.3
A list of recent changes made to this Module is shown below:
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes HC-1.5 01/04/05 Transparency requirements formalized. HC-1.6 01/04/05 Notification requirements formalized. HC-1.1, 1.2 & HC-1.4 01/10/05 High-level controls enhanced. HC-1.5 01/10/05 New SPV requirements. HC-3.1 – HC-3.2 01/10/05 Revised compliance function requirements. HC-1.5.3, HC-1.5.5 & HC-4.1 01/01/06 Revised notification requirements for SPVs and dealing staff. HC-2, HC-3 and HC-4 01/07/06 Requirements relating to controllers moved to Module GR; Remaining requirements relating to 'fit and proper' re-drafted to ensure consistency with other Rulebook Volumes (without changing the substance of the previous 'fit and proper' requirements); Requirements relating to dealers incorporated into the 'fit and proper' requirements. HC-1.2 & HC-1.3 01/10/07 Reordering of Paragraphs to separate Rules from Guidance. HC-A.1 10/2007 New Rule HC-A.1.5 introduced, categorising this Module as a Directive. HC-1.3.5 04/2008 Mandatory requirement for at least one independent non-executive director HC-2.1.16 01/2009 Amendment to notification process for "approved person" status HC-1.5.3 01/2009 Requirement to appoint a permanent replacement within 120 days when a controlled function falls vacant. HC-2.1.2 10/2009 CBB prior approval requirement for appointment of Deputy MLRO HC-B HC-B General guidance and best practice
HC-B.1 HC-B.1 Guidance provided by other international bodies
Basel Committee: Enhancing Corporate Governance in Banking Organisations and High-level Controls for Banks
HC-B.1.1
These papers (see www.bis.org/publ/bcbs56.pdf) issued in September 1998 and September 1999 provide guidance on corporate governance and high-level controls in banks. These papers form part of an on-going effort by the Committee to strengthen procedures for risk management and disclosure in banks.
October 07HC-B.1.2
The papers draw on supervisory experience with corporate governance problems at banking organisations and suggest the types of practices that could help to avoid such problems. They identify a number of practices as critical elements of any financial institution's corporate governance process.
October 07HC-B.1.3
The CBB draws banks' attention to the Basel papers as benchmarks of best practice for corporate governance standards and high-level controls to be followed by banks operating in the Kingdom of Bahrain.
October 07HC-B.2 HC-B.2 Enforceability
HC-B.2.1
The requirements of Chapter 1, Sections HC-1.1–HC-1.4 are binding requirements, which banks and their Boards should follow on an 'apply or explain' basis. If a Board or a bank elects not to follow these requirements, they must explain why to the Central Bank and document the reasons for not applying the concerned requirements in the Minutes of the Board. The remaining Chapters are binding requirements except where shown as guidance.
October 07HC-1 HC-1 Corporate Governance
HC-1.1 HC-1.1 Scope
HC-1.1.1
The contents of this Chapter are applicable to locally incorporated banks. Bahrain branches of foreign banks must satisfy the Central Bank that equivalent arrangements are in place at the parent level and that these arrangements provide for effective high-level controls over activities conducted under the Bahrain license.
October 07HC-1.1.2
This Chapter covers the high-level controls aspects of corporate governance of banks, and therefore focuses on the functions of the constituent parts of high-level controls, starting with the respective roles and responsibilities of the Board and senior management.
October 07HC-1.1.3
This Chapter therefore does not cover matters of corporate governance relating to the Commercial Companies Law (e.g. General Meetings, the role of shareholders and other administrative matters) or Listing Requirements.
October 07HC-1.1.4
The CBB has historically pursued a 'best practice' guidance approach to high-level controls and corporate governance, rather than a prescriptive rules-based approach. The Central Bank has chosen to notify licensees of international best practice standards, and allowed banks to interpret these, according to the scope of operations of the concerned bank. This Chapter blends a best practice-based approach with minimum requirements.
October 07HC-1.1.5
Banks must satisfy the CBB that financial services activities conducted in subsidiaries and other group members including foreign branches are subject to the same or equivalent arrangements for ensuring effective high-level controls over their activities. In instances where local jurisdictional requirements are more stringent than those applicable in this Module, the local requirements are to be applied.
October 07HC-1.1.6
Where a bank is unable to satisfy the CBB that its subsidiaries and other group members or foreign branches are subject to the same or equivalent arrangements, the CBB will assess the potential impact of risks – both financial and reputational – to the bank arising from inadequate high-level controls in the rest of the group of which it is a member. In such instances, the CBB may impose restrictions on dealings between the bank and other group members. Where weaknesses in controls are assessed by the CBB to pose a major threat to the stability of the bank, then its authorisation may be called into question.
October 07HC-1.2 HC-1.2 The Board of Directors – Its Functions and Responsibilities
Strategy
HC-1.2.1
In most banks, shareholders, creditors, employees, depositors and investment account holders ('stakeholders') are unable to closely monitor management, its strategies and the bank's performance due to a lack of information and resources. A key responsibility of the Board is to fill the gap between uninformed stakeholders to whom it owes a duty of care, and the more fully informed executive management by monitoring management closely on behalf of stakeholders.
October 07HC-1.2.2
The Board is ultimately accountable and responsible for the affairs and performance of the bank. The Board must establish the objectives of the bank and develop the strategies that direct the on-going activities of the bank to achieve these objectives. The strategies must be communicated throughout the bank, and be disclosed publicly (e.g. via the website or in the annual report in an abbreviated form as applicable). In its strategy document, the Board must demonstrate that it is able to proactively identify and understand the significant risks that the bank faces in achieving its business objectives through its business strategies and plans.
October 07HC-1.2.3
The precise functions reserved for the Board, and those delegated to management and committees will vary, dependent upon the business of the institution, its size and ownership structure. However, as a minimum, the Board must establish and maintain a statement of its responsibilities for:
a) The adoption and annual review of strategy;b) The adoption and review of management structure and responsibilities;c) The adoption and review of the systems and controls framework; andd) Monitoring the implementation of strategy by management.The Board may not delegate its ultimate responsibility to ensure that an adequate, effective, comprehensive and transparent corporate governance process is in place.
October 07HC-1.2.4
In its strategy review process under Paragraphs HC-1.2.3 a) and d), the Board must:
a) Review the bank's business plans and the inherent level of risk in these plans;b) Assess the adequacy of capital to support the business risks of the bank;c) Set performance objectives;d) Review the performance of executive management; ande) Oversee major capital expenditures, divestitures and acquisitions.October 07HC-1.2.5
The CBB expects the Board to have effective policies and processes in place for:
a) Ensuring a formal and transparent Board nomination process;b) Appointing senior managers, and ensuring that they have the necessary integrity, technical and managerial competence, and experience;c) Overseeing succession planning and replacing key executives when necessary, and ensuring appropriate resources are available, and minimising reliance on key individuals;d) Reviewing the remuneration and incentive packages of the executive management and members of the Board of Directors and ensuring that such packages are consistent with the corporate values and strategy of the bank;e) Effectively monitoring and making formal (annual) evaluations of senior management's performance in implementing agreed strategy and business plans;f) Approving budgets and reviewing performance against those budgets and key performance indicators; andg) The management of the bank's compliance risk.October 07Risk Recognition and Assessment
HC-1.2.6
The Board is responsible for ensuring that the systems and controls framework, including the Board structure and organisational structure of the bank, is appropriate for the bank's business and associated risks (see HC-1.2.3 c)). The Board must ensure that collectively it has sufficient expertise to identify, understand and measure the significant risks to which the bank is exposed in its business activities.
The Board must regularly assess the systems and controls framework of the bank. In its assessments, the Board must demonstrate to the CBB that:
a) The bank's operations, individually and collectively are measured, monitored and controlled by appropriate, effective and prudent risk management systems commensurate with the scope of the bank's activities; andb) The bank's operations are supported by an appropriate control environment. The compliance, risk management and financial reporting functions must be adequately resourced, independent of business lines and must be run by individuals not involved with the day-to-day running of the various business areas. The Board must additionally ensure that management develops, implements and oversees the effectiveness of comprehensive know your customer standards, as well as on-going monitoring of accounts and transactions, in keeping with the requirements of relevant law, regulations and best practice (with particular regard to anti-money laundering measures). The control environment must maintain necessary client confidentiality and ensure that the privacy of the bank is not violated, and ensure that clients' rights and assets are properly safeguarded.c) Where the Board has identified any significant issues related to the bank's adopted governance framework, appropriate and timely action is taken to address any identified adverse deviations from the requirements of this Module.October 07HC-1.2.7
In its review of the systems and controls framework in Paragraph HC-1.2.6, the Board must:
a) Make effective use of the work of external and internal auditors. The Board must ensure the integrity of the bank's accounting and financial reporting systems through regular independent review (by internal and external audit). Audit findings must be used as an independent check on the information received from management about the bank's operations and performance and the effectiveness of internal controls; andb) Make use of self-assessments, stress/scenario tests, and/or independent judgements made by external advisors. The Board should appoint supporting committees, and engage senior management to assist it in the oversight of risk management; andc) Ensure that senior management have put in place appropriate systems of control for the business of the bank and the information needs of the Board; in particular, there must be appropriate systems and functions for identifying as well as for monitoring risk, the financial position of the bank, and compliance with applicable laws, regulations and best practice standards. The systems must produce information on a timely basis.October 07Corporate Ethics, Conflicts of Interest and Code of Conduct
HC-1.2.8
Banks are subject to a wide variety of laws, regulations and codes of best practice that directly affect the conduct of business. Such laws involve the Bahraini Stock Exchange Law, the Labour Law, the Commercial Companies Law, occupational health and safety, even environment and pollution laws, as well as codes of conduct and regulations of the Central Bank. The Board sets the 'tone at the top' of a bank, and has a responsibility to oversee compliance with these various requirements. The Board should ensure that the staff conduct their affairs with a high degree of integrity, taking note of applicable laws, codes and regulations.
October 07HC-1.2.9
The Board must establish corporate standards for itself, senior management, and employees. This requirement should be met by way of a documented and published code of conduct or similar document. These values must be communicated throughout the bank, so that the Board and senior management and staff understand the importance of conducting business based on good corporate governance values and understand their accountabilities to the various stakeholders of the licensee. Banks' Boards, senior management and staff must be informed of and be required to fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities to the bank's stakeholders.
October 07HC-1.2.10
An internal code of conduct is separate from the business strategy of a bank. A code of conduct should outline the practices that Directors, senior management and staff should follow in performing their duties. Banks may wish to use procedures and policies to complement their codes of conduct. The suggested contents of a code of conduct are covered below:
a) Commitment by the Board and management to the code. The code of conduct should be linked to the objectives of the bank, and its responsibilities and undertakings to customers, shareholders, staff and the wider community (see HC-1.2.8 and HC-1.2.9). The code should give examples or expectations of honesty, integrity, leadership and professionalism;b) Commitment to the law and best practice standards. This commitment would include commitments to following accounting standards, industry best practice (such as ensuring that information to clients is clear, fair, and not misleading), transparency, and rules concerning potential conflicts of interest (see HC-1.2.11);c) Employment practices. This would include rules concerning health and safety of employees, training, policies on the acceptance and giving of business courtesies, prohibition on the offering and acceptance of bribes, and potential misuse of company assets;d) How the company deals with disputes and complaints from clients and monitors compliance with the code; ande) Confidentiality. Disclosure of client or bank information should be prohibited, except where disclosure is required by law (see HC-1.2.6 b).October 07HC-1.2.11
The Board must establish and disseminate to its members and management, policies and procedures for the identification, reporting, disclosure, prevention, or strict limitation of potential conflicts of interest. It is senior management's responsibility to implement these policies. Rules concerning connected party transactions and potential conflicts of interest may be dealt with in the Code of Conduct (see HC-1.2.9). In particular, the Central Bank requires that any decisions to enter into transactions, under which Board members or any member of management would have conflicts of interest that are material, should be formally and unanimously approved by the full Board. Best practice would dictate that a Board member or member of senior management must:
a) Not enter into competition with the bank;b) Not demand or accept substantial gifts from the bank for himself or his associates;c) Not misuse the banks' assets;d) Not use company privileged information or take advantage of business opportunities to which the company is entitled for himself or his associates;e) Report to the Board any (potential) conflict of interest in their activities with, and commitments to other organisations. In any case, all Board members and members of senior management must declare in writing all of their other interests in other enterprises or activities (whether as a shareholder of above 5% of the voting capital of a company, a manager, or other form of significant participation) to the Board (or the Nominations or Audit Committees) on an annual basis; andf) Absent themselves from any discussions or decision-making that involves a subject where they are incapable of providing objective advice, or which involves a subject or (proposed) transaction where a conflict of interest exists.October 07HC-1.2.12
The Central Bank expects that the Board and its members individually and collectively:
a) Act with honesty, integrity and in good faith, with due diligence and care, with a view to the best interest of the bank and its shareholders and other stakeholders (see Paragraphs HC-1.2.8 to HC-1.2.11);b) Act within the scope of their responsibilities (which should be clearly defined – see HC-1.3.7 and HC-1.3.8 below) and not participate in the day-to-day management of the bank;c) Have a proper understanding of, and competence to deal with the affairs and products of the bank and devote sufficient time to their responsibilities;d) To independently assess and question the policies, processes and procedures of the bank, with the intent to identify and initiate management action on issues requiring improvement. (i.e. to act as checks and balances on management).October 07HC-1.2.13
All Directors whether non-executive or executive should exercise independence in their decision-making. To facilitate independence, the Board should agree procedures whereby the Board or its individual members (or committees) may take independent professional advice at the bank's expense.
October 07HC-1.3 HC-1.3 Board Composition and The Role of Committees
Board Composition & Frequency of Meetings
HC-1.3.1
To fulfil its responsibility for the review of the systems and controls framework (HC-1.2.3 c), the Board must periodically assess its composition and size and, where appropriate, reconstitute itself and its committees by selecting new Directors to replace long-standing members or those members whose contribution to the bank or its committees (such as the audit committee) is not adequate.
October 07HC-1.3.2
No Board member may have more than one Directorship of a Retail Bank or a Wholesale Bank. This would mean an effective cap of a maximum of two Directorships of financial institutions inside Bahrain. Two Directorships of licensees within the same Category (e.g. 'Retail Bank') would not be permitted. Banks may approach the Central Bank for exemption from this limit where the Directorships concern banks or financial institutions within the same group.
October 07HC-1.3.3
The Board must meet sufficiently often to enable it to discharge its responsibilities effectively, taking into account the bank's scale and complexity.
October 07HC-1.3.4
To meet its obligations under Rule HC-1.3.3 above, the full Board should meet preferably no less than four times per year. The Central Bank recommends that meetings should take place once every quarter to address the Board's responsibilities for management oversight and performance monitoring. Furthermore, Board rules should require members to step down if they are not actively participating in Board meetings.
October 07Independent and Non-Executive Directors
HC-1.3.5
Where there is the potential for conflict of interest, or there is a need for impartiality, the Board must assign a sufficient number of independent non-executive Board members capable of exercising independent judgement. At a minimum, all locally incorporated banks must appoint one independent non-executive director. The Board must outline its criteria and materiality thresholds in the annual report for the definition of 'independence'. The Directors must be identified in the annual report as executive, non-executive, and independent non-executive, as follows:
a) Executive Director (or 'Managing Director' under the Commercial Companies Law 'CCL') - A person who is involved in the day-to-day management and/or is in full-time employment of the bank and/or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries or parent companies. An Executive Director may not occupy the post of 'Chairman';b) Non-Executive Director - A person not involved in the day-to-day management and/or is not a full-time salaried employee of the bank and/or any of its affiliates, or subsidiaries or parent companies; andc) Independent Non-Executive Director - A non-Executive Director (as defined above), who also:• Is not a 'controller' of the bank (see Section GR-5.2).• Is not an Associate (see Section GR-5.2) of a Director or a member of senior management of the bank.• Is not a professional advisor to the bank or group (A partner or member of senior management of an accountancy or law firm that provides services to the bank would not be perceived by the Central Bank as an independent non-Executive Director).• Is not a large depositor with, or large borrower from the bank (i.e. whose deposits or credit facilities exceed 10% of the capital base of the bank).• Has no significant contractual or business relationship with the bank or group which could be seen to materially interfere with the person's capacity to act in an independent manner.October 07
Amended: April 2008HC-1.3.6
Independent non-executive Directors should be permitted to meet periodically (e.g. at separate meetings from the main Board) without executive management present.
October 07Checks and Balances
HC-1.3.7
To ensure a clear segregation of duties, the Board must clearly define, document and enforce its own responsibilities, including those of its Chairman, as well as the delegated authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities of the Board and management committees, the bank's Chief Executive and senior management to the stakeholders of the bank.
October 07HC-1.3.8
In particular, the Board must issue formal letters of appointment both to senior management and Board members, outlining their specific responsibilities and accountabilities. Wherever possible, these documents or a summary of responsibilities should be disclosed publicly, for example in the annual report. Letters of appointment facilitate better understanding of the respective accountabilities of the Board and management.
October 07Responsibilities of the Chairman
HC-1.3.9
The Chairman is responsible for the leadership of the Board, and for the efficient functioning of the Board. The Chairman is responsible for ensuring that Board members are adequately briefed in sufficient time for issues arising at Board meetings; therefore it is vital that the Chairman commit sufficient time to perform his role effectively, taking into account the points below.
a) The role of Chairman and Chief Executive may not be exercised by the same person; andb) Furthermore, there needs to be a clear division of responsibility between these two positions (see also HC-1.3.8 in this regard).October 07HC-1.3.10
The Chairman of the Board preferably should be non-executive and independent (see HC-1.3.5 for the definitions of 'non-executive' and 'independent').
October 07The benefits and functions of committees
HC-1.3.11
In order to perform its duties more efficiently, the Board may set up committees where it feels appropriate with specific responsibilities, which must be documented. Where committees are set up, they should keep full minutes of their activities and meet regularly to fulfil their mandates. In particular, there are three areas where there is a need for checks and balances within the Board itself:
a) The nomination of Directors;b) The remuneration of Directors; andc) The audit of the bank's financial performance.In these areas, executive Directors have clear potential conflicts of interest. Nomination is all about the continuation of their own jobs and the jobs of their colleagues and potential new colleagues. Remuneration is all about the rewards that executive Directors and/or senior management receive for their services to the bank. Audit concerns the probity of the financial and non-financial reporting of the performance of the company by the very same persons who are responsible for its performance.
For larger banks that deal with the general public, committees can be a more efficient mechanism to assist the main Board in its monitoring and control of the activities of the bank. The establishment of committees should not mean that the role of the Board is diminished, or that the Board becomes fragmented. Each Committee must have a clear written mandate outlining its purpose, objectives and responsibilities, including composition, frequency of meetings and reporting relationships.
October 07Audit Committee
HC-1.3.12
The Central Bank requires all banks to establish an Audit Committee. The committee members must have sufficient technical expertise to enable the committee to perform its functions effectively. There must be at least one qualified and appropriately experienced accountant in the committee. All members of the committee must be financially literate. The CEO may not be a member of this committee.
October 07HC-1.3.13
Responsibilities of the Audit Committee are as follows:
a) To review the integrity of the bank's financial reporting (particularly with reference to information passed to the Board - see HC-1.2.6 a). This review must include the choice of accounting policies. The information needs of the Board to perform its monitoring responsibilities must be defined in writing, and regularly monitored by the Audit Committee;b) To oversee the selection and compensation of the external auditor for appointment and approval at the shareholders' meeting. The audit committee must oversee relations with the external auditors, including ensuring the external auditor's independence (in particular, making sure that the external audit firm and its partners have no other financial or business relationship without the Board's knowledge), the terms and conditions of the auditor's appointment and remuneration arrangements. The committee must monitor rotation arrangements for audit engagement partners. The audit committee must monitor the performance of the external auditor and the non-audit services provided by the external auditor. The committee must meet with the external auditor at least twice per year, and at least once per year in the absence of any members of executive management;c) To regularly review the activities and performance of the internal audit function;d) To review whether the bank complies with all relevant laws, regulations, codes and business practices, and ensure that the bank communicates with shareholders and relevant stakeholders (internal and external) openly and promptly, and with substance of compliance prevailing over form; ande) To review and supervise the implementation of, enforcement of and adherence to the bank's code of conduct.October 07HC-1.3.14
Below the Audit Committee, the bank must set up an internal audit function, which reports directly to the Audit Committee (with a parallel reporting line to senior management for day-to-day matters as appropriate).
October 07HC-1.4 HC-1.4 Transparency and Disclosure
Board's Responsibility for Disclosure
HC-1.4.1
The Board must oversee the process of disclosure and communications with internal and external stakeholders. The Board must ensure that disclosures made by the bank are fair, transparent, comprehensive and timely and reflect the character of the bank and the nature, complexity and risks inherent in the bank's business activities. Disclosure policies must be reviewed for compliance with the Central Bank's disclosure requirements (see Rulebook Chapter PD-1).
October 07HC-1.5 HC-1.5 Notification, reporting, and approval requirements for changes to activities, personnel and ownership, strategy, Board meetings and special purpose vehicles ('SPVs')
HC-1.5.1
Banks must notify the CBB in writing of all major proposed changes to the strategy and/or corporate plan of the bank prior to implementation.
October 07HC-1.5.2
Banks must notify the Central Bank in writing of any proposed changes to senior positions or ownership changes mentioned in Sections HC-2.1, HC-3.2 and HC-4.1 (whether in terms of structure or identity of personnel) prior to the change. The communication should include the reason for the departure of the personnel and the Curriculum Vitae of any new persons taking up the relevant positions in the bank (see also HC-2.1.17). See also Section BR-5.1 for notification requirements concerning contact details of senior staff.
Amended January 2009
October 07HC-1.5.3
If a
controlled function falls vacant, theconventional bank licensee must appoint a permanent replacement (after obtaining CBB approval), within 120 calendar days of the vacancy occurring. Pending the appointment of a permanent replacement, theconventional bank licensee must make immediate interim arrangements to ensure continuity of the duties and responsibilities of thecontrolled function affected. These interim arrangements must be approved by the CBB.Added January 2009HC-1.5.4
All locally incorporated banks, in addition to the requirements in Paragraphs HC-1.5.1 and HC-1.5.2, should obtain the Central Bank's prior specific written approval before establishing any subsidiaries (including SPVs where the bank exercises a majority shareholding or has majority voting control by virtue of direct ownership or by proxy/nominee arrangements),
branches and/or representative offices, either inside or outside of Bahrain. In order to avoid any delays and/or disruption in implementation of banks' plans in this context, the Central Bank should be approached as soon as possible, even at a very preliminary stage.Renumbered January 2009
October 07HC-1.5.5
All locally incorporated banks are required to submit, on an annual basis, as an attachment to the year-end quarterly PIR, a report recording the meetings during the year by their Board of Directors. For a sample report, refer to Appendix BR-10.
Renumbered January 2009
October 07HC-1.5.6
All locally incorporated banks must notify the Central Bank if they intend to act as sponsor or manager of a special purpose vehicle ('SPV'), or if they intend to participate in the creation of an SPV, or if they intend to acquire shares in an SPV. All locally incorporated banks must notify the Central Bank if they are appointed as nominee shareholders of SPVs or hold votes by proxy arrangement in SPVs on behalf of other investors. In all cases listed above, the concerned bank must notify the Central Bank quarterly of any new commitments to, or engagements in business arrangements with SPVs. These reporting and notification arrangements apply in addition to arrangements under HC-1.5.4 where the SPV is a subsidiary.
Renumbered January 2009
October 07HC-1.5.7
The Central Bank requires any locally incorporated bank associated with an SPV to give the background to the following points in any notification under HC-1.5.6 above:
a) The purpose of the SPV;b) The nature of the relationship between the bank and the SPV (i.e. sponsor, manager, investor, controller etc.);c) The external auditor's proposed consolidation/accounting treatment of the SPV;d) The availability of financial and other information relevant to the SPV and access to its business premises and records;e) Whether the bank is providing any guarantees, warranties or financial/liquidity support of any kind to the SPV.Renumbered January 2009
October 07HC-1.5.8
Where the SPV is consolidated into the accounts of a locally incorporated bank, the bank must provide separate accounting information on the SPV to the Central Bank on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, the annual audited financial statements of all consolidated SPVs must be submitted to the Central Bank within 3 months of the year end of the concerned SPV.
Renumbered January 2009
October 07HC-1.5.9
Where a locally incorporated bank has a controller or majority ownership relationship with an SPV, or acts as sponsor, the bank must obtain the prior approval of the Central Bank for any changes to the capital, ownership, management or control of the SPV. All locally incorporated banks must also notify the Central Bank of any significant events in relation to the SPV. If necessary, the Central Bank may require that formal information exchange arrangements are put in place (e.g. a memorandum of understanding) if the SPV is located in a foreign jurisdiction and its activities are not supervised locally.
Renumbered January 2009
October 07HC-2 HC-2 Approved Persons
HC-2.1 HC-2.1 CBB Notification and Approval
General Requirement
HC-2.1.1
All persons wishing to undertake a
controlled function in aconventional bank licensee must be approved by the CBB prior to their appointment (subject to the variations contained in Rule HC-2.1.3).October 07HC-2.1.2
Controlled functions are those of:(a)Director ;(b)Chief Executive orGeneral Manager ;(c)Senior Manager ;(d) Compliance officer;(e) Money Laundering Reporting Officer;(f) Deputy Money Laundering Reporting Officer; and(g)Financial Instruments Trader .Amended: October 2009
October 2007HC-2.1.3
Prior approval is required for
controlled functions (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f). Controlled functions (d) and (e) may be combined, however (see also FC-4.1, regarding the MLRO function).Controlled function (g) does not require prior approval: instead, notification only is required, once the person concerned has accepted to undertake that function.Amended: October 2009
October 2007Basis for Approval
HC-2.1.4
Approval under Rule HC-2.1.1 is only granted by the CBB, if it is satisfied that the person is fit and proper to hold the particular position in the licensee concerned. 'Fit and proper' is determined by the CBB on a case-by-case basis. The definition of 'fit and proper' and associated guidance is provided in Sections HC-2.2 and HC-2.3 respectively.
October 07Definitions
HC-2.1.5
Director is any person who occupies the position of a Director, as defined in Article 173 of the Commercial Companies Law (Legislative Decree No. 21 of 2001).October 07HC-2.1.6
The fact that a person may have '
Director ' in their job title does not of itself make them aDirector within the meaning of the definition noted in Rule HC-2.1.5. For example, a 'Director of Marketing', is not necessarily a member of the Board of Directors and therefore may not fall under the definition of Rule HC-2.1.5.October 07HC-2.1.7
The
Chief Executive orGeneral Manager means a person who is responsible for the conduct of the licensee (regardless of actual title). TheChief Executive orGeneral Manager must be resident in Bahrain. This person is responsible, alone or jointly, for the conduct of the whole of the firm, or, in the case of anoverseas conventional bank licensee , for all of the activities of the branch (in which case, he may hold the title of 'Branch Manager').October 07HC-2.1.8
Senior Manager means a person who, under the immediate authority of aDirector or theChief Executive /General Manager , exercises major managerial responsibilities, is responsible for a significant business or operating unit, or has major managerial responsibility for maintaining accounts or other records of the licensee.October 07HC-2.1.9
Whether a person is a
Senior Manager will depend on the facts in each case and is not determined by the presence or absence of the word in their job title. Examples ofSenior Managers might include, depending on the scale, nature and complexity of the business, a deputyChief Executive ; and heads of departments such as Risk Management, or Internal Audit; or the Chief Financial Officer.October 07HC-2.1.10
Financial Instruments Trader means a person who is engaged in buying or sellingfinancial instruments .October 07HC-2.1.11
Where a firm is in doubt as to whether a function should be considered a
controlled function it must discuss the case with the CBB.October 07Notification Requirements and Process
HC-2.1.12
Conventional bank licensees must obtain CBB approval before a person is formally appointed to acontrolled function ; the request for CBB approval must be made by submitting to CBB a duly completed Form 3 (Application for Approved Person status). In the case of a financial instruments trader, notification only is required (see Rule HC-2.1.3): this notification must also be made by submitting a Form 3.October 07HC-2.1.13
In the case of license applications, the Form 3 must be marked for the attention of the Director, Licensing and Policy Directorate. When made by a
conventional bank licensee , the Form 3 must be marked for the attention of either the Director, Retail Banks Supervision or the Director, Wholesale Banks Supervision, as appropriate.October 07HC-2.1.14
Licensees should give the CBB a reasonable amount of notice in order for an application for approval to be reviewed. The CBB aims to respond within 2 weeks of receipt of an application, although in some cases, where referral to an overseas supervisor is required, the response time is likely to be longer.
October 07HC-2.1.15
Licensees seeking to appoint Board Directors should seek CBB approval for all the candidates to be put forward for election at a shareholder meeting, in advance of the agenda being issued to shareholders. CBB approval of the candidates does not in any way limit shareholders' rights to refuse those put forward for election.
October 07HC-2.1.16
All refusals by the CBB to grant a person approved person status have to be reviewed and approved by an Executive Director of the CBB. A notice of intent is issued to the licensee concerned, setting out the basis for the decision. The licensee has 30 calendar days from the date of the notice in which to appeal the decision. The CBB then has 30 calendar days from the date of the representation in which to make a final determination. See also Chapter EN-5.
Amended January 2009
October 07HC-2.1.17
Conventional bank licensees must immediately notify CBB when anapproved person ceases to hold thecontrolled function for which they have been approved, for whatever reason (see also HC-1.5.2).Amended January 2009
October 07HC-2.1.18
Thus, licensees are required to notify CBB should an
approved person transfer to another function within the licensee, or to another group entity; or else resign, be suspended or dismissed. CBB may require further clarification as to the reasons for the person's transfer or departure. CBB will automatically withdraw the individual'sapproved person status: should the person wish to undertake anothercontrolled function , whether within the same licensee or in another licensee, then a new application should be resubmitted.October 07HC-2.1.19
Conventional bank licensees must immediately notify CBB should they become aware of information that could reasonably be viewed as calling into question anapproved person's compliance with CBB's 'fit and proper' requirement (see HC-2.2).October 07HC-2.2 HC-2.2 'Fit and proper' requirement
HC-2.2.1
Licensees seeking an
approved person authorisation for an individual, must satisfy the CBB that the individual concerned is 'fit and proper' to undertake thecontrolled function in question.October 07HC-2.2.2
To be considered 'fit and proper', those nominated must demonstrate:
(a) Personal integrity, honesty and good reputation;(b) Professional competence, experience and expertise, sufficient for thecontrolled function for which authorisation is being applied for, and given the scale, complexity and nature of theconventional bank licensee concerned; and(c) Financial soundness.October 07HC-2.2.3
In assessing the conditions prescribed in Rule HC-2.2.2, the CBB will take into account the criteria contained in Section HC-2.3. The CBB reviews each application on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant circumstances. A person may be considered 'fit and proper' to undertake one type of
controlled function but not another, depending on the function's job size and required levels of experience and expertise. Similarly, a person approved to undertake acontrolled function in oneconventional bank licensee may not be considered to have sufficient expertise and experience to undertake nominally the samecontrolled function but in a much bigger licensee.October 07HC-2.2.4
Approved persons undertaking acontrolled function must act prudently, and with honesty, integrity, care, skill and due diligence in the performance of their duties. They must avoid conflicts of interest arising whilst undertaking acontrolled function .October 07HC-2.2.5
In determining whether a conflict of interest may arise, factors that may be considered include whether:
(a) A person has breached any fiduciary obligations to the company or terms of employment;(b) A person has undertaken actions that would be difficult to defend, when looked at objectively, as being in the interest of the licensee; and(c) A person has failed to declare a personal interest that has a material impact in terms of the person's relationship with the licensee.October 07HC-2.3 HC-2.3 Interpretative Guidance on 'Fit and Proper' Requirement
HC-2.3.1
In assessing a person's fitness and propriety, the CBB will consider previous professional and personal conduct (in Bahrain or elsewhere) including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The propriety of a person's conduct, whether or not such conduct resulted in a criminal offence being committed, the contravention of a law or regulation, or the institution of legal or disciplinary proceedings;(b) A conviction or finding of guilt in respect of any offence, other than a minor traffic offence, by any court or competent jurisdiction;(c) Any adverse finding in a civil action by any court or competent jurisdiction, relating to fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct in connection with the formation or management of a corporation or partnership;(d) Whether the person has been the subject of any disciplinary proceeding by any government authority, regulatory agency or professional body or association;(e) The contravention of any financial services legislation or regulation;(f) Whether the person has ever been refused a license, authorisation, registration or other authority;(g) Dismissal or a request to resign from any office or employment;(h) Disqualification by a court, regulator or other competent body, as a Director or as a manager of a corporation;(i) Whether the person has been a Director, partner or manager of a corporation or partnership which has gone into liquidation or administration or where one or more partners have been declared bankrupt whilst the person was connected with that partnership;(j) The extent to which the person has been truthful and open with supervisors;(k) The extent to which the person has appropriate professional and other qualifications for the controlled function in question;(l) The extent to which the person has sufficient experience, or is otherwise able to perform the functions of the controlled function in question;(m) Whether the person has ever been adjudged bankrupt, entered into any arrangement with creditors in relation to the inability to pay due debts, or failed to satisfy a judgement debt under a court order.October 07HC-2.3.2
With respect to HC-2.3.1(b), (c), (d) and (e), the CBB will take into account the length of time since any such event occurred, as well as the seriousness of the matter in question.
October 07HC-2.3.3
Further guidance on the process for assessing a person's 'fit and proper' status is given in Module EN (Enforcement): see Chapter EN-8.
October 07HC-3 HC-3 Compliance officer/manager
HC-3.1 HC-3.1 Introduction
HC-3.1.1
In order to promote best practice with respect to banks' internal systems and controls and international banking supervision, the Central Bank, in this Chapter, outlines its requirements for the compliance function of banks. The expression 'Compliance Function' in this Chapter is used to describe staff carrying out compliance duties.
October 07HC-3.1.2
The expression 'Compliance Risk', in this Chapter refers to the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material or financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, reporting requirements, standards and codes of conduct applicable to its activities, rather than compliance with a bank's internal limits or procedures.
October 07HC-3.1.3
For further information and guidance on compliance risk and the compliance function, banks should refer to the Basel Committee publication, 'Compliance and the compliance function in banks' (www.bis.org/publ April 2005). The Central Bank expects banks to carry out a review of their compliance with the principles in this paper on a regular basis (either by way of a self-assessment or by way of a review by the internal or external audit function).
October 07HC-3.2 HC-3.2 Requirement for and approval of a compliance officer/manager
HC-3.2.1
All banks must appoint a senior member of staff with responsibility for the management of compliance risk as their Compliance Officer/Manager.
October 07HC-3.2.2
The compliance function must be independent (i.e. it must not be placed in a position where its other duties or responsibilities may cause a conflict of interest with its compliance risk management responsibilities). Therefore the compliance function must be separate from the internal audit function. The compliance officer or manager may however, perform other limited related compliance roles (e.g. the MLRO or legal advisor), subject to the Central Bank's prior approval.
October 07HC-3.2.3
The compliance officer/manager must be appropriately qualified and experienced and the compliance function must have adequate resources to carry out its functions effectively.
October 07HC-3.2.4
The appointment of a compliance manager/officer requires the Central Bank's prior approval and the submission of the appointee's Personal Questionnaire (Appendix LR 2) and Curriculum Vitae to the Central Bank. The bank must also outline how the compliance function fits into the bank's senior management reporting structure, and must give details of relevant reporting lines within the bank.
October 07HC-3.2.5
In the case of locally incorporated banks, the compliance officer/manager must have access to the Board of Directors in addition to the senior management.
October 07HC HC High-Level Controls [Versions Up To April 2023]
HC-A HC-A Introduction
HC-A.1 HC-A.1 Purpose
Executive Summary
HC-A.1.1
This Module presents requirements that have to be met by
conventional bank licensees with respect to:(a) Corporate governance principles issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce as "The Corporate Governance Code"; and(b) International best practice corporate governance standards set by bodies such as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision; and(c) Related high-level controls and policies.Amended: April 2011
October 2010HC-A.1.2
The Principles referred to in this Module are in line with the Principles relating to the Corporate Governance Code issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
October 2010HC-A.1.3
The purpose of the Module is to establish best practice corporate principles in Bahrain, and to provide protection for investors and other
conventional bank licensee's stakeholders through compliance with those principles.October 2010HC-A.1.4
Whilst the Module follows best practice, it is nevertheless considered as the minimum standard to be applied. This Module also includes additional rules and guidance issued by the CBB prior to the publication of the Code and previously contained in Module HC.
October 2010Structure of this Module
HC-A.1.5
This Module follows the structure of the Corporate Governance Code and each Chapter deals with one of the eight Principles of corporate governance. The numbered directives included in the Code are Rules for purposes of this Module. Recommendations under the Code have been included as guidance. However, where the previous version of Module HC had a similar recommendation as a Rule, the Module retains this Paragraph as a Rule.
October 2010HC-A.1.6
The Module also incorporates other high-level controls and policies that apply in particular to
conventional bank licensees .October 2010HC-A.1.7
All references in this Module to 'he' or 'his' shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as also being references to 'she' and 'her'.
October 2010The Comply or Explain Principle
HC-A.1.8
This Module is issued as a Directive (as amended from time to time) in accordance with Article 38 of the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law 2006 ('CBB Law'). In common with other Rulebook Modules, this Module contains a mixture of Rules and Guidance (See Module UG-1.2 for detailed explanation of Rules and Guidance). All Rulebook content that is categorised as a Rule must be complied with by those to whom the content is addressed. Other parts of this Module are Guidance; nonetheless every
conventional bank licensee to whom Module HC applies, is expected to comply with recommendations made as Guidance in Module HC or explain its noncompliance in the Annual Report in accordance with Subparagraph PD-1.3.8(x) and to the CBB (see Chapter HC-8).Amended: April 2012
Amended: January 2011
October 2010Monitoring and Enforcement of Module HC
HC-A.1.9
Disclosure and transparency are underlying principles of Module HC. Disclosure is crucial to allow outside monitoring to function effectively. This Module looks to a combined monitoring system relying on the board, the
conventional bank licensee's shareholders and the CBB.October 2010HC-A.1.10
It is the board's responsibility to see to the accuracy and completeness of the
conventional bank licensee's corporate governance guidelines and compliance with Module HC. Failure to comply with this Module is subject to enforcement measures as outlined in Module EN (Enforcement).October 2010Legal Basis Legal Basis
HC-A.1.11
This Module contains the CBB's Directive (as amended from time to time) relating to high-level controls and is issued under the powers available to the CBB under Article 38 of the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law 2006 ('CBB Law'). The Directive in this Module is applicable to
conventional bank licensees (including theirapproved persons ).Amended: January 2011
October 2010HC-A.1.12
For an explanation of the CBB's rule-making powers and different regulatory instruments, see Section UG-1.1.
October 2010Effective Date
HC-A.1.13
The previous version of Module HC is applicable until 31st December 2010. This updated Module issued in October 2010, is effective on 1st January 2011. All
conventional bank licensees to which Module HC applies should be in full compliance by the financial year end 2011. At everyconventional bank licensee's annual shareholder meeting held after 1st January 2011, corporate governance should be an item on the agenda for information and any questions from shareholders regarding theconventional bank licensee's governance. Where possible, theconventional bank licensee should also have corporate governance guidelines in place at that time and should have a "comply or explain" report as described in Paragraph HC-A.1.8.October 2010HC-A.2 HC-A.2 Module History
HC-A.2.1
This Module was first issued in June 2004 by the BMA and updated in October 2007 to reflect the switch to the CBB. Following the issuance of the Corporate Governance Code by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in March 2010, the Module was amended in October 2010 to be in line with the new Corporate Governance Code and to include previous requirements that were in place in the originally issued Module HC. Any material changes that have subsequently been made to this Module are annotated with the calendar quarter date in which the change was made: Chapter UG-3 provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control.
October 2010HC-A.2.2
A list of recent changes made to this Module is detailed in the table below:
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes HC-1 to HC-8 10/2010 Amendments due to introduction of new MOIC Corporate Governance Code. HC-1.3 10/2010 Prohibition of proxies and requirement to attend 75% of board meetings in a financial year. HC-A.1.8 and HC-A.1.11 01/2011 Clarified legal basis. HC-2.2.4, 2.2.5 and 3.2.1 01/2011 Corrected cross references. HC-2.3.2 01/2011 Corrected cross reference; reference changed to connected persons. Appendix C 01/2011 Corrected cross reference. Appendix A 04/2011 Clarified membership of audit committee to be in line with Rule HC-3.2.1. HC-6.2.1 10/2011 Clarified management structure. HC-B.2.2 01/2012 Clarified language related to corporate governance. HC-1.2.8 and HC-1.5.3 01/2012 Clarified that the Chairman of the Board may delegate specific duties dealt with in these Paragraphs. HC-1.3.12 01/2012 Amended Rule on Directorships. HC-1.9.1 01/2012 Deleted last sentence to be in line with other Volumes of the CBB Rulebook. HC-3.2.1(a) and HC-5.6.6 01/2012 Amended to be in line with other Volumes of the CBB Rulebook. HC-6.3.1 01/2012 Clarified Rule by following corporate governance code wording. Appendix A 01/2012 Amended criteria for audit committee member. HC-A.1.8 04/2012 Clarified the reporting of noncompliance with Module HC in the Annual Report. HC-7.2.5 04/2012 Clarified Guidance on election of board members. Appendices A, B and C 04/2012 Amended requirement for written report on performance evaluation for various Board committees. Appendix A 04/2012 Included reference to compliance under Committee Duties and Responsibilities. HC-2.2.6A and HC-2.2.6B 07/2012 Added Rule and guidance dealing with benefits received from approved persons from projects and investments. Appendices A, B and C 07/2012 Clarified requirement for written report on performance evaluation for various Board committees. HC-1.3.7A 10/2012 Added requirement on minimum number of Board meetings to take place in the Kingdom of Bahrain to be consistent with other Volumes of the CBB Rulebook. HC-2.2.6A 10/2012 Clarified Rule dealing with benefits received from approved persons from projects and investments. Appendix A 10/2012 Corrected minor typo. HC-2.2.2 and HC-2.4.1 01/2013 Clarified scope of application for Rules. HC-2.2.6A, HC-5 and Appendix C 01/2014 Amendments due to new rules on sound remuneration practices. HC-1.2.6 04/2014 Clarified CBB's requirements for proposed changes to strategy and/or corporate plans. HC-5.2, HC-5.4 and HC-5.5 07/2014 Updated Rules on remuneration. HC-1.2.11 10/2014 Corrected cross reference. HC-1.3.10 10/2014 Corrected typo. HC-6.4.3 10/2014 Clarified self assessment of compliance function. HC-5.4.2 01/2015 Clarified application of remuneration rules for Bahrain operations. HC-5.4.5 01/2015 Paragraph deleted. HC-5.5.2 04/2015 Clarified cap on board of directors' remuneration as per Article 188 of the Company Law. HC-5.4.3A 07/2015 Amended to allow for CBB-approved consultancy firm to prepare report on the bank's compliance with the remuneration Rules outlined in Chapter HC-5. HC-2.3.3 04/2016 Added a requirement for the conventional bank licensee to have in place a board approved policy on the employment of relatives of approved persons. HC-2.4.1A 04/2016 Added the requirement to disclose to the board on annual basis relatives of any approved persons occupying controlled functions. HC-7.2 04/2016 Added requirements dealing with shareholders' meetings. HC-2.3 and HC-2.4 07/2016 Clarified application of rules to overseas conventional bank licensees. HC-5.4.30(a) and HC-5.4.30A 10/2016 Amended Standard for all Remuneration HC-5.2.1 01/2017 Amendment in sub-paragraph (b) HC-7.2.4 04/2017 Amendment in paragraph on website requirement. HC-8.2.1 04/2017 Amendment in sub-paragraph (b) on website requirement. HC-7.2.3A 07/2017 Amended paragraph to be in line with Article (199) of the Commercial Companies law. HC-2.4.1A 10/2017 Amended paragraph. HC-6.5 04/2018 Added new Section on Internal Audit. HC-1.8.1 07/2018 Amended paragraph to be consistent with HC-6.6. HC-6.6 07/2018 Added new Section on Risk Management. HC-6.5.5 10/2018 Amended Paragraph. HC-6.4 01/2019 Amended Section and added new requirements on Compliance. HC-6.6.2A 10/2019 Added a new Paragraph on branches of foreign bank licensees. HC-6.6.6 10/2019 Deleted Paragraph. HC-6.6.7 10/2019 Amended Paragraph on branches of foreign bank licensees. HC-1.4.11 01/2020 Added a new Paragraph on independent directors. HC-1.4.12 01/2020 Added a new Paragraph on termination of Board membership of a retired, terminated CEO. HC-6.4.7 & HC-6.4.10 01/2020 Amended Paragraphs on policy and procedures approval. HC-5.4.9A 04/2020 Added a new Paragraph on KPIs compliance with AML/CFT requirements. HC-6.2.1 04/2020 Amended Paragraph on reporting line. HC-6.6.33 01/2022 Amended Paragraph. HC-6.6.34 01/2022 Amended Paragraph. HC-6.6.35 01/2022 Added a new Paragraph on the independent third-party review. HC-6.6.36 01/2022 Added a new Paragraph on the independent review reports. HC-B HC-B Scope of Application
HC-B.1 HC-B.1 Scope of Application
HC-B.1.1
The contents of this Module - unless otherwise stated - apply to all
conventional bank licensees , incorporated under the Legislative Decree No. 21 of 2001, with respect to promulgating the Commercial Companies Law ('Company Law').October 2010HC-B.1.2
Overseas conventional bank licensees must satisfy the CBB that equivalent arrangements are in place at theparent entity level, and that these arrangements provide for effective high-level controls over activities conducted under the Bahrain license.October 2010HC-B.2 HC-B.2 Subsidiaries and Foreign Branches
HC-B.2.1
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must ensure that, as a minimum, the same or equivalent provisions of this Module apply to their foreignbranches , located outside the Kingdom of Bahrain, such that these are also subject to effective high-level controls. In instances where local jurisdictional requirements are more stringent than those applicable in this Module, the local requirements are to be applied.October 2010HC-B.2.2
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must satisfy the CBB that financial services activities conducted insubsidiaries and other group members are subject to the same or equivalent arrangements for ensuring effective corporate governance over their activities.Amended: January 2012
October 2010HC-B.2.3
Where a
conventional bank licensee is unable to satisfy the CBB that itssubsidiaries and other group members are subject to the same or equivalent arrangements, the CBB will assess the potential impact of risks — both financial and reputational — to the licensee arising from inadequate high-level controls in the rest of the group of which it is a member. In such instances, the CBB may impose restrictions on dealings between the licensee and other group members. Where weaknesses in controls are assessed by the CBB to pose a major threat to the stability of the licensee, then its authorisation may be called into question.October 2010HC-1 HC-1 The Board
HC-1.1 HC-1.1 Principle
HC-1.1.1
All
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must be headed by an effective, collegial and informed Board of Directors ('the Board').October 2010HC-1.2 HC-1.2 Role and Responsibilities
HC-1.2.1
All directors must understand the board's role and responsibilities under the Commercial Companies Law and any other laws or regulations that may govern their responsibilities from time to time. In particular:
(a) The board's role as distinct from the role of the shareholders (who elect the board and whose interests the board serves) and the role of officers (whom the board appoints and oversees); and(b) The board's fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to theconventional bank licensee and the shareholders (see HC-2.1).October 2010HC-1.2.2
The board's role and responsibilities include but are not limited to:
(a) The overall business performance and strategy for theconventional bank licensee ;(b) Causing financial statements to be prepared which accurately disclose theconventional bank licensee's financial position;(c) Monitoring management performance;(d) Convening and preparing the agenda for shareholder meetings;(e) Monitoring conflicts of interest and preventing abusive related party transactions;(f) Assuring equitable treatment of shareholders including minority shareholders; and(g) Establishing the objectives of the bank.October 2010HC-1.2.3
The precise functions reserved for the Board, and those delegated to management and committees will vary, dependent upon the business of the institution, its size and ownership structure. However, as a minimum, the Board must establish and maintain a statement of its responsibilities for:
(a) The adoption and annual review of strategy;(b) The adoption and review of management structure and responsibilities;(c) The adoption and review of the systems and controls framework; and(d) Monitoring the implementation of strategy by management.Amended: April 2011
October 2010HC-1.2.4
The directors are responsible both individually and collectively for performing the responsibilities outlined in HC-1.2.1 to HC-1.2.3. Although the Board may delegate certain functions to committees or management, it may not delegate its ultimate responsibility to ensure that an adequate, effective, comprehensive and transparent corporate governance framework is in place.
October 2010HC-1.2.5
In its strategy review process under Paragraphs HC-1.2.3 a) and d), the Board must:
(a) Review the bank's business plans and the inherent level of risk in these plans;(b) Assess the adequacy of capital to support the business risks of the bank;(c) Set performance objectives; and(d) Oversee major capital expenditures, divestitures and acquisitions.Amended: April 2011
October 2010HC-1.2.6
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must obtain the CBB's prior written approval for all major proposed changes to the strategy and/or corporate plan of theBahraini conventional bank licensee prior to implementation (see also Paragraph BR-5.2.6).Amended: April 2014
October 2010HC-1.2.7
The Board is expected to have effective policies and processes in place for:
(a) Approving budgets and reviewing performance against those budgets and key performance indicators; and(b) The management of the bank's compliance risk.Amended: April 2011
October 2010HC-1.2.8
When a new director is inducted, the chairman of the board, or the
conventional bank licensee's legal counsel or compliance officer, or other individual delegated by the chairman of the board, should review the board's role and duties with that person, particularly covering legal and regulatory requirements and Module HC (see also HC-4.5.1).Amended: January 2012
October 2010HC-1.2.9
The
conventional bank licensee must have a written appointment agreement with each director which recites the directors' powers, duties, responsibilities and accountabilities and other matters relating to his appointment including his term, the time commitment envisaged, the committee assignment if any, hisremuneration and expense reimbursement entitlement, and his access to independent professional advice when that is needed.October 2010Risk Recognition and Assessment
HC-1.2.10
The Board is responsible for ensuring that the systems and controls framework, including the Board structure and organisational structure of the bank, is appropriate for the bank's business and associated risks (see HC-1.2.3 c). The Board must ensure that collectively it has sufficient expertise to identify, understand and measure the significant risks to which the bank is exposed in its business activities.
The Board must regularly assess the systems and controls framework of the bank. In its assessments, the Board must demonstrate to the CBB that:
(a) The bank's operations, individually and collectively are measured, monitored and controlled by appropriate, effective and prudent risk management systems commensurate with the scope of the bank's activities;(b) The bank's operations are supported by an appropriate control environment. The compliance, risk management and financial reporting functions must be adequately resourced, independent of business lines and must be run by individuals not involved with the day-to-day running of the various business areas. The Board must additionally ensure that management develops, implements and oversees the effectiveness of comprehensive know your customer standards, as well as on-going monitoring of accounts and transactions, in keeping with the requirements of relevant law, regulations and best practice (with particular regard to anti-money laundering measures). The control environment must maintain necessary client confidentiality and ensure that the privacy of the bank is not violated, and ensure that clients' rights and assets are properly safeguarded; and(c) Where the Board has identified any significant issues related to the bank's adopted governance framework, appropriate and timely action is taken to address any identified adverse deviations from the requirements of this Module.Amended: April 2011
October 2010HC-1.2.11
The board must adopt a formal board charter or other statement specifying matters which are reserved to it, which should include but need not be limited to the specific requirements and responsibilities of directors. This charter must cover the points in HC-1.2.1 to HC-1.2.10. Wherever possible, the documents referred to in HC-1.2.3 to HC-1.2.10 or a summary of responsibilities should be disclosed publicly, for example in the annual report, which must be submitted to the CBB in line with the requirements of Module BR.
Amended: October 2014
October 2010HC-1.3 HC-1.3 Decision Making Process
HC-1.3.1
The board must be collegial and deliberative, to gain the benefit of each individual director's judgment and experience.
October 2010HC-1.3.2
The chairman must take an active lead in promoting mutual trust, open discussion, constructive dissent and support for decisions after they have been made.
October 2010HC-1.3.3
The board must meet frequently to enable it to discharge its responsibilities effectively but in no event less than four times a year. All directors must attend the meetings whenever possible and the directors must maintain informal communication between meetings.
October 2010HC-1.3.4
Individual board members must attend at least 75% of all Board meetings in a given financial year to enable the Board to discharge its responsibilities effectively (see table below). Voting and attendance proxies for Board meetings are prohibited at all times.
Meetings per year 75% Attendance requirement 4 3 5 4 6 5 7 5 8 6 9 7 10 8 October 2010HC-1.3.5
The absence of Board members at Board and committee meetings must be noted in the meeting minutes. In addition, Board attendance percentage must be reported during any general assembly meeting when board members stand for re-election (e.g. Board member XYZ attended 95% of scheduled meetings this year).
October 2010HC-1.3.6
In the event that a Board member has not attended at least 75% of Board meetings in any given financial year, the bank must immediately notify the CBB indicating which member has failed to satisfy this requirement, his level of attendance and any mitigating circumstances affecting his non-attendance. The CBB shall then consider the matter and determine whether disciplinary action, including disqualification of that Board member pursuant to Article 65 of the CBB Law, is appropriate. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, it is likely that the CBB will take disciplinary action.
October 2010HC-1.3.7
To meet its obligations under Rule HC-1.3.3 above, the full Board should meet once every quarter to address the Board's responsibilities for management oversight and performance monitoring Furthermore, Board rules should require members to step down if they are not actively participating in Board meetings. Board members are reminded that non attendance at board meetings does not absolve them of their responsibilities as directors. It is important that each individual director should allocate adequate time and effort to discharge his responsibilities. All Directors are expected to contribute actively to the work of the Board in order to discharge their responsibilities and should make every effort to attend board meetings where major issues are to be discussed. Banks are encouraged to amend their Articles of Association to provide for telephonic and videoconference meetings. Participation in board meetings by means of video or telephone conferencing is regarded as attendance and may be recorded as such.
October 2010HC-1.3.7A
At least half the Board meetings of
Bahraini conventional bank licensees in any twelve-month period must be held in the Kingdom of Bahrain.Added: October 2012HC-1.3.8
All locally incorporated banks are required to submit, on an annual basis, as an attachment to the year-end quarterly PIR, a report recording the meetings during the year by their Board of Directors. For a sample report, refer to Appendix BR-10.
October 2010HC-1.3.9
The Chairman is responsible for the leadership of the Board, and for the efficient functioning of the Board. The chairman must ensure that all directors receive an agenda, minutes of prior meetings, and adequate background information in writing before each board meeting and when necessary between meetings. Therefore it is vital that the Chairman commit sufficient time to perform his role effectively. All directors must receive the same board information. At the same time, directors have a legal duty to inform themselves and they must ensure that they receive adequate and timely information and must study it carefully (See also HC-7 for other duties of the Chairman).
October 2010HC-1.3.10
The board should have no more than 15 members, and should regularly review its size and composition to ensure that it is small enough for efficient decision making yet large enough to have members who can contribute from different specialties and viewpoints. The board should recommend changes in board size to the shareholders when a needed change requires amendment of the
conventional bank licensee's Memorandum of Association.Amended: October 2014
October 2010HC-1.3.11
Potential
non-executive directors should be made aware of their duties before their nomination, particularly as to the time commitment required. The Nominating Committee should regularly review the time commitment required from eachnon-executive director and should require eachnon-executive director to inform the Committee before he accepts any board appointments to another company.October 2010HC-1.3.12
No Board member may have more than one Directorship of a Retail Bank or a Wholesale Bank. This means an effective cap of a maximum of two Directorships of banks inside Bahrain. Two Directorships of licensees within the same Category (e.g. 'Retail Bank') are not permitted. Banks may approach the CBB for exemption from this limit where the Directorships concern banks or financial institutions within the same group.
Amended: January 2012
October 2010HC-1.3.13
One person should not hold more than three directorships in public companies in Bahrain with the provision that no conflict of interest may exist, and the Board should not propose the election or reelection of any director who does.
October 2010HC-1.4 HC-1.4 Independence of Judgment
HC-1.4.1
Every director must bring independent judgment to bear in decision making. No individual or group of directors must dominate the board's decision-making and no one individual should have unfettered powers of decision.
October 2010HC-1.4.2
Executive directors must provide the board with all relevant business and financial information within their cognizance, and must recognise that their role as a director is different from their role as a member of management (see HC-2.3.2).October 2010HC-1.4.3
Non-executive directors must be fully independent of management and must constructively scrutinise and challenge management including the management performance ofexecutive directors .October 2010HC-1.4.4
Where there is the potential for conflict of interest, or there is a need for impartiality, the Board must assign a sufficient number of independent Board members capable of exercising independent judgement. At a minimum, all locally incorporated banks must appoint one independent director.
October 2010HC-1.4.5
At least half of a
conventional bank licensee's board should benon-executive directors and at least three of those persons should beindependent directors . (Note the exception for controlled companies in Paragraph HC-1.5.2.)October 2010HC-1.4.6
The chairman of the board should be an
independent director , so that there will be an appropriate balance of power and greater capacity of the board for independent decision making.October 2010HC-1.4.7
The Chairman and/or Deputy Chairman must not be the same person as the Chief Executive Officer.
October 2010HC-1.4.8
The Chairman must not be an Executive Director.
October 2010HC-1.4.9
The board should review the independence of each director at least annually in light of interests disclosed by them, and their conduct. Each
independent director shall provide the board with all necessary and updated information for this purpose.October 2010HC-1.4.10
To facilitate free and open communication among
independent directors , each board meeting should be preceded or followed with a session at which onlyindependent directors are present, except as may otherwise be determined by theindependent directors themselves.October 2010HC-1.4.11
Where an
independent director has served three consecutive terms on the board, such director will lose his/her independence status and must not be classified as anindependent director if reappointed.Added: January 2020HC-1.4.12
Where a Chief Executive Officer of a Bank, who is also a Board member, no longer occupies the CEO position, whether due to resignation, retirement or termination, his/her Board Membership must also be immediately terminated.
Added: January 2020HC-1.5 HC-1.5 Representation of all Shareholders
HC-1.5.1
Each director must consider himself as representing all shareholders and must act accordingly. The board must avoid having representatives of specific groups or interests within its membership and must not allow itself to become a battleground of vested interests. If the
conventional bank licensee hascontrollers (as defined by Module GR-5.2) (or a group of controllers acting in concert), the latter must recognise its or their specific responsibility to the other shareholders, which is direct and is separate from that of the board of directors.October 2010HC-1.5.2
In
conventional bank licensees with acontroller , at least one-third of the board must beindependent directors . Minority shareholders must generally look toindependent directors' diligent regard for their interests, in preference to seeking specific representation on the board.October 2010HC-1.5.3
In
conventional bank licensees withcontrollers , both controllers and other shareholders should be aware ofcontrollers' specific responsibilities regarding their duty of loyalty to theconventional bank licensee and conflicts of interest (see Chapter HC-2) and also of rights that minority shareholders may have to elect specific directors under the Company Law or if theconventional bank licensee has adopted cumulative voting for directors. The chairman of the board or other individual delegated by the chairman of the board should take the lead in explaining this with the help of theconventional bank licensee's lawyers.Amended: January 2012
October 2010HC-1.6 HC-1.6 Directors' Access to Independent Advice
HC-1.6.1
The board must ensure by way of formal procedures that individual directors have access to independent legal or other professional advice at the
conventional bank licensee's expense whenever they judge this necessary to discharge their responsibilities as directors and this must be in accordance with theconventional bank licensee's policy approved by the board.October 2010HC-1.6.2
Individual directors must also have access to the
conventional bank licensee's corporate secretary, who must have responsibility for reporting to the board on board procedures. Both the appointment and removal of the corporate secretary must be a matter for the board as a whole, not for the CEO or any other officer.October 2010HC-1.6.3
Whenever a director has serious concerns which cannot be resolved concerning the running of the
conventional bank licensee or a proposed action, he should consider seeking independent advice and should ensure that the concerns are recorded in the board minutes and that any dissent from a board action is noted or delivered in writing.October 2010HC-1.6.4
Upon resignation, a
non-executive director should provide a written statement to the chairman, for circulation to the board, if he has any concerns such as those in Paragraph HC-1.6.3.October 2010HC-1.7 HC-1.7 Directors' Communication with Management
HC-1.7.1
The board must encourage participation by management regarding matters the board is considering, and also by management members who by reason of responsibilities or succession, the CEO believes should have exposure to the directors.
October 2010HC-1.7.2
Non-executive directors should have free access to theconventional bank licensee's management beyond that provided in board meetings. Such access should be through the Chairman of the Audit Committee or CEO. The board should make this policy known to management to alleviate any management concerns about a director's authority in this regard.October 2010HC-1.8 HC-1.8 Committees of the Board
HC-1.8.1
The board must establish Audit, Remuneration, Nominating and Risk Committees described elsewhere in this Module.
Amended: July 2018
October 2010HC-1.8.2
The board should establish a corporate governance committee of at least three independent members which should be responsible for developing and recommending changes from time to time in the
conventional bank licensee's corporate governance policy framework.Amended: January 2012
October 2010HC-1.8.3
The board or a committee may invite non-directors to participate in, but not vote at, a committee's meetings so that the committee may gain the benefit of their advice and expertise in financial or other areas.
October 2010HC-1.8.4
Committees must act only within their mandates and therefore the board must not allow any committee to dominate or effectively replace the whole board in its decision-making responsibility.
October 2010HC-1.8.5
Committees may be combined provided that no conflict of interest might arise between the duties of such committees, subject to CBB prior approval.
October 2010HC-1.8.6
Every committee must have a formal written charter similar in form to the model charters which are set forth in Appendices A, B and C of this Module for the Audit, Nominating and Remuneration Committees.
October 2010HC-1.8.7
Where committees are set up, they should keep full minutes of their activities and meet regularly to fulfil their mandates. For larger banks that deal with the general public, committees can be a more efficient mechanism to assist the main Board in its monitoring and control of the activities of the bank. The establishment of committees should not mean that the role of the Board is diminished, or that the Board becomes fragmented.
October 2010HC-1.9 HC-1.9 Evaluation of the Board and Each Committee
HC-1.9.1
At least annually the board must conduct an evaluation of its performance and the performance of each committee and each individual director.
Amended: January 2012
October 2010HC-1.9.2
The evaluation process must include:
(a) Assessing how the board operates, especially in light of Chapter HC-1;(b) Evaluating the performance of each committee in light of its specific purposes and responsibilities, which shall include review of the self-evaluations undertaken by each committee;(c) Reviewing each director's work, his attendance at board and committee meetings, and his constructive involvement in discussions and decision making;(d) Reviewing the board's current composition against its desired composition with a view toward maintaining an appropriate balance of skills and experience and a view toward planned and progressive refreshing of the board; and(e) Recommendations for new Directors to replace long-standing members or those members whose contribution to the bank or its committees (such as the audit committee) is not adequate.October 2010HC-1.9.3
While the evaluation is a responsibility of the entire board, it should be organised and assisted by an internal board committee and, when appropriate, with the help of external experts.
October 2010HC-1.9.4
The board should report to the shareholders, at each annual shareholder meeting, that evaluations have been done and report its findings.
October 2010HC-2 HC-2 Approved Persons Loyalty
HC-2.1 HC-2.1 Principle
HC-2.1.1
The
approved persons must have full loyalty to theconventional bank licensee .October 2010HC-2.2 HC-2.2 Personal Accountability
HC-2.2.1
Banks are subject to a wide variety of laws, regulations and codes of best practice that directly affect the conduct of business. Such laws involve the Bahraini Stock Exchange Law, the Labour Law, the Commercial Companies Law, occupational health and safety, even environment and pollution laws, as well as the Law, codes of conduct and regulations of the Central Bank. The Board sets the 'tone at the top' of a bank, and has a responsibility to oversee compliance with these various requirements. The Board should ensure that the staff conduct their affairs with a high degree of integrity, taking note of applicable laws, codes and regulations.
October 2010Corporate Ethics, Conflicts of Interest and Code of Conduct
HC-2.2.2
Each member of the board must understand that under the Company Law he is personally accountable to the
conventional bank licensee and the shareholders if he violates his legal duty of loyalty to theconventional bank licensee , and that he can be personally sued by theconventional bank licensee or the shareholders for such violations.Amended: January 2013
October 2010HC-2.2.3
The Board must establish corporate standards for
approved persons and employees. This requirement should be met by way of a documented and published code of conduct or similar document. These standards must be communicated throughout the bank, so that theapproved persons and staff understand the importance of conducting business based on good corporate governance values and understand their accountabilities to the various stakeholders of the licensee. Banks'approved persons and staff must be informed of and be required to fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities to the bank's stakeholders.October 2010HC-2.2.4
An internal code of conduct is separate from the business strategy of a bank. A code of conduct should outline the practices that
approved persons and staff should follow in performing their duties. Banks may wish to use procedures and policies to complement their codes of conduct. The suggested contents of a code of conduct are covered below:(a) Commitment by the Board and management to the code. The code of conduct should be linked to the objectives of the bank, and its responsibilities and undertakings to customers, shareholders, staff and the wider community (see HC-2.2.3 and HC-2.2.4). The code should give examples or expectations of honesty, integrity, leadership and professionalism;(b) Commitment to the law and best practice standards. This commitment would include commitments to following accounting standards, industry best practice (such as ensuring that information to clients is clear, fair, and not misleading), transparency, and rules concerning potential conflicts of interest (see HC-2.3);(c) Employment practices. This would include rules concerning health and safety of employees, training, policies on the acceptance and giving of business courtesies, prohibition on the offering and acceptance of bribes, and potential misuse ofconventional bank licensee's assets;(d) How theconventional bank licensee deals with disputes and complaints from clients and monitors compliance with the code; and(e) Confidentiality. Disclosure of client or bank information should be prohibited, except where disclosure is required by law (see HC-1.2.10 b).Amended: April 2011
Amended: January 2011
October 2010HC-2.2.5
The Central Bank expects that the Board and its members individually and collectively:
(a) Act with honesty, integrity and in good faith, with due diligence and care, with a view to the best interest of the bank and its shareholders and other stakeholders (see Paragraphs HC-2.2.2 to HC-2.2.4);(b) Act within the scope of their responsibilities (which should be clearly defined—see HC-1.2.9 and HC-1.2.11 and not participate in the day-to-day management of the bank;(c) Have a proper understanding of, and competence to deal with the affairs and products of the bank and devote sufficient time to their responsibilities; and(d) To independently assess and question the policies, processes and procedures of the bank, with the intent to identify and initiate management action on issues requiring improvement. (i.e. to act as checks and balances on management).Amended: April 2011
Amended: January 2011
October 2010HC-2.2.6
The duty of loyalty (mentioned in Paragraph HC-2.2.2 above) includes a duty not to use property of the
conventional bank licensee for his personal needs as though it was his own property, not to disclose confidential information of theconventional bank licensee or use it for his personal profit, not to take business opportunities of theconventional bank licensee for himself, not to compete in business with theconventional bank licensee , and to serve theconventional bank licensee's interest in any transactions with a company in which he has a personal interest.October 2010HC-2.2.6A
[This Paragraph was moved to Paragraph HC-5.4.39].
Amended: January 2014
Amended: October 2012
Added: July 2012HC-2.2.6B
[This Paragraph was moved to Paragraph HC-5.4.40].
Amended: January 2014
Added: July 2012HC-2.2.7
For purposes of Paragraph HC-2.2.6, an
approved person should be considered to have a "personal interest" in a transaction with a company if:(a) He himself; or(b) A member of his family (i.e. spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers or sisters); or(c) Another company of which he is a director or controller,is a party to the transaction or has a material financial interest in the transaction. (Transactions and interests which are de minimis in value should not be included.)
October 2010HC-2.3 HC-2.3 Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest
HC-2.3.1
Each
approved person must make every practicable effort to arrange his personal and business affairs to avoid a conflict of interest with theconventional bank licensee .October 2010HC-2.3.2
The Board must establish and disseminate to its members and management, policies and procedures for the identification, reporting, disclosure, prevention, or strict limitation of potential conflicts of interest. It is
senior management's responsibility to implement these policies. Rules concerning connected party transactions and potential conflicts of interest may be dealt with in the Code of Conduct (see HC-2.2.4). In particular, the CBB requires that any decisions to enter into transactions, under whichapproved persons would have conflicts of interest that are material, should be formally and unanimously approved by the full Board. Best practice would dictate that anapproved person must:a) Not enter into competition with the bank;b) Not demand or accept substantial gifts from the bank for himself orconnected persons ;c) Not misuse the bank's assets;d) Not use theconventional bank licensee's privileged information or take advantage of business opportunities to which theconventional bank licensee is entitled, for himself or his associates; ande) Absent themselves from any discussions or decision-making that involves a subject where they are incapable of providing objective advice, or which involves a subject or (proposed) transaction where a conflict of interest exists.Amended: January 2011
October 2010HC-2.3.3
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must have in place a board approved policy on the employment of relatives ofapproved persons and a summary of such policy must be disclosed in the annual report of theBahraini conventional bank licensee .Amended: July 2016
Added: April 2016HC-2.3.4
Overseas conventional bank licensees must have in place a policy on the employment of relatives ofapproved persons pertaining to their Bahrain operations.Added: July 2016HC-2.4 HC-2.4 Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest
HC-2.4.1
Each
approved person must inform the entire board of (potential) conflicts of interest in their activities with, and commitments to other organisations as they arise. Board members must abstain from voting on the matter in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Company Law. This disclosure must include all material facts in the case of a contract or transaction involving theapproved person . Theapproved persons must understand that any approval of a conflicted transaction is effective only if all material facts are known to the authorising persons and the conflicted person did not participate in the decision. In any case, allapproved persons must declare in writing all of their other interests in other enterprises or activities (whether as a shareholder of above 5% of the voting capital of a company, a manager, or other form of significant participation) to the Board (or the Nominations or Audit Committees) on an annual basis.Amended: January 2013
Amended: January 2011
October 2010HC-2.4.1A
The chief executive/general manager of the
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must disclose to the board of directors on an annual basis those individuals who are occupyingcontrolled functions and who are relatives of anyapproved persons within theBahraini conventional bank licensee .Amended: October 2017
Amended: July 2016
Added: April 2016HC-2.4.1B
The chief executive/general manager of the
overseas conventional bank licensees must disclose to a designated officer at its head office or regional manager on an annual basis those individuals who are occupyingcontrolled functions and who are relatives of anyapproved persons within theoverseas conventional bank licensee .Added: July 2016HC-2.4.2
The board of a
Bahraini conventional bank licensee should establish formal procedures for:(a) Periodic disclosure and updating of information by eachapproved person on his actual and potential conflicts of interest; and(b) Advance approval by directors or shareholders who do not have an interest in the transactions in which aconventional bank licensee's approved person has a personal interest. The board should require such advance approval in every case.Amended: July 2016
October 2010HC-2.5 HC-2.5 Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest to Shareholders
HC-2.5.1
The
conventional bank licensee must disclose to its shareholders in the Annual Report any abstention from voting motivated by a conflict of interest and must disclose to its shareholders any authorisation of a conflict of interest contract or transaction in accordance with the Company Law.October 2010HC-3 HC-3 Audit Committee and Financial Statements Certification
HC-3.1 HC-3.1 Principle
HC-3.1.1
The Board must have rigorous controls for financial audit and reporting, internal control, and compliance with law.
October 2010HC-3.2 HC-3.2 Audit Committee
HC-3.2.1
The board must establish an audit committee of at least three directors of which the majority must be independent including the Chairman. The committee must:
(a) Review theconventional bank licensee's accounting and financial practices;(b) Review the integrity of theconventional bank licensee's financial and internal controls and financial statements (particularly with reference to information passed to the Board - see HC-1.2.10). The information needs of the Board to perform its monitoring responsibilities must be defined in writing, and regularly monitored by the Audit Committee;(c) Review theconventional bank licensee's compliance with legal requirements;(d) Recommend the appointment, compensation and oversight of theconventional bank licensee's external auditor; and(e) Recommend the appointment of the internal auditor.Amended: January 2012
Amended: January 2011
October 2010HC-3.2.2
In its review of the systems and controls framework in Paragraph HC-3.2.1, the audit committee must:
(a) Make effective use of the work of external and internal auditors. The audit committee must ensure the integrity of the bank's accounting and financial reporting systems through regular independent review (by internal and external audit). Audit findings must be used as an independent check on the information received from management about the bank's operations and performance and the effectiveness of internal controls; and(b) Make use of self-assessments, stress/scenario tests, and/or independent judgements made by external advisors. The Board should appoint supporting committees, and engage senior management to assist the audit committee in the oversight of risk management; and(c) Ensure that senior management have put in place appropriate systems of control for the business of the bank and the information needs of the Board; in particular, there must be appropriate systems and functions for identifying as well as for monitoring risk, the financial position of the bank, and compliance with applicable laws, regulations and best practice standards. The systems must produce information on a timely basis.October 2010HC-3.2.3
The
conventional bank licensee must set up an internal audit function, which reports directly to the Audit Committee and administratively to theCEO .October 2010HC-3.2.4
The
CEO must not be a member of the audit committee.October 2010HC-3.3 HC-3.3 Audit Committee Charter
HC-3.3.1
The audit committee must adopt a written charter which shall, at a minimum, state the duties outlined in Paragraph HC-3.2.1 and the other matters included in Appendix A to this Module.
October 2010HC-3.3.2
A majority of the audit committee must have the financial literacy qualifications stated in Appendix A.
October 2010HC-3.3.3
The board should adopt a "whistleblower" program under which employees can confidentially raise concerns about possible improprieties in financial or legal matters. Under the program, concerns may be communicated directly to any audit committee member or, alternatively, to an identified officer or employee who will report directly to the Audit Committee on this point.
October 2010HC-3.4 HC-3.4 CEO and CFO Certification of Financial Statements
HC-3.4.1
To encourage management accountability for the financial statements required by the directors, the
conventional bank licensee's CEO and chief financial officer must state in writing to the audit committee and the board as a whole that theconventional bank licensee's interim and annual financial statements present a true and fair view, in all material respects, of theconventional bank licensee's financial condition and results of operations in accordance with applicable accounting standards.October 2010HC-4 HC-4 Appointment, Training and Evaluation of the Board
HC-4.1 HC-4.1 Principle
HC-4.1.1
The
conventional bank licensee must have rigorous and transparent procedures for appointment, training and evaluation of the Board.October 2010HC-4.2 HC-4.2 Nominating Committee
HC-4.2.1
The board must establish a Nominating Committee of at least three directors which must:
(a) Identify persons qualified to become members of the board of directors or Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Secretary and any other officers of theconventional bank licensee considered appropriate by the Board, with the exception of the appointment of the internal auditor which shall be the responsibility of the Audit Committee in accordance with Paragraph HC-3.2.1 above; and(b) Make recommendations to the whole board of directors including recommendations of candidates for board membership to be included by the board of directors on the agenda for the next annual shareholder meeting.October 2010HC-4.2.2
The committee must include only
independent directors or, alternatively, onlynon-executive directors of whom a majority must beindependent directors and the chairman must be anindependent director . This is consistent with international best practice and it recognises that the Nominating Committee must exercise judgment free from personal career conflicts of interest.October 2010HC-4.3 HC-4.3 Nominating Committee Charter
HC-4.3.1
The Nominating Committee must adopt a formal written charter which must, at a minimum, state the duties outlined in Paragraph HC-4.2.1 and the other matters included in Appendix B to this Module.
October 2010HC-4.4 HC-4.4 Board Nominations to Shareholders
HC-4.4.1
Each proposal by the board to the shareholders for election or reelection of a director must be accompanied by a recommendation from the board, a summary of the advice of the Nominating Committee, and the following specific information:
(a) The term to be served, which may not exceed three years (but there need not be a limit on reelection for further terms);(b) Biographical details and professional qualifications;(c) In the case of anindependent director , a statement that the board has determined that the criteria ofindependent director have been met;(d) Any other directorships held;(e) Particulars of other positions which involve significant time commitments, and(f) Details of relationships between:(i) The candidate and theconventional bank licensee , and(ii) The candidate and other directors of theconventional bank licensee. October 2010HC-4.4.2
The chairman of the board should confirm to shareholders when proposing re-election of a director that, following a formal performance evaluation, the person's performance continues to be effective and continues to demonstrate commitment to the role. Any term beyond six years (e.g. two three-year terms) for a director should be subject to particularly rigorous review, and should take into account the need for progressive refreshing of the board. Serving more than six years is relevant to the determination of a non-executive director's independence.
October 2010HC-4.5 HC-4.5 Induction and Training of Directors
HC-4.5.1
The chairman of the board must ensure that each new director receives a formal and tailored induction to ensure his contribution to the board from the beginning of his term. The induction must include meetings with senior management, visits to the
conventional bank licensee's facilities, presentations regarding strategic plans, significant financial, accounting and risk management issues, compliance programs, its internal and external auditors and legal counsel.October 2010HC-4.5.2
All continuing directors must be invited to attend orientation meetings and all directors must continually educate themselves as to the
conventional bank licensee's business and corporate governance.October 2010HC-4.5.3
Management, in consultation with the chairman of the board, should hold programs and presentations to directors respecting the
conventional bank licensee's business and industry, which may include periodic attendance at conferences and management meetings. The Nominating Committee shall oversee directors' corporate governance educational activities.October 2010HC-5 HC-5 Remuneration of Approved Persons and Material Risk-Takers
HC-5.1 HC-5.1 Principle
HC-5.1.1
The
conventional bank licensee must remunerateapproved persons andmaterial risk-takers fairly and responsibly.Amended: January 2014
October 2010HC-5.2 HC-5.2 Role of the Board of Directors and Remuneration Committee
HC-5.2.1AA
The board of directors must actively oversee the remuneration system s design and operation for
approved persons as well as formaterial risk-takers . The CEO andsenior management must not primarily control the remuneration system.Added: January 2014HC-5.2.1
The Board must establish a remuneration committee of at least three directors which must:
(a) Review theconventional bank licensee's remuneration policies for theapproved persons andmaterial risk-takers , which must be approved by the shareholders and be consistent with the corporate values and strategy of the bank;(b) Approve theremuneration package and amounts for eachapproved person andmaterial risk-taker , as well as the total variable remuneration to be distributed, taking account of totalremuneration including salaries, fees, expenses, bonuses and other employee benefits;(c) Approve, monitor and review the remuneration system to ensure the system operates as intended; and(d) Recommend Board member remuneration based on their attendance and performance and in compliance with Article 188 of the Company Law.Amended: January 2017
Amended: July 2014
Amended: January 2014
October 2010HC-5.2.1A
In reviewing the remuneration system (see Subparagraph HC-5.2.1(c)), the remuneration committee should ensure that the system includes effective controls, including back testing and stress testing of the remuneration policy. The practical operation of the system should be regularly reviewed for compliance with regulations, internal policies and bank procedures. In addition, remuneration outcomes, risk measurements, and risk outcomes should be regularly reviewed by the Board for consistency with Board's approved risk appetite.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.2.1B
Stress testing or stressed measures might be used by banks to help ex-ante risk adjustments take into account severe but plausible scenarios, based on possible expected loss on loans, as an example. Due to the uncertainty of payoffs, there will always be a need for ex-post adjustments so as to back-test actual performance against risk assumptions.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.2.1C
As part of the duties noted under Paragraph HC-5.2.1, the remuneration committee must carefully evaluate practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain. It must demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of the bank's financial condition and future prospects.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.2.2
The committee may be merged with the nominating committee.
October 2010HC-5.3 HC-5.3 Remuneration Committee Charter
HC-5.3.1
The committee must adopt a written charter which must, at a minimum, state the duties in Paragraph HC-5.2.1 and other matters in Appendix C of this Module.
October 2010HC-5.3.1A
Members of the remuneration committee must have independence of any risk taking function or committees.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.3.2
The committee should include only
independent directors or, alternatively, onlynon-executive directors of whom a majority areindependent directors and the chairman is anindependent director . This is consistent with international best practice and it recognises that the remuneration committee must exercise judgment free from personal career conflicts of interest.October 2010HC-5.4 HC-5.4 Standard for all Remuneration
HC-5.4.1
Remuneration ofapproved persons andmaterial risk-takers must be sufficient enough to attract, retain and motivate persons of the quality needed to run theconventional bank licensee successfully, but theconventional bank licensee must avoid paying more than is necessary for that purpose.Amended: January 2014
October 2010HC-5.4.2
While this Section applies to all
approved persons andmaterial risk-takers for the Bahrain operations, the rules on the proportion of fixed and variableremuneration (Paragraph HC-5.4.30) as well as those rules related to the deferral of variableremuneration (Paragraphs HC-5.4.31 and HC-5.4.32) and the obligation to have part of the variableremuneration in shares (Paragraphs HC-5.4.33 and HC-5.4.34) apply only to:(a)Approved persons ; or(b)Material risk-takers whose total annual
remuneration (including all benefits) is in excess of BD100,000, unless the board of directors requires the application of these Rules to all staff.Amended: January 2015
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.2A
The reference to 'Bahrain operations' in Paragraph HC-5.4.2 refers to any activities carried on from an establishment in Bahrain.
Added: April 2015HC-5.4.3
All policies for performance-based incentives should be approved by the shareholders, but the approval should be only of the plan itself and not of the grant to specific individuals of benefits under the plan.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.3A
As noted in Sections AU-3.6 and BR-4A.3, the external auditor or a CBB approved consultancy firm must undertake an annual review of the bank's compliance with the remuneration Rules outlined in this Chapter. The results of this review are to be submitted to the CBB within 3 months from the financial year end.
Amended: July 2015
Moved from HC-5.4.6 to HC-5.4.3A: January 2015
Added: January 2014Application to Overseas Conventional Banks
HC-5.4.4
Banks operating as
overseas conventional bank licensees in Bahrain must apply the most stringent set of remuneration rules to which they may be subject to. Such rules are:(a) The requirements imposed in Bahrain with respect to remuneration as outlined in Volume 1 CBB Rulebook; and(b) The requirements imposed by their home supervisor and head office.Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.5
[This Paragraph was deleted in January 2015.]
Deleted: January 2015
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.6
[Moved to Paragraph HC-5.4.3A in January 2015.]
Amended: January 2015
Added: January 2014Approved Persons in Risk Management, Internal Audit, Operations, Financial Controls, Internal Shari'a Review/Audit, AML and Compliance Functions
HC-5.4.7
The bank's
approved persons engaged in risk management, internal audit, operations, financial controls, internal Shari'a review/audit, AML and compliance functions must be independent, have appropriate authority, and be remunerated in a manner that is independent of the business areas they oversee and commensurate with their key role in the bank. Effective independence and appropriate authority of such staff are necessary to preserve the integrity of financial risk and management's influence on incentive remuneration.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.8
The performance measures of
approved persons referred to in Paragraph HC-5.4.7 must be based principally on the achievement of the objectives and targets of their functions.Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.9
The mix of fixed and variable remuneration for risk management, internal audit, operations, financial controls, internal Shari'a review/audit, AML and compliance functions personnel must be weighted in favour of fixed remuneration.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
Alignment of All Staff Remuneration with Compliance with AML/CFT Requirements
HC-5.4.9A
The performance evaluation and remuneration of senior management and staff of the
conventional bank licensees must be based on the achievement of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) relevant to ensuring compliance with AML/CFT requirements as specified in Paragraphs FC-2.1.3 and FC-2.1.4.Added: April 2020Effective Alignment of Remuneration with Prudent Risk-Taking
HC-5.4.10
Remuneration must be adjusted for all types of risks.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.11
In relation to Paragraph HC-5.4.10, two employees who generate the same short-run profit but take different amounts of risk on behalf of their bank should not be treated the same by the remuneration system.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.12
Both quantitative measures and human judgement must play a role in determining risk adjustments.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.13
Risk adjustments must account for all types of risk, including intangible and other risks such as reputation risk, liquidity risk and the cost of capital.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.14
Banks' remuneration policies and practices must be designed to reduce employees' incentives to take excessive and undue risk.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.15
Remuneration outcomes must be symmetric with risk outcomes.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.16
The mix of cash, equity and other forms of remuneration must be consistent with risk alignment. The mix will vary depending on the employee's position and role and the bank must be able to explain the rationale for its mix to the CBB.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.17
Existing contractual payments related to a termination of employment must be re-examined, and kept in place only if there is a clear basis for concluding that they are aligned with long-term value creation and prudent risk-taking. Prospectively, any such payments must be related to performance achieved over time and designed in a way that does not reward failure.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.18
Banks must ensure that their employees commit themselves not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements. Banks must ensure that appropriate compliance mechanisms are in place to monitor their employees commitment in this regard such as signed adherence by staff to the bank's code of ethics which should include the conditions outlined in this Paragraph.
Added: January 2014
Variable Remuneration
HC-5.4.19
Remuneration systems must link the size of the bonus pool to the overall performance of the bank.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.20
Employees' incentive payments must be linked to the contribution of the individual and business to such performance.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.21
As profits and losses of different activities of a bank are realised over different periods of time, remuneration payout schedules must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks and variable remuneration must therefore be deferred accordingly. Variable remuneration must not be finalised over short periods where risks are realised over long periods.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.22
The remuneration committee of the bank must question payouts for income that cannot be realised or whose likelihood of realisation remains uncertain at the time of payout.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.23
Banks must ensure that total variable remuneration does not limit their ability to strengthen their capital base. The extent to which capital needs to be built up must be a function of a bank's current capital position and its ICAAP.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.24
The size of the variable remuneration pool and its allocation within the bank must take into account the full range of current and potential risks, including:
(a) The cost and quantity of capital required to support the risks taken;(b) The cost and quantity of the liquidity risk assumed in the conduct of business; and(c) Consistency with the timing and likelihood of potential future revenues incorporated into current earnings.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014HC-5.4.25
Paragraph HC-5.4.24 focuses on the overall size of the variable remuneration, at the overall bank level, in order to ensure that the recognition and accrual of variable remuneration will not compromise the financial soundness of the bank.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.26
Bonuses must diminish or be deferred in the event of poor bank, divisional or business unit performance.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.27
Subdued or negative financial performance of the bank should generally lead to a considerable contraction of the bank's total variable remuneration, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus and clawback arrangements. Recognition of staff who have achieved their targets or better, may take place by way of deferred compensation, which may be paid once the bank's performance improves.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.28
If the bank and/or relevant line of business is incurring losses in any year during the vesting period, any unvested portions must be subject to
malus .Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.29
Accrual and deferral of variable remuneration does not oblige the bank to pay the variable remuneration, particularly when the anticipated outcome has not materialised or the bank's financial position does not support such payments.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.30
For
approved persons andmaterial risk-takers , other than those covered under Paragraphs HC-5.4.9 and Section HC-5.5, as their actions have a material impact on the risk exposure of the bank:(a) An appropriate ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration must be set to ensure that fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and paid on the basis of individual, business-unit and bank-wide measures that adequately measure performance; and(b) The variable proportion of remuneration must increase significantly along with the level of seniority and/or responsibility.Amended: October 2016
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014HC-5.4.30A
The Level of the fixed component referred to in Subparagraph HC-5.4.30(a) should represent a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable component.
Amended: October 2016
Added: July 2014HC-5.4.31
For purposes of Paragraph HC-5.4.30:
(a) At least 40% of the variable remuneration must be payable under deferral arrangements over a period of at least 3 years; and(b) For the CEO, his deputies and the other 5 most highly paid business line employees, at least 60% of the variable remuneration must be payable under deferral arrangements over a period of at least 3 years.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.32
The deferral period referred to under Subparagraph HC-5.4.31(a) must be aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the employee in question. Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements should generally vest no faster than on a pro rata basis.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.33
As a minimum, 50% of variable remuneration (including both the deferred and undeferred portions of the variable remuneration) must be awarded in shares or share-linked instruments or where appropriate, other non-cash instruments.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.34
The remaining portion (other than that mentioned under Paragraph HC-5.4.33) of the deferred remuneration can be paid as cash remuneration vested over a minimum 3-year period.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.34A
The only instance where deferred
remuneration can be paid out before the end of the vesting period is in the case of the death of the employee where the beneficiaries would receive any unpaid deferredremuneration .Added: July 2014HC-5.4.35
Banks must not provide any form of guaranteed variable remuneration as part of the overall remuneration package. Exceptional minimum variable remuneration must only occur in the context of hiring new staff and limited to the first year.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
Remuneration in the Form of Shares or Share-Linked Instruments
HC-5.4.36
Awards in shares or share-linked instruments must be subject to a minimum share retention policy of 6 months from the time the shares are awarded, unless the bank's policy requires a longer period.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014HC-5.4.37
For
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , where fixed or variable remuneration include common shares, banks must limit the shares awarded to an annual aggregate limit of 10% of the total issued shares outstanding of the bank, at all times.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.38
For
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , all share incentive plans must be approved by the shareholders.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
Remuneration from Projects and Investments
HC-5.4.39
In reference to Paragraph HC-2.2.6, for greater certainty,
approved persons are not allowed to take any benefits from any projects or investments which are managed by theconventional bank licensee or promoted to its customers or potential customers except for board related remuneration (declared as per Paragraph HC-2.4.1) linked to their fiduciary duties to the investors of the project/investment. This Rule applies to allapproved persons including those appointed as members of the board of special purpose vehicles or other operating companies set up by theconventional bank licensee for projects or investments.Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.40
The reference to benefits in Paragraph HC-5.4.39 includes commission, fees, shares, consideration in kind, or other remuneration or incentives in respect of the performance of the project or investment
Added: January 2014
HC-5.5 HC-5.5 Board of Directors' Remuneration
HC-5.5.1
Remuneration ofnon-executive directors must not include performance-related elements such as grants of shares, share options or other deferred stock-related incentive schemes, bonuses, or pension benefits.October 2010HC-5.5.2
The Board of Directors' remuneration must be capped so that total remuneration is in line with Article 188 of the Company Law, in any financial year and has been approved by the shareholders.
Amended: April 2015
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.5.3
If a
senior manager is also a director, hisremuneration as asenior manager must take into account compensation received in his capacity as a director.Added: January 2014
HC-5.5.4
In the years where the bank has not generated any profits it must comply with the approval requirements of Article 188 of the Company Law.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.5.5
In addition to the requirements of Article 188 of the Company Law, the articles of association regarding remuneration of the board of directors must be in line with the Rules outlined in this Chapter.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.6 HC-5.6 [This Section was deleted and is replaced with requirements contained under Section HC-5.4]
Deleted: January 2014
HC-5.6.1
[This paragraph was deleted and is replaced with requirements contained under Section HC-5.4]
Deleted: January 2014HC-5.6.2
[This paragraph was deleted and is replaced with requirements contained under Section HC-5.4]
Deleted: January 2014HC-5.6.3
[This paragraph was deleted and is replaced with requirements contained under Section HC-5.4]
Deleted: January 2014HC-5.6.4
[This paragraph was deleted and is replaced with requirements contained under Section HC-5.4]
Deleted: January 2014HC-5.6.5
[This paragraph was deleted and is replaced with requirements contained under Section HC-5.4]
Deleted: January 2014HC-5.6.6
[This paragraph was deleted and is replaced with requirements contained under Section HC-5.4]
Deleted: January 2014HC-6 HC-6 Management Structure
HC-6.1 HC-6.1 Principle
HC-6.1.1
The board must establish a clear and efficient management structure.
October 2010HC-6.2 HC-6.2 Establishment of Management Structure
HC-6.2.1
The board must appoint senior management whose authority must include management and operation of current activities of the
conventional bank licensee under the direction and oversight of the board. The senior management must include at a minimum:(a) ACEO ;(b) A chief financial officer;(c) A corporate secretary; and(d) An internal auditor,and must also include such other
approved persons as the board considers appropriate.Amended: April 2020
Amended: October 2011
Added: October 2010HC-6.3 HC-6.3 Titles, Authorities, Duties and Reporting Responsibilities
HC-6.3.1
The board must adopt by-laws prescribing each
senior manager's title, authorities, duties, accountabilities and internal reporting responsibilities. This must be done with the advice of the Nominating Committee and in consultation with theCEO , to whom the other senior managers should normally report.Amended: January 2012
October 2010HC-6.3.2
These provisions must include but should not be limited to the following:
(a) TheCEO must have authority to act generally in theconventional bank licensee's name, representing theconventional bank licensee's interests in concluding transactions on theconventional bank licensee's behalf and giving instructions to other senior managers andconventional bank licensee employees;(b) The chief financial officer must be responsible and accountable for:(i) The complete, timely, reliable and accurate preparation of theconventional bank licensee's financial statements, in accordance with the accounting standards and policies of the conventional bank licensee (see also HC-3.4.1); and(ii) Presenting the board with a balanced and understandable assessment of theconventional bank licensee's financial situation;(c) The corporate secretary's duties must include arranging, recording and following up on the actions, decisions and meetings of the Board and of the shareholders (both at annual and extraordinary meetings) in books to be kept for that purpose; and(d) The internal auditor's duties must include providing an independent and objective review of the efficiency of theconventional bank licensee's operations. This would include a review of the accuracy and reliability of theconventional bank licensee's accounting records and financial reports as well as a review of the adequacy and effectiveness of theconventional bank licensee's risk management, control, and governance processes.October 2010HC-6.3.3
The board should also specify any limits which it wishes to set on the authority of the
CEO or other senior managers, such as monetary maximums for transactions which they may authorise without separate board approval.October 2010HC-6.3.4
The corporate secretary should be given general responsibility for reviewing the
conventional bank licensee's procedures and advising the board directly on such matters (see Rule HC-6.3.2(c)). Whenever practical, the corporate secretary should be a person with legal or similar professional experience and training.October 2010HC-6.3.5
At least annually the board shall review and concur in a succession plan addressing the policies and principles for selecting a successor to the
CEO , both in emergencies and in the normal course of business. The succession plan should include an assessment of the experience, performance, skills and planned career paths for possible successors to theCEO .October 2010HC-6.4 HC-6.4 Compliance
HC-6.4.1
Compliance starts at the top. It will be most effective in a corporate culture that emphasises standards of honesty and integrity and in which the board of directors and senior management lead by example. It concerns everyone within the bank and should be viewed as an integral part of the bank's business activities. A bank should hold itself to high standards when carrying on business, and at all times strive to observe the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Failure to consider the impact of its actions on its shareholders, customers, employees and the markets may result in significant adverse publicity and reputational damage, even if no law has been broken.
Amended: January 2019
October 2010HC-6.4.2
Conventional bank licensees must establish an effective compliance framework, which is appropriate for the size and complexity of their operations, for managing their compliance risks.Amended: January 2019
October 2010HC-6.4.3
The term "Compliance risk" refers to the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regulations, directives, directions, reporting requirements and codes of conduct, including internal code of conduct.
Amended: January 2019
Amended: October 2014
October 2010HC-6.4.4
Compliance laws, rules and standards generally cover matters such as observing proper prudential standards, standards of market conduct, managing conflicts of interest, treating customers fairly and ensuring suitability of customer advice, as well as matters specified in HC-6.4.3 above. They typically include specific areas such as the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, and may extend to tax laws that are relevant to the structuring of banking products or customer advice.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.5
It is important that banks do not consider compliance function as a cost center rather it is an activity that enhances the reputation of the bank and promotes the right environment for better financial performance.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.6
The relationship between a bank's business units, the support functions and the compliance function can be explained using the three lines of defence model.
a) The business units are the first line of defence. They undertake the management of risks within assigned limits of risk exposure and are responsible and accountable for identifying, assessing and controlling the risks of their business.b) The second line of defence includes the support functions, such as risk management, compliance, legal, human resources, finance, operations, and technology. Each of these functions, in close relationship with the business units, ensures that risks in the business units have been appropriately identified and managed. The business support functions work closely to help define strategy, implement bank policies and procedures, and collect information to create a bank-wide view of risks.c) The third line of defence is the internal audit function that independently assesses the effectiveness of the controls over the processes created in the first and second lines of defence and provides assurance on these processes. The responsibility for internal control does not transfer from one line of defence to the next line.Added: January 2019Responsibilities of the Board of Directors
HC-6.4.7
The board of directors of a
conventional bank licensee is responsible for overseeing the management of the bank's compliance risk. The board must establish a permanent and effective compliance function and approve the bank's compliance policies for identifying, assessing, monitoring, reporting and advising on compliance risk. At least once a year, the board or a designated board committee must assess the extent to which the bank is managing its compliance risk effectively. The board must also ensure that the agenda for the meetings of the board or the designated board committee include compliance as a topic at least every quarter.Amended: January 2020
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.8
The board designated committee referred to in HC-6.4.7 may be the audit committee, the governance committee, the risk committee, or other committee which does not have a role in the business or executive roles, such as those relevant to executive committees and investment committees. For
branches of foreign bank licensees , all references in this Section to the Board/the designated board committee should be interpreted as the Group Compliance Officer or a sufficiently senior level Regional Compliance Committee or Officer.Added: January 2019Responsibilities of the Senior Management
HC-6.4.9
Senior management is responsible for effective management of bank's compliance risk.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.10
Senior management is responsible for establishing the operating framework and the processes to support a permanent and an effective compliance function. It is responsible for establishing and communicating a written compliance policy through all levels of the organisation for ensuring that it is adhered to in practice. It is responsible also for approving the bank's compliance procedures for identifying, assessing, monitoring, reporting and advising on compliance risk.Amended: January 2020
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.11
The compliance policy must be approved by the Board/the designated board committee and must address the following:
(a) The role and responsibilities of the compliance function;(b) Measures to ensure its independence;(c) Its relationship with other risk management functions within the bank and with the internal audit function;(d) In cases where compliance responsibilities are carried out by staff in different departments, how these responsibilities are to be allocated among the departments;(e) Its right to obtain access to information necessary to carry out its responsibilities, and the corresponding duty of bank staff to cooperate in supplying this information;(f) Its right to conduct investigations of possible breaches of the relevant laws and regulations and the compliance policy and to appoint outside experts to perform this task if appropriate; and(g) Its right to be able freely to express and disclose its findings to the board of directors or to the designated board committee, e.g. the audit committee or the governance committee of the board.(h) The basic principles to be followed by management and staff describing the main processes by which compliance risks are to be identified and managed through all levels of the organization.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.12
The Board and the designated Board committee must ensure that all compliance findings and recommendations are resolved within six months for high risk/critical issues and 9 months for any other issues from the issue date of the subject compliance report unless otherwise agreed with the CBB taking into consideration time required for specific issues that may require substantive changes to technology, systems and/or processes.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.13
Senior management must assess the training needs of staff taking into account the existing skills and competencies, the nature of changes to laws and regulations in developing a training plan for compliance across all levels throughout the organisation. Training must be provided by competent and skilled personnel, whether available internally or externally. Training that is provided must reflect the seniority, role and responsibilities of the individuals for whom it is intended.Added: January 2019Compliance Function
HC 6.4.14
Conventional bank licensees must organise their compliance function and set priorities for the management of their compliance risk in a way that is consistent with their own risk management strategy and structures.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.15
The compliance function must be independent and effective. It must be headed by an executive or senior staff member with overall responsibility for co-ordinating the identification and management of the bank's compliance risk and for supervising the activities of other compliance function staff
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.16
The Head of Compliance, with the assistance of
senior management must:(a) report to the board of directors or the designated committee of the board on a quarterly basis, even if there are no issues to highlight,(b) report to the board or the designated committee of the board on the bank's management of its compliance risk, in such a manner as to assist board members to make an informed judgment on whether the bank is managing its compliance risk effectively;(c) report promptly to the board or the designated committee of the board on any material compliance failures as they arise (e.g. failures that may attract a significant risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation); and(d) ensure that senior management develop remedial action plans to address compliance breaches.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.17
The role of head of compliance may be combined with those of the head of risk if the size and nature of the bank justifies a single function for both roles. Banks which carry out limited operations or are small branches of foreign banks would qualify for such a practice.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.18
The compliance function should assist senior management, the board and the designated committee of the board in their compliance obligations and help promote the right culture within the bank. While the board and management are accountable for the bank's compliance, the compliance function has an important role in supporting corporate values, policies and processes that help ensure that the bank acts responsibly and fulfils all applicable obligations.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.19
The independence and effectiveness of the function must be based on the following related elements:
(a) The compliance function must have a formal status with sufficient authority within the bank;(b) There must be a group compliance officer or head of compliance with overall responsibility for co-ordinating the management of the bank's compliance risk;(c) Compliance function staff, and in particular, the head of compliance, must not be placed in a position where there is a possible conflict of interest between their compliance responsibilities and any other responsibilities they have;(d) Compliance function staff must have access to the information and personnel necessary to carry out their responsibilities; and(e) The compliance function must directly report to the board or a designated board committee in the case ofBahraini conventional bank licensees ) and administratively to the CEO; and(f) In the case ofbranches of foreign bank licensees , the reporting must be to the Group Compliance Officer or Regional Compliance Officer and may report administratively to the CEO/GM of the branch.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.20
The concept of independence does not mean that the compliance function cannot work closely with management and staff in the various business units. Indeed, a co-operative working relationship between compliance function and business units should help to identify and manage compliance risks at an early stage. Rather, the various elements described above should be viewed as safeguards to help ensure the effectiveness of the compliance function, notwithstanding the close working relationship between the compliance function and the business units. The way in which the safeguards are implemented will depend to some extent on the specific responsibilities of individual compliance function staff.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.21
The compliance function should be free to highlight to senior management on any irregularities or possible breaches disclosed by its investigations, without fear of retaliation or disfavour from management or other staff members.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.22
Appointment, dismissal and other changes to the head of compliance must be approved by the board or the designated board committee. Appointments of head of compliance must be approved by the CBB in accordance with paragraph LR-IA.1.17. If the head of compliance is removed from his or her position for any reason, this must be notified to the CBB, describing fully the reasons as required under paragraph LR-1A.1.22.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.23
Conventional bank licensees must ensure that the compliance risk management framework is subject to an independent review by a third party consultant, other than the external auditor, every three years and when there are material changes to the business. The results of the independent review and action must be provided to the CBB by 30th September of the relevant year.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.24
The responsibilities of the compliance function must be carried out under a compliance programme that sets out its planned activities, such as the implementation and review of specific policies and procedures, compliance risk assessment, compliance testing, and educating staff on compliance matters. The compliance programme must be risk based and subject to oversight by the head of compliance to ensure appropriate coverage across businesses and co-ordination among risk management functions.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.25
The Compliance function must on a pro-active basis, identify, measure, document and assess the compliance risks associated with the bank's business activities including the development of new products and business practices; the proposed establishment of new types of business or customer relationships, or material changes in the nature of such relationships. If the bank has a new products committee, the compliance function staff should be represented on the committee.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.26
While the Compliance function is responsible for oversight and compliance checks across the full spectrum of compliance risk areas, it is recognised that many areas of compliance require specialist skills which can be found in different parts of the organisation, example, the skill sets for compliance with ICAAP can be found either with financial control or with risk management, for compliance with labour laws, the specialist skills are with human resources departments etc. In such cases, the compliance function ensures that the right levels of checks and balances and compliance reporting are available to get comfort that the licensee has adhered to the relevant requirements. In certain instances, it may use external experts with the approval of the relevant authority within the bank.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.27
The compliance function should consider ways to measure compliance risk (e.g. by using performance indicators) and use such measurements to enhance compliance risk assessment.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.28
In case of new regulations, the compliance function must assess the appropriateness of the bank's compliance procedures and guidelines, promptly follow up any identified deficiencies, and, where necessary, formulate proposals for amendments.
Added: January 2019Monitoring, testing and reporting
HC-6.4.29
The compliance function must monitor and test compliance by performing sufficient and representative compliance testing. The results of the compliance testing must be reported to the board or designated committee of the board.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.30
The compliance function must advise
senior management and the designated committee of the board on all relevant laws, rules and standards, in all jurisdictions in which the bank conducts its business, and inform them on developments in the subject.Added: January 2019Guidance and education
HC-6.4.31
The compliance function must assist senior management in:
a) Educating staff on compliance issues, and acting as a contact point within the bank for compliance queries from staff members; andb) Establishing written guidance to staff on the appropriate implementation of laws, rules and standards through policies and procedures and other documents such as manuals, internal codes of conduct and practice guidelines.Added: January 2019Statutory responsibilities and liaison
HC-6.4.32
The compliance function must have specific statutory responsibilities (e.g. fulfilling the role of anti-money laundering officer). It may also liaise with relevant external bodies, including regulators, standard setters and external experts.
Added: January 2019Right of access
HC-6.4.33
The compliance function must have access across the entire organisation to carry out its responsibilities on its own initiative where compliance risk exists. It must, additionally, have the right to communicate with any staff member and to obtain access to any records or files necessary to conduct its responsibilities and to conduct investigations of possible breaches of the compliance policy and to request assistance from specialists within the bank (e.g. legal or internal audit) or engage outside specialists subject to appropriate internal approval to perform this task if appropriate.
Added: January 2019Competent Resources
HC-6.4.34
The compliance function must have adequate resources to carry out its functions effectively commensurate with the size and complexity of the organisation. The resources to be provided for the compliance function must be both sufficient and appropriate to ensure that compliance risk within the bank is managed effectively.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.35
The compliance function staff must have the necessary qualifications, experience and professional and personal qualities to enable them to carry out their specific duties. Compliance function staff must have a sound understanding of laws, rules and standards and their practical impact on the bank's operations.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.36
The professional skills of compliance function staff, especially with respect to keeping up-to-date with developments in compliance laws, rules and standards, must be maintained through regular and systematic education and training.
Relationship with Internal Audit
HC-6.4.37
The scope and breadth of the activities of the compliance function must be subject to periodic review by the internal audit function.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.38
Compliance risk must be included in the risk assessment methodology of the internal audit function, and an audit programme that covers the adequacy and effectiveness of the bank's compliance function should be established, including testing of controls commensurate with the perceived level of risk.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.39
The compliance function and the internal audit function must be separate, to ensure that the activities of the compliance function are subject to independent review. It is important, therefore, that there is a clear understanding within the bank as to how risk assessment and testing activities are divided between the two functions, and that this is documented (e.g. in the bank's compliance policy or in a related document such as a protocol). The internal audit function must, of course, keep the head of compliance informed of any audit findings relating to compliance.
Added: January 2019Cross-border Issues
HC-6.4.40
Conventional bank licensees that conduct business through a branch or subsidiary in other jurisdictions must through the Group Compliance Function:(a) comply with local laws and regulations;(b) have Group Compliance policy and procedures;(c) Conduct annual compliance testing on overseas operations whose total revenue represents 20% or more of the Group's total revenue and on every two years basis for other overseas operations.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.41
Conventional bank licensees must have procedures in place to identify and assess the possible increased reputational risk to the bank if it offers products or carries out activities in certain jurisdictions.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.42
Conventional bank licensees with overseas operations must establish a Group Compliance Function which must oversee the compliance activities on a group-wide basis. The Group Compliance Officer must ensure that compliance reviews and checks are carried out at branches and subsidiaries. As legal and regulatory requirements may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, compliance issues specific to each jurisdiction must be coordinated within the structure of the bank's group-wide compliance policy.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.43
The
senior management with assistance of Group Compliance Officer must ensure that adequate resources, commensurate with the scale and complexity of the operations, are assigned for compliance activities at, the head office, branches and subsidiaries.Added: January 2019HC-6.4.44
The Group Compliance Officer must ensure that adequate reports and information is received from overseas branches and subsidiaries on compliance related issues.
Added: January 2019Outsourcing
HC-6.4.45
Compliance function or its activities must not be outsourced.
Added: January 2019Other requirements
HC-6.4.46
Every application/request for approval to the CBB must be accompanied by a compliance assessment report confirming that all related requirements pertaining to the request have been thoroughly checked by the compliance function including the impact of such a request on the licensee's financial position and compliance status. In addition, reference must be made to any previously approved arrangements by the CBB.
Added: January 2019HC6.4.47
In cases where the requests have a potential financial impact on the licensee a report from the financial control function in consultation with external auditors must also be submitted as part of the compliance assessment report, whereas in case of any legal implication of such a request a legal opinion on the matter must be submitted.
Added: January 2019HC-6.4.48
Where breaches or deficiencies have occurred due to failures by approved persons, the CBB may consider re-assessing the fitness and propriety of such persons.
Added: January 2019HC-6.5 HC-6.5 Internal Audit
Introduction
HC-6.5.1
Conventional bank licensees must establish and implement an effective internal audit function which provides an independent and objective assurance to the board of directors andsenior management on the quality and effectiveness of a bank's internal control, risk management and governance systems and processes, to protect the bank and its reputation.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.2
The internal audit function must develop an independent and informed view of the risks faced by the bank based on its access to all bank records and data, its enquiries, and its professional competence. The internal audit function must discuss its views, findings and conclusions directly with the audit committee and, if necessary with the board of directors at their routine quarterly meetings, thereby helping the board to oversee
senior management .Added: April 2018HC-6.5.3
In this Section, all references to the board of directors may also be taken as referring to the bank's audit committee where the audit committee is mandated to carry out such functions on the board's behalf.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.4
For
branches of foreign bank licensees , and where no local board of directors exists, all references in this Module to the board of directors should be interpreted as the Head Office/ Regional Office.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.5
Branches should ensure that equivalent arrangements are in place at the parent level for the requirements in this Section and these arrangements provide for an effective internal audit function over activities conducted under the Bahrain license.
Amended: October 2018
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.6
The extent of application of this Section must be commensurate with the significance, complexity and international presence of the bank (principle of proportionality).
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.7
The key features for the effective operation of an internal audit function are:
(a) Independence and objectivity;(b) Professional competence and due professional care; and(c) Professional ethicsAdded: April 2018Independence and Objectivity
HC-6.5.8
Conventional bank licensees internal audit function must be independent of the audited activities. This means that the internal audit is independent of all functions including compliance, risk management and financial control functions. The internal audit function must also have sufficient standing and authority within the bank and must operate according to sound principles.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.9
The internal audit function must report directly to the audit committee and administratively to the CEO, thereby providing a framework for internal auditors to carry out their assignments with objectivity.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.10
The internal audit function must be able to perform its assignments on its own initiative in all areas and functions of the bank based on the audit plan established by the head of the internal audit function and approved by the board of directors or audit committee. It must be free to report its findings and assessments internally through clear reporting lines. The head of internal audit must demonstrate appropriate leadership and have the necessary personal characteristics and professional skills to fulfill his or her responsibility for maintaining the function's independence and objectivity.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.11
The internal audit function must not be involved in designing, selecting, implementing or operating specific internal control measures. However, the independence of the internal audit function must not prevent
senior management from requesting input from internal audit on matters related to risk and internal controls. Nevertheless, the development and implementation of internal controls must remain the responsibility of management.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.12
Conventional bank licensees should, whenever practicable and without jeopardising competence and expertise, periodically rotate internal audit staff within the internal audit function.Added: April 2018Professional Competence and Due Professional Care
HC-6.5.13
The head of internal audit must have the responsibility for acquiring human resources with sufficient qualifications and skills to effectively deliver on the mandate for professional competence and to audit to the required level. He/she must continually assess and monitor the skills necessary to do so. The skills required for senior internal auditors must include the abilities to judge outcomes and make an impact at the highest level of the organisation.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.14
For purposes of Paragraph HC-6.5.13, professional competence depends on the auditor's capacity to collect and understand information, to examine and evaluate audit evidence and to communicate with the stakeholders of the internal audit function.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.15
The head of internal audit must ensure that internal audit staff acquire appropriate ongoing training in order to meet the growing technical complexity of the
Conventional Bank licensee's activities and the increasing diversity of tasks that need to be undertaken as a result of the introduction of new products and processes within theConventional Bank licensee and other developments in the financial sector.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.16
The internal audit function collectively must be competent to examine all areas in which the bank operates. When internal audit is outsourced, the head of internal audit/coordinator must ensure that the use of those experts does not compromise the independence and objectivity of the internal audit function.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.17
For purposes of Paragraph HC-6.5.16, the coordinator must be an approved person within the
Conventional Bank licensee .Added: April 2018HC-6.5.18
The head of internal audit/coordinator should ensure that, whenever practical, the relevant knowledge input from an expert is assimilated into the organisation. This may be possible by having one or more members of the bank's internal audit staff participate in the external expert's work.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.19
Internal auditors must apply the care and skills expected of a reasonably prudent and competent professional. Due professional care does not imply infallibility; however, internal auditors having limited competence and experience in a particular area must be appropriately supervised by more experienced internal auditors.
Added: April 2018Professional Ethics
HC-6.5.20
Internal auditors must act with integrity. Integrity includes, being straightforward, honest and truthful.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.21
Internal auditors must respect the confidentiality of information acquired in the course of their duties. They must not use that information (particularly 'confidential information' as defined in Article 116 of the CBB Law) for personal gain or malicious action and must be diligent in the protection of information acquired.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.22
The head of the internal audit function and all internal auditors must avoid conflicts of interest (see Section HC-2.3). Internally recruited internal auditors must not engage in auditing activities for which they have had previous responsibility before a one year "cooling off" period has elapsed.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.23
Internal auditors must adhere to the code of ethics of both the bank and The Institute of Internal Auditors (see Section HC-2.2).
Added: April 2018Internal Audit Charter
HC-6.5.24
All
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must have an internal audit charter that articulates the purpose, standing and authority of the internal audit function within the bank in a manner that promotes an effective internal audit function as described in Paragraph HC-6.5.1.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.25
The charter must be drawn up and reviewed annually by the head of internal audit and approved by the board of directors or audit committee. It must be available to all internal stakeholders and, in certain circumstances, such as listed entities, to external stakeholders.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.26
At a minimum, the internal audit charter must establish:
(a) The internal audit function's standing within the bank, its authority, its responsibilities and its relations with other control functions in a manner that promotes the effectiveness of the function as described in Paragraphs HC-6.5.1 and HC-6.5.2;(b) The purpose and scope of the internal audit function;(d) The obligation of the internal auditors to communicate the results of their engagements and a description of how and to whom this must be done (reporting line);(e) The criteria for when and how the internal audit function may outsource some of its engagements to external experts;(f) The terms and conditions according to which the internal audit function can be called upon to provide consulting or advisory services or to carry out other special tasks;(g) The responsibility and accountability of the head of internal audit;(h) A requirement to comply with sound internal auditing standards; and(i) Procedures for the coordination of the internal audit function with the external auditor.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.27
The charter must empower the internal audit function, whenever relevant to the performance of its assignments and discharge of its duties, to initiate direct communication with any member of staff, to examine any activity or entity of the bank, and to have full and unconditional access to any records, files, data and physical properties of the bank. This includes access to management information systems and records and the minutes of board and sub-board committee meetings and all consultative and decision-making committees.
Added: April 2018Scope of Activity
HC-6.5.28
The scope of internal audit activities must include the examination and evaluation of the effectiveness of the internal control, risk management and governance systems and processes of the entire bank, including the bank's outsourced activities and its subsidiaries (including SPVs) and branches.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.29
The internal audit function must independently evaluate the:
(a) Effectiveness and efficiency of internal control, risk management and governance systems and processes created by the business units and support functions in the context of both current and potential or actual emerging risks and provide assurance on these systems and processes;(b) Reliability, effectiveness and integrity of management information systems and processes (including relevance, accuracy, completeness, availability, confidentiality and comprehensiveness of data);(c) Monitoring of compliance with laws and regulations, including any requirements from the CBB; and(d) Safeguarding of assets.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.30
The head of internal audit must establish, prior to year-end an annual internal audit plan. It must be based on a robust risk assessment (including direct or indirect input from
senior management and the board).Added: April 2018HC-6.5.31
The audit committee's approval of the audit plan also requires that an appropriate budget will be available to support the internal audit function's activities.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.32
The scope of the internal audit function's activities must ensure adequate coverage of matters of regulatory interest within the audit plan.
Added: April 2018Risk Management
HC-6.5.33
Internal audit must include in its scope the following aspects of risk management:
(a) The organisation and mandates of the risk management function including market, credit, liquidity, interest rate and operational risks;(b) Evaluation of risk appetite, escalation and reporting of issues and decisions taken by the risk management function;(c) The adequacy of risk management systems and processes for identifying, measuring, assessing, controlling, responding to, and reporting on all the risks resulting from the bank's activities;(d) The integrity of the risk management information systems, including the accuracy, reliability and completeness of the data used;(e) The approval and maintenance of risk models including verification of the consistency, timeliness, independence and reliability of data sources used in such models;(f) Information technology and information security;(g) The bank's system for identifying and measuring its regulatory capital and assessing the adequacy of its capital resources in relation to the bank's risk exposures and established minimum ratios; and(h) The review of management's process for stress testing its capital levels, taking into account the frequency of such exercises, their purpose (e.g., internal monitoring vs. regulator imposed), the reasonableness of scenarios and the underlying assumptions employed, and the reliability of the processes used.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.34
When the risk management function has not informed the board of directors about the existence of a significant divergence of views between
senior management and the risk management function regarding the level of risk faced by the bank, the head of internal audit must inform the audit committee about this divergence.Added: April 2018Capital Adequacy and Liquidity
HC-6.5.35
The internal audit must review the bank's system for identifying and measuring its regulatory capital and assessing the adequacy of its capital resources in relation to the bank's risk exposures and established minimum ratios.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.36
Internal audit must review management's process for stress testing its capital levels.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.37
Internal audit must review the effectiveness of the bank's systems and processes for measuring and monitoring its liquidity positions in relation to its risk profile, external environment, and minimum regulatory requirements including the requirement set out in Paragraph CA-1.3.4.
Added: April 2018Regulatory and Internal Reporting
HC-6.5.38
The internal audit function must regularly evaluate the effectiveness of the process by which the risk and reporting functions interact to produce timely, accurate, reliable and relevant reports for both internal management and the CBB. Such reports include, but not limited to, the PIR and public disclosure requirements included in the CBB Rulebook, Module PD.
Added: April 2018Compliance
HC-6.5.39
The internal audit function must periodically review the scope of the activities of the compliance function using the risk-based approach. The audit of the compliance function must include an assessment of how effectively it fulfils its responsibilities.
Added: April 2018Finance
HC-6.5.40
The internal audit function must periodically review the controls over the bank's finance function using the risk-based approach.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.41
The internal audit function must devote sufficient resources to evaluate the valuation control environment, availability and reliability of information or evidence used in the valuation process and the reliability of estimated fair values. This is achieved through reviewing the independent price verification processes and testing valuations of significant transactions.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.42
The internal audit function must, as a minimum, also include the following aspects in its scope:
(a) The organisation and mandate of the finance function;(b) The adequacy and integrity of underlying financial data and finance systems and processes for completely identifying, capturing, measuring and reporting key data such as profit or loss, valuations of financial instruments and impairment allowances;(c) The approval and maintenance of pricing models including verification of the consistency, timeliness, independence and reliability of data sources used in such models;(d) Controls in place to prevent and detect trading irregularities;(e) Balance sheet controls including key reconciliations performed and actions taken (e.g. adjustments).Added: April 2018Permanency of the Internal Audit Function
HC-6.5.43
The internal audit function must be structured consistent with
Paragraphs HC-6.5.61 to HC-6.5.65.
Senior management and the board must ensure that the internal audit function is permanent and commensurate with the size, the nature and complexity of the bank's operations.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.44
Where the head of internal audit function ceases to act in this capacity, the CBB will meet with him/her to discuss the reasons.
Added: April 2018Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and Senior Management
HC-6.5.45
Conventional bank licensees board of directors must ensure thatsenior management establishes and maintains an adequate, effective and efficient internal control system (see HC-1.2.3(c)) and accordingly, the board must support the internal audit function in discharging its duties effectively.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.46
The board of directors must review at least annually, the effectiveness and efficiency of the internal control system based, in part, on information provided by the internal audit function (see HC-1.2.10).
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.47
The board of directors, its audit committee and
senior management must promote a strong internal control environment supported and assessed by a sound internal audit function.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.48
As part of their oversight responsibilities, the audit committee must review the performance of the internal audit function.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.49
Every five years, the audit committee must commission an independent external quality assurance review of the internal audit function.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.50
Senior management must inform the internal audit function of new developments, initiatives, projects, products and operational changes.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.51
Senior management must ensure that all internal audit findings and recommendations are resolved within six months for high risk/critical issues and 12 months for any other issues from the issue date of the subject internal audit report.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.52
Senior management must ensure that the head of internal audit has the necessary resources, financial and otherwise, available to carry out his or her duties commensurate with the annual internal audit plan, scope and budget approved by the audit committee.Added: April 2018Responsibilities of the Audit Committee in relation to the Internal Audit Function
HC-6.5.53
The audit committee must oversee the bank's internal audit function (see also Paragraph HC-3.2.3).
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.54
The bank's audit committee and the internal audit function must develop and maintain their own tools to assess the quality of the internal audit function.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.55
The audit committee must ensure that the internal audit function is able to discharge its responsibilities in an independent manner, consistent with Paragraph HC-6.5.8. It must review and approve the audit plan, its scope, and the budget of the internal audit function. It must also review audit reports and ensure that
senior management is taking necessary and timely corrective actions to address control weaknesses, compliance issues with policies, laws and regulations, and other concerns identified and reported by the internal audit function.Added: April 2018Management of the Internal Audit Function
HC-6.5.56
The head of the internal audit function must ensure that the function complies with The Institute of Internal Auditors' International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.57
The audit committee must ensure that the head of the internal audit function is a person of integrity. This means that he or she will be able to perform his or her work with honesty, diligence and responsibility. It also implies that this person observes the law and has not been a party to any illegal activity. The head of internal audit must also ensure that the members of internal audit staff are persons of integrity.
Added: April 2018Reporting Lines of the Internal Audit Function
HC-6.5.58
The internal audit function must be accountable to the audit committee, on all matters related to the performance of its mandate as described in the internal audit charter. It must also promptly inform the CEO and other related Heads of Functions about its findings.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.59
The internal audit function must inform
senior management of all significant findings so that timely corrective actions can be taken. Subsequently, the internal audit function must follow up withsenior management on the outcome of these corrective measures. The head of the internal audit function must quarterly report to the audit committee, the status of pending findings.Added: April 2018The Relationship between the Internal Audit, Compliance and Risk Management Functions
HC-6.5.60
The relationship between a bank's business units, the support functions and the internal audit function can be explained using the three lines of defence model. The business units are the first line of defence. They undertake the management of risks within assigned limits of risk exposure and are responsible and accountable for identifying, assessing and controlling the risks of their business. The second line of defence includes the support functions, such as risk management, compliance, legal, human resources, finance, operations, and technology. Each of these functions, in close relationship with the business units, ensures that risks in the business units have been appropriately identified and managed. The business support functions work closely to help define strategy, implement bank policies and procedures, and collect information to create a bank-wide view of risks. The third line of defence is the internal audit function that independently assesses the effectiveness of the controls over the processes created in the first and second lines of defence and provides assurance on these processes. The responsibility for internal control does not transfer from one line of defence to the next line.
Added: April 2018Internal Audit within a Group or Holding Company Structure
HC-6.5.61
The internal auditors who perform the internal audit work at the bank must report to the bank's audit committee, or its equivalent, and to the group or holding company's head of internal audit.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.62
To facilitate a consistent approach to internal audit across all the banks within a banking organisation, the board of directors of each bank within a banking group or holding company structure should ensure that either:
(a) The bank has its own internal audit function, which should be accountable to the bank's board and should report to the banking group or holding company's head of internal audit; or(b) The banking group or holding company's internal audit function performs internal audit activities of sufficient scope at the bank to enable the board to satisfy its fiduciary and legal responsibilities.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.63
The board of directors and
senior management of the parent bank in a banking group must ensure that an adequate and effective internal audit function is established across the banking organisation and must ensure that internal audit policies and practices are appropriate to the structure, business activities and risks of all of the components of the group or holding company.Added: April 2018HC-6.5.64
The head of internal audit at the level of the parent bank must define the group or holding company's internal audit strategy, determine the organisation of the internal audit function both at the parent and subsidiary bank levels (in consultation with these entities' respective audit committees and in accordance with local laws) and formulate the internal audit principles, which include the audit methodology and quality assurance measures.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.65
The group or holding company's internal audit function must determine the audit scope for the banking organisation. In doing so, it must comply with local legal and regulatory provisions and incorporate local knowledge and experience.
Added: April 2018Outsourcing of Internal Audit Activities
HC-6.5.66
Regardless of whether internal audit activities are outsourced, the board of directors remains ultimately responsible for the internal audit function.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.67
The head of internal audit/coordinator must maintain adequate oversight and ensure that any outsourcing providers comply with the principles of the bank's internal audit charter.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.68
To preserve independence, the head of internal audit/coordinator must ensure that the outsourcing provider has not been previously engaged in a consulting engagement in the same area within the bank unless a one year "cooling-off" period has elapsed. Subsequently, those experts who participated in an internal audit engagement must not provide consulting services to a function of the bank they have audited within the previous 12 months. Additionally, banks must not outsource internal audit activities to their own external audit firm (see OM-3).
Added: April 2018Communication between the CBB and the Internal Audit Function
HC-6.5.69
The bank's internal auditor must have formal regular communication with the CBB to (i) discuss the risk areas identified, (ii) understand the risk mitigation measures taken by the bank, and (iii) monitor the bank's response to weaknesses identified.
Added: April 2018HC-6.5.70
At least two weeks prior to the prudential meeting date, all internal audit reports issued since the last prudential meeting must be submitted to the CBB supervisory point of contact.
Added: April 2018HC-6.6 HC-6.6 Risk Management
Bank-wide Risk Management Framework
HC-6.6.1
Conventional bank licensees must establish a sound risk management framework commensurate with the bank's size, complexity and risk profile. A risk management framework must have the following key features:(a) active Board andsenior management oversight;(b) independent risk management function;(c) a Board driven sound risk management culture that is established throughout the bank;(d) appropriate policy, procedures and limits;(e) comprehensive and timely identification, measurement, mitigation, controlling, monitoring and reporting of risks;(f) appropriate management information systems ('MIS') at a business and bank-wide level; and(g) comprehensive internal controls.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.2
More specifically, the risk management framework generally encompasses the process of:
(a) developing and implementing the enterprise-wide risk governance framework, subject to the review and approval of the board, which includes the bank's risk culture, risk appetite and risk limits;(b) identifying key risks to the bank including material individual, aggregate and emerging risks;(c) assessing the key risks and measuring the bank's exposures to them;(d) ongoing monitoring and assessing of the risk taking activities, decisions and risk exposures in line with the board-approved risk strategy, risk appetite, risk limits and determining the corresponding capital or liquidity needs (i.e. capital planning) on an ongoing basis;(e) reporting to senior management, and the board or risk committee as appropriate, on all the items noted in this Paragraph including but not limited to proposing appropriate risk-mitigating actions;(f) establishing an early warning or trigger system for breaches of the bank's risk appetite or limits; and(g) influencing and, when necessary, challenging decisions that give rise to material risk.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.2A
Further to the requirement in Paragraph HC-B.1.2,
branches of foreign bank licensees must demonstrate that the activities of the Bahrain branch are subject to appropriate risk management oversight commensurate with the size, complexity, nature and the risk profile of the branch.Added: October 2019HC-6.6.3
Senior management must establish a risk management process that is not limited to credit, market, Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB), liquidity and operational risks, but which incorporates all material risks. This includes reputational and strategic risks, as well as risks that do not appear to be significant in isolation, but when combined with other risks, could lead to material losses.Added: July 2018Independent Risk Management Function and Chief Risk Officer
HC-6.6.4
All
Conventional bank licensees must establish an independent Risk Management function and appoint a head of risk management function, referred to as Chief Risk Officer ('CRO') or any equivalent title. The function must be independent of the individual business lines and report directly to the Board of Directors or its Audit or Risk Committees and administratively to the Chief Executive Officer ('CEO'). The role of the CRO must be independent and distinct from other executive functions and business line responsibilities, and there must be no 'dual hatting' (i.e. the chief operating officer, CFO, chief auditor or other senior management personnel must not also serve as the CRO).Added: July 2018HC-6.6.5
For branches of foreign bank licensees, and where no local board of directors exists, all references in this Module to the board of directors should be interpreted as the Head Office/ Regional Office.
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.6
[This Paragraph was deleted in October 2019].
Deleted: October 2019
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.7
Branches of foreign bank licensees operating in Bahrain have the choice of having an in-house risk management function in Bahrain or to outsource such role to their regional or Head offices.Amended: October 2019
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.8
The CRO should have the ability to interpret and articulate risk in a clear and understandable manner and to effectively engage the board and management in constructive dialogue on key risk issues. The CRO should also not have any management or financial responsibility in respect of any operational business lines or revenue-generating functions. Interaction between the CRO and the board should occur regularly and be documented adequately. Non-executive board members should have the right to meet regularly — in the absence of
senior management — with the CRO.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.9
The CRO has primary responsibility for overseeing the development and implementation of the bank's risk management framework. This includes the ongoing strengthening of risk management staff skills and enhancements to risk management systems, policies, processes, quantitative models and reports as necessary to ensure that the bank's risk management capabilities are sufficiently robust and effective to fully support its strategic objectives and all of its risk-taking activities. The CRO is responsible for supporting the board and the Risk Committee, as appropriate, in its engagement with and oversight of the development of the bank's risk strategy, risk appetite statement ('RAS') and for translating the risk appetite into a risk limits structure.
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.10
The risk management function must have access to all business lines that have the potential to generate material risk to the
Conventional bank licensee as well as to relevant risk-bearing subsidiaries.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.11
The CRO, together with management, must be actively engaged in monitoring performance relative to risk-taking and risk limit adherence. The CRO's responsibilities also include participating in key decision-making processes (e.g. strategic planning, capital and liquidity planning, new products and services development and compensation design and operation).
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.12
The CRO must have sufficient organisational stature, authority, seniority within the organisation and necessary skills to oversee the
Conventional bank licensee's risk management activities.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.13
Appointment, dismissal and other changes to the CRO position must be approved by the board or its Risk/ Audit Committee. If the CRO is removed from his or her position for any reason, this must be disclosed publicly. The bank must also discuss the reasons for such removal with the CBB. The CRO's performance, compensation and budget must be reviewed and approved by the board Remuneration Committee.
Added: July 2018Board Risk Committee
HC-6.6.14
Further to HC-1.8.1, all
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must establish a board risk committee composed of at least three independent directors. Such board risk committee must be responsible for supporting the board in its oversight and decisions related to the bank's risk management framework.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.15
The risk committee must meet the following requirements:
(a) must be chaired by an independent director;(b) include a majority of members who are independent of day to day risk taking activities;(c) include members who have experience in risk management issues and practices;(d) develop a committee charter which among other matters include its role in the discussions of risk strategies, both at an aggregated basis and by type of risk and make recommendations to the board thereon, and on the risk appetite and risk limits;(e) review and revise as may be required, the bank's policies from a risk management perspective, at least every three years, unless there are material changes in the relevant Rulebook requirements or to the business conducted by the bank and / or its risk profile;(f) review and recommend the appointment or removal of Chief Risk Officer; and(g) oversee that the bank has in place processes to promote the bank's adherence to the approved risk policies.Added: July 2018Role of Board and Senior Management
HC-6.6.16
The Board must define the
Conventional bank licensee's risk appetite and ensure that the bank's risk management framework is aligned with the bank's strategic, capital strategies and financial plans and compensation practices and includes detailed policy that sets specific bank-wide prudential limits on the bank's activities. The bank's risk appetite must be clearly conveyed through an RAS that can be easily understood by all relevant parties: the board itself, senior management and bank employees.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.17
The
Conventional bank licensee's RAS must:(a) include both quantitative and qualitative considerations;(b) establish the individual and aggregate level and types of risk that the bank is willing to assume in advance of and in order to achieve its business activities within its risk capacity;(c) define the boundaries and business considerations in accordance with which the bank is expected to operate when pursuing the business strategy; and(d) be communicated effectively throughout the bank, linking it to daily operational decision-making and establishing the means to raise risk issues and strategic concerns across the bank.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.18
Developing and conveying the
Conventional bank licensee's risk appetite is essential to reinforcing a strong risk culture. The risk governance framework should outline actions to be taken when stated risk limits are breached, including disciplinary actions for excessive risk-taking, escalation procedures and board of director notification.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.19
The development of an effective RAS should be driven by both top-down board leadership and bottom-up management involvement. While the definition of risk appetite may be initiated by senior management, successful implementation depends upon effective interactions between the board, senior management, risk management and operating businesses, including the chief financial officer (CFO).
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.20
The Board must ensure that:
(a) a sound risk management culture is established throughout the bank;(b) appropriate limits are established that are consistent with the bank's risk appetite, risk profile and capital strength, and that are understood by, and regularly communicated to, relevant staff;(c) policy and processes are developed for risk-taking, that are consistent with the Risk Management Strategy and the established risk appetite;(d) uncertainties attached to risk measurement are recognised; and(e)senior management is taking all necessary steps to monitor and control all material risks consistent with the approved strategies and risk appetite.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.21
The Board of Directors and
senior management must possess sufficient knowledge of all major business lines to ensure that appropriate policy, controls and risk monitoring systems are implemented effectively. They must have the necessary expertise to understand the activities in which theConventional bank licensee is involved — such as securitisation and off-balance sheet activities — and the associated risks. The Board andsenior management must remain informed, on an on-going basis, about these risks as financial markets, risk management practices and the bank's activities evolve. In addition, the Board andsenior management must ensure that accountability and lines of authority are clearly delineated.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.22
Before embarking on new lines of business or activities, the Board and
senior management must identify and review the changes in risk profile arising from these potential new activities and ensure that the infrastructure and internal controls necessary to manage any related risks, are in place.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.23
Before embarking on new or complex products,
senior management must identify and review the changes in risk profile arising from these potential new products and ensure that the infrastructure and internal controls necessary to manage any related risks, are in place.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.24
For purposes of paragraph HC-6.6.22 and HC-6.6.23,
senior management must understand the underlying assumptions regarding accounting treatment, business models, valuation and risk management practices. In addition,senior management must evaluate the potential risk exposure if those assumptions fail.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.25
As part of the Board members annual training program,
Conventional bank licensees must include training to enable Board members to better analyse risk and question strategic decisions, policy and transactions. Banks must also provide adequate training for all staff across the business units on risk management related matters.Added: July 2018Policy, Procedures, Limits and Controls
HC-6.6.26
A
Conventional bank licensee's policy and procedures must provide specific guidance for the implementation of broad risk management strategies and must establish, where appropriate, internal limits for the various types of risk to which the bank may be exposed. These limits must consider the bank's role in the financial system and be defined in relation to the bank's capital, total assets, earnings or, where adequate measures exist, its overall risk level.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.27
A
Conventional bank licensee's policy, procedures and limits must:(a) provide for adequate and timely identification, measurement, monitoring, control and mitigation of all risks, including the risks posed by its lending, investing, trading, securitisation, off-balance sheet, fiduciary and other significant activities at the business line and bank-wide levels;(b) ensure that the economic substance of a bank's risk exposures, including reputational risk and valuation uncertainty, are fully recognised and incorporated into the bank's risk management processes;(c) be consistent with the bank's stated goals and objectives, as well as its overall financial strength;(d) clearly delineate accountability and lines of authority across the bank's various business activities, and ensure there is a clear separation between business lines and the Risk Management function;(e) escalate and address breaches of internal position limits;(f) provide for the review of new businesses and products by bringing together all relevant risk management, control and business lines, to ensure that the bank is able to manage and control the activity, prior to it being initiated; and(g) include a schedule and process for reviewing the policy, procedures and limits, and for updating them as appropriate.Added: July 2018Monitoring and Reporting of Risk
HC-6.6.28
A
Conventional bank licensee's MIS must provide the Board andsenior management with timely and relevant information concerning their risk profile, in a clear and concise manner. This information must include all risk exposures, including those that are off-balance sheet.Senior management must understand the assumptions behind, and limitations inherent in, specific risk measures.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.29
Conventional bank licensees must establish appropriate risk management methodologies, tools and models and systems commensurate with the nature and complexity of their business.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.30
Where
conventional bank licensees use models to measure components of risk, they must establish model governance frameworks including regulatory validation and testing.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.31
Conventional bank licensees must have information systems that are adequate (both under normal circumstances and in periods of stress) for measuring, assessing and reporting on the size, composition and quality of exposures on a bank-wide basis across all risk types, products, countries, region, etc. and counterparties. These reports must reflect the bank's risk profile, capital and liquidity needs, and are provided on a timely basis to the bank's Board andsenior management . A bank's MIS must be capable of capturing limit breaches, and there must be procedures in place to promptly report such breaches tosenior management , as well as to ensure that the appropriate follow-up actions are taken.Added: July 2018HC-6.6.32
The CRO must consistently remind staff, through a regular process, under the sponsorship of the CEO, of the risk management requirements and enhance a common understanding of these requirements across the bank in order to create a culture of risk awareness.
Added: July 2018Independent Review
HC-6.6.33
Conventional bank licensees must ensure that their risk management frameworks are subject to a comprehensive independent review by a third-party consultant, other than their external auditors:(a) Upon first implementation of a new or revised module on specific risk management requirements;(b) When there are material changes to certain Rulebook requirements and the CBB requires such a review;(c) When there are material changes to the business conducted by the bank or its risk profile and the CBB requires such a review; or(d) In case of a major failure of controls or major adverse changes in relevant business environment and the CBB requires such a review.Amended: January 2022
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.34
With regards to HC-6.6.33(a), the relevant Modules are the following:
(a) Module IC;(b) Module CA;(c) Module DS;(d) Module CM;(e) Module OM;(f) Module ST;(g) Module LM; and(h) Module RR.Amended: January 2022
Added: July 2018HC-6.6.35
Resources involved in the independent third-party review must be competent and appropriately trained. The independent third-party must not have been previously involved in the development, implementation and operation of the bank’s risk management framework.
Added: January 2022HC-6.6.36
The independent review reports must be presented to the Board or a designated committee of the Board. The agreed action planning steps to remedy any material weaknesses must be documented. The independent report together with the action plan must be provided to the CBB within one month of the date of the report.
Added: January 2022HC-7 HC-7 Communication between Board and Shareholders
HC-7.1 HC-7.1 Principle
HC-7.1.1
The
conventional bank licensee must communicate with shareholders, encourage their participation, and respect their rights.October 2010HC-7.2 HC-7.2 Conduct of Shareholders' Meetings
HC-7.2.1
The board must observe both the letter and the intent of the Company Law's requirements for shareholder meetings. Among other things:
(a) Notices of meetings must be honest, accurate and not misleading. They must clearly state and, where necessary, explain the nature of the business of the meeting;(b) Meetings must be held during normal business hours and at a place convenient for the greatest number of shareholders to attend;(c) Notices of meetings must encourage shareholders to attend shareholder meetings and, if not possible, to participate by proxy and must refer to procedures for appointing a proxy and for directing the proxy how to vote on a particular resolution. The proxy agreement must list the agenda items and must specify the vote (such as "yes," "no" or "abstain");(d) Notices must ensure that all material information and documentation is provided to shareholders on each agenda item for any shareholder meeting, including but not limited to any recommendations or dissents of directors;(e) The board must propose a separate resolution at any meeting on each substantially separate issue, so that unrelated issues are not "bundled" together;(f) In meetings where directors are to be elected or removed the board must ensure that each person is voted on separately, so that the shareholders can evaluate each person individually;(g) The chairman of the meeting must encourage questions from shareholders, including questions regarding theconventional bank licensee's corporate governance guidelines;(h) The minutes of the meeting must be made available to shareholders upon their request as soon as possible but not later than 30 days after the meeting; and(i) Disclosure of all material facts must be made to the shareholders by the Chairman prior to any vote by the shareholders.Amended: April 2011
October 2010HC-7.2.2
The
Bahraini conventional bank licensee should require all directors to attend and be available to answer questions from shareholders at any shareholder meeting and, in particular, ensure that the chairs of the audit, remuneration and nominating committees are ready to answer appropriate questions regarding matters within their committee's responsibility (it being understood that confidential and proprietary business information may be kept confidential).Amended: April 2016
Added: October 2010HC-7.2.3
The
Bahraini conventional bank licensee should require its external auditor to attend the annual shareholders' meeting and be available to answer shareholders' questions concerning the conduct and conclusions of the audit.Amended: April 2016
Added: October 2010HC-7.2.3A
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must provide to the CBB, for its review and comment, at least 5 business days prior to communicating with the shareholders or publishing in the press, the draft agenda for any shareholders' meetings referred to in Paragraph HC-7.2.3C.Amended: July 2017
Added: April 2016HC-7.2.3B
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must ensure that any agenda items to be discussed or presented during the course of meetings which require the CBB's prior approval, have received the necessary approval, prior to the meeting taking place.Added: April 2016HC-7.2.3C
The
Bahraini conventional bank licensee must invite a representative of the CBB to attend any shareholders' meetings (i.e. ordinary and extraordinary general assembly) taking place. The invitation must be provided to the CBB at least 5 business days prior to the meeting taking place.Added: April 2016HC-7.2.3D
Within a maximum of 15 calendar days of any shareholders' meetings referred to in Paragraph HC-7.2.3C, the
Bahraini conventional bank licensee must provide to the CBB a copy of the minutes of the meeting.Added: April 2016HC-7.2.4
The
conventional bank licensee should maintain a website. Theconventional bank licensee should dedicate a specific section of its website to describing shareholders' rights to participate and vote at each shareholders' meeting, and should post significant documents relating to meetings including the full text of notices and minutes. Theconventional bank licensee may also consider establishing an electronic means for shareholders' communications including appointment of proxies. For confidential information, theconventional bank licensee should grant a controlled access to such information to its shareholders.Amended: April 2017
October 2010HC-7.2.5
In notices of meetings at which directors are to be elected or removed the
conventional bank licensee should ensure that:(a) Where the number of candidates exceeds the number of available seats, the notice of the meeting should explain the voting method by which the successful candidates will be selected and the method to be used for counting of votes; and(b) The notice of the meeting should present a factual and objective view of the candidates so that shareholders may make an informed decision on any appointment to the board.Amended: April 2012
October 2010HC-7.3 HC-7.3 Direct Shareholder Communication
HC-7.3.1
The chairman of the board (and other directors as appropriate) must maintain continuing personal contact with
controllers to solicit their views and understand their concerns. The chairman must ensure that the views of shareholders are communicated to the board as a whole. The chairman must discuss governance and strategy withcontrollers . Given the importance of market monitoring to enforce the "comply or explain" approach of this Module, the board should encourage investors, particularly institutional investors, to help in evaluating theconventional bank licensee's corporate governance (see also HC-1.2 and 1.3 for other duties of the Chairman).October 2010HC-7.4 HC-7.4 Controllers
HC-7.4.1
In
conventional bank licensees with one or morecontrollers , the chairman and other directors must actively encourage thecontrollers to make a considered use of their position and to fully respect the rights of minority shareholders (see also HC-1.2 and 1.3 for other duties of the Chairman).October 2010HC-8 HC-8 Corporate Governance Disclosure
HC-8.1 HC-8.1 Principle
HC-8.1.1
The
conventional bank licensee must disclose its corporate governance.October 2010HC-8.2 HC-8.2 Disclosure under the Company Law and CBB Requirements
HC-8.2.1
In each
conventional bank licensee :(a) The board must adopt written corporate governance guidelines covering the matters stated in this Module and Module PD and other corporate governance matters deemed appropriate by the board. Such guidelines must include or refer to the principles and rules of Module HC;(b) Theconventional bank licensee must publish the guidelines on its website;(c) At each annual shareholders' meeting the board must report on theconventional bank licensee's compliance with its guidelines and Module HC, and explain the extent if any to which it has varied them or believes that any variance or noncompliance was justified; and(d) At each annual shareholders' meeting the board must also report on further items listed in Module PD. Such information should be maintained on theconventional bank licensee's website or held at theconventional bank licensee's premises on behalf of the shareholders.Amended: April 2017
October 2010HC-8.2.2
The CBB may issue a template as a guide for a
conventional bank licensee's annual meeting corporate governance discussion.October 2010Board's Responsibility for Disclosure
HC-8.2.3
The Board must oversee the process of disclosure and communications with internal and external stakeholders. The Board must ensure that disclosures made by the bank are fair, transparent, comprehensive and timely and reflect the character of the bank and the nature, complexity and risks inherent in the bank's business activities. Disclosure policies must be reviewed for compliance with the Central Bank's disclosure requirements (see Chapter PD-1).
October 2010Appendix A Appendix A Audit Committee
Committee Duties
The Committee's duties shall include those stated in Paragraph HC-3.2.1.
October 2010Committee Membership and Qualifications
The Committee shall have at least three members. Such members must have no conflict of interest with any other duties they have for the
conventional bank licensee .A majority of the members of the committee including the Chairman shall be
independent directors .The CEO must not be a member of this committee.
The committee members must have sufficient technical expertise to enable the committee to perform its functions effectively. Technical expertise means that members must have recent and relevant financial ability and experience, which includes:
(a) An ability to read and understand corporate financial statements including aconventional bank licensee's balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement and changes in shareholders' equity;(b) An understanding of the accounting principles which are applicable to theconventional bank licensee's financial statements;(c) Experience in evaluating financial statements that have a level of accounting complexity comparable to that which can be expected in theconventional bank licensee's business;(d) An understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting; and(e) An understanding of the audit committee's controls and procedures for financial reporting.Amended: January 2012
Amended: April 2011
October 2010Committee Duties and Responsibilities
In serving those duties, the Committee shall:
(a) Be responsible for the selection, appointment, remuneration, oversight and termination where appropriate of the external auditor, subject to ratification by theconventional bank licensee's board and shareholders. The external auditor shall report directly to the committee;(b) Make a determination at least once each year of the external auditor's independence, including:(i) Determining whether its performance of any non-audit services compromised its independence (the committee may establish a formal policy specifying the types of non-audit services which are permissible) and;(ii) Obtaining from the external auditor a written report listing any relationships between the external auditor and theconventional bank licensee or with any other person or entity that may compromise the auditor's independence;(c) Review and discuss with the external auditor the scope and results of its audit, any difficulties the auditor encountered including any restrictions on its access to requested information and any disagreements or difficulties encountered with management;(d) Review and discuss with management and the external auditor each annual and each quarterly financial statements of theconventional bank licensee including judgments made in connection with the financial statements;(e) Review and discuss and make recommendations regarding the selection, appointment and termination where appropriate of the head of internal audit and head of compliance and the budget allocated to the internal audit and compliance function, and monitor the responsiveness of management to the committee's recommendations and findings;(f) Review and discuss the activities, performance and adequacy of theconventional bank licensee's internal auditing and compliance personnel and procedures and its internal controls and compliance procedures, risk management systems, and any changes in those;(g) Oversee theconventional bank licensee's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, codes and business practices, and ensure that the bank communicates with shareholders and relevant stakeholders (internal and external) openly and promptly, and with substance of compliance prevailing over form; and(h) Review and discuss possible improprieties in financial reporting or other matters, and ensure that arrangements are in place for independent investigation and follow-up regarding such matters;(i) The committee must monitor rotation arrangements for audit engagement partners. The audit committee must monitor the performance of the external auditor and the non-audit services provided by the external auditor; and(j) The review and supervision of the implementation of, enforcement of and adherence to the bank's code of conduct.Amended: October 2012
Amended: April 2012
Amended: April 2011
October 2010Committee Structure and Operations
The committee shall elect one member as its chair.
The committee shall meet at least four times a year. Its meetings may be scheduled in conjunction with regularly-scheduled meetings of the entire board.
The committee may meet without any other director or any officer of the
conventional bank licensee present. Only the committee may decide if a non-member of the committee should attend a particular meeting or a particular agenda item. Non-members who are not directors of theconventional bank licensee may attend to provide their expertise, but may not vote. It is expected that the external auditor's lead representative will be invited to attend regularly but that this shall always be subject to the committee's decision.The committee must meet with the external auditor at least twice per year, and at least once per year in the absence of any members of executive management.
The committee shall report regularly to the full board on its activities.
October 2010Committee Resources and Authority
The committee shall have the resources and authority necessary for its duties and responsibilities, including the authority to select, retain, terminate and approve the fees of outside legal, accounting or other advisors as it deems necessary or appropriate, without seeking the approval of the board or management. The
conventional bank licensee shall provide appropriate funding for the compensation of any such persons.October 2010Committee Performance Evaluation
The committee shall prepare and review with the board an annual performance evaluation of the committee, which shall compare the committee's performance with the above requirements and shall recommend to the board any improvements deemed necessary or desirable to the committee's charter. The report must be in the form of a written report provided at any regularly scheduled board meeting.
Amended: July 2012
Amended: April 2012
October 2010Appendix B Appendix B Nominating Committee
Committee Duties
The committee's duties shall include those stated in Paragraph HC-4.2.1.
October 2010Committee Duties and Responsibilities
In serving those duties with respect to board membership:
(a) The committee shall make recommendations to the board from time to time as to changes the committee believes to be desirable to the size of the board or any committee of the board;(b) Whenever a vacancy arises (including a vacancy resulting from an increase in board size), the committee shall recommend to the board a person to fill the vacancy either through appointment by the board or through shareholder election;(c) In performing the above responsibilities, the committee shall consider any criteria approved by the board and such other factors as it deems appropriate. These may include judgment, specific skills, experience with other comparable businesses, the relation of a candidate's experience with that of other board members, and other factors;(d) The committee shall also consider all candidates for board membership recommended by the shareholders and any candidates proposed by management;(e) The committee shall identify board members qualified to fill vacancies on any committee of the board and recommend to the board that such person appoint the identified person(s) to such committee; and(f) Assuring that plans are in place for orderly succession of senior management.In serving those purposes with respect to officers the committee shall:
(a) Make recommendations to the board from time to time as to changes the committee believes to be desirable in the structure and job descriptions of the officers including the CEO, and prepare terms of reference for each vacancy stating the job responsibilities, qualifications needed and other relevant matters including integrity, technical and managerial competence, and experience;(b) Overseeing succession planning and replacing key executives when necessary, and ensuring appropriate resources are available, and minimising reliance on key individuals;(c) Design a plan for succession and replacement of officers including replacement in the event of an emergency or other unforeseeable vacancy; and(d) If charged with responsibility with respect toconventional bank licensee's corporate governance guidelines, the committee shall develop and recommend to the board corporate governance guidelines, and review those guidelines at least once a year.Amended: April 2011
October 2010Committee Structure and Operations
The committee shall elect one member as its chair.
The committee shall meet at least twice a year. Its meetings may be scheduled in conjunction with regularly-scheduled meetings of the entire board.
October 2010Committee Resources and Authority
The committee shall have the resources and authority necessary for its duties and responsibilities, including the authority to select, retain, terminate and approve the fees of outside legal, consulting or search firms used to identify candidates, without seeking the approval of the board or management. The
conventional bank licensee shall provide appropriate funding for the compensation of any such persons.October 2010Performance Evaluation
The committee shall preview and review with the board an annual performance evaluation of the committee, which shall compare the committee's performance with the above requirements and shall recommend to the board any improvements deemed necessary or desirable to the committee's charter. The report must be in the form of a written report provided at any regularly scheduled board meeting.
Amended: July 2012
Amended: April 2012
October 2010Appendix C Appendix C Remuneration Committee
Committee Duties
The committee's duties shall include those stated in Paragraph HC-5.2.1.
Amended: January 2011
October 2010Committee Duties and Responsibilities
In serving those duties the committee shall consider, and make specific recommendations to the board on, both
remuneration policy and individualremuneration packages for theapproved persons and othermaterial risk-takers as well as the total variableremuneration to be distributed. Thisremuneration policy should cover at least:a) The following components:i) Salary;ii) The specific terms of performance-related plans including any stock compensation, stock options, or other deferred-benefit compensation;iii) Pension plans;iv) Fringe benefits such as non-salary perks; andv) Termination policies including any severance payment policies; andb) Policy guidelines to be used for determiningremuneration in individual cases, including on:i) The relative importance of each component noted in a) above;ii) Specific criteria to be used in evaluating a senior manager's performance.The committee shall evaluate the
approved persons andmaterial risk-takers' performance in light of the bank's corporate goals, agreed strategy, objectives and business plans and may consider theconventional bank licensee's performance and shareholder return relative to comparableconventional bank licensees , the value of awards toCEOs at comparableconventional bank licensees , and awards to theCEO in past years.The committee should also be responsible for retaining and overseeing outside consultants or firms for the purpose of determining
approved persons andmaterial risk-takers' remuneration, administering remuneration plans, or related matters.Amended: January 2014
October 2010Committee Structure and Operations
The committee shall elect one member as its chair.
The committee shall meet at least twice a year. Its meetings may be scheduled in conjunction with regularly-scheduled meetings of the entire board.
October 2010Committee Resources and Authority
The committee shall have the resources and authority necessary for its duties and responsibilities, including the authority to select, retain, terminate and approve the fees of outside legal, consulting or compensation firms used to evaluate the compensation of directors, the
CEO or other approved persons, without seeking the approval of the board or management. Theconventional bank licensee shall provide appropriate funding for the compensation of any such persons.October 2010Performance Evaluation
The committee shall preview and review with the board an annual performance evaluation of the committee, which shall compare the committee's performance with the above requirements and shall recommend to the board any improvements deemed necessary or desirable to the committee's charter. The report must be in the form of a written report provided at any regularly scheduled board meeting.
Amended: July 2012
Amended: April 2012
October 2010AU AU Auditors and Accounting Standards
AU-A AU-A Introduction
AU-A.1 AU-A.1 Purpose
AU-A.1.1
This Module presents requirements that have to be met by
conventional bank licensees with respect to the appointment of external auditors. This Module also sets out certain obligations that external auditors have to comply with, as a condition of their appointment byconventional bank licensees .AU-A.1.2
This Module is issued under the powers given the BMA under Article 41 of the BMA Law 1973. It supplements Article 79 of the BMA Law, which requires licensees to appoint an external auditor acceptable to the BMA.
AU-A.2 AU-A.2 Module History
Evolution of Module
AU-A.2.1
This Module was first issued as Module AU (Audit Firms) in July 2004, as part of the first release of Volume 1 (conventional banks) of the BMA Rulebook. It was subsequently reissued in full in July 2006 (and renamed "Auditors and Accounting Standards").
AU-A.2.2
The reissued Module was one of several Modules modified to reflect the introduction of the BMA's new integrated license framework. Although the new framework did not change the substance of the requirements contained in this Module, the Module was re-issued in order to simplify its drafting and layout and align it with equivalent Modules in other Volumes of the BMA Rulebook.
AU-A.2.3
This Module is dated July 2006. Pages that are subsequently changed in this Module are updated with the end-calendar quarter date in which the change was made: Chapter UG-3 provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control.
AU-A.2.4
A list of changes made to this Module is provided below:
Module Reference Change Date Description of Changes Whole Module July 2006 Module renamed as Module AU (Auditors and Accounting Standards). Text redrafted but substance of requirements left unchanged. AU-A.1 10/2007 New Rule AU-A.1.3 introduced, categorising this Module as a Directive. AU-1.2 10/2007 Rule AU-1.2.3 redrafted to clarify reporting obligation. AU-1.5 10/2007 Paragraphs AU-1.5.4 and AU-1.5.6 updated to reflect CBB Law requirements on auditor independence. Amended: October 2007Superseded Requirements
AU-A.2.5
This Module supersedes the following provisions contained in circulars or other regulatory instruments, issued prior to the introduction of Volume 1 (conventional banks) of the BMA Rulebook:
Circular Ref. Date of Issue Module Ref. (July 2004 version) Circular Subject BC/5/82 5 Aug 1982 AU-1.1 Approval of Appointment of Auditors ODG/59/99 15 Jul 1999 AU-1.1–AU-1.2 Audit Partners of External Auditors and Reporting Accountants of Locally Incorporated Banks BC/3/02 13 Mar 2002 AU-1.3 Additional Public Disclosure Requirements Amended Version — 2002 BC/12/01
(partial)26 Nov 2001 AU-1.4 The Monitoring and Control of Large Exposures of Banks Licensed by the Agency ODG/162/03
(partial)21 May 2003 AU-2.2 Outsourcing BS/9/03
(partial)14 Sep 2003 AU-1.4 Operational Risk Management BC/1/97 12 Feb 1997 AU-1.5 Request for Approval for Dividend Distribution 14/86 19 Jun 1986 AU-2.1 Auditors' Relationship with Supervisors BC/2/99 21 Feb 1999 AU-3.2 Public Disclosure BMA/751/93
(partial)8 Jul 1993 AU-3.2 Directors' Interest in the Shares of, and the Unaudited Quarterly Financial Statements of, Locally Incorporated Banks Quoted on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. BC/1/99 22 Feb 1999 AU-3.3 Enhancing Bank Transparency BC/07/02 26 Jun 2002 AU-3.4 Review of PIR by External Auditors ODG/50/98
(partial)11 Sep 1998 AU-3.5 Market Risk Capital Regulations EDBC/6/01
(partial)14 Oct 2001 AU-3.6 Money laundering RegulationBC/3/02 13 Mar 2002 AU-3.7 Additional Public Disclosure Requirements Amended Version — 2002 BC/7/01
(partial)23 Oct 2001 AU-3.7 Audited Financial Statement of Locally Incorporated Banks for the Year Ending 31 December 2001 and Subsequent Years. BC/8/01
(partial)23 Oct 2001 AU-3.7 Audited Financial Statement of Branches of Foreign Banks for the Year Ending 31 December 2001 and Subsequent Years. BC/6/97 21 Apr 1997 AU-4 Reporting Accountants AU-B AU-B Scope of Application
AU-B.1 AU-B.1 Conventional bank Licensees
AU-B.1.1
The contents of this Module — unless otherwise stated — apply to all
conventional bank licensees .AU-B.2 AU-B.2 Auditors
AU-B.2.1
Certain requirements in this Module extend to auditors, by virtue of their appointment by
conventional bank licensees . Auditors appointed byconventional bank licensees must be independent (cf. Sections AU-1.4 and AU-1.5). Auditors who resign or are otherwise removed from office must inform the BMA in writing of the reasons for the termination of their appointment (cf. Sections AU-1.2). Other requirements are contained in Sections AU-1.3 (Audit partner rotation) and AU-3 (Auditor reports).AU-1 AU-1 Auditor Requirements
AU-1.1 AU-1.1 Appointment of Auditors
AU-1.1.1
Conventional bank licensees must obtain prior written approval from the BMA before appointing or re-appointing their auditors.AU-1.1.2
As the appointment of auditors normally takes place during the course of the firm's annual general meeting,
conventional bank licensees should notify the BMA of the proposed agenda for the annual general meeting in advance of it being circulated to shareholders. The BMA's approval of the proposed auditors does not limit in any way shareholders' rights to subsequently reject the Board's choice.AU-1.1.3
The BMA, in considering the proposed (re-) appointment of an auditor, takes into account the expertise, resources and reputation of the audit firm, relative to the size and complexity of the licensee. The BMA will also take into account the track record of the audit firm in auditing
conventional bank licensees within Bahrain; the degree to which it has generally demonstrated independence from management in its audits; and the extent to which it has identified and alerted relevant persons of significant matters. Finally, the BMA will also consider the audit firm's compliance with applicable laws and regulations (including legislative Decree No. 26 of 1996; the Ministry of Industry and Commerce's Ministerial Resolution No. 6 of 1998; and relevant Bahrain Stock Exchange regulations).AU-1.1.4
In the case of
overseas conventional bank licensees , the BMA will also take into account who acts as the auditors of the parent firm. As a general rule, the BMA does not favour different parts of a banking firm or group having different auditors.AU-1.2 AU-1.2 Removal or Resignation of Auditors
AU-1.2.1
Conventional bank licensees must notify the BMA as soon as they intend to remove their auditors, with an explanation of their decision, or as soon as their auditors resign.AU-1.2.2
Conventional bank licensees must ensure that a replacement auditor is appointed (subject to BMA approval as per Section AU-1.1), as soon as reasonably practicable after a vacancy occurs, but no later than three months.AU-1.2.3
An auditor who resigns or is otherwise removed from the office of auditor must, within 30 days of the resignation or removal, write to the BMA setting out the reasons for the resignation or removal.
AU-1.3 AU-1.3 Audit Partner Rotation
AU-1.3.1
Unless otherwise exempted by the BMA,
conventional bank licensees must ensure that the audit partner responsible for their audit does not undertake that function more than five years in succession.AU-1.3.2
Conventional bank licensees must notify the BMA of any change in audit partner.AU-1.4 AU-1.4 Auditor Independence
AU-1.4.1
Before a
conventional bank licensee appoints an auditor, it must take reasonable steps to ensure that the auditor has the required skill, resources and experience to carry out the audit properly, and is independent of the licensee.AU-1.4.2
For an auditor to be considered independent, it must, amongst other things, comply with the restrictions in Section AU-1.5.
AU-1.4.3
If a
conventional bank licensee becomes aware at any time that its auditor is not independent, it must take reasonable steps to remedy the matter and notify the BMA of the fact.AU-1.4.4
If in the opinion of the BMA, independence has not been achieved within a reasonable timeframe, then the BMA may require the appointment of a new auditor.
AU-1.5 AU-1.5 Licensee/Auditor Restrictions
Financial Transactions with Auditors
AU-1.5.1
Conventional bank licensees must not lend to their auditors, nor enter into any contracts of professional indemnity insurance with their auditors.Outsourcing to Auditors
AU-1.5.2
Section OM-2.7 generally prohibits
conventional bank licensees from outsourcing their internal audit function to the same firm that acts as their external auditors. However, the BMA may allow short-term outsourcing of internal audit operations to aconventional bank licensee's external auditor, to meet unexpected urgent or short-term needs (for instance, on account of staff resignation or illness). Any such arrangement will normally be limited to a maximum period of one year and is subject to BMA prior approval.Other Relationships
AU-1.5.3
Conventional bank licensees and their auditors must comply with the restrictions contained in Article 217(c) of the Commercial Companies Law (Legislative Decree No. (21) of 2001).AU-1.5.4
Article 217(c) prohibits an auditor from (i) being the chairman or a member of the Board of Directors of the company he/she audits; (ii) holding any managerial position in the company he/she audits; and (iii) acquiring any shares in the company he/she audits, or selling any such shares he/she may already own, during the period of his audit. Furthermore, the auditor must not be a relative (up to the second degree) of a person assuming management or accounting duties in the company.
AU-1.5.5
The restriction in Paragraph AU-1.5.3 applies to
overseas conventional bank licensees as well asBahraini conventional bank licensees .AU-1.5.6
A partner, Director or manager on the engagement team of auditing a
conventional bank licensee may not serve on the Board or in acontrolled function of the licensee, for two years following the end of their involvement in the audit, without prior authorisation of the BMA.AU-1.5.7
Chapter HC-2 sets out the BMA's "
controlled functions " requirements.Definition of "Auditor"
AU-1.5.8
For the purposes of Section AU-1.5, "auditor" means the partners, Directors and managers on the engagement team responsible for the audit of the
conventional bank licensee .AU-2 AU-2 Access
AU-2.1 AU-2.1 BMA Access to Auditors
AU-2.1.1
Conventional bank licensees must waive any duty of confidentiality on the part of their auditors, such that their auditors may report to the BMA any concerns held regarding material failures by theconventional bank licensee to comply with BMA requirements.AU-2.1.2
The BMA may, as part of its on-going supervision of
conventional bank licensees , request meetings with a licensee's auditors. If necessary, the BMA may direct that the meeting be held without the presence of the licensee's management or Directors.AU-2.2 AU-2.2 Auditor Access to Outsourcing Providers
AU-2.2.1
Rule OM-2.5.1(c) on
outsourcing agreements betweenconventional bank licensees andoutsourcing providers requireslicensees to ensure that their internal and external auditors have timely access to any relevant information they may require to fulfil their responsibilities. Such access must allow them to conduct on-site examinations of theoutsourcing provider , if required.AU-3 AU-3 Auditor Reports
AU-3.1 AU-3.1 Review of Quarterly Prudential Information Returns
AU-3.1.1
Conventional bank licensees must arrange for their auditors to review the licensee's quarterly Prudential Information Returns to the BMA, prior to their submission, unless otherwise exempted in writing by the BMA.AU-3.1.2
Conventional bank licensees are required to submit a quarterly Prudential Information Return (PIR).Conventional bank licensees may apply in writing to the BMA for an exemption from the requirement that the PIR be reviewed by the licensee's external auditors: this exemption would normally only be given where the licensee had established a track record of accurate and timely reporting, and there were no other supervisory issues of concern. Further details on the BMA's reporting and related requirements, including the precise scope of the auditor's review and attestation, are contained in Module BR (BMA Reporting).AU-3.2 AU-3.2 Review of Financial Disclosures
AU-3.2.1
Conventional bank licensees that are required to publish financial disclosures in accordance with Chapters PD-2 and PD-3 must arrange for their external auditors to review these prior to their publication, unless otherwise exempted in writing by the BMA.AU-3.2.2
Chapter PD-2 requires
overseas conventional bank licensees operating as retail banks to publish on a semi-annual basis summary information on their balance sheet and profit and loss account, in the same format as their annual audited accounts. Chapter PD-3 requires all locally incorporated conventional bank licensees to publish quarterly financial statements, in accordance with International Accounting Standard 34 (Interim Financial Reporting).AU-3.3 AU-3.3 Report on Compliance with Financial Crime Rules
AU-3.3.1
Conventional bank licensees must arrange for their external auditors to report on the licensee's compliance with the requirements contained in Module FC (Financial Crime), at least once a year.AU-3.3.2
The report specified in Rule AU-3.3.1 must be in the form agreed by the BMA, and must be submitted to the BMA within four months of the licensee's financial year-end.
AU-3.3.3
The context to the above requirement can be found in Section FC-4.3.
AU-3.4 AU-3.4 Review and Validation of internal models
AU-3.4.1
Conventional bank licensees seeking BMA approval for their use of internal models for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements, must arrange for their external auditors to validate the soundness of the model concerned. This external review must be undertaken at least once a year, unless otherwise exempted in writing by the BMA.AU-3.4.2
Before granting its approval for
Bahraini conventional bank licensees to use internal models for the measurement of market risk in the context of regulatory capital calculations, the BMA requires such models to be validated by both the internal and external auditors of the bank (see Chapter CA-9). The Agency will review the validation procedures performed by the internal and external auditors, and may independently carry out further validation procedures.AU-3.4.3
The specific requirements and procedures for external validation of models are contained in Section CA-9.8.
AU-3.4.4
Exemptions from the external validation requirement are normally only given where a track record of satisfactory validations has been developed over several years, and where the BMA has no other material supervisory concerns regarding the licensee concerned.
AU-4 AU-4 Accounting Standards
AU-4.1 AU-4.1 General Requirements
AU-4.1.1
Conventional bank licensees must comply with International Financial Reporting Standards / International Accounting Standards.AU-4.1.2
Overseas conventional bank licensees that do not, at the parent company level, apply IFRS/IAS are still required under Paragraph AU-4.1.1 to produce pro-forma accounts for the Bahrain branch in conformity with these standards. Where this requirement is difficult to implement, the Bahrainiconventional bank licensee should contact the BMA in order to agree a solution.AU-4.1.3
Paragraph AU-4.1.1 requires
conventional bank licensees that maintain Islamic 'windows' or units to apply relevant AAOIFI Financial Accounting Standards, depending on the type of Islamic finance contracts entered into. In particular, attention is drawn to AAOIFI Financial Accounting Standard 18, "Islamic Financial Services Offered by Conventional Financial Institutions".GR GR General Requirements
GR-A GR-A Introduction
GR-A.1 GR-A.1 Purpose
GR-A.1.1
The General Requirements Module presents a variety of different requirements that are not extensive enough to warrant their own stand-alone Module, but for the most part are generally applicable. These include general requirements on books and records; on the use of corporate and trade names; and on
controllers . Each set of requirements is contained in its own Chapter: a table listing these and their application to licensees is given in Chapter GR-B.GR-A.2 GR-A.2 Module History
Evolution of Module
GR-A.2.1
This Module was first issued in July 2006, with immediate effect, as a new Module aimed at aligning the structure and contents of Volume 1 with other Volumes of the BMA Rulebook. It is dated July 2006. All subsequent changes to this Module are annotated with the end-calendar quarter date in which the change was made: Chapter UG-3 provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control.
GR-A.2.2
The July 2006 version of Module GR does not introduce new requirements. Rather, it incorporates the record keeping requirements previously contained in Chapter LR-6 of the Licensing and Authorisation Requirement Module (reissued, in July 2006, as the Licensing Module). It also incorporates the requirements relating to
controllers , previously contained in Chapter HC-2 of the High-Level Controls Module. Finally, Module GR expands on certain requirements that were previously contained only in the BMA Law 1973, such as the requirement to seek BMA approval for use of a corporate or trading name.GR-A.2.3
A list of recent changes made to this Module is detailed in the table below:
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes Superseded Requirements
GR-A.2.4
This Module supersedes:
Circular / other reference Provision Subject Module LR (April 2006 version) LR-6: Record Keeping Record keeping requirements were moved to GR-1, and edited down to simplify and avoid duplication of record keeping requirements contained in Module FC. Module HC (April 2006 version) HC-2: 'Fit and Proper Requirement' Requirements relating to controllers were moved to GR-5. Remaining 'fit and proper' elements regarding Directors and key employees of licensees were retained in HC-2, in a re-drafted form. GR-B GR-B Scope of Application
GR-B.1 GR-B.1 Conventional Bank Licensees
License categories
GR-B.1.1
The requirements in Module GR (General Requirements) apply to both retail and wholesale
conventional bank licensees .Bahraini and overseas conventional bank licensees
GR-B.1.2
The scope of application of Module GR (General Requirements) is as follows:
Chapter Bahraini bank licensees Overseas bank licensees GR-1 GR-1.1 and GR-1.3 apply to the whole bank; GR-1.2 applies to business booked in Bahrain only. Applies to the Bahrain branch only. GR-2 Applies to the whole bank. Applies to the Bahrain branch only. GR-3 Applies to the whole bank. Doesn't apply. GR-4 Applies to the whole bank. Applies to the Bahrain branch only. GR-5 Applies to the whole bank. Applies to the whole bank. GR-6 [This chapter has been left blank.] [This chapter has been left blank.] GR-7 Applies to the whole bank. Applies to the Bahrain branch only. GR-B.1.3
In the case of
Bahraini bank licensees , certain requirements apply to the whole bank, irrespective of the location of its business; other requirements apply only in respect to business booked in Bahrain. In the case ofoverseas conventional bank licensees , the requirements of Module GR mostly only apply to business booked in the Bahrain branch.GR-1 GR-1 Books and Records
GR-1.1 GR-1.1 General Requirements
GR-1.1.1
The requirements in Section GR-1.1 apply to
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , with respect to the business activities of the whole bank (whether booked in Bahrain or in a foreign branch). The requirements in Section GR-1.1 also apply tooverseas conventional bank licensees , but only with respect to the business booked in their branch in Bahrain.GR-1.1.2
All
conventional bank licensees must maintain books and records (whether in electronic or hard copy form) sufficient to produce financial statements and show a complete record of the business undertaken by a licensee. These records must be retained for at least the minimum period specified under Bahrain law.GR-1.1.3
GR-1.1.2 includes accounts, books, files and other records (e.g. trial balance, general ledger, nostro/vostro statements, reconciliations and list of counterparties). It also includes records that substantiate the value of the assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet activities of the licensee (e.g. client activity files and valuation documentation). Finally, it includes email records, including email correspondence with customers and other third parties.
GR-1.1.4
Bahrain law currently requires corporate records to be retained for at least 5 years (see Ministerial Order No. 23 of 2002, made pursuant to the Amiri Decree Law No. 4 of 2001).
GR-1.1.5
Unless otherwise agreed with the BMA in writing, records must be kept in either English or Arabic; or else accompanied by a certified English or Arabic translation. Records must be kept current. The records must be sufficient to allow an audit of the licensee's business or an on-site examination of the licensee by the BMA.
GR-1.1.6
If a licensee wishes to retain certain records in a language other than English or Arabic without translation, the licensee should write to the BMA, explaining which types of records it wishes to keep in a foreign language, and why systematically translating these may be unreasonable. Generally, only loan contracts or similar original transaction documents may be kept without translation. Where exemptions are granted by the BMA, the licensee is nonetheless asked to confirm that it will make available certified translations of such documents, if requested by the BMA for an inspection or other supervisory purpose.
GR-1.1.7
Translations produced in compliance with Rule GR-1.1.5 may be undertaken in-house, by an employee or contractor of the licensee, providing they are certified by an appropriate officer of the licensee.
GR-1.1.8
Records must be accessible at any time from within the Kingdom of Bahrain, or as otherwise agreed with the BMA in writing.
GR-1.1.9
Where older records have been archived, or in the case of records relating to overseas branches of
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , the BMA may accept that records be accessible within a reasonably short time frame (e.g. within 5 business days), instead of immediately. The BMA may also agree similar arrangements foroverseas conventional bank licensees , as well asBahraini conventional bank licensees , where elements of record retention and management have been centralised in another group company, whether inside or outside of Bahrain.GR-1.1.10
All original account opening documentation, due diligence and transaction documentation should normally be kept in Bahrain, if the business is booked in Bahrain. However, where a licensee books a transaction in Bahrain, but the transaction documentation is handled entirely by another (overseas) branch or affiliate of the licensee, the relevant transaction documentation may be held in the foreign office, provided electronic or hard copies are retained in Bahrain; the foreign office is located in a FATF member state; and the foreign office undertakes to provide the original documents should they be required.
GR-1.1.11
Licensees should also note that to perform effective consolidated supervision of a group (or sub-group), the BMA needs to have access to financial information from foreign operations of a licensee, in order to gain a full picture of the financial condition of the group: see Module BR (BMA Reporting), regarding the submission of consolidated financial data. If a licensee is not able to provide to the BMA full financial information on the activities of its branches and subsidiaries, it should notify the BMA of the fact, to agree alternative arrangements: these may include requiring the group to restructure or limit its operations in the jurisdiction concerned.
GR-1.1.12
In the case of
Bahraini conventional bank licensees with branch operations overseas, where local record keeping requirements are different, the higher of the local requirements or those contained in this Chapter must be followed.GR-1.2 GR-1.2 Transaction Records
GR-1.2.1
Conventional bank licensees must keep completed transaction records for as long as they are relevant for the purposes for which they were made (with a minimum period in all cases of five years from the date when the transaction was completed). Records of completed transactions must be kept in their original form (whether in hard copy and / or electronic format), for at least five years from the date of the transaction.GR-1.2.2
For example, if the original documents are paper, they must be kept in their original form. Electronic payments and receipts may be kept electronically without the need for hard copies. The record format selected must be capable of producing complete and accurate financial, management and regulatory reports, and allow monitoring and review of all transactions.
GR-1.2.3
Rule GR-1.2.1 applies to all transactions entered into by a
Bahraini conventional bank licensee , whether booked in Bahrain or in an overseas branch. With respect to overseas conventional bank licensees, it applies only to transactions booked in the Bahrain branch.GR-1.2.4
In the case of
overseas conventional bank licensees , Rule GR-1.2.1 therefore only applies to business booked in the Bahrain branch, not in the rest of the company.GR-1.3 GR-1.3 Other Records
Corporate Records
GR-1.3.1
Conventional bank licensees must maintain the following records in original form or in hard copy at their premises in Bahrain:(a) internal policies, procedures and operating manuals;(b) corporate records, including minutes ofshareholders' ,Directors' and management meetings;(c) correspondence with the BMA and records relevant to monitoring compliance with BMA requirements;(d) reports prepared by theconventional bank licensee's internal and external auditors; and(e) employee training manuals and records.GR-1.3.2
In the case of
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , these requirements apply to the licensee as a whole, including any overseas branches. In the case ofoverseas conventional bank licensees , all the requirements of Chapter GR-1 are limited to the business booked in their branch in Bahrain and the records of that branch (see Rule GR-1.1.1). They are thus not required to hold copies of shareholders' and Directors' meetings, except where relevant to the branch's operations.Customer Records
GR-1.3.3
Record keeping requirements with respect to customer records, including customer identification and due diligence records, are contained in Module FC (Financial Crime). These requirements address specific requirements under the Amiri Decree Law No. 4 of 2001, the standards promulgated by the Financial Action Task Force, as well as to the best practice requirements of the Basel Committee Core Principles methodology, and its paper on "Customer due diligence for banks".
GR-2 GR-2 Corporate and Trade Names
GR-2.1 GR-2.1 Vetting of Names
GR-2.1.1
Conventional bank licensees must seek prior written approval from the BMA for their corporate name and any trade names, and those of their subsidiaries located in Bahrain.GR-2.1.2
GR-2.1.1 applies to
overseas conventional bank licensees only with respect to their Bahrain branch.GR-2.1.3
Rules GR-2.1.1 and GR-2.1.2 implement the requirements contained in Article 62 of the BMA Law 1973.
GR-2.1.4
In approving a corporate or trade name, the BMA seeks to ensure that it is sufficiently distinct as to reduce possible confusion with other unconnected businesses, particularly those operating in the financial services sector. The BMA also seeks to ensure that names used by unregulated subsidiaries do not suggest those subsidiaries are in fact regulated.
GR-3 GR-3 Dividends
GR-3.1 GR-3.1 BMA Non-Objection
GR-3.1.1
Bahraini conventional bank licensees must obtain a letter of no-objection from the BMA to any dividend proposed, before submitting a proposal for a distribution of profits to ashareholder vote.GR-3.1.2
The BMA will grant a no-objection letter where it is satisfied that the level of dividend proposed is unlikely to leave the licensee vulnerable — for the foreseeable future — to breaching the BMA's capital requirements, taking into account (as appropriate) trends in the licensee's business volumes, expenses, overall performance and the adequacy of provisions against impaired loans or other assets.
GR-3.1.3
To facilitate the prior approval required under Paragraph GR-3.1.1,
conventional bank licensees subject to GR-3.1.1 should provide the BMA with a copy of the proposed agenda for the annual general meeting or other special meeting, noting the licensee's intended declared dividends for the coming year.GR-3.1.4
Conventional bank licensees must also comply with the provisions contained in Articles 72 to 75 of the BMA Law 1973.GR-4 GR-4 Asset / Liability Transfers
GR-4.1 GR-4.1 [deleted] [1 July 2011 to 30 September 2012]
[This Section was deleted in July 2011 as Regulation on Asset/Liability transfers currently under consultation].
GR-4.1.1 [deleted]
Deleted: July 2011GR-4.1.2 [deleted]
Deleted: July 2011GR-4.1.3 [deleted]
Deleted: July 2011GR-4.1.4 [deleted]
Deleted: July 2011GR-4.1.5 [deleted]
Deleted: July 2011GR-4.1.6 [deleted]
Deleted: July 2011GR-4.1 GR-4.1 BMA Approval
GR-4.1.1
Conventional bank licensees must seek prior written approval from the BMA before transferring assets or liabilities of a material nature to a third party, except where such transfers are effected within the normal scope of the bank's operations.GR-4.1.2
Rule GR-4.1.1 is intended to apply to circumstances where a bank wishes to sell part of its business or a portfolio to a third party, or is undertaking winding up proceedings. It implements the provisions contained in Article 65(A)(2) of the BMA Law 1973.
GR-4.1.3
For the purposes of Rule GR-4.1.1, assets or liabilities of a material nature would be assets or liabilities that comprise 5% or more of the total assets or liabilities of the bank concerned, and any deposit liabilities (regardless of amount).
GR-4.1.4
In the case of a
Bahraini conventional bank licensee , Chapter GR-4 applies to its assets and liabilities booked in Bahrain and in the bank's overseas branches. In the case of anoverseas conventional bank licensee , Chapter GR-4 applies only to assets and liabilities booked in the bank's Bahrain branch.GR-4.1.5
Banks intending to apply to transfer assets or liabilities are advised to contact the BMA at the earliest possible opportunity, in order that the BMA may determine the nature and level of any documentation to be provided and the need for an auditor or other expert opinion to be provided. The BMA will grant its permission where the transfer will have no negative impact on the financial soundness of the bank, and does not otherwise compromise the interests of the bank's depositors and creditors. In all cases, the BMA will only grant its permission where the institution acquiring the assets or deposit liabilities holds the appropriate regulatory approvals and is in good regulatory standing.
GR-5 GR-5 Controllers
GR-5.1 GR-5.1 Key Provisions
GR-5.1.1
Condition 3 of the BMA's licensing conditions specifies, amongst other things, that
conventional bank licensees must satisfy the BMA that theircontrollers are suitable and pose no undue risks to the licensee. (See Paragraph LR-2.3.1.)GR-5.1.2
Applicants for a
conventional bank license must provide details of theircontrollers , by submitting a duly completed Form 2 (Application for authorisation of controller). (See sub-paragraph LR-3.1.5(a)GR-5.1.3
Conventional bank licensees must obtain prior approval from the BMA for any of the following changes to itscontrollers (as defined in Section GR-5.2):(a) a newcontroller ;(b) an existingcontroller increasing its holding from below 20% to above 20%;(c) an existingcontroller increasing its holding from below 33% to above 33%;(d) an existingcontroller increasing its holding from below 50% to above 50%; and(e) an existingcontroller increasing its holding from below 75% to above 75%.GR-5.1.4
For approval under Paragraph GR-5.1.3 to be granted, the BMA must be satisfied that the proposed increase in control poses no undue risks to the licensee. A duly completed Form 2 (Controllers) must be submitted as part of the request for a change in
controllers .GR-5.1.5
If, as a result of circumstances outside the
conventional bank licensee's knowledge and/or control, one of the changes specified in Paragraph GR-5.1.3 is triggered prior to BMA approval being sought or obtained, theconventional bank licensee must notify the BMA as soon as it becomes aware of the fact and no later than 7 days.GR-5.1.6
Conventional bank licensees are encouraged to notify the BMA as soon as they become aware of events that are likely to lead to changes in theircontrollers . The criteria by which the BMA assesses the suitability ofcontrollers are set out in Section GR-5.3. The BMA aims to respond to requests for approval within 30 calendar days. The BMA may contact references and supervisory bodies in connection with any information provided to support an application forcontroller . The BMA may also ask for further information, in addition to that provided in Form 2, if required to satisfy itself as to the suitability of the applicant.GR-5.1.7
Conventional bank licensees must submit, within 3 months of their financial year-end, a report on theircontrollers . This report must identify allcontrollers of the licensee, as defined in Section GR-5.2.GR-5.2 GR-5.2 Definition of Controller
GR-5.2.1
A
controller of aconventional bank licensee is a natural or legal person who:(a) holds 10% or more of the shares in the licensee ("L"), or is able to exercise (or control the exercise) of more than 10% of the voting power in L; or(b) holds 10% or more of the shares in aparent undertaking ("P") of L, or is able to exercise (or control the exercise) of more than 10% of the voting power in P; or(c) is able to exercise significant influence over the management of L or P.GR-5.2.2
For the purposes of Paragraph GR-5.2.1, "person" means the person ("H") or any of the person's associates, where associate includes:
(a) the spouse, child or stepchild of H;(b) an undertaking of which H is a Director;(c) a person who is an employee or partner of H;(d) if H is a corporate entity, a Director of H, a subsidiary of H, or a Director of any subsidiary undertaking of H.GR-5.2.3
Associate also includes any other person or undertaking with which the person H has entered into an agreement or arrangement as to the acquisition, holding or disposal of shares or other interests in the
conventional bank licensee , or under which they undertake to act together in exercising their voting power in relation to theconventional bank licensee .GR-5.3 GR-5.3 Suitability of Controllers
GR-5.3.1
A
controller of aconventional bank licensee must satisfy the BMA of his suitability.GR-5.3.2
In assessing the suitability of
controllers who are natural persons, the BMA has regard to their professional and personal conduct, including, but not limited to, the following:(a) the propriety of a person's conduct, whether or not such conduct resulted in conviction for a criminal offence, the contravention of a law or regulation, or the institution of legal or disciplinary proceedings;(b) a conviction or finding of guilt in respect of any offence, other than a minor traffic offence, by any court or competent jurisdiction;(c) any adverse finding in a civil action by any court or competent jurisdiction, relating to fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct in connection with the formation or management of a corporation or partnership;(d) whether the person has been the subject of any disciplinary proceeding by any government authority, regulatory agency or professional body or association;(e) the contravention of any financial services legislation or regulation;(f) whether the person has ever been refused a license, authorisation, registration or other authority;(g) dismissal or a request to resign from any office or employment;(h) disqualification by a court, regulator or other competent body, as a Director or as a manager of a corporation;(i) whether the person has been a Director, partner or manager of a corporation or partnership which has gone into liquidation or administration or where one or more partners have been declared bankrupt whilst the person was connected with that partnership;(j) the extent to which the person has been truthful and open with regulators; and(k) whether the person has ever been adjudged bankrupt, entered into any arrangement with creditors in relation to the inability to pay due debts, or failed to satisfy a judgement debt under a court order.GR-5.3.3
In addition, the following criteria are also taken into consideration:
(a) the financial resources of the person and the likely stability of their shareholding;(b) existing directorships or ownership of more than 20% of the capital or voting rights of any financial institution in the Kingdom of Bahrain or elsewhere, and the potential for conflicts of interest that such directorships or ownership may imply;(c) the interests of depositors, creditors and shareholders of the licensee; and(d) the interests of Bahrain's banking and financial sector.GR-5.3.4
In assessing the suitability of corporate
controllers , the BMA has regard to their financial standing, judicial and regulatory record, and standards of business practice and reputation, including, but not limited to, the following:(a) the financial strength of the controller, its parent(s) and other members of its group, its implications for theconventional bank licensee and the likely stability of thecontroller's shareholding;(b) whether thecontroller or members of its group have ever entered into any arrangement with creditors in relation to the inability to pay due debts;(c) thecontroller's jurisdiction of incorporation, location of Head Office, group structure and close links, and the implications for theconventional bank licensee as regards effective supervision of theconventional bank licensee and potential conflicts of interest;(d) thecontroller's (and other group members') propriety and general standards of business conduct, including the contravention of any laws or regulations, or the institution of disciplinary proceedings by a government authority, regulatory agency or professional body;(e) any adverse finding in a civil action by any court or competent jurisdiction, relating to fraud, misfeasance or other misconduct;(f) any criminal actions instigated against thecontroller or other members of its group, whether or not this resulted in an adverse finding; and(g) the extent to which thecontroller or other members of its group have been truthful and open with regulators and supervisors.GR-5.3.5
In addition, the following criteria are also taken into consideration:
(a) the interests of depositors, creditors and shareholders of the licensee; and(b) the interests of Bahrain's banking and financial sector.GR-5.4 GR-5.4 Approval Process
GR-5.4.1
Following receipt of an approval request under Paragraph GR-5.1.3, the BMA will issue a written notice of objection if it is not satisfied that the person concerned is suitable to become a
controller of theconventional bank licensee . The notice of objection will specify the reasons for the objection and specify the applicant's right of appeal.GR-5.4.2
Notices of objection have to be approved by an Executive Director of the BMA. The applicant has 30 calendar days from the date of the notice in which to make written representations. The BMA then has 30 calendar days from the date of the representation in which to consider any mitigating evidence submitted and make a final determination. See Module EN (Enforcement).
GR-5.4.3
Where a person has become a
controller by virtue of his shareholding in contravention of Paragraph GR-5.1.3, or a notice of objection has been served to him under Paragraph GR-5.4.1 and the period of appeal has expired, the BMA may, by notice in writing served on the person concerned, direct that his shareholding shall, until further notice, be subject to all or any of the following restrictions:(a) no voting right shall be exercisable in respect of those shares; and(b) except in a liquidation, no payment shall be made of any sum due on the shares from theconventional bank licensee , whether in respect of capital, dividend or otherwise.GR-6 [This Chapter has been left blank.]
[This Chapter has been left blank.]
GR-7 GR-7 Suspension of Business
GR-7.1 GR-7.1 BMA Approval
GR-7.1.1
A
conventional bank licensee wishing to suspend its operations and liquidate its business must notify the BMA in writing at least six months in advance of its intended suspension, setting out how it proposes to do so and, in particular, how it will treat any deposits that it holds.GR-7.1.2
The notice period under Rule GR-7.1.1 is a statutory requirement, specified in Article 91 of the BMA Law 1973. Article 91, however, also provides for the notice period to be reduced, by prior agreement with the BMA, if in the BMA's view the rights of depositors are safeguarded.
GR-7.1.3
If the
conventional bank licensee wishes to transfer assets or liabilities to a third party, it must comply with the requirements contained in Chapter GR-4.GR-7.1.4
If the
conventional bank licensee wishes to liquidate its business, the BMA will revise its license to restrict the firm from entering into new business. The licensee must continue to comply with all applicable BMA requirements until such time as it is formally notified by the BMA that its obligations have been discharged and that it may surrender its license.GR-7.1.5
A
conventional bank licensee in liquidation must continue to meet its contractual and regulatory obligations to depositors, other clients and creditors.GR-7.1.6
Once the
conventional bank licensee believes that it has discharged all its remaining contractual obligations to depositors, clients and creditors, it must publish a notice in two national newspapers in Bahrain approved by the BMA (one being in English and one in Arabic), stating that is has settled all its dues and wishes to leave the market.GR-7.1.7
The notice referred to in Paragraph GR-7.1.6 must include a statement that written representations concerning the liquidation may be sent to the BMA before a specified day, which shall not be earlier than sixty days after the day of the first publication of the notice. The BMA will not decide on the application until after considering any representations made to the BMA before the specified day.
GR-7.1.8
If no objections to the liquidation are upheld by the BMA, then the BMA may issue a written notice of approval for the surrender of the license.
GR-8 GR-8 BMA Fees
GR-8.1 GR-8.1 Annual License Fees
GR-8.1.1
Conventional bank licensees must pay the relevant annual license fee to the BMA, upon the issuance of their license and thereafter on 1 January each year. The annual license fee charged upon issuance of a license is charged on a pro-rata basis, proportionate to the period remaining between the issuance of the license and the end of the calendar year in question (subject to a minimum charge of BD 1,000).Business Standards
BC BC Business and Market Conduct
BC-A BC-A Introduction
BC-A.1 BC-A.1 Purpose
BC-A.1.1
The purpose of this module is to lay down rules and guidelines that lay down the regulations and provide guidance on best practices that banks should adhere to in relation to business and market conduct.
BC-A.1.2
This module provides support for certain other parts of the Rulebook, mainly:
(a) Principles of Business;(b) Audit Firms;(c) Public Disclosure; and(d) BMA Reporting Requirements.BC-A.1.3
This module also provides support for certain aspects relating to business and market conduct in the Bahrain Commercial Companies Law of 2001 (as amended).
BC-A.2 BC-A.2 Key requirements
Promotion of financial products and services
BC-A.2.1
The Agency should be sent copies of documentation relating to promotional schemes at least ten days prior to their launch for information purposes.
BC-A.2.2
All documentation concerning promotional schemes should be in Arabic and English and, if relevant, any other language necessary for customers to fully understand and appreciate their terms and conditions. Such terms and conditions, including any related advertising, need to be clear, concise, truthful, unambiguous and complete so as to enable customers to make a fully informed decision.
Code of conduct for bank dealers and foreign exchange and money brokers in the foreign currency and deposit markets
BC-A.2.3
Management of banks and money brokers are responsible for ensuring that their institutions are in full compliance with the Code.
BC-A.2.4
Brokers should pass details verbally, and principals be prepared to receive them, normally within a few minutes after deals have been concluded.
Disclosure of information about individual accounts
BC-A.2.5
Banks should not publish or release information to third parties concerning the accounts or activities of their individual customers, unless:
(a) such information is requested by an authorised official from the BMA or by an order from the Courts; or(b) the release of such information is approved by the customer concerned.Minimum balance and charges on savings accounts
BC-A.2.6
Banks may impose no more than a monthly charge of BD 1/– when the monthly weighted average balance for savings accounts for individuals falls below BD 20/– (or equivalent in other currencies).
BC-A.2.7
Orphans, widows, pensioners, individuals receiving social subsidies from the Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs, students and Bahraini nationals with a monthly salary below BD 250/– should be exempted from maintaining the above minimum balance requirement for savings accounts.
Dinar Certificates of Deposits — Rules
BC-A.2.8
Certificates of Deposit may be issued for any amount subject only to a minimum denomination of BD 30,000.BC-A.2.9
Certificates of Deposit may be issued for any maturity between 183 days (6 months) and 5 years.Disclosure of charges
BC-A.2.10
Banks should also ensure that each customer is in receipt of its current list of charges. The list should specify standard charges and commissions that will be applied by the bank to individual services and transactions and to specific areas of business.
Accounts held for clubs and societies in Bahrain
BC-A.2.11
The Full Commercial Bank (FCB) is requested to notify General Organisation for Youth and Sport (GOYS) when any club or society registered with GOYS requests the opening of an account with the bank.
Current accounts
BC-A.2.12
FCBs levying fees on their low-balance customer current accounts, are required by the Agency to apply such fees to average balances when these fall below a prescribed level during a specified period.
Notification to the Agency on introduction of new or expanded customer products and facilities
BC-A.2.13
All full commercial banks are required to notify the Agency before the introduction of any new or expanded customer products and facilities.
Penalty system for dishonoured cheques
BC-A.2.14
On the first working day of each calendar month, each FCB will provide to the Agency a list of the names, supported with I.D. numbers (CPR or CR numbers (as applicable) for Bahrain
residents , Passport or CR-equivalent numbers (as applicable) for non-Bahrain residents) of those customers to whom one (or more) written warning(s) has been sent in accordance with section BC-5.1 during the immediately preceding calendar month.BC-A.2.15
Concerned FCB(s) must not provide current account facilities to the abuser of cheques for the twelve calendar month period immediately following the date of issue of the relevant list (as mentioned in section BC-5.1) by the Agency. All other FCBs should, within a maximum period of one month after the issue of the relevant list, also withdraw current account facilities from that abuser of cheques for the same twelve calendar month period.
General guidance on administration of dishonoured cheques
BC-A.2.16
FCBs that wish to issue cheque guarantee cards for an amount not exceeding BD 200/= may do so — subject to informing the Director of Banking Services at the Agency of their intention and the arrangements governing the issue of such cards.
Penalty charges on dishonoured cheques
BC-A.2.17
The Agency will impose penalty charges of BD 5/= on each returned cheque for the reasons of 'Refer to Drawer', 'Not Arranged For', 'Re-present', and 'Account Closed'.
BC-A.2.18
FCBs will be entitled to charge customers no more than BD 10/= in respect of each dishonoured cheque.
Installation of an off-site ATM in Bahrain
BC-A.2.19
FCBs wishing to install an off-site ATM must submit an application (in writing) for the BMA's (Executive Director of Banking Supervision) approval. This application must be accompanied by a copy of a feasibility study for that particular ATM, as well as such other information as the BMA may request. In particular, a copy of the written permission (for installation of that off-site ATM) of the legal owner of the proposed location must be provided to the Agency, as well as a copy of the written permission of any other relevant authorities in this context (e.g. the Traffic & Licensing and Civil Defence & Fire Service Directorates of the Ministry of Interior).
GCC ATM network charges
BC-A.2.20
The Agency requires that the charges on such customer withdrawals and other ATM services should not exceed BD 1/= per transaction.
Margin Trading System
BC-A.2.21
FCBs may write to the Agency to obtain approval to provide margin trading facilities to their customers. FCBs must follow the rules and guidance in Chapter BC-7.
BC-A.3 BC-A.3 Regulation history
BC-A.3.1
This module was first issued in July 2004 as part of the conventional principles volume. All regulations in this volume have been effective since this date. All subsequent changes are dated with the month and year at the base of the relevant page and in the Table of Contents. Chapter UG-3 of Module UG provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and control.
BC-A.3.2
The most recent changes to this module are detailed in the table below:
Summary of changes
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes BC-4.1 01/01/05 New minimum balance and charges regulations BC-4.7 01/10/05 Streamlined notification requirements regarding new products BC-7 01/04/06 Margin trading rules and guidance Effective date and evolution of the Module
BC-A.3.3
Prior to the Rulebook, the Agency had issued various circulars representing regulations covering different aspects of Business and Market Conduct. The contents of this module are effective from the date depicted in the original circulars listed below or from the dates indicated in paragraph BC-A.3.2 above:
Circular Ref. Date of Issue Module Ref. Circular Subject EDBC/73/96 1 May 1996 BC-1.1 Explanatory note on the promotion of Banking and Financial Products. BS.C7/91/442 10 Sep 1991 BC-1.1 Promotion of Banking Services 85/25 2 May 1985 BC-2 Code of Conduct for Foreign Exchange Dealers and Brokers 83/5 10 Apr 1983 BC-3 Disclosure of Information about Individual Accounts BS/11/2004 10 Aug 2004 BC-4.1 Min balances and savings accounts BS.C7/90/34 31 Jan 1990 BC-4.2 Dinar Certificates of Deposits EDBO/51/02 2 Apr 2002 BC-4.3 Charges to Customers BC/5/00 8 Mar 2000 BC-4.4 Accounts held for Clubs and Societies BSD(111)/94/157 24 Sep 1994 BC-4.5 Fees on Current Accounts BC/2/01 3 Mar 2001 BC-4.6 Brokerage Fees in Bahrain ODG/145/92 18 Aug 1992 BC-4.7 New products in the Retail Banking Field EDBO/46/03 8 Apr 2003 BC-4.8 Inheritance—Financial Procedures EDBO/27/96 25 Sep 1996 BC-5.1 Regulation for "Dishonoured Cheques" OG/399/94 28 Nov 1994 BC-5.2 Returned Cheques EDBO/49/01 6 May 2001 BC-5.3 Penalty Charges on Returned Cheques BC/8/98 24 May 1998 BC-6.1 Off-site ATMs EDBO/45/02 13 Mar 2002 BC-6.2 GCC ATM Network Charges BC/15/99 17 Jul 1999 BC-7.1 Margin Trading BC-1 BC-1 Promotion of financial products and services
BC-1.1 BC-1.1 Promotion of financial products and services offered in/from Bahrain by means of incentives etc.
Introduction
BC-1.1.1
The purpose of the content of this section is to set out regulations pertaining to the promotion of banking/financial products offered in/from Bahrain by means of incentives etc. (herein referred to as 'promotional schemes').
BC-1.1.2
The Agency has no objection to the use of promotional schemes in general and, unless it otherwise specifically directs in any particular case, the Agency does not expect to be actively consulted/have its approval sought about the idea and/or substance of any promotional schemes. The Agency should, however, be sent copies of documentation relating to promotional schemes at least ten days prior to their launch for information purposes.
BC-1.1.3
The Agency will monitor promotional schemes and, if thought appropriate in the interests of a bank or other financial institution (together herein referred to as 'institutions') and its customers in particular and/or the financial sector in general, may issue specific guidance in certain cases. Institutions should feel free to consult the Agency at any time regarding any matters referred to in the explanatory note set out in this section.
General requirements
BC-1.1.4
Institutions should take care to ensure that promotional schemes do not involve a breach of Bahrain law or any other relevant applicable law, regulation or international practice. In addition, promotional schemes should not in any way be detrimental to the public good or public morals.
BC-1.1.5
While there is to be no formal restriction on the types of incentive which may be used by institutions, care should be taken to ensure that promotional schemes do not negatively affect the integrity, reputation, good image and standing of Bahrain and/or its financial sector, and do not detrimentally affect Bahrain's economy.
BC-1.1.6
Bearing in mind the reputation of, and the requirement to develop, the financial sector in Bahrain, as well as the need to act at all times in the best interests of the customer, institutions need to take adequate care to ensure that promotional schemes do not unreasonably divert the attention of the public from other important considerations in choosing an institution or a banking/financial product.
BC-1.1.7
All documentation concerning promotional schemes should be in Arabic and English and, if relevant, any other language necessary for customers to fully understand and appreciate their terms and conditions. Such terms and conditions, including any related advertising, need to be clear, concise, truthful, unambiguous and complete so as to enable customers to make a fully informed decision.
BC-1.1.8
Customers to whom promotional schemes are directed should enjoy equal opportunity in terms of access to, and treatment within, such schemes.
BC-1.1.9
No costs (including funding costs), charges or levies associated with promotional schemes should be concealed from prospective customers.
BC-1.1.10
Full and complete records should be maintained for promotional schemes, particularly where raffles/lotteries etc. are concerned.
BC-1.1.11
Any raffles/lotteries etc. held as part of promotional schemes should be independently monitored (e.g. by the institution's external auditor) and adequate systems put in place to ensure fair play and impartiality.
BC-1.1.12
An appropriate system should also exist for informing participants of the results of a raffle/lottery without delay. Institutions should note that raffles/lotteries etc. may be subject to rules and requirements (including prior authorisation/approval) laid down by the Ministry of Commerce.
BC-1.1.13
Institutions may use small 'gifts' as an inducement to members of the public to use banks' services, provided such gifts are offered on a general basis and have a low monetary value.
BC-1.1.14
Finally, due note should be taken of the overriding provisions of Bahrain (and any other relevant) law in relation to institutions' duties to customers to the extent (if any) that promotional schemes might impact on such duties.
BC-2 BC-2 Code of conduct for bank dealers and foreign exchange and money brokers in the foreign currency and deposit markets
BC-2.1 BC-2.1 Introduction
BC-2.1.1
The Code of Conduct, which is prepared in cooperation with the Bankers' Society of Bahrain and foreign exchange brokers, provides rules in respect of certain kinds of practice which experience has shown may cause difficulty and may jeopardise the good standing of the Bahrain market. Management of banks and money brokers are responsible for ensuring that their institutions are in full compliance with the Code.
BC-2.1.2
Every broker and dealer shall at all times comply with the criteria in respect to market practice, integrity and conduct. Failure to comply with such criteria will be regarded as a serious offence by the BMA, which reserves the right to investigate any complaints brought to its attention. All participants should adhere to the spirit as well as to the letter of the Code.
BC-2.2 BC-2.2 Market terminology and definitions
BC-2.2.1
The use of generally accepted precise terminology should reduce misunderstandings and frustration, and to this end Appendix BC 5 sets out, without claiming to be exhaustive, accepted market terminology and definitions.
BC-2.2.2
For the purpose of this chapter, the following definitions apply:
(a) 'Broker' means a money and foreign exchange broker who is authorised by the BMA to operate in Bahrain.(b) 'Principal' means a party undertaking a transaction through a broker.(c) 'Bank' means any institution holding a banking license.BC-2.3 BC-2.3 Confidentiality and market practice
BC-2.3.1
Confidentiality is vital for the preservation of a reputable and efficient market. Accordingly, the exchange of confidential information in respect of third parties is forbidden.
BC-2.3.2
The rules which follow are not intended to define exhaustively the obligations of dealers and brokers but set down specific ways in which confidentiality should be safeguarded and operations should be conducted.
(a) Use of phrases and terms likely to identify the name of the principal should be avoided at all times.(b) In foreign exchange transactions brokers should not disclose the name of the principal until the deal is being closed.A broker asking for a specific support price should be prepared to qualify the principal in terms of geographical location, by country or by region when the broker genuinely believes it will enable business to be concluded satisfactorily to the benefit of both broker and principal.
(c) Indeposit transactions, brokers should not disclose the name of the borrower until the broker is satisfied that the potential lender seriously intends to do business. Once a lender has asked for the identity of the borrower ('Who pays?'), the lender is committed to do business at the rate quoted with an acceptable name, until the lending bank takes the broker 'off' or puts himself under reference. In the event of the first disclosed name being unacceptable to the lender, the lender will be prepared to check other acceptable names provided that such names are shown to the lender by the broker within a reasonable amount of time, which should be stipulated if necessary.(d) In the deposit market, banks should whenever possible give brokers prior indication of those categories of principals and of any centres and areas with which they would be unwilling to do business, in order that the smooth operation of markets be facilitated and frustration be minimized. Lenders should indicate the amounts they are prepared to place with particular categories of borrower. Brokers should classify bids with an indication of the type and quality of names they are in a position to pass.(e) Practices whereby banks reject a succession of names in order to assess the market and brokers offer banks deals which have no chance of being concluded, merely in order to establish their interest, are totally unacceptable.(f) A principal is urged whenever possible to specify to a broker the rate, the amount, the currency, and the period of his requirements. The principal shall be willing to deal in a marketable amount with acceptable names and shall remain bound so to deal at the quoted rate unless either:(i) the broker is informed otherwise at the time of acceptance, or(ii) a time limit was placed (for example, 'Firm for one minute only').A broker who quotes a firm rate without qualification shall be prepared to deal at the rate, in a marketable amount. A broker, if quoting only the basis of one or two names, shall qualify his quotation, e.g., 'one small offeror — only two names paying'. The broker should indicate whether prices are firm or simply for guidance and, if requested by the principal, should be willing to indicate the amount involved. Further he should confirm with banks at reasonable intervals that their interest is still firm.
It is the responsibility of the principal to ensure the broker is made aware of any circumstances which materially affect the validity of the order placed with the broker.
(g) A principal, by selecting to 'put a broker on', is deemed to have a serious intention of completing business, and should allow the broker sufficient time to quote the principal's interest to a potentialcounterparty with a view to doing business. In quantifying a 'sufficient time' factors such as the currency, market conditions and communication systems employed, should be taken into account.(h) A broker is held responsible for advising a principal on every occasion that hisdeposit rates are being checked by a potentialcounterparty . This action should help minimise the occasional difficulties that arise when a principal 'takes a broker off' simultaneously to having his prices checked.Whenever possible and subject to market conditions, a bank in the deposit market should, before he 'takes a broker off' either a single order or several orders, check whether the broker is already committed to deal on his behalf.
(i) 'Under reference' orders placed by banks with brokers without having first being placed as 'firm', are to be discouraged. Firm orders which are later qualified by a request to 'put me under reference' indicate a principal's weakening desire to conclude business with that broker. 'Under reference' orders should not be left with a broker for more than a few minutes. A principal must ensure that the broker has the opportunity frequently to check the validity of an 'under reference' order.(j) No person may visit the dealing room of any broker or any bank except with the consent of a Manager or Director of that institution. A broker shall not in any circumstances permit any visitors from a bank to deal for his bank in the dealing room of that broker.(k) Management of banks should issue clear directions to staff on the monitoring, control and recording of 'after hours' dealing from premises other than bank dealing rooms. All deals of this kind must be properly authorised and confirmed.(l) A bank dealer shall not apply unfair pressure upon a broker to pass information which it would be improper for the broker to pass. Unfair pressure would for example include a statement made in any form that a failure to co-operate would lead to reduction in the business given by the principal or by other principals to the broker.(m) A principal should not place an order with a broker solely with the intention of finding out the name of a counterparty, who can be contacted directly with a view to concluding further deals.(n) Management of banks and brokers should lay down clear directions to staff on the extent to which dealing in foreign exchange ordeposits for personal accounts is permitted. Any such dealing must be strictly controlled.(o) Care should be taken over the positioning of 2-way loudspeakers in dealing rooms.(p) Brokers and dealers should inform each other if conversations are being recorded. The use of such equipment is encouraged as a sensible means of enabling any subsequent disputes and differences to be settled.BC-2.4 BC-2.4 Passing of details
BC-2.4.1
The passing and recording of details forms an essential part of the transaction and the possibility of errors and misunderstanding is increased by delay and by the passing of details in batches. Brokers should pass details verbally, and principals should be prepared to receive them, normally within a few minutes after deals have been concluded.
BC-2.4.2
When arranging and passing details on forward contracts in foreign exchange, banks and brokers must ensure that the rate applied to the spot end of the transaction bears a close relationship to the spot rate at the time the deal was concluded.
BC-2.5 BC-2.5 Confirmations
BC-2.5.1
Written confirmation by a broker is the final check on the details of the transaction. The handling of confirmations must take account of the desire of brokers to have a realistic time-limit placed on their liability for differences. There is an obligation on recipients to check such confirmations. Initial confirmations should be sent out by telex without delay, and at the latest by close of business on the same working day. They should be followed up by written confirmation, normally hand-delivered and receipted before close of business on the following working day.
BC-2.5.2
Banks must check all confirmations carefully upon receipt so that discrepancies shall be quickly revealed and differences minimised. Principals shall also make enquiries of brokers about particular confirmations which have not been received within an appropriate time (as above) or about any changes in contract terms.
BC-2.5.3
In the case of deals where a bank pays against telex confirmation, the broker remains liable for differences until receipt of written confirmation is provided by the bank.
BC-2.6 BC-2.6 Differences and disputes
BC-2.6.1
The majority of differences payable by brokers arise from errors occurring in payment or repayment instructions. They also arise from a broker, having in good faith indicated a firm rate, being unable to substantiate his quotation.
BC-2.6.2
Any differences deemed payable by a broker to a bank (or by a bank to a broker) should be settled as soon as possible. The parties should provide each other with documents, setting out the exact details of and circumstances surrounding the deal.
BC-2.6.3
It is acknowledged that differences are sometimes paid by 'points'. The management of broking firms should always ensure that this practice is strictly controlled and monitored.
BC-2.6.4
All differences settled by direct payment should be advised in writing by the broker to the Director of Reserve Management, the BMA, (copied to the Bank) indicating the amount paid and the other party's name. The BMA reserves the right to ask for further information at its discretion.
BC-2.7 BC-2.7 Conduct
BC-2.7.1
The BMA will regard any breaches of the rules stated below regarding gifts, favours, betting and entertainment unacceptable.
Gifts and favours
BC-2.7.2
No broker, including management, employees and other persons acting on their behalf, shall offer or give inducements to dealing room personnel of a bank. No gifts or favours whatsoever shall be so given unless the broker is satisfied that the person responsible for dealing operations in the bank concerned has been informed of the nature of the gift or favour.
BC-2.7.3
Employees of banks shall not solicit inducements from brokers, nor shall they receive unsolicited gifts or favours from brokers without informing the person responsible for dealing operations in the bank concerned of the nature of such gifts or favours.
Bets
BC-2.7.4
The making or arranging of bets between brokers and bank dealers is totally unacceptable.
Entertaining
BC-2.7.5
It shall be the responsibility of management in both banks and brokers to ensure that entertainment offered in the course of business does not exceed reasonable limits and does not infringe standards of propriety and decency.
BC-2.8 BC-2.8 Responsibility
BC-2.8.1
Brokers shall be responsible for ensuring that:
(a) their principals understand fully the limitations of the brokers' responsibilities for business and market conducted;(b) all their principals understand that they are required to conform, where appropriate, to the Code of Conduct;(c) their staff carrying out transactions on behalf of principals are adequately trained both in the practices of the market-place and in the firm's responsibilities to principals; and(d) the BMA is notified of any changes in broking staff, in accordance with the BMA requirements.BC-2.8.2
Bankers shall be responsible for ensuring that:
(a) their dealing staff are adequately trained and supervised in the practices of the market (the requirement of this Code of Conduct should be fully understood by all staff involved in foreign exchange and currencydeposit operations);(b) the BMA is notified of any changes in dealing staff, in accordance with BMA requirements;(c) their staff understand that the ultimate responsibility for assessing the creditworthiness of a borrower or lender lies with the bank and not the broker;(d) brokerage is normally payable at the end of the month in which the money passes, or otherwise by special arrangement; and(e) there is no pressure on brokers to reduce charges below the approved minimum rates.BC-2.9 BC-2.9 Market regulations — Foreign exchange
Currencies
BC-2.9.1
A broker will, in response to an enquiry from any bank, make known the currencies which it elects to quote and to make a service in.
BC-2.9.2
Each broker shall provide, on request by a bank taking a service, general market information on all currencies handled (whether for the time being active or not) by that broker.
Brokerage
BC-2.9.3
Brokers shall comply with the minimum scales of brokerage charges (see section BC-4.6) agreed in consultation with the Bankers' Society Council from time to time, or laid down by the BMA.
In cases where there is no established minimum scale of brokerage charges, no deals shall be transacted until a rate has been agreed. Rates of brokerage in these cases should be agreed in advance, and only by Directors or senior managers on each side, and in no event by the dealers themselves.
BC-2.9.4
Put-through deals may be net of brokerage.
BC-2.9.5
Brokerage should be expressed in US dollars.
BC-2.10 BC-2.10 Market regulations — Currency deposits
Brokerage
BC-2.10.1
Brokers shall comply with the minimum scales of brokerage charges (see section BC-4.6) agreed in consultation with the Bankers' Society Council from time to time, or laid down by the BMA. In cases where there is no established minimum scale of brokerage charges, no deals shall be transacted until a rate has been agreed. Rates of brokerage in these cases should be agreed in advance, and only by Directors or senior managers on each side, and in no event by the dealers themselves.
BC-2.10.2
Calculation of brokerage on all currency deposits shall be worked out on a 360-day year, or a 365-day year, according to normally accepted market practice. For example, Sterling and Kuwaiti Dinars are on a 365-day year basis, and US dollars and Saudi Riyals are on a 360-day year basis.
Brokers' confirmations and statements should express brokerage in US dollars.
BC-2.10.3
In a forward-forward
deposit (e.g. one month against six months) the brokerage to be charged shall be on the actual intervening period (i.e. in the above example — five months).BC-2.10.4
Put-through deals may be net of brokerage.
BC-2.11 BC-2.11 Market discipline
BC-2.11.1
As part of its responsibility for supervising the conduct of brokers and dealers in the foreign exchange and currency markets, the Agency may, at its discretion:
(a) Investigate any complains concerning the conduct of brokers and dealers;(b) Investigate possible breaches of this Code by brokers and banks; and/or(c) Take such further action as it considers appropriate, in the light of all the relevant facts.BC-2.12 BC-2.12 Adjustment of value dates in case of unexpected banking closing dates
BC-2.12.1
Spot transactions and outrights:(a) Original agreed upon value date for identical currency sold and purchased: extension of value date to next possible value date for both currencies.(b) Original agreed upon value date for non-identical currency sold and purchased (for instance, Friday for US Dollars and Saturday for Gulf Currencies): as unexpected banking closing days for non-Middle Eastern currencies are unlikely — value of non-Gulf currencies unchanged and value of Gulf currency on the next working day, adjusting spot or outright rate taking into account interest rate difference between the two currencies.For pure outrights it would be advisable to adopt the same system as for
swaps ; however, impliedswap difference is not visible or identical for both parties.• It can be assumed that, if the above rule would cause substantial losses for one party, dealers will re-negotiate a new rate, on a case-by case basis; if no agreement can be reached, the BMA — as final arbitrator — will fix the interest rates, prevailing at that time, which will be used to calculate the points difference, with which the outright rate will be adjusted.It is possible that payment instructions for counter-currency are already sent out and cannot be cancelled; in that case the paying party should be entitled to the proceeds of the unexpected use of funds by the receiving party.
BC-2.12.2
Deposits :(a) Maturing on unexpected closing day(s): Extendingdeposit to next possible value date; interest to be calculated in the extended period at original agreed upon interest rate.(b) Starting on unexpected closing day(s) and maturing after unexpected closing day(s): Starting date will be extended to next possible value date without altering maturing date; interest to be calculated on the shortened period at the originally agreed upon interest rate.(c) Starting on unexpected closing day(s) and maturing before or on next possible value date: Cancellation of deal.1. If payment instructions are already sent out by lender and can only be executed on next possible value date, and cannot be cancelled, borrower ensures repayment will be done on the same next possible value date. If in that case borrower cannot repay because of deadline of receiving instructions by correspondent on same next possible value day, parties negotiate a new deal starting at value date of payment by lender and maturing according to new deal.2. If payment instructions are already sent out by lender for capital and by borrower for capital and interest both payments will be executed at same next possible value date, lender should refund to borrower unearned interest.BC-2.12.3
Swaps :(a) Maturing on unexpected closing day(s): Extendingswap to next possible value date for both currencies, adjustingswap difference according to formula —swap difference divided by original number of days and multiplied by new number of days.(b) Starting on unexpected closing day(s) and maturing after unexpected closing day(s): Starting date for both currencies would be extended to next possible value date for both currencies without altering maturing date, adjustingswap difference according to Formula under paragraph BC-2.12.3(a).(c) Starting on unexpected closing day(s) and maturing before or on next possible value date: Deals are cancelled.If starting or maturing date of original
swap under paragraph BC-2.12.1 or paragraph BC-2.12.2 are substantially different, per currencyswap difference has to be recalculated in mutual agreement between the dealers;• It is possible that payment instructions for counter currency are already sent out and cannot be cancelled — in that case paying party should be entitled to the proceeds of the unexpected use of funds by the receiving party;BC-3 BC-3 Client confidentiality
BC-3.1 BC-3.1 Disclosure of information about individual accounts
BC-3.1.1
Banks should not publish or release information to third parties concerning the accounts or activities of their individual customers, unless:
(a) such information is requested by an authorised official from the BMA or by an order from the Courts; or(b) the release of such information is approved by the customer concerned.BC-4 BC-4 Customer account services and charges
BC-4.1 BC-4.1 Minimum balance and charges on savings accounts
BC-4.1.1
Banks may impose no more than a monthly charge of BD 1/– when the monthly weighted average balance for savings accounts for individuals falls below BD 20/– (or equivalent in other currencies).
BC-4.1.2
Orphans, widows, pensioners, individuals receiving social subsidies from the Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs, students and Bahraini nationals with a monthly salary below BD 250/– should be exempted from maintaining the above minimum balance requirement for savings accounts. Banks should establish criteria for determining the eligibility of a person for exemption from the above charges and should notify their concerned customers accordingly.
BC-4.2 BC-4.2 Dinar Certificates of Deposits — Rules
BC-4.2.1
The purpose of the contents of this section is to set out rules governing the issue of Dinar
Certificates of Deposit by commercial banks.BC-4.2.2
For the purpose of this section, 'Dinar
Certificates of Deposit ' are financial instruments payable in Bahraini Dinars. They must be negotiable — in accordance with the Law of Commerce (No. 7) of 1987 — and must satisfy the conditions set out in this section.Issue
BC-4.2.3
Dinar
Certificates of Deposit may be issued only by full commercial banks and must be payable at their offices in Bahrain.BC-4.2.4
Commercial banks may issue
Certificates of Deposit to bothresident and non-resident customers and to other banks inside and outside Bahrain.BC-4.2.5
Commercial banks may not issue
Certificates of Deposit until they receive the necessary funds.Denominations
BC-4.2.6
Certificates of Deposit may be issued for any amount subject only to a minimum denomination of BD 30,000.Maturities
BC-4.2.7
Certificates of Deposit may be issued for any maturity between 183 days (6 months) and 5 years.Interest rates
BC-4.2.8
The interest rates on
Certificates of Deposit may be freely agreed between banks and theircounterparties at the time of issue.BC-4.2.9
Interest may be payable by agreement at a fixed or floating rate. In the case of a floating interest rate, the formula for revising the rate must be specified at the time of issue.
BC-4.2.10
Interest may be payable at maturity or on earlier dates specified at the time of issue.
BC-4.2.11
As an alternative to paying interest,
Certificates of Deposit may be issued (like Treasury bills) at a discount to their face value (the repayment amount).BC-4.2.12
Interest and discounted values should be calculated on the basis of a 360 day year.
Negotiability
BC-4.2.13
In view of their negotiability,
Certificates of Deposit may be freely traded between banks, and between banks and customers. Issuing banks are permitted to re-purchase their own Certificates.Safe custody
BC-4.2.14
Although it is not obligatory, holders of
Certificates of Deposit are advised to keep these certificates with a bank for safecustody and to handle them with care at all times.Reserve ratio
BC-4.2.15
Outstanding
Certificates of Deposit are subject to reserve requirements in accordance with the provisions set out under section BR-4.2.Other conditions
BC-4.2.16
Banks must not describe
deposit receipts, confirmations and other non-negotiable documents relating to ordinarydeposits as 'Certificates of Deposit ' and must not include such liabilities amongCertificates of Deposit in their monthly statistical reports (also see Module BR).BC-4.2.17
In their statistical reports (also see Module BR), banks should always classify their outstanding
Certificates of Deposit according to the type of customer (e.g.resident etc.) to whom they were first issued.BC-4.3 BC-4.3 Disclosure of charges
BC-4.3.1
In order to improve customer awareness and enhance transparency of bank charging structures, full commercial banks should display, by notice in their banking halls (both head offices and
branches ), a list of current charges.BC-4.3.2
Banks should also ensure that each customer is in receipt of its current list of charges. The list should specify standard charges and commissions that will be applied by the bank to individual services and transactions and to specific areas of business.
BC-4.3.3
The requirement in this section is in addition to the requirements set out under section CM-8.2 that require all full commercial banks to display, by a conspicuous notice, their current effective rate of interest.
BC-4.4 BC-4.4 Accounts held for clubs and societies in Bahrain
BC-4.4.1
All clubs and societies registered with the General Organisation for Youth and Sports (GOYS), are permitted under GOYS rules to only have one account with FCBs in Bahrain.
BC-4.4.2
The FCB is requested to notify GOYS when any club or society registered with GOYS requests the opening of an account with the bank. The purpose of the notification is to obtain clarification whether or not the account in question can be opened in accordance with the rules of GOYS.
BC-4.4.3
For accounts already held with the FCBs for clubs and societies registered with GOYS (i.e. before the application of the regulation in this section), the bank is requested to provide details of such accounts to GOYS (by reference to account name, relevant society, date opened and type of account) as soon as possible. If appropriate, GOYS will contact the relevant club or society in writing (with a copy to the bank) with instructions (e.g. to close the account) regarding such account.
BC-4.5 BC-4.5 Current accounts
BC-4.5.1
FCBs levying fees on their low-balance customer current accounts are required by the Agency to apply such fees to average balances when these fall below a prescribed level during a specified period.
BC-4.5.2
In order to prevent incidences of returned cheques due to maintenance of low-balance current accounts, the banks may convert some low-balance and/or inactive current accounts to savings accounts.
BC-4.6 BC-4.6 Brokerage fees
BC-4.6.1
The purpose of the contents of this section is to set out the new scale of brokerage fees effective for all banks in Bahrain.
BC-4.6.2
The new scale of fees is the result of discussion and consultation between The Bankers' Society and the Bahrain Money Brokers.
BC-4.6.3
For the list of brokerage fees, see Appendix BC 6.
BC-4.7 BC-4.7 Notification to the Agency on introduction of new or expanded customer products and facilities
BC-4.7.1
The content of this section is applicable only to full commercial banks licensed by the Agency.
BC-4.7.2
All institutions referred to under paragraph BC-4.7.1 are required to notify the Agency before the introduction of any new or expanded customer products and facilities. The Agency will respond to the concerned bank within one week of receipt of the notification if it has any observations on the new product.
BC-4.7.3
Further, institutions should also advise the Agency, on a six-monthly basis, on the status of new or expanded products and facilities. The advice should cover the following aspects:
(a) response to,(b) success of, and(c) difficulties in,the introduction of new or expanded products and facilities. The institution should also advise the Agency on any variances which are introduced to the terms and conditions applying to these products and facilities.
BC-4.8 BC-4.8 Procedures for inheritance of financial assets
BC-4.8.1
The content of this section is applicable to all full commercial banks licensed by the Agency in the Kingdom of Bahrain.
BC-4.8.2
The Agency requires all commercial banks to follow the undermentioned procedures regarding the distribution of the financial assets of a deceased customer.
(a) Legal ownership of financial assets should only pass after sight of, and in accordance with, the relevant documentation issued by the Ministry of Justice (known as the "statutory portion").(b) Distribution of assets should be made to the order of an individual named in, and in accordance with, a mandate, duly certified by the Ministry of Justice, that reflects the permission of all inheritors that the named individual may act on their collective behalf.(c) Where minors are inheritors, the Ministry of Justice documentation must specifically refer to their inheritance and the instruction followed absolutely.BC-5 BC-5 Dishonoured cheques
BC-5.1 BC-5.1 Penalty system for dishonoured cheques
BC-5.1.1
The purpose of the contents of this section is to set out regulations relating to the system of penalising any person, whether natural or corporate in form, (referred to as a 'customer' in this chapter) whose cheque is
(a) presented for payment, but is returned due to insufficient funds being available on his current account, where,(b) in the opinion of the FCB on whom the cheque is drawn, such cheque has been issued by the customer in bad faith.Cheques falling within this system are referred to as 'dishonoured cheques'. Due regard must be given by FCBs to the general provisions of Bahrain Law regarding
joint accounts , partnership accounts and accounts in the name of corporate entities, as well as to the customer mandate in each case, to determine how such accounts may be dealt with for purposes of the Regulation in this chapter.Procedures to be followed
BC-5.1.2
On each occasion that an FCB becomes aware of a dishonoured cheque of one of its customers, that FCB will send a written warning to the relevant customer informing him/her of the existence of the dishonoured cheque, requesting him/her to immediately make good the insufficiency in his current account in order to clear the cheque. This written warning will also inform the customer of the provisions of this system with regard to dishonoured cheques and abusers of cheques.
BC-5.1.3
On the first working day of each calendar month, each FCB should provide to the Agency a list of the names, supported with I.D. numbers (CPR or CR numbers (as applicable) for Bahrain residents, Passport or CR-equivalent numbers (as applicable) for non-Bahrain residents) of those customers to whom one (or more) written warning(s) has been sent in accordance with paragraph BC-5.1.2 above during the immediately preceding calendar month. This list should specify the number of written warnings relating to dishonoured cheques for each customer of the relevant FCB for the month in question and shall be in the form set out in Appendix BC 1. FCBs will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of all details on their respective lists.
BC-5.1.4
Using the lists referred to in paragraph BC-5.1.3 above, the Agency will prepare a further list (the 'Control List') of those customers to whom two or more written warnings were sent by any one or more FCB at any time within a maximum period of three consecutive calendar months. The Control List, which will be in the form set out in Appendix BC 2, will specify the name and I.D. numbers of each such customer, the total number of dishonoured cheques for that customer included in the lists referred to in paragraph BC-5.1.3 above, the name of the relevant FCB(s) on whose list(s) the customer's name has been included, and other relevant details for FCBs' information and checking in accordance with paragraph BC-5.1.5 below. Any customer to whom more than two written warnings relating to dishonoured cheques were sent by any one or more FCB at any time within a maximum period of three consecutive calendar months will be automatically deemed an abuser of cheques for the purposes of paragraph BC-5.1.7 below.
BC-5.1.5
On the second working day of each calendar month, the Agency will circulate a draft copy of the Control List to FCBs. FCBs will be requested to check the accuracy of the Control List by reference to the information they have sent to the Agency in accordance with paragraph BC-5.1.3 above, and to notify the Agency within a maximum period of one week of receiving the list of any inaccuracies on the Control List. The Control List, as amended if appropriate, will be circulated to FCBs by the Agency on the second working day after it receives all responses from FCBs. FCBs will be required to monitor the customers on this Control List to establish whether any one or more of them issued another dishonoured cheque in the instant calendar month. Any FCB becoming aware of a dishonoured cheque of one or more of its customers on the Control List during this month should notify the Agency of this fact, using the relevant section in Appendix BC 1, on the first working day of each calendar month.
BC-5.1.6
If the Agency does not receive any notification as contemplated in paragraph BC-5.1.5 above for a particular customer on the Control List, that customer's name shall be withdrawn from the next issue of the Control List. However, the Agency will monitor the names of customers appearing on the Control List during the three consecutive calendar months falling immediately after the calendar month in which a customer's name is taken off the Control List. If any such customer's name is again reported to the Agency pursuant to paragraph BC-5.1.3 above at any time during this three month period,
(a) his name will be returned to the Control List on the date of its next issue if there is only one dishonoured cheque reported in this context, or(b) he will be automatically deemed an abuser of cheques for the purposes of paragraph BC-5.1.7 below if there is more than one dishonoured cheque reported in this context.If, however, his name is not reported to the Agency in this regard, the Agency will cease its monitoring thereof.
BC-5.1.7
If the Agency does receive notification as contemplated in paragraph BC-5.1.5 above for a particular customer on the Control List, or if a customer is deemed to be an abuser of cheques within paragraph BC-5.1.4 or paragraph BC-5.1.6 above, such customer (herein referred to as an 'abuser of cheques') will be penalised as follows. Using Appendix BC 3, on the second working day of the calendar month following the receipt of the information referred to above, the Agency will circulate a draft list to FCBs. FCBs will be requested to check the accuracy of this list by reference to the information they have sent to the Agency in accordance with paragraph BC-5.1.5 above, and to notify the Agency within a maximum period of one week of receiving the list of any inaccuracies on that list. The list, as amended if appropriate, will be circulated to FCBs by the Agency on the second working day after it receives all responses from FCBs, and will direct the FCB(s) which has/have reported an abuser of cheques to withdraw all cheque books held by that abuser of cheques, and to close such person's current account(s) by transferring any balances therein to savings and/or any other accounts held with that/those FCB(s). Furthermore, that FCB(s) must not provide current account facilities to that abuser of cheques for the twelve calendar month period immediately following the date of issue of the relevant list. All other FCBs should, within a maximum period of one month after the issue of the relevant list, also withdraw current account facilities from that abuser of cheques for the same twelve calendar month period. FCBs will be entitled to recover any amounts due to them from abusers of cheques as a result of compliance with this system by availing of their set-off rights under Bahrain Law.
BC-5.1.8
On Appendix BC 4, the Agency will notify FCBs of those abusers of cheques in respect of whom the twelve calendar month period referred to in paragraph BC-5.1.7 above has ended, and to whom FCBs may reinstate/offer current account facilities at their discretion.
BC-5.1.9
Nothing in this Regulation shall prejudice the rights of banks against customers otherwise existing under Bahrain Law and/or under any particular bank/customer agreement. Furthermore, FCBs will be entitled to the same immunity from prosecution as the Agency for any harm suffered, or alleged to be suffered, by customers as a result of FCBs complying with the Regulation in this chapter.
BC-5.1.10
The Regulation in this chapter may be amended, in whole or in part, from time to time by the Agency. In addition, the Agency may, at its discretion and as it so deems appropriate, issue specific directions to all or any FCBs regarding abusers of cheques or any particular abuser of cheques.
BC-5.2 BC-5.2 General guidance on administration of dishonoured cheques
BC-5.2.1
FCBs that wish to issue cheque guarantee cards for an amount not exceeding BD 200 may do so — subject to informing the Director of Banking Services at the Agency of their intention and the arrangements governing the issue of such cards.
BC-5.2.2
FCBs, generally, should take steps to extend their administrative supervision and control over current account customers (in particular those who are in repeated breach of normally-accepted behaviour), and to stress to account holders the need for an appropriate level of discipline in the usage of cheques.
BC-5.2.3
FCBs should exercise greater vigilance over borrowers, especially in the area of consumer finance, where such borrowers maintain their current accounts at a bank or banks other than at the lending bank.
BC-5.2.4
The Agency will monitor the incidence of returned cheques on a monthly basis (as stipulated in section BC-5.1) in order to determine the extent to which such incidence is being reduced or otherwise.
BC-5.3 BC-5.3 Penalty charges on dishonoured cheques
BC-5.3.1
The Agency will impose penalty charges of BD 5/= (five Bahraini Dinars) on each returned cheque for the reasons of 'Refer to Drawer', 'Not Arranged For', 'Re-present', and 'Account Closed'. Individual banks will continue to be informed daily of any charges accruing to their accounts. The respective accounts will be debited on the same day.
BC-5.3.2
FCBs will be entitled to charge customers no more than BD 10/= (ten Bahraini Dinars) in respect of each dishonoured cheque.
BC-6 BC-6 Automated Teller Machine (ATMs)
BC-6.1 BC-6.1 Installation of an off-site ATM in Bahrain
BC-6.1.1
The purpose of the content of this section is to set out the criteria to be followed by banks for the installation and usage of
off-site ATMs in the Kingdom of Bahrain.BC-6.1.2
Applications for the installation of
off-site ATMs should be sent in writing, and in accordance with the requirements set out in paragraphs BC-6.1.3 to paragraphs BC-6.1.10, to the Executive Director of Banking Supervision at the Agency.General criteria
BC-6.1.3
Subject to the prior written approval of the Agency,
off-site ATMs may be owned individually or jointly by licensed FCBs which are members of the BENEFIT Switch. Each relevant owning FCB must already have linked its bank's ATM capability to the BENEFIT Switch prior to requesting the BMA's permission to install an off-site ATM and, furthermore, must conform to the general standards set by the Benefit company.BC-6.1.4
Subject to the prior written approval of the Agency,
off-site ATMs may, at each relevant owning FCB's discretion, be fully functioning or operate as cash dispensers only. In addition,off-site ATMs may, at each relevant owning FCB's discretion (and subject to the prior written approval of the Agency), be 'walk-up' or 'drive-in' machines.BC-6.1.5
Owning FCBs will bear full legal responsibility for their respective
off-site ATMs , as well as all costs associated with such ATMs (including, but not limited to, cash replenishment, installation, security etc.).BC-6.1.6
FCBs wishing to install an off-site ATM must submit an application (in writing) for the BMA's approval. This application must be accompanied by a copy of a feasibility study for that particular ATM, as well as such other information as the BMA may request. In particular, a copy of the written permission (for installation of that off-site ATM) of the legal owner of the proposed location must be provided to the Agency, as well as a copy of the written permission of any other relevant authorities in this context (e.g. the Traffic & Licensing and Civil Defence & Fire Service Directorates of the Ministry of Interior).
BC-6.1.7
Applications will generally be considered on a 'first come, first served' basis for a particular location. If more than one application is received to install an off-site ATM in the same location, the number of such applications which are approved will depend upon whether the location appears to the Agency to be capable of sustaining multiple
off-site ATMs (subject, in addition, to the exact details of each individual application regarding security etc. being acceptable to the Agency).BC-6.1.8
Each application will be assessed on its individual merits, and at the Agency's discretion, taking into account factors which the Agency considers relevant including, but not limited to:
(a) the suitability of the location in question,(b) the level of overall activities of the applicant in the market as well as the size and make-up of its customer base, and(c) the type and range of facilities which the applicant proposes offering through the off-site ATM at the location in question.BC-6.1.9
In addition to the information required by the Agency under paragraph BC-6.1.6, the Agency may require further information/clarification to be provided to it before it takes a decision regarding the application. The Agency's decision in this regard will be notified to each relevant applicant FCB in writing and will be final.
BC-6.1.10
The Agency may, at its discretion, require an off-site ATM to be closed at any time. In addition, an owning FCB may request the Agency in writing for permission to close any of its
off-site ATMs .BC-6.2 BC-6.2 GCC ATM network charges
BC-6.2.1
The purpose of this section is to set a limit on ATM charges imposed by full commercial banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain for customer withdrawals and other ATM services transactions relating to other banks in the GCC (i.e. linking to GCC ATM networks).
BC-6.2.2
The limits in this section do not apply to ATM service charges on local ATM networks.
BC-6.2.3
The Agency requires that the charges on such customer withdrawals and other ATM services should not exceed BD 1/= (one Bahraini Dinar) per transaction.
BC-7 BC-7 Margin Trading System
BC-7.1 BC-7.1 Introduction
BC-7.1.1
This Chapter applies to all full commercial banks in Bahrain.
BC-7.1.2
Investors purchasing securities (as defined from time to time by the Bahrain Stock Exchange ("BSE")) listed on the BSE may pay for them under the Margin Trading System ("The System") by borrowing a portion of the purchase price from a participating bank. The System is subject to relevant provisions of the BMA Law, the BSE Law, any rules and regulations issued pursuant to such Laws and this Module. The System applies to equities in companies listed on the BSE. Unless restrictions apply under Bahrain law in this regard, the System shall be available to Bahraini or non-Bahraini investors, whether resident or non-resident in Bahrain.
BC-7.1.3
The main objective of introducing the System is to enhance the overall activity on the BSE, allowing investors to leverage their investments, in a controlled manner.
General criteria
BC-7.1.4
Only Full Commercial Banks licensed by the Agency will be permitted to act as participating banks for the System. Participating banks must each receive the prior general written approval of the BMA in order to take part in the System. The BMA will notify the BSE of the identity of participating banks for the System. The BMA's approval may be withdrawn at its discretion.
BC-7.1.5
Stock Exchange Brokers will not be permitted to act as lenders or financiers for the System.
BC-7.2 BC-7.2 Limits and Trading Rules
BC-7.2.1
An investor may, through his relationship with any one individual participating bank under the System, invest a maximum of BD 200,000 in securities (i.e. BD 200,000 per investor/per individual participating bank, made up of BD 100,000 by way of the investor's own initial margin and BD 100,000 by way of financing from the relevant participating bank to that investor).
BC-7.2.2
An investor may, through approaching more than one bank under the System, invest a maximum of BD 500,000 in securities (i.e. BD 500,000 per investor/from all participating banks, made up of BD 250,000 by way of the investor's own initial margin with all participating banks and BD 250,000 by way of total financing from all participating banks to that investor.
BC-7.2.3
The amount of the margin facility made to an investor under the System shall be included as an exposure to that customer, and contribute towards the large exposures limit and the consumer finance limit for that person.
BC-7.2.4
The total amount of financing granted by an individual participating bank to all investors under the System shall not, at any time exceed 15% of that participating bank's capital base, such percentage to be reviewed by the BMA at its discretion from time to time.
BC-7.2.5
In relation to the aggregate limit under paragraph BC-7.2.2 above, the Agency will require participating banks to inform the Credit Risk Bureau of all facility limits approved to investors under the System from time to time. Participating banks must check with the CRB on the amount of facility limits outstanding under the System at any time to a particular investor.
Brokers
BC-7.2.6
Only those brokers approved by the BSE will be permitted to act as brokers for the System. Generally, brokers will only be approved if they (a) hold a "Class A" license from the BSE, and (b) meet the requirements set for the System from time to time by the BSE and the BMA.
Documentation
BC-7.2.7
Only standard-form documents (application forms and agreements) will be used for the System. Standard-form agreements, drafted and approved in advance by the BSE, will be entered into between the participating bank and the investor (in respect of financing), and between the participating bank and the investor and the broker (in respect of trading) and, as relevant, these agreements shall (amongst other things) confirm that:
a. The investor is borrowing or financing a stated amount from the participating bank for the purpose of taking part in the System;b. The investor will repay such stated amount, together with any interest or charges thereon, when due and in accordance with the agreement;c. The investor understands the risks involved in margin trading as well as the implications of the undertakings given by him;d. The participating bank can sell the securities bought through the System if the relevant margin is called and not met, without further formalities being required;e. The broker is liable for marking the securities to market on a daily (or more frequent) basis and for keeping the participating bank updated as to the participating bank's exposure to the investor;f. The investor can place orders with the broker for the purchase of securities up to the limit permitted by the agreement;g. Each party to the agreement in question shall abide by the duty of confidentiality imposed on him in relation to the matters set out in the agreement; andh. There is an overriding obligation on the parties thereto to comply with Bahrain law in general and, in particular, with the share-ownership restrictions applying to certain types of securities.Owner of the Securities bought using the System
BC-7.2.8
For ease of transfer and sale of the securities in the event that a margin is called by the participating bank but not met by the investor, the securities will be registered in the participating bank's name (for the account of the investor) and held by a custodian.
BC-7.2.9
Under paragraph BC-7.2.8 above: (a) the securities should not be considered as part of the bank's own assets for the purposes of determining ownership/control under Bahrain law, and (b) if the investor has discharged his obligations to the participating bank under the System and the securities have not been sold, the securities shall be transferred into the legal ownership of the investor.
Margin Percentage
BC-7.2.10
For equities listed on the BSE, an investor shall have the right to borrow a loan the value of which shall not exceed 50% of the total value of the funds being invested (i.e. 1:1). The BMA and the BSE shall coordinate in making any change to the margin percentages set for the System.
Margin Call Top-up
BC-7.2.11
The margin call top-up shall be 30% of the total value of the funds invested by an investor through a margin account with a participating bank. An investor shall settle a margin call on the settlement date (as determined by the BSE) by making a cash payment of such amount to the participating bank. Such cash payment may, at the investor's discretion and in whole or part, come from the sale of the securities bought through the System, or otherwise. Failure to meet such margin call will, however, give the participating bank the right to sell the securities bought through the System.
Margin Interest
BC-7.2.12
The participating bank shall charge a rate of interest or impose charges on the financing amount granted to the investor at a rate or on a basis to be determined by the participating bank. In the event that investor's margin account is in credit in excess of the margin applicable thereto, interest or profit shall be paid on the excess at a rate to be determined by the participating bank.
CA CA Capital Adequacy
CA-A CA-A Introduction
CA-A.1 CA-A.1 Application
CA-A.1.1
Regulations in this module are applicable to locally incorporated banks on both a stand-alone, including foreign
branches , and consolidated group basis.CA-A.1.2
In addition to licensees mentioned in paragraph CA-A.1.1, certain of these regulations (in particular market risk requirements) are also applicable to full commercial
branches of foreign banks.CA-A.2 CA-A.2 Purpose
CA-A.2.1
The purpose of this module is to set out the Agency's
capital adequacy regulations and provide guidance on the risk measurement for the calculation of capital requirements by locally incorporated banks.CA-A.2.2
The module also sets out the minimum gearing requirements which relevant banks (referred to in section CA-A.1) must meet as a condition of their licensing.
CA-A.2.3
The Agency requires in particular that the relevant banks maintain adequate capital, in accordance with the Regulation in this module, against their risks as capital provides banks with a cushion to absorb losses without endangering customer
deposits . Due to this, the Agency also requires the relevant banks to maintain adequate liquidity and identify and control their large creditexposures that might otherwise be a source of loss to a licensee on a scale that might threaten its solvency.CA-A.2.4
This module provides support for certain other parts of the Rulebook, mainly:
(a) Licensing and Authorisation Requirements;(b) BMA Reporting Requirements;(c) Credit Risk Management;(d) Market Risk Management;(e) Operational Risk Management;(f) Liquidity Risk Management;(g) High Level Controls:(h) Relationship with Audit Firms; and(i) Penalties and Fines.CA-A.3 CA-A.3 Key requirements
CA-A.3.1
All locally incorporated banks are required to measure and apply capital charges in respect of their credit and market risk capital requirements.
The capital requirement
CA-A.3.2
Banks are allowed three classes of capital instruments (see section CA-2.2) to meet their capital requirements for credit risk and market risk, as set out below:
Tier 1: Core capital — May be used to support credit risk and market risk;Tier 2: Supplementary capital — May be used to support credit risk and market risk; andTier 3: Ancillary capital — May be used solely to support market risk.Measuring credit risks
CA-A.3.3
In measuring credit risk for the purpose of
capital adequacy , banks are required to apply a simple risk-weighted approach through which claims of different categories of counterparties are assigned risk weights according to broad categories of relative riskiness.Measuring market risks
CA-A.3.4
For the measurement of their market risks, banks will have a choice, subject to the written approval of the Agency, between two broad methodologies. One alternative is to measure the risks in a standardised approach, using the measurement frameworks described in chapters CA-4 to CA-8 of these regulations. The second alternative methodology (i.e. the internal models approach) is set out in detail in chapter CA-9 including the procedure for obtaining the Agency's approval. This methodology is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. The use of this methodology is, therefore, conditional upon the explicit approval of the Agency.
Minimum capital ratio requirement
CA-A.3.5
On a consolidated basis, the Agency has set a minimum Risk Asset Ratio ("RAR") of 12.0% for all locally incorporated banks. Furthermore, on a solo basis, the parent bank is required to maintain a minimum RAR of 8.0% (i.e. unconsolidated).
CA-A.3.6
For banks that are required to complete only the PIR form, the Agency has set a minimum Risk Asset Ratio ("RAR") of 12.0%.
Maintaining minimum RAR
CA-A.3.7
The Agency considers it a matter of basic prudential practice that, in order to ensure that these RARs are constantly met, banks set up internal "targets" of 12.5% (on a consolidated basis) and 8.5% (on a solo basis) to warn them of a potential fall by the bank below the Agency's required minimum RARs. Where a bank's capital ratio falls below its target ratio, the General Manager should notify the Agency immediately, however, no formal action plan will be necessary. The General Manager should explain what measures are being implemented to ensure that the bank will remain above its minimum RAR(s).
CA-A.3.8
The bank will be required to submit form PIR (and PIRC where applicable) to the Agency on a monthly basis, until the RAR(s) exceeds its target ratio(s).
Gearing requirements
CA-A.3.9
For Full Commercial Bank and Offshore Banking Unit licensees,
deposit liabilities should not exceed 20 times the respective bank's capital and reserves.CA-A.3.10
For Investment Bank licensees,
deposit liabilities should not exceed 10 times the respective bank's capital and reserves.CA-A.4 CA-A.4 Regulation history
CA-A.4.1
This module was first issued in July 2004 as part of the conventional principles volume. All regulations in this volume have been effective since this date. All subsequent changes are dated with the month and year at the base of the relevant page and in the Table of Contents. Chapter UG-3 of Module UG provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and control. The most recent changes made to this module are detailed in the table below:
Summary of changes
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes Evolution of the Module
CA-A.4.2
Prior to the development of the Rulebook, the Agency had issued various circulars representing regulations relating to
capital adequacy requirements. These circulars have now been consolidated into this module covering thecapital adequacy regulation. These circulars and their evolution into this module are listed below:Circular Ref. Date of Issue Module Ref. Circular Subject ODG/50/98 11 Sep 1998 CA-1–CA-9 Market Risk Capital Regulations BC/07/02 26 Jun 2002 CA-1.4 Review of PIR by External Auditors OG/78/01 20 Feb 2001 CA-2.5 Monitoring of Capital Adequacy BC/01/98 10 Jan 1998 CA-2.5 Risk Asset Ratio Effective date
CA-A.4.3
The contents in this module are effective from the date depicted in the original circulars (see Paragraph CA-A.4.2) from which the requirements are compiled.
CA-B CA-B General guidance and best practice
CA-B.1 CA-B.1 Introduction
CA-B.1.1
This chapter provides general guidance on
Capital adequacy requirements, unless otherwise stated.CA-B.1.2
It sets best practice standards and should generally be applied by all licensees to their activities.
CA-B.2 CA-B.2 Guidance provided by other international bodies
Basel Committee: Use of 'Backtesting' in Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements
CA-B.2.1
In January 1996, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued technical guidance on the "use of 'Backtesting' in Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements" (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.htm).CA-B.2.2
This technical guidance presents a methodology for testing the accuracy of the internal models used by banks to measure market risks.
CA-B.2.3
Backtesting offers the best opportunity for incorporating suitable incentives into the internal models in a consistent manner.
CA-B.2.4
The Agency will rely upon technical guidance for its assessment and review of bank's market risk capital requirements including, but not limited to, the determination of the add-on factor.
Basel Committee: The management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures — a supervisory perspective
CA-B.2.5
In March 1986, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a paper titled "The management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures — a supervisory perspective" (see www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc134.pdf).CA-B.2.6
This paper examines off-balance-sheet risks from three angles: market/position risk, credit risk and operational/control risk. Part III of this paper examines credit risk (including control of large
exposures , settlement risk and country risk), with particular emphasis given to the assessment of the relative risks of the different types of off-balance-sheet activity.CA-B.3 CA-B.3 Enforceability
CA-B.3.1
This guidance should not be taken as legally binding requirements, unless otherwise embodied in Bahrain law or by regulation.
CA-B.3.2
It should be noted that the provisions in this chapter are to be taken as guidance, unless otherwise stated, supplementing the Regulations set out in this module.
CA-1 CA-1 Scope and coverage of capital charges
CA-1.1 CA-1.1 Introduction
CA-1.1.1
All locally incorporated banks are required to measure and apply capital charges in respect of their credit and market risk capital requirements.
CA-1.1.2
Credit risk is defined as the potential that a bank's borrower or
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. Credit risk exists throughout the activities of a bank in the banking book and in the trading book including both on- and off-balance-sheetexposures .CA-1.1.3
Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on- or off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market prices. The risks subject to the capital requirement of this module are:
(a) the risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book: and(b) foreign exchange andcommodities risks throughout the bank.CA-1.2 CA-1.2 Measuring credit risks
CA-1.2.1
In measuring credit risk for the purpose of
capital adequacy , banks are required to apply a simple risk-weighted approach through which claims of different categories of counterparties are assigned risk weights according to broad categories of relative riskiness.CA-1.2.2
The framework of weights consists of four weights — 0%, 20%, 50% and 100% for on- and off-balance-sheet items, which based on a broad-brush judgment, are applied to the different types of assets and off-balance-sheet
exposures (with the exception of derivative transactions) within the banking book.CA-1.2.3
The resultant different weighted assets and off-balance-sheet
exposures are then added together to calculate the total credit-risk-weighted assets of the bank.CA-1.3 CA-1.3 Measuring market risks
Trading book
CA-1.3.1
The trading book means the bank's proprietary positions in financial instruments (including positions in derivative products and off-balance-sheet instruments) which are intentionally held for short-term resale and/or which are taken on by the bank with the intention of benefiting in the short-term from actual and/or expected differences between their buying and selling prices, or from other price or interest rate variations, and positions in financial instruments arising from matched principal brokering and market making, or positions taken in order to
hedge other elements of the trading book.CA-1.3.2
Each bank should agree a written policy statement with the Agency on which activities are normally considered trading and which, therefore, constitute the trading book.
CA-1.3.3
It is expected that the trading activities will be managed and monitored by a separate unit and that such activities should be identifiable because of their intent, as defined in paragraph CA-1.3.1 above.
Interest rate and equity risk
CA-1.3.4
The capital charges for interest rate related instruments and equities will apply based on the current market values of items in a bank's trading book.
Foreign exchange and commodities risk
CA-1.3.5
The capital charges for foreign exchange risk and for
commodities risk will apply to a bank's total currency andcommodity positions, with the exception of structural foreign exchange positions in accordance with section CA-6.3 of this module.Exemptions
CA-1.3.6
Banks will be allowed certain de minimis exemptions from the capital requirements for foreign exchange risk, as described in section CA-6.2. For the time being, there shall be no exemptions from the trading book capital requirements, or from the capital requirements for
commodities risk.Hedging instruments
CA-1.3.7
A trading book
exposure may behedged , completely or partially, by an instrument that, in its own right, is not normally considered eligible to be a part of the trading book. Subject to the policy statement agreed by the bank with the Agency as explained in paragraph CA-1.3.2 above, and with the prior written approval of the Agency, banks will be allowed to include within their market risk measure non-trading instruments (on- or off-balance-sheet) which are deliberately used tohedge the trading activities. The positions in these instruments will attractcounterparty risk capital requirements and general market risk, but not specific risk requirements.CA-1.3.8
Where a financial instrument which would normally qualify as part of the trading book is used to
hedge anexposure in the banking book, it should be carved out of the trading book for the period of thehedge , and included in the banking book with theexposure it ishedging . Such instruments will be subject to the credit risk capital requirements.CA-1.3.9
It is possible that general market risk arising from the trading book may
hedge positions in the banking book without reference to individual financial instruments. In such circumstances, there must nevertheless be underlying positions in the trading book. The positions in the banking book which are beinghedged must remain in the banking book, although the general market riskexposure associated with them should be incorporated within the calculation of general market risk capital requirements for the trading book (i.e. the general market risk element on the banking book side of thehedge should be added to the trading book calculation, rather than that on the trading book side of thehedge being deducted from it). As no individual financial instruments are designated, there is no resultant specific risk requirement in the trading book and the risk-weighted assets in the banking book will not be reduced. Any such arrangement for the transfer of risk must be subject to the policy statement agreed with the Agency as explained in paragraph CA-1.3.2 above, and should have the specific prior written approval of the Agency.Allocation of financial and hedging instruments
CA-1.3.10
The allocation of a financial instrument between the trading book and the banking book, or the allocation of
hedging instruments described in paragraph CA-1.3.7 above, or the transfer of general market risk as explained in paragraph CA-1.3.9 above, should be subject to appropriate and adequate documentation to ensure that it can be established through audit verification that the item is treated correctly for the purposes of capital requirements, in compliance with the bank's established criteria for allocating items to the trading or banking book, and subject to the policy statement agreed with the Agency.CA-1.3.11
The Agency intends to carefully monitor the way in which banks allocate financial instruments and will seek, in particular, to ensure that no abusive switching designed to minimise capital charges occurs and to prevent "gains trading" in respect of
securities which are not marked to market.Review of compliance by internal and external auditors
CA-1.3.12
The bank's compliance with the established criteria for allocating items to the trading and banking books, and with the policy statement agreed with the Agency, should be reviewed by the bank's internal auditors at least on a quarterly basis, and by the external auditors at least once a year.
CA-1.3.13
Any cases of non-compliance identified by the internal auditor should be immediately brought to the attention of the Agency, in writing, by the senior management of the bank. Any non-compliance identified by the external auditors, requires them to submit a written report directly to the Agency (in accordance with the requirements in section CA-9.8), in addition to a report to be submitted by the management.
Valuation requirements
CA-1.3.14
To establish a relevant base for measuring the market risk in the trading book, all positions should be marked to market daily, including the recognition of accruing interest, dividends or other benefits as appropriate. Banks are required to have, and discuss with the Agency, a written policy statement on the subject of valuing trading book positions, which in particular should address the valuation process for those items where market prices are not readily available. This policy statement should have been developed in conjunction with the bank's internal and external auditors. Having arrived at a valuation mechanism for a single position or a group of similar positions, the valuation approach should be applied consistently. In addition to the considerations of prudence and consistency, the bank's valuation policy should reflect the points set out below:
(a) A bank may mark to market positions using either a close-out valuation based on two-way prices (i.e., a long position shall be valued at its current bid price and a short position at its current offer price) or, alternatively, using a mid-market price but making a provision for the spread between bid and offer prices for different instruments. The bank must have due regard to the liquidity of the position concerned and any special factors which may adversely affect the closure of the position.(b) Where a bank has obtained the Agency's approval for the use of a risk assessment model in the calculation of the capital requirements foroptions (in accordance with chapter CA-9 of these regulations), it may value itsoptions using the values derived from that model.(c) Where a bank does not use a model and the prices are not published for itsoptions positions, it must determine the market value as follows:(i) For purchasedoptions , the marked-to-market value is the product of the "in the money" amount and the quantity underlying theoption ; and(ii) For writtenoptions , the marked-to-market value is the initial premium received for theoption plus the product of the amount by which the current "in the money" amount exceeds either the "in the money" amount at the time the contract was written, or zero if the contract was "out of the money" at the time that it was written; and the quantity underlying theoption .(d) A bank must calculate the value of aswap contract or an FRA having regard to the net present value of the future cash flows of the contract, using current interest rates relevant to the periods in which the cash flows will arise.(e) Where a bank is a market maker in an instrument(s), the valuation should be the bank's own bid or offer price which should reflect the bank'sexposure to the market as a whole and its views on future prices. Where the bank is the sole market maker in a particular instrument, it should take proper care to ensure that the valuation used is prudent in all circumstances.(f) In the event that a bank is only able to access indicative prices, having regard to the fact that they are only a guide, such prices may have to be adjusted to some degree in order to arrive at a prudent valuation.(g) In the event that the bank is only able to access mid-market or single values, it should have regard to the fact that these prices will have to be adjusted to some degree in order to arrive at a prudent valuation.Consolidation
CA-1.3.15
Both credit risk and market risk capital requirements will apply on a worldwide consolidated basis. Only a bank which is running a global consolidated book may apply the offsetting rules contained in the remainder of these regulations, on a consolidated basis with the prior written agreement of the Agency. However, where it would not be prudent to offset or net positions within the group as, for example, where there are obstacles to the quick repatriation of profits from a foreign subsidiary or where there are legal and procedural difficulties in carrying out the timely management of risks on a consolidated basis, the Agency will require the bank to take individual positions into account without any offsetting.
CA-1.3.16
Notwithstanding that the market risk capital requirements will apply on a worldwide consolidated basis, the Agency retains the right to monitor the market risks of banks on a non-consolidated basis to ensure that significant imbalances within a group do not escape supervision. The Agency will be particularly vigilant to ensure that banks do not pass positions on reporting dates in such a way as to escape measurement.
Approach to measurement
CA-1.3.17
For the measurement of their market risks, banks will have a choice, subject to the written approval of the Agency, between two broad methodologies. One alternative is to measure the risks in a standardised approach, using the measurement frameworks described in chapters CA-4 to CA-8 of these regulations. Chapters CA-4 to CA-7 deal with the four risks addressed by these regulations; namely interest rate risk, equity position risk, foreign exchange risk and
commodities risk. Chapter CA-8 sets out a number of possible methods for measuring theprice risk inoptions of all kinds. The capital charge under the standardised approach is the arithmetical sum of the risk measures obtained from the measurement frameworks in chapters CA-4 to CA-8.CA-1.3.18
The standardised approach uses a "building-block" approach in which the specific risk and the general market risk arising from interest rate and equity positions are calculated separately.
CA-1.3.19
The second alternative methodology, which is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions and the use of which is, therefore, conditional upon the explicit approval of the Agency, is set out in detail in chapter CA-9 including the procedure for obtaining the Agency's approval. This method allows banks to use risk measures derived from their own internal risk measurement models (Internal Models Approach), subject to seven sets of conditions which are described in detail in chapter CA-9.
CA-1.3.20
The focus of most internal models currently used by banks is the general market risk
exposure , typically leaving specific risk (i.e.,exposures to specific issuers of debtsecurities or equities1) to be measured largely through separate credit risk measurement systems. Banks using internal models for the measurement of their market risk capital requirements will be subject to a separate capital charge for specific risk, to the extent that the model does not capture specific risk. The capital charge for banks which are modelling specific risk is set out in chapter CA-9.
1 Specific risk includes the risk that an individual debt or equity
security moves by more or less than the general market in day-to-day trading (including periods when the whole market is volatile) and event risk (where the price of an individual debt or equitysecurity moves precipitously relative to the general market, e.g., on a take-over bid or some other shock event; such events would also include the risk of "default ").CA-1.3.21
In measuring the
price risk inoptions under the standardised approach, a number of alternatives with varying degrees of sophistication are allowed (see chapter CA-8). The more a bank is engaged in writingoptions , the more sophisticated its measurement method needs to be. In the longer term, banks with significantoptions business will be expected to move to comprehensivevalue-at-risk models and become subject to the full range of quantitative and qualitative standards set out in chapter CA-9.CA-1.3.22
All transactions, including forward sales and purchases, shall be included in the calculation of capital requirements as from the date on which they were entered into.
Monitoring
CA-1.3.23
Banks are expected to manage their market risk in such a way that the capital requirements for market risk are being met on a continuous basis, i.e. at the close of each business day and not merely at the end of each calendar quarter, both in the case of banks that use the standardised approach and those that use internal models. Banks are also expected to maintain strict risk management systems to ensure that their intra-day
exposures are not excessive.CA-1.3.24
Banks' daily compliance with the capital requirements for market risk shall be verified by the independent risk management department and the internal auditor. It is expected that the external auditors will perform appropriate tests of the banks' daily compliance with the capital requirements for market risk. Where a bank fails to meet the minimum capital requirements for market risk on any business day, the Agency should be informed in writing. The Agency will then seek to ensure that the bank takes immediate measures to rectify the situation.
CA-1.3.25
Besides what is stated in paragraphs CA-1.3.2, CA-1.3.3, CA-1.3.10, CA-1.3.11, CA-1.3.19 and section CA-1.6, the Agency will consider a number of other appropriate and effective measures to ensure that banks do not "window-dress" by showing significantly lower market risk positions on reporting dates.
CA-1.4 CA-1.4 Reporting
CA-1.4.1
Formal reporting, to the Agency, of
capital adequacy shall be made in accordance with the requirements set out under section BR-3.1.Review of Prudential Information Returns by External Auditors
CA-1.4.2
The Agency requires all relevant banks to request their external auditors to conduct a review of the prudential returns on a quarterly basis in accordance with the requirements set out under section BR-3.1.
CA-1.5 CA-1.5 Summary of overall capital adequacy requirement
CA-1.5.1
Each bank is expected to monitor and report the level of risk against which a capital requirement is to be applied, in accordance with section CA-1.3 above. The bank's overall minimum capital requirement will be:
The credit risk requirements laid down by the Agency, excluding debt and equity
securities in the trading book and all positions incommodities , but including the creditcounterparty risk on allover-the-counter derivatives whether in the trading or the banking books: PLUS one of the following:(a) The capital charges for market risks calculated according to the measurement frameworks described in chapters CA-4 to CA-8, summed arithmetically: OR(b) The measure of market risk derived from the models approach set out in chapter CA-9 (with the prior written approval of the Agency for adopting this approach — see chapter CA-9); OR(c) A mixture of (a) and (b) above, summed arithmetically (with the prior written approval of the Agency for adopting a combination of the standardised approach and the internal models approach — see chapter CA-9).CA-1.6 CA-1.6 Transitional provisions
CA-1.6.1
Banks which start to use internal models for one or more risk categories should, over a reasonable period of time, extend the models to all of their operations, subject to the exceptions mentioned in paragraph CA-1.6.4 below, and to move towards a comprehensive model (i.e., one which captures all market risk categories).
CA-1.6.2
On a transitional basis, banks will be allowed to use a combination of the standardised approach and the internal models approach to measure their market risks provided they should cover a complete risk category (e.g., interest rate risk or foreign exchange risk), i.e., a combination of the two methods will not be allowed within the same risk category1. However, for banks that are, at present, still implementing or further improving their internal models, they will be allowed some flexibility, even within risk categories, in including all their operations on a worldwide basis. This flexibility shall be subject to the specific prior written approval of the Agency, and such approval will be given on a case-by-case basis and reviewed by the Agency from time to time.
1 This does not, however, apply to pre-processing techniques which are used to simplify the calculation and whose results become subject to the standardised methodology.
CA-1.6.3
The Agency will closely monitor banks to ensure that there will be no "cherry-picking" between the standardised approach and the models approach within a risk category. Banks which adopt a model will not be permitted, save in exceptional circumstances, to revert to the standardised approach.
CA-1.6.4
The Agency recognises that even a bank which uses a comprehensive model may still incur risks in positions which are not captured by their internal models2, for example, in remote locations, in minor currencies or in negligible business areas3. Any such risks that are not included in a model should be separately measured and reported using the standardised approach described in chapters CA-4 to CA-8.
2 Banks may also incur interest rate and equity risks outside of their trading activities. However, there are no explicit capital charges for the
price risk in such positions.3 For example, if a bank is hardly engaged in
commodities it will not necessarily be expected to model itscommodities risk.CA-1.6.5
Transitioning banks are required to move towards a comprehensive internal model approach.
CA-1.6.6
The Agency will closely monitor the risk management practices of banks moving towards the models approach, to ensure that they will be in a position to meet all the standards once they are applying a fully-fledged model for any risk category.
CA-2 CA-2 The capital requirement
CA-2.1 CA-2.1 Introduction
CA-2.1.1
Banks are allowed three types of capital instruments to meet their capital requirements for credit risk and market risk, as set out below:
Tiers 1 and 2: May be used to support credit risk and market risk; andTier 3: May be used solely to support market risk.CA-2.1.2
For a
branch of a foreign bank operating as a full commercialbranch , a designated capital is required, as agreed between the BMA and the licensee, taking into consideration the gearing requirement stated in section CA-10.1.CA-2.2 CA-2.2 Definition of capital
Tier 1: Core capital
CA-2.2.1
Tier 1 capital shall consist of the sum of items (a) to (c) below, less the sum of items (d) to (e) below:
(a) Permanent shareholders' equity (including issued and fully paid ordinary shares / common stock and perpetual non-cumulative preference shares, but excluding cumulative preference shares);(b) Disclosed reserves, which are audited and approved by the shareholders, in the form of legal, general and other reserves created by appropriations of retained earnings, share premiums,capital redemption reserves and other surplus but excluding revaluation reserves; and(c) Minority interests, arising on consolidation, in the equity of subsidiaries which are less than wholly owned.
LESS:(d) Goodwill; and(e) Current year's cumulative net losses which have been reviewed or audited as per the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) by the external auditors.Tier 2: Supplementary capital
CA-2.2.2
Tier 2 capital shall consist of the following items:
(a) Interim retained profits which have been reviewed as per the ISA by the external auditors;(b)Asset revaluation reserves , which arise in two ways. Firstly, these reserves can arise from the revaluation of fixed assets from time to time in line with the change in market values, and are reflected on the face of the balance sheet as a revaluation reserve. Secondly, hidden values or "latent' revaluation reserves may be present as a result of long-term holdings of equitysecurities valued in the balance sheet at the historical cost of acquisition. Both types of revaluation reserve may be included in tier 2 capital, with the concurrence of the external auditors, provided that the assets are prudently valued, fully reflecting the possibility of price fluctuation and forced sale. In the case of "latent" revaluation reserves, a discount of 55% will be applied to the difference between the historical cost book value and the market value to reflect the potential volatility of this form of unrealised capital.(c) General provisions held against future, presently unidentified losses which are freely available to meet losses which subsequently materialise and, therefore, qualify for inclusion within supplementary elements of capital, subject to a maximum of 1.25% of total risk-weighted assets (both credit and market risk-weighted assets). Provisions ascribed to impairment of particular assets or known liabilities should be excluded.(d)Hybrid instruments , which include a range of instruments which combine characteristics of equity capital and of debt, and which meet the following requirements:• They are unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up;• They are not redeemable at the initiative of the holder or without the prior consent of the Agency;• They are available to participate in losses without the bank being obliged to cease trading (unlike conventional subordinated debt); and• Although the capital instrument may carry an obligation to pay interest that cannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike dividends on ordinary shareholders' equity), it should allow service obligations to be deferred (as with cumulative preference shares) where the profitability of the bank would not support payment.Cumulative preference shares, having the above characteristics, would be eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital. Debt capital instruments which do not meet the above criteria may be eligible for inclusion in item (e) below.(e) Subordinated term debt, which comprises all conventional unsecured borrowing subordinated (in respect of both interest and principal) to all other liabilities of the bank except the share capital and limited life redeemable preference shares. To be eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital, subordinated debt capital instruments should have a minimum original fixed term to maturity of over five years. During the last five years to maturity, a cumulative discount (or amortisation) factor of 20% per year will be applied to reflect the diminishing value of these instruments as a continuing source of strength. Unlike instruments included in item (d) above, these instruments are not normally available to participate in the losses of a bank which continues trading. For this reason, these instruments will be limited to a maximum of 50% of tier 1 capital.(f) 45% of unrealised gains on equitysecurities held as available-for-sale (on an aggregate net-basis).Deduction from tiers 1 and 2 capital
CA-2.2.3
The following item shall be deducted from tiers 1 and 2 capital on a pro-rata basis:
—Investments in and lending of a capital nature to unconsolidated subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial activities. The assets representing the investments in subsidiary companies whose capital is deducted from that of the parent would not be included in total assets for the purpose of computing the capital ratio.Tier 3: Trading book ancillary capital
CA-2.2.4
Tier 3 capital will consist of short-term subordinated debt which, if circumstances demand, needs to be capable of becoming part of the bank's permanent capital and thus be available to absorb losses in the event of insolvency. It must, therefore, at a minimum meet the following conditions:
(a) Be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid up;(b) Have an original maturity of at least two years;(c) Not be repayable before the agreed repayment date; and(d) Be subject to a lock-in clause which stipulates that neither interest nor principal may be paid (even at maturity) if such payment means that the bank falls below or remains below its minimum capital requirement.CA-2.3 CA-2.3 Limits on the use of different forms of capital
Tier 1: Core capital
CA-2.3.1
Tier 1 capital should represent at least half of the total eligible capital, i.e., the sum total of tier 2 plus tier 3 eligible capital should not exceed total tier 1 eligible capital.
Tier 2: Supplementary capital
CA-2.3.2
Tier 2 elements may be substituted for tier 3 up to the tier 3 limit of 250% of tier 1 capital (as below) in so far as eligible tier 2 capital does not exceed total tier 1 capital, and long-term subordinated debt does not exceed 50% of tier 1 capital.
Tier 3: Ancillary capital
CA-2.3.3
Tier 3 capital is limited to 250% of a bank's tier 1 capital that is required to support market risks. This means that a minimum of about 28.57% of market risks needs to be supported by tier 1 capital that is not required to support risks in the remainder of the book.
CA-2.4 CA-2.4 Calculation of the capital ratio
CA-2.4.1
A bank should start the calculation of the capital ratio with the measure of market risk (i.e., specific risk plus general market risk) in accordance with the regulations in this module, including interest rate risk, equity risk, foreign exchange and
commodities risks.CA-2.4.2
The bank should next calculate its credit risk-weighted assets in accordance with the regulations in this module.
CA-2.4.3
The next step is to create an explicit numerical link between the capital requirements for credit and market risks. This is accomplished by multiplying the measure of market risk (calculated as stated in paragraphs CA-2.4.1 and CA-2.4.2 above) by 12.5 and adding the resulting figure to the sum of the credit risk-weighted assets. The capital ratio will then be calculated in relation to the sum of the two, using as the numerator only the eligible capital.
CA-2.4.4
In calculating the eligible capital, it will be necessary first to calculate the bank's minimum capital requirement for credit risk, and only afterwards its market risk requirement, to establish how much tier 1 and tier 2 capital is available to support market risk. Eligible capital will be the sum of the whole of the bank's tier 1 capital, plus tier 2 capital under the limits set out in section CA-2.3 above. Tier 3 capital will be regarded as eligible only if it can be used to support market risks under the conditions set out in section CA-2.2 and CA-2.3 above. The quoted capital ratio will thus represent capital that is available to meet both credit risk and market risk. Where a bank has tier 3 capital, which meets the conditions set out in section CA-2.2 above and which is not at present supporting market risks, it may report that excess as unused but eligible tier 3 capital alongside its capital ratio. A worked example of the calculation of the capital ratio is set out in Appendix CA 1.
CA-2.5 CA-2.5 Minimum capital ratio requirement
Banking group
CA-2.5.1
On a consolidated basis, the Agency has set a minimum Risk Asset Ratio ("RAR") of 12.0% for all locally incorporated banks. Furthermore, on a solo basis, the parent bank of a group is required to maintain a minimum RAR of 8.0% (i.e. unconsolidated).
CA-2.5.2
This means where a bank is required to complete both form PIR (Appendix BR 5) and form PIRC (Appendix BR 6), 8.0% is the minimum RAR necessary for the solo bank (PIR), and 12.0% for the consolidated bank (PIRC).
Individual bank
CA-2.5.3
For banks that are required to complete only the PIR form, the Agency has set a minimum Risk Asset Ratio ("RAR") of 12.0%.
Maintaining minimum RAR
CA-2.5.4
To clarify the effect of these minimum ratios (as identified in paragraphs CA-2.5.1 to CA-2.5.3) on differing banking groups and individual banks, four examples (see Appendix CA 1) are given. In the examples, the parent and the subsidiary are Bahrain incorporated banks, but the cases could apply to overseas incorporated subsidiaries (with adjustment to the minimum RAR where appropriate in individual cases).
(a) Case One: Compliant solo bank—No subsidiaries (PIR only).(b) Case Two: Compliant parent bank, compliant group (PIR and PIRC).(c) Case Three: Compliant parent bank, compliant subsidiary bank, but non-compliant group.(d) Case Four: Non-compliant parent bank, compliant subsidiary bank and compliant group.For detailed workings of the above cases, refer to Appendix CA 1.
CA-2.5.5
All locally incorporated banks must give the Agency, immediate written notification of any actual breach by such banks of either or both of the above RARs. Where such notification is given, the bank must also:
(a) provide the Agency no later than one calendar week after the notification, with a written action plan setting out how the bank proposes to restore the relevant RAR(s) to the required minimum level(s) set out above and, further, describing how the bank will ensure that a breach of such RAR(s) will not occur again in the future; and(b) report on a weekly basis thereafter on the bank's relevant RAR(s) until such RAR(s) have reached the required target level(s) set out below.CA-2.5.6
In addition, the Agency considers it a matter of basic prudential practice that, in order to ensure that these RARs are constantly met, banks set up internal "targets" of 12.5% (on a consolidated basis) and 8.5% (on a solo basis) to warn them of a potential fall by the bank below the Agency's required minimum RARs as set out above.
CA-2.5.7
Where a bank's capital ratio falls below its target ratio, the General Manager should notify the Director of Banking Supervision at the Agency immediately. No formal action plan will be necessary, however the General Manager should explain what measures are being implemented to ensure that the bank will remain above its minimum RAR(s).
CA-2.5.8
The bank will be required to submit form PIR (and PIRC where applicable) to the Agency on a monthly basis, until the RAR(s) exceeds its target ratio(s).
CA-2.5.9
The Agency will notify banks in writing of any action required of them with regard to the corrective and preventive action (as appropriate) proposed by the bank pursuant to the above, as well as of any other requirement of the Agency in any particular case.
CA-2.5.10
Banks should note that the Agency considers the breach of RARs to be a very serious matter. Consequently, the Agency may (at its discretion) subject a bank which breaches its RAR(s) to a formal licensing reappraisal. Such reappraisal may be effected either through the Agency's own inspection function or through the use of Reporting Accountants, as appropriate. Following such appraisal, the Agency will notify the bank concerned in writing of its conclusions with regard to the continued licensing of the bank.
CA-2.5.11
The Agency recommends that the bank's compliance officer supports and cooperates with the Agency in the monitoring and reporting of the capital ratios and other regulatory reporting matters. Compliance officers should ensure that their banks have adequate internal systems and controls to comply with these regulations.
CA-3 CA-3 Credit risk
CA-3.1 CA-3.1 Introduction
CA-3.1.1
This chapter describes the standardised approach for the measurement of the credit risk
exposure in the bank's banking book.CA-3.2 CA-3.2 Risk weighting — On-balance-sheet asset category
CA-3.2.1
Risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet asset are illustrated in the table below:
Risk weights Category of on-balance-sheet assets/claims 0% (a) Cash and balances with Central Banks(b) Holdings of Gold bullion and othercommodities (c) Claims on & guaranteed by:
(i) The Government of Bahrain & Bahrain public sector entities(ii) Government-owned GCC companies incorporated in Bahrain(d) Claims on & guaranteed by or collateralised by cash orsecurities issued by central governments and central banks of Group A countries; and(e) Claims on the central governments and central banks of Group B countries, where denominated in national currency and funded in that currency.20% (a) Claims on and guaranteed by or collateralised bysecurities issued by multilateral development banks(b) Claims on and guaranteed by banks and securities firms incorporated in Group A countries(c) Claims on and guaranteed by banks incorporated in Group B countries with a residual maturity of 1 year or less(d) Claims on and guaranteed by public sector entities in Group A countries(e) Claims on and guaranteed by government-owned GCC companies incorporated outside Bahrain; and(f) Cash items in process of collection50% Claims secured by mortgage on residential property 100% (a) Claims on related parties(b) Holdings of other (non-subsidiary) banks' andsecurities firms' capital instruments(c) Claims on and guaranteed by banks incorporated in Group B countries with a residual maturity over one year(d) Claims on central governments and central banks of Group B countries (not included above)(e) Claims on and guaranteed by public sector entities of Group B countries(f) Claims on and guaranteed by government-owned companies in non-GCC countries(g) Claims on and guaranteed by private sector persons and entities in and outside Bahrain(h) Premises and equipment, real estate investments and assets not reported elsewhereCA-3.3 CA-3.3 Risk weighting — Off-balance-sheet items
CA-3.3.1
The framework takes account of the credit risk on off-balance-sheet
exposures by applying credit conversion factors to the different types of off-balance-sheet instruments or transactions (with the exception ofderivatives ).CA-3.3.2
The conversion factors are derived from the estimated size and likely occurrence of the credit
exposure , as well as the relative degree of credit risk as identified in theBasel Committee's paper on "The management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures: a supervisory perspective" (see www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc134.pdf) issued in March 1986.CA-3.3.3
The credit conversion factors applicable to the off-balance-sheet items are set out in the table below:
Credit Conversion factors Off-balance-sheet items 100% Direct credit substitutes, including general guarantees of indebtedness and acceptances 50% Transaction-related contingent items (e.g. performance bonds, bid bonds, warranties and standby letters of credit related to particular transactions) 20% Short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingencies (such as documentary credits collateralised by the underlying shipments) 100% Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with recourse, where the credit risk remains with the bank 100% Forward asset purchases, forward forward deposits and the unpaid part of partly-paid shares andsecurities , which represent commitments with certain draw-down50% Underwriting commitments under note issuance and revolving underwriting facilities (minus own holdings of notes underwritten) 50% Other commitments (e.g. formal standby facilities and credit lines) with an original maturity of 1 year and over 0% Similar commitments with an original maturity of up to 1 year, or which can be unconditionally cancelled at any time CA-3.3.4
The applicable credit conversion factors should be multiplied by the weights applicable to the category of the
counterparty as set out below:Risk weights Counterparty 0% Type (a) — The Government of Bahrain.— Bahrain public sector entities.— Government-owned (non-banking) GCC companies incorporated in Bahrain.— Central government and central banks of Group A countries.20% Type (b) — Banks incorporated in Bahrain or Group A countries andsecurities firms.— Banks incorporated in Group B countries (if the commitment has a residual life of 1 year or less).— Public sector entities in Group A countries.— Government-owned (non-banking) GCC companies incorporated outside Bahrain.100% Type (c) — Banks incorporated in Group B countries (if the commitment has a residual life of more than 1 year).— Central governments, central banks and public sector entities in Group B countries.— Government-owned companies incorporated in non-GCC countries.— Private sector persons and entities in Bahrain and abroad.CA-3.4 CA-3.4 Treatment of derivatives contracts in the banking book
CA-3.4.1
The treatment of forwards,
swaps , purchasedoptions and similar derivative contracts needs special attention because banks are not exposed to credit risk for the full face value of their contracts, but only to the potential cost of replacing the cash flow (on contracts showing positive value) if thecounterparty defaults . The credit equivalent amounts (as referred to under paragraph CA-3.4.13) will depend inter alia on the maturity of the contract and on the volatility of the rates and prices underlying that type of instrument.CA-3.4.2
Instruments traded on exchanges may be excluded where they are subject to daily receipt and payment of cash variation margins.
CA-3.4.3
Options purchasedover-the-counter are included with the same conversion factors as other instruments.Interest rate contracts
CA-3.4.4
Interest rate contracts are defined to include single-currency interest rate
swaps , basisswaps , forward rate agreements, interest rate futures, interest rate options purchased and similar instruments.Exchange rate contracts
CA-3.4.5
Exchange rate contracts include cross-currency interest rate
swaps , forward foreign exchange contracts, currency futures, currency options purchased and similar instruments.CA-3.4.6
Exchange rate contracts with an original maturity of 14 calendar days or less may be excluded.
Equity contracts
CA-3.4.7
Equity contracts include forwards,
swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts based on individual equities or on equity indices.Gold contracts
CA-3.4.8
Gold contracts are treated the same as foreign exchange contracts for the purpose of calculating credit risk except that contracts with original maturity of 14 calendar days or less are included.
CA-3.4.9
Precious metals other than gold receive a separate treatment (see section BR-4.1) and include forwards,
swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts that are based on precious metals (e.g. silver, platinum, and palladium).Other commodities
CA-3.4.10
Other
commodities are also treated separately (see section BR-4.1) and include forwards,swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts based on energy contracts, agricultural contracts, base metals (e.g. aluminium, copper, and zinc), and any other non-precious metalcommodity contracts.General guidance on treatment of derivatives contracts
CA-3.4.11
The following points should be noted for the treatment of certain
derivatives contracts:(a) For contracts with multiple exchange of principal, the add-on factors are to be multiplied by the number of remaining payments in the contracts.(i) For contracts that are structured to settle outstandingexposure following specified payment dates and where the terms are reset such that the market value of the contract is zero on these specified dates, the residual maturity would be set equal to the time until the next reset date.(ii) Forwards,swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts not covered in any of the above mentioned categories should be treated as "othercommodities ".(iii) No potential future creditexposure (as referred to under paragraph CA-3.4.12) would be calculated for single currency floating/floating interest rateswaps .Calculation of weighted derivative exposures
CA-3.4.12
Banks should calculate their weighted
exposure under the above mentioned contracts according to the Current Exposure Method, which involves calculating the current replacement cost by marking contracts to market, thus capturing the currentexposure without any need for estimation, and then adding a factor (the "add-on") to reflect the potential futureexposure over the remaining life of the contract.The 'add-on' factor table:
Residual maturity of contracts 1 year or less Over 1 year to 5 years Over 5 years Interest rate related contracts 0.000 0.005 0.015 Foreign exchange & gold contracts 0.010 0.050 0.075 Equity contracts 0.060 0.080 0.100 Precious metals (except gold) 0.070 0.070 0.070 Other commodities 0.120 0.120 0.150 CA-3.4.13
In order to reflect
counterparty risk, the total credit equivalent amount, which results from the calculation in paragraph CA-3.4.12 has to be broken down again according to type ofcounterparty , using the same classification into types (a), (b) and (c) given in section CA-3.3. Finally, theexposure to each type ofcounterparty has to be weighted as 0%, 20% or 50% respectively, and the total weightedexposure calculated.CA-4 CA-4 Interest rate risk — Standardised approach
CA-4.1 CA-4.1 Introduction
CA-4.1.1
This chapter describes the standardised approach for the measurement of the interest rate risk in the bank's trading book, in order to determine the capital requirement for this risk. The interest rate
exposure captured includesexposure arising from interest-bearing and discounted financial instruments,derivatives which are based on the movement of interest rates, foreign exchange forwards, and interest rateexposure embedded inderivatives which are based on non-interest rate related instruments.CA-4.1.2
For the guidance of the banks, and without being exhaustive, the following list includes financial instruments in the trading book to which interest rate risk capital requirements will apply, irrespective of whether or not the instruments carry coupons:
(a) bonds/loan stocks, debentures etc.;(b) non-convertible preference shares;(c) convertiblesecurities such as preference shares and bonds, which are treated as debt instruments4;(d) mortgage backedsecurities and other securitised assets5;(e)Certificates of Deposit ;(f) treasury bills, local authority bills, banker's acceptances;(g) commercial paper;(h) euronotes, medium term notes, etc.;(i) floating rate notes, FRCDs etc.;(j) foreign exchange forward positions;(k)derivatives based on the above instruments and interest rates; and(l) interest rateexposure embedded in other financial instruments.
4 See section CA-5.1 for an explanation of the circumstances in which convertible
securities should be treated as equity instruments. In other circumstances, they should be treated as debt instruments.5 Traded mortgage
securities and mortgage derivative products possess unique characteristics because of the risk of pre-payment. It is possible that including such products within the standardised methodology as if they were similar to other securitised assets may not capture all the risks of holding positions in them. Banks which have traded mortgagesecurities and mortgage derivative products should discuss their proposed treatment with the Agency and obtain the Agency's prior written approval for it.CA-4.1.3
For instruments that deviate from the above structures, or could be considered complex, each bank should agree a written policy statement with the Agency about the intended treatment, on a case-by-case basis. In some circumstances, the treatment of an instrument may be uncertain, for example bonds whose coupon payments are linked to equity indices. The position risk of such instruments should be broken down into its components and allocated appropriately between the equity, interest rate and foreign exchange risk categories. Advice must be sought from the Agency in cases of doubt, particularly when a bank is trading an instrument for the first time.
CA-4.1.4
A
security which is the subject of a repurchase orsecurities lending agreement will be treated as if it were still owned by the lender of thesecurity , i.e., it will be treated in the same manner as othersecurities positions.CA-4.1.5
The minimum capital requirement is expressed in terms of two separately calculated charges, one applying to the 'specific risk" of each position, and the other to the interest rate risk in the portfolio, termed "general market risk". The aggregate capital requirement for interest rate risk is the sum of the general market interest rate risk capital requirements across currencies, and the specific risk capital requirements.
CA-4.1.6
The specific risk capital requirement recognises that individual instruments may change in value for reasons other than shifts in the
yield curve of a given currency. The general risk capital requirement reflects the price change of these products caused by parallel and non-parallel shifts in theyield curve , as well as the difficulty of constructing perfect hedges.CA-4.1.7
There is general market risk inherent in all interest rate risk positions. This may be accompanied by one or more out of specific interest rate risk,
counterparty risk, equity risk and foreign exchange risk, depending on the nature of the position. Banks should consider carefully which risks are generated by each individual position. It should be recognised that the identification of the risks will require the application of the appropriate level of technical skills and professional judgment.CA-4.1.8
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of general and specific interest rate risks and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Agency for those models. The Agency's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in chapter CA-9. Banks which do not use internal models should adopt the standardised approach to calculate the interest rate risk capital requirement, as set out in detail in this chapter.
CA-4.2 CA-4.2 Specific risk calculation
CA-4.2.1
The capital charge for specific risk is designed to protect against a movement in the price of an individual instrument, owing to factors related to the individual issuer.
CA-4.2.2
In measuring the specific risk for interest rate related instruments, a bank may net, by value, long and short positions (including positions in
derivatives ) in the same debt instrument to generate the individual net position in that instrument. Instruments will be considered to be the same where the issuer is the same, they have an equivalent ranking in a liquidation, and the currency, the coupon and the maturity are the same.CA-4.2.3
The specific risk capital requirement is determined by weighting the current market value of each individual net position, whether long or short, according to its allocation among the following five broad categories:
(a) Eligible central government debt instrument 0.00% (b) Qualifying items with residual maturity up to 6 months 0.25% (c) Qualifying items with residual maturity between 6 and 24 months 1.00% (d) Qualifying items with residual maturity exceeding 24 months 1.60% (e) Non-qualifying items 8.00% CA-4.2.4
Eligible central "government" debt instruments will include all forms of government paper, including bonds, treasury bills and other short-term instruments, but the Agency reserves the right to apply a specific risk weight to
securities issued by certain foreign governments, especially tosecurities denominated in a currency other than that of the issuing government.CA-4.2.5
Governments eligible are those which are members of either the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
CA-4.2.6
The "qualifying" category includes
securities issued by or fully guaranteed by public sector entities and multilateral development banks (refer to Appendix CA 2), plus othersecurities that are:(a) rated investment grade by at least two internationally recognised credit rating agencies (to be agreed with the Agency); or(b) deemed to be of comparable investment quality by the reporting bank, provided that the issuer is rated investment grade by at least two internationally recognised credit rating agencies (to be agreed with the Agency); or(c) rated investment grade by one credit rating agency and not less than investment grade by any internationally recognised credit rating agencies (to be agreed with the Agency); or(d) unrated (subject to the approval of the Agency), but deemed to be of comparable investment quality by the reporting bank and where the issuer hassecurities listed on a recognised stock exchange, may also be included.CA-4.3 CA-4.3 General market risk calculation
CA-4.3.1
The capital requirements for general market risk are designed to capture the risk of loss arising from changes in market interest rates, i.e. the risk of parallel and non-parallel shifts in the
yield curve . A choice between two principal methods of measuring the general market risk is permitted, a "maturity" method and a "duration" method. In each method, the capital charge is the sum of the following four components:(a) the net short or long position in the whole trading book;(b) a small proportion of the matched positions in each time-band (the "vertical disallowance");(c) a larger proportion of the matched positions across different time-bands (the "horizontal disallowance"); and(d) a net charge for positions in options, where appropriate (see chapter CA-8).CA-4.3.2
Separate maturity ladders should be used for each currency and capital charges should be calculated for each currency separately and then summed, by applying the prevailing foreign exchange spot rates, with no off-setting between positions of opposite sign.
CA-4.3.3
In the case of those currencies in which the value and volume of business is insignificant, separate maturity ladders for each currency are not required. Instead, the bank may construct a single maturity ladder and slot, within each appropriate time-band, the net long or short position for each currency. However, these individual net positions are to be summed within each time-band, irrespective of whether they are long or short positions, to arrive at the gross position figure for the time-band.
CA-4.3.4
A combination of the two methods (referred to under paragraph CA-4.3.1) is not permitted. Any exceptions to this rule will require the prior written approval of the Agency. It is expected that such approval will only be given in cases where a bank clearly demonstrates to the Agency, the difficulty in applying, to a definite category of trading instruments, the method otherwise chosen by the bank as the normal method. It is further expected that the Agency may, in future years, consider recognising the duration method as the approved method, and the use of the maturity method may be discontinued.
CA-4.4 CA-4.4 Maturity method
CA-4.4.1
A worked example of the maturity method is included in Appendix CA 3. The various time-bands and their risk weights, relevant to the maturity method, are illustrated in paragraph CA-4.4.2(a) below.
CA-4.4.2
The steps in the calculation of the general market risk for interest rate positions, under this method, are set out below:
(a) Individual long or short positions in interest-rate related instruments, includingderivatives , are slotted into a maturity ladder comprising thirteen time-bands (or fifteen time-bands in the case of zero-coupon and deep-discount instruments, defined as those with a coupon of less than 3%), on the following basis:(i) fixed rate instruments are allocated according to their residual term to maturity (irrespective of embedded puts and calls), and whether their coupon is below 3%;(ii) floating rate instruments are allocated according to the residual term to the next repricing date;(iii) positions inderivatives , and all positions in repos, reverse repos and similar products are decomposed into their components within each time band. Derivative instruments are covered in greater detail in sections CA-4.6 to CA-4.9;(iv) opposite positions of the same amount in the same issues (but not different issues by the same issuer), whether actual or notional, can be omitted from the interest rate maturity framework, as well as closely matchedswaps , forwards, futures and FRAs which meet the conditions set out in section CA-4.8. In other words, these positions are netted within their relevant time-bands; and(v) the Agency's advice must be sought on the treatment of instruments that deviate from the above structures, or which may be considered sufficiently complex to warrant the Agency's attention.Maturity method: time-bands and risk weights
Coupon > 3% Coupon < 3% Risk weight Zone 1 1 month or less 1 month or less 0.00% 1 to 3 months 1 to 3 months 0.20% 3 to 6 months 3 to 6 months 0.40% 6 to 12 months 6 to 12 months 0.70% Zone 2 1 to 2 years 1 to 1.9 years 1.25% 2 to 3 years 1.9 to 2.8 years 1.75% 3 to 4 years 2.8 to 3.6 years 2.25% Zone 3 4 to 5 years 3.6 to 4.3 years 2.75% 5 to 7 years 4.3 to 5.7 years 3.25% 7 to 10 years 5.7 to 7.3 years 3.75% 10 to 15 years 7.3 to 9.3 years 4.50% 15 to 20 years 9.3 to 10.6 years 5.25% > 20 years 10.6 to 12 years 6.00% 12 to 20 years 8.00% > 20 years 12.50% (b) The market values of the individual long and short net positions in each maturity band are multiplied by the respective risk weighting factors given in paragraph CA-4.4.2(a) above.(c) Matching of positions within each maturity band (i.e. vertical matching) is done as follows:• Where a maturity band has both weighted long and short positions, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a band) is called the unmatched weighted position for that band.(d) Matching of positions, across maturity bands, within each zone (i.e. horizontal matching—level 1), is done as follows:• Where a zone has both unmatched weighted long and short positions for various bands, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position for that zone. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a zone) is called the unmatched weighted position for that zone.(e) Matching of positions, across zones (i.e. horizontal matching—level 2), is done as follows:(i) The unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be offset against the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 2. The extent to which the unmatched weighted positions in zones 1 and 2 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 2.(ii) After step (i) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 2 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 2 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 2 and 3.The calculations in steps (i) and (ii) above may be carried out in reverse order (i.e. zones 2 and 3, followed by zones 1 and 2).
(i) After steps (i) and (iii) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 1 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 3.(f) Any residual unmatched weighted positions, following the matching within and between maturity bands and zones as described above, will be summed.(g) The general interest rate risk capital requirement is the sum of:
(i) Matched weighted positions in all maturity bands x 10% (ii) Matched weighted positions in zone 1 x 40% (iii) Matched weighted positions in zone 2 x 30% (iv) Matched weighted positions in zone 3 x 30% (v) Matched weighted positions between zones 1 & 2 x 40% (vi) Matched weighted positions between zones 2 & 3 x 40% (vii) Matched weighted positions between zones 1 & 3 x 100% (viii) Residual unmatched weighted positions x 100%
Item (i) is referred to as the vertical disallowance, items (ii) through (iv) as the first set of horizontal disallowances, and items (v) through (vii) as the second set of horizontal disallowances.CA-4.5 CA-4.5 Duration method
CA-4.5.1
The duration method is an alternative approach to measuring the
exposure to parallel and non-parallel shifts in theyield curve , and recognises the use of duration as an indicator of the sensitivity of individual positions to changes in market yields. Under this method, banks may use a duration-based system for determining their general interest rate risk capital requirements for traded debt instruments and other sources of interest rateexposures includingderivatives . A worked example of the duration method is included in Appendix CA 4. The various time-bands and assumed changes in yield, relevant to the duration method, are illustrated below.Duration method: time-bands and assumed changes in yield
Time-band Assumed change in yield Zone 1 1 month or less 1.00 1 to 3 months 1.00 3 to 6 months 1.00 6 to 12 months 1.00 Zone 2 1 to 1.9 years 0.90 1.9 to 2.8 years 0.80 2.8 to 3.6 years 0.75 Zone 3 3.6 to 4.3 years 0.75 4.3 to 5.7 years 0.70 5.7 to 7.3 years 0.65 7.3 to 9.3 years 0.60 9.3 to 10.6 years 0.60 10.6 to 12 years 0.60 12 to 20 years 0.60 > 20 years 0.60 CA-4.5.2
Banks should notify the Agency of the circumstances in which they elect to use this method. Once chosen, the duration method must be consistently applied, in accordance with the requirements of section CA-4.3.
CA-4.5.3
Where a bank has chosen to use the duration method, it is possible that it will not be suitable for certain instruments. In such cases, the bank should seek the advice of the Agency or obtain approval for application of the maturity method to the specific category(ies) of instruments, in accordance with the provisions of section CA-4.3.
CA-4.5.4
The steps in the calculation of the general market risk for interest rate positions, under this method, are set out below:
(a) The bank will determine theYield-to-Maturity (YTM) for each individual net position in fixed rate and floating rate instruments, based on the current market value. The basis of arriving at individual net positions is explained in section CA-4.4 above. TheYTM for fixed rate instruments is determined without any regard to whether the instrument is coupon bearing, or whether the instrument has any embedded options. In all cases,YTM for fixed rate instruments is calculated with reference to the final maturity date and, for floating rate instruments, with reference to the next repricing date.(b) The bank will calculate, for each debt instrument, the modified duration (M) on the basis of the following formula:
M = D
(1+r) where, D (duration) = Σ m t × C
t=1 (1+r)t
Σ m C
t=1 (1+r)t
r =YTM % per annum expressed as a decimal
C = Cash flow at time t
t = time at which cash flows occur, in years
m = time to maturity, in years(c) Individual net positions, at current market value, are allocated to the time-bands illustrated in paragraph CA-4.5.1, based on their modified duration.(d) The bank will then calculate the modified duration-weighted position for each individual net position by multiplying its current market value by the modified duration and the assumed change in yield.(e) Matching of positions within each time band (i.e. vertical matching) is done as follows:• Where a time band has both weighted long and short positions, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a band) is called the unmatched weighted position for that band.(f) Matching of positions, across time bands, within each zone (i.e. horizontal matching—level 1), is done as follows:• Where a zone has both unmatched weighted long and short positions for various bands, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position for that zone. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a zone) is called the unmatched weighted position for that zone.(g) Matching of positions, across zones (i.e. horizontal matching—level 2), is done as follows:(i) The unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be offset against the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 2. The extent to which the unmatched weighted positions in zones 1 and 2 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 2.(ii) After step (i) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 2 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 2 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 2 and 3.The calculations in steps (i) and (ii) above may be carried out in reverse order (i.e. zones 2 and 3, followed by zones 1 and 2).
(iii) After steps (a) and (b) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 1 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 3.(h) Any residual unmatched weighted positions, following the matching within and between maturity bands and zones as described above, will be summed.(i) The general interest rate risk capital requirement is the sum of:
(i) Matched weighted positions in all maturity bands x 5% (ii) Matched weighted positions in zone 1 x 40% (iii) Matched weighted positions in zone 2 x 30% (iv) Matched weighted positions in zone 3 x 30% (v) Matched weighted positions between zones 1 & 2 x 40% (vi) Matched weighted positions between zones 2 & 3 x 40% (vii) Matched weighted positions between zones 1 & 3 x 100% (viii) Residual unmatched weighted positions x 100%
Item (i) is referred to as the vertical disallowance, items (ii) through (iv) as the first set of horizontal disallowances, and items (v) through (vii) as the second set of horizontal disallowances.CA-4.6 CA-4.6 Derivatives
CA-4.6.1
Banks which propose to use internal models to measure the interest rate risk inherent in
derivatives will seek the prior written approval of the Agency for using those models. The use of internal models to measure market risk, and the Agency's rules applicable to them, are discussed in detail in chapter CA-9.CA-4.6.2
Where a bank, with the prior written approval of the Agency, uses an interest rate sensitivity model, the output of that model is used, by the duration method, to calculate the general market risk as described in section CA-4.5.
CA-4.6.3
Where a bank does not propose to use models, it must use the techniques described in the following paragraphs, for measuring the market risk on interest rate
derivatives . The measurement system should include all interest ratederivatives and off-balance-sheet instruments in the trading book which react to changes in interest rates (e.g. forward rate agreements, other forward contracts, bond futures, interest rate and cross-currencyswaps , options and forward foreign exchange contracts). Where a bank has obtained the approval of the Agency for the use of non-interest ratederivatives models, the embedded interest rateexposures should be incorporated in the standardised measurement framework described in sections CA-4.7 to CA-4.9.CA-4.6.4
Derivative positions will attract specific risk only when they are based on an underlying instrument or
security . For instance, where the underlyingexposure is an interest rateexposure , as in aswap based upon interbank rates, there will be no specific risk, but onlycounterparty risk. A similar treatment applies to FRAs, forward foreign exchange contracts and interest rate futures. However, for a swap based on a bond yield, or a futures contract based on a debtsecurity or an index representing a basket of debtsecurities , the credit risk of the issuer of the underlying bond will generate a specific risk capital requirement. Future cash flows derived from positions inderivatives will generatecounterparty risk requirements related to thecounterparty in the trade, in addition to position risk requirements (specific and general market risk) related to the underlyingsecurity .CA-4.7 CA-4.7 Calculation of derivative positions
CA-4.7.1
The
derivatives should be converted to positions in the relevant underlying and become subject to specific and general market risk charges as described in sections CA-4.2 and CA-4.3, respectively. For the purpose of calculation by the standard formulae, the amounts reported are the market values of the principal amounts of the underlying or of the notional underlying. For instruments where the apparent notional amount differs from the effective notional amount, banks should use the latter.CA-4.7.2
The remaining paragraphs in this section include the guidelines for the calculation of positions in different categories of interest rate
derivatives . Banks which need further assistance in the calculation, particularly in relation to complex instruments, should contact the Agency in writing.Forward foreign exchange contracts
CA-4.7.3
A forward foreign exchange position is decomposed into legs representing the paying and receiving currencies. Each of the legs is treated as if it were a zero coupon bond, with zero specific risk, in the relevant currency and included in the measurement framework as follows:
(a) If the maturity method is used, each leg is included at the notional amount.(b) If the duration method is used, each leg is included at the present value of the notional zero coupon bond.Deposit futures and FRAs
CA-4.7.4
Deposit futures, forward rate agreements and other instruments where the underlying is a money market
exposure will be split into two legs as follows:(a) The first leg will represent the time to expiry of the futures contract, or settlement date of the FRA as the case may be.(b) The second leg will represent the time to expiry of the underlying instrument.(c) Each leg will be treated as a zero coupon bond with zero specific risk.(d) For deposit futures, the size of each leg is the notional amount of the underlying money marketexposure . For FRAs, the size of each leg is the notional amount of the underlying money marketexposure discounted to present value, although in the maturity method, the notional amount may be used without discounting.For example, under the maturity method, a single 3-month Euro$ 1,000,000 deposit futures contract expiring in 3 months' time will have one leg of $ 1,000,000 representing the 8 months to contract expiry, and another leg of $ 1,000,000 in the 11 months' time-band representing the time to expiry of the
deposit underlying the futures contract.Bonds futures and forwards bond transactions
CA-4.7.5
Bond futures, forward bond transactions and the forward leg of repos, reverse repos and other similar transactions will use the two-legged approach. A forward bond transaction is one where the settlement is for a period other than the prevailing norm for the market.
(a) The first leg is a zero coupon bond with zero specific risk. Its maturity is the time to expiry of the futures or forward contract. Its size is the cash flow on maturity discounted to present value, although in the maturity method, the cash flow on maturity may be used without discounting.(b) The second leg is the underlying bond. Its maturity is that of the underlying bond for fixed rate bonds, or the time to the next reset for floating rate bonds. Its size is as set out in (c) and (d) below.(c) For forward bond transactions, the underlying bond and amount is used at the present spot price.(d) For bond futures, the principal amounts for each of the two legs is reckoned as the futures price times the notional underlying bond amount.(e) Where a range of deliverable instruments may be delivered to fulfil a futures contract (at theoption of the "short"), then the following rules are used to determine the principal amount, taking account of any conversion factors defined by the exchange:(i) The "long" may use one of the deliverable bonds, or the notional bond on which the contract is based, as the underlying instrument, but this notional long leg may not be offset against a short cash position in the same bond.(ii) The "short" may treat the notional underlying bond as if it were one of the deliverable bonds, and it may be offset against a short cash position in the same bond.(f) For futures contracts based on a corporate bond index, the positions will be included at the market value of the notional underlying portfolio ofsecurities .(g) Arepo (or sell-buy or stock lending) involving exchange of asecurity for cash should be represented as a cash borrowing — i.e. a short position in a government bond with maturity equal to the repo and coupon equal to therepo rate. A reverserepo (or buy-sell or stock borrowing) should be represented as a cash loan — i.e. a long position in a government bond with maturity equal to the reverserepo and coupon equal to therepo rate. These positions are referred to as "cash legs".(h) It should be noted that, where asecurity owned by the bank (and included in its calculation of market risk) isrepo'd , it continues to contribute to the bank's interest rate or equity position risk calculation.Swaps
CA-4.7.6
Swaps are treated as two notional positions in governmentsecurities with the relevant maturities.(a) Interest rateswaps will be decomposed into two legs, and each leg will be allocated to the maturity band equating to the time remaining to repricing or maturity. For example, an interest rateswap in which a bank is receiving floating rate interest and paying fixed is treated as a long position in a floating rate instrument of maturity equivalent to the period until the next interest fixing and a short position in a fixed rate instrument of maturity equivalent to the residual life of theswap .(b) Forswaps that pay or receive a fixed or floating interest rate against some other reference price, e.g. a stock index, the interest rate component should be slotted into the appropriate repricing or maturity category, with the equity component being included in the equity risk measurement framework as described in chapter CA-5.(c) For cross currencyswaps , the separate legs are included in the interest rate risk measurement for the currencies concerned, as having a fixed/floating leg in each currency. Alternatively, the two parts of a currencyswap transaction are split into forward foreign exchange contracts and treated accordingly.(d) Where aswap has a deferred start, and one or both legs have been fixed, then the fixed leg(s) will be sub-divided into the time to the commencement of the leg and the actualswap leg with fixed or floating rate. Aswap is deemed to have a deferred start when the commencement of the interest rate calculation periods is more than two business days from the transaction date, and one or both legs have been fixed at the time of the commitment. However, when aswap has a deferred start and neither leg has been fixed, there is no interest rateexposure , albeit there will becounterparty exposure .(e) Where aswap has a different structure from those discussed above, it may be necessary to adjust the underlying notional principal amount, or the notional maturity of one or both legs of the transaction.CA-4.7.7
Banks with large
swap books may use alternative formulae for theseswaps to calculate the positions to be included in the maturity or duration ladder. One method would be to first convert the cash flows required by theswap into their present values. For this purpose, each cash flow should be discounted using the zero coupon yields, and a single net figure for the present value of the cash flows entered into the appropriate time-band using procedures that apply to zero or low coupon (less than 3%) instruments. An alternative method would be to calculate the sensitivity of the net present value implied by the change in yield used in the duration method (as set out in section CA-4.5), and allocate these sensitivities into the appropriate time-bands.CA-4.7.8
Banks which propose to use the approaches described in paragraph CA-4.7.7, or any other similar alternative formulae, should obtain the prior written approval of the Agency. The Agency will consider the following factors before approving any alternative methods for calculating the
swap positions:(a) Whether the systems proposed to be used are accurate;(b) Whether the positions calculated fully reflect the sensitivity of the cash flows to interest rate changes and are entered into the appropriate time-bands; and(c) Whether the positions are denominated in the same currency.CA-4.8 CA-4.8 Netting of derivative positions
Permissible offsetting of fully matched positions for both specific and general market risk
CA-4.8.1
Banks may exclude from the interest rate risk calculation, altogether, the long and short positions (both actual and notional) in identical instruments with exactly the same issuer, coupon, currency and maturity. A matched position in a future or a forward and its corresponding underlying may also be fully offset, albeit the leg representing the time to expiry of the future is included in the calculation.
CA-4.8.2
When the future or the forward comprises a range of deliverable instruments, offsetting of positions in the futures or forward contract and its underlying is only permitted in cases where there is a readily identifiable underlying
security which is most profitable for the trader with a short position to deliver. The price of thissecurity , sometimes called the "cheapest-to-deliver", and the price of the future or forward contract should, in such cases, move in close alignment. No offsetting will be allowed between positions in different currencies. The separate legs of cross-currencyswaps or forward foreign exchange contracts are treated as notional positions in the relevant instruments and included in the appropriate calculation for each currency.Permissible offsetting of closely matched positions for general market risk only
CA-4.8.3
For the purpose of calculation of the general market risk, in addition to the permissible offsetting of fully matched positions as described in paragraph CA-4.8.1 above, opposite positions giving rise to interest rate
exposure can be offset if they relate to the same underlying instruments, are of the same nominal value and are denominated in the same currency and, in addition, fulfil the following conditions:(a) For futures:
Offsetting positions in the notional or underlying instruments to which the futures contract relates should be for identical products and mature within seven days of each other.(b) Forswaps and FRAs:
The reference rate (for floating rate positions) must be identical and the coupons must be within 15 basis points of each other.(c) Forswaps , FRAs and forwards:
The next interest fixing date or, for fixed coupon positions or forwards, the residual maturity must correspond within the following limits:
— less than one month: same day; — between one month and one year: within 7 days; — over one year: within 30 days. CA-4.9 CA-4.9 Calculation of capital charge for derivatives
CA-4.9.1
After calculating the
derivatives positions, taking account of the permissible offsetting of matched positions, as explained in section CA-4.8, the capital charges for specific and general market risk for interest ratederivatives are calculated in the same manner as for cash positions, as described earlier in this chapter.Summary of treatment of interest rate
derivatives Instrument Specific risk charge* General market risk charge Exchange-traded futures — Government** debt security No Yes, as two positions — Corporate debt security Yes Yes, as two positions — Index on interest rates (e.g. LIBOR) No Yes, as two positions — Index on basket of debt securities Yes Yes, as two positions OTC forwards— Government** debt security No Yes, as two positions — Corporate debt security Yes Yes, as two positions — Index on interest rates No Yes, as two positions FRAs No Yes, as two positions Swaps — Based on interbank rates No Yes, as two positions — Based on Government** bond yields No Yes, as two positions — Based on corporate bond yields Yes Yes, as two positions Forward foreign exchange No Yes, as one position in each currency Options — Government** debt security No Either (a) or (b) as below (see chapter CA-8 for a detailed description): (a) Carve out together with the associatedhedging positions, and use:— simplified approach; or— scenario analysis; or— internal models (see chapter CA-9).(b) General market risk charge according to the delta-plus method (gamma and vega should receive separate capital charges).— Corporate debt security Yes — Index on interest rates No — FRAs, swaps No * This is the specific risk charge relating to the issuer of the instrument. Under the credit risk rules, there remains a separate capital charge for the counterparty risk.
** As defined in section CA-4.2.CA-5 CA-5 Equity position risk — Standardised approach
CA-5.1 CA-5.1 Introduction
CA-5.1.1
This chapter sets out the minimum capital requirements to cover the risk of holding or taking positions in equities in the bank's trading book.
CA-5.1.2
For the guidance of the banks, and without being exhaustive, the following list includes financial instruments in the trading book, including forward positions, to which equity position risk capital requirements will apply:
(a) common stocks, whether voting or non-voting;(b) depository receipts (which should be included in the measurement framework in terms of the underlying shares);(c) convertible preferencesecurities (non-convertible preferencesecurities are treated as bonds);(d) convertible debtsecurities which convert into equity instruments and are, therefore, treated as equities (see paragraph CA-5.1.3 below);(e) commitments to buy or sell equitysecurities ;(f)derivatives based on the above instruments.CA-5.1.3
Convertible debt
securities must be treated as equities where:(a) the first date at which the conversion may take place is less than three months ahead, or the next such date (where the first date has passed) is less than a year ahead; and(b) the convertible is trading at a premium of less than 10%, where the premium is defined as the current marked-to-market value of the convertible less the marked-to-market value of the underlying equity, expressed as a percentage of the latter.In other instances, convertibles should be treated as either equity or debt
securities , based reasonably on their market behaviour.CA-5.1.4
For instruments that deviate from the structures described in paragraphs CA-5.1.2 and CA-5.1.3 above, or which could be considered complex, each bank should agree a written policy statement with the Agency about the intended treatment, on a case-by-case basis. In some circumstances, the treatment of an instrument may be uncertain, for example bonds whose coupon payments are linked to equity indices. The position risk of such instruments should be broken down into its components and allocated appropriately between the equity, interest rate and foreign exchange risk categories. Advice must be sought from the Agency in cases of doubt, particularly when a bank is trading an instrument for the first time.
CA-5.1.5
Where equities are part of a forward contract, a future or an
option (i.e. a quantity of equities to be received or delivered), any interest rate or foreign currencyexposure from the other leg of the contract should be included in the measurement framework as described in chapters CA-4 and CA-6, respectively.CA-5.1.6
As with interest rate related instruments, the minimum capital requirement for equities is expressed in terms of two separately calculated charges, one applying to the "specific risk" of holding a long or short position in an individual equity, and the other to the "general market risk" of holding a long or short position in the market as a whole.
CA-5.1.7
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of general and specific equity risk and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Agency for those models. The Agency's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in chapter CA-9. Banks which do not use internal models should adopt the standardised approach to calculate the equity position risk capital requirement, as set out in detail in this chapter.
CA-5.2 CA-5.2 Calculation of equity positions
CA-5.2.1
A bank may net long and short positions in the same equity instrument, arising either directly or through
derivatives , to generate the individual net position in that instrument. For example, a future in a given equity may be offset against an opposite cash position in the same equity, albeit the interest rate risk arising out of the future should be calculated separately in accordance with the rules set out in chapter CA-4.CA-5.2.2
A bank may net long and short positions in one
tranche of an equity instrument against anothertranche only where the relevanttranches :(a) rank pari passu in all respects; and(b) become fungible within 180 days, and thereafter the equity instruments of onetranche can be delivered in settlement of the othertranche .CA-5.2.3
Positions in depository receipts may only be netted against positions in the underlying stock if the stock is freely deliverable against the depository receipt. If a bank takes a position in depository receipts against an opposite position in the underlying equity in different markets (i.e. arbitrage), it may offset the position provided that any costs on conversion are fully taken into account. Furthermore, the foreign exchange risk arising out of these positions should be included in the measurement framework as set out in chapter CA-6.
CA-5.2.4
More detailed guidance on the treatment of equity
derivatives is set out in section CA-5.5.CA-5.2.5
Equity positions, arising either directly or through
derivatives , should be allocated to the country in which each equity is listed. Where an equity is listed in more than one country, the bank should discuss the appropriate country allocation with the Agency.CA-5.3 CA-5.3 Specific risk calculation
CA-5.3.1
Specific risk is defined as the bank's gross equity positions (i.e. the sum of all long equity positions and of all short equity positions), and is calculated for each country or equity market. For each national market in which the bank holds equities, it should sum the market values of its individual net positions as determined in accordance with section CA-5.2, irrespective of whether they are long or short positions, to produce the overall gross equity position for that market.
CA-5.3.2
The capital charge for specific risk is 8%, unless the portfolio is both liquid and well-diversified, in which case the capital charge will be 4%. To qualify for the reduced 4% capital charge, the following requirements need to be met:
(a) The portfolio should be listed on a recognised stock exchange;(b) No individual equity position shall comprise more than 10% of the gross value of the country portfolio; and(c) The total value of the equity positions which individually comprise between 5% and 10% of the gross value of the country portfolio, shall not exceed 50% of the gross value of the country portfolio.CA-5.4 CA-5.4 General risk calculation
CA-5.4.1
The general market risk is the difference between the sum of the long positions and the sum of the short positions (i.e. the overall net position) in each national equity market. In other words, to calculate the general market risk, the bank should sum the market value of its individual net positions for each national market, as determined in accordance with section CA-5.2, taking into account whether the positions are long or short.
CA-5.4.2
The general market equity risk measure is 8% of the overall net position in each national market.
CA-5.5 CA-5.5 Equity derivatives
CA-5.5.1
For the purpose of calculating the specific and general market risk by the standardised approach, equity derivative positions should be converted into notional underlying equity positions, whether long or short. All equity
derivatives and off-balance-sheet positions which are affected by changes in equity prices should be included in the measurement framework. This includes futures andswaps on both individual equities and on stock indices.CA-5.5.2
The following guidelines will apply to the calculation of positions in different categories of equity
derivatives . Banks which need further assistance in the calculation, particularly in relation to complex instruments, should contact the Agency.(a) Futures and forward contracts relating to individual equities should, in principle, be included in the calculation at current market prices.(b) Futures relating to stock indices should be included in the calculation, at the marked-to-market value of the notional underlying equity portfolio, i.e. as a single position based on the sum of the current market values of the underlying instruments.(c) Equityswaps are treated as two notional positions. For example, an equityswap in which a bank is receiving an amount based on the change in value of one particular equity or stock index, and paying a different index is treated as a long position in the former and a short position in the latter. Where one of theswap legs involves receiving/paying a fixed or floating interest rate, thatexposure should be slotted into the appropriate time-band for interest rate related instruments as set out in chapter CA-4. The stock index leg should be covered by the equity treatment as set out in this chapter.(d) Equity options and stock index options are either "carved out" together with the associated underlying instruments, or are incorporated in the general market risk measurement framework, described in this chapter, based on the delta-plus method. The treatment of options, being a complex issue, is dealt with in detail in chapter CA-8.CA-5.5.3
A summary of the treatment of equity
derivatives is set out in paragraph CA-5.5.8.Specific risk on positions in equity indices
CA-5.5.4
Positions in highly liquid equity indices whether they arise directly or through
derivatives , attract a 2% capital charge in addition to the general market risk, to cover factors such as execution risk.CA-5.5.5
For positions in equity indices not regarded as highly liquid, the specific risk capital charge is the highest specific risk charge that would apply to any of its components, as set out in section CA-5.3.
CA-5.5.6
In the case of the futures-related arbitrage strategies set out below, the specific risk capital charge described above may be applied to only one index with the opposite position exempt from a specific risk capital charge. The strategies are as follows:
(a) where a bank takes an opposite position in exactly the same index, at different dates or in different market centres;(b) where a bank takes opposite positions in contracts at the same date in different but similar indices, provided the two indices contain at least 90% common components.CA-5.5.7
Where a bank engages in a deliberate arbitrage strategy, in which a futures contract on a broad-based index matches a basket of stocks, it will be allowed to carve out both positions from the standardised methodology on the following conditions:
(a) the trade has been deliberately entered into, and separately controlled; and(b) the composition of the basket of stocks represents at least 90% of the index when broken down into its notional components.In such a case, the minimum capital requirement is limited to 4% (i.e. 2% of the gross value of the positions on each side) to reflect divergence and execution risks. This applies even if all of the stocks comprising the index are held in identical proportions. Any excess value of the stocks comprising the basket over the value of the futures contract or vice versa is treated as an open long or short position.
Counterparty risk
CA-5.5.8
Derivative positions may also generatecounterparty riskexposure related to thecounterparty in the trade, in addition to position risk requirements (specific and general) related to the underlying instrument, e.g.counterparty risk related toOTC trades through margin payments, fees payable or settlement exposures. The credit risk capital requirements will apply to suchcounterparty riskexposure .Summary of treatment of equity
derivatives Instrument Specific risk charge* General market risk charge Exchange-traded or OTC futures— Individual equity Yes Yes, as underlying — Index Yes
(see section CA-5.5)Yes, as underlying Options — Individual equity Yes Either (a) or (b) as below (chapter CA-8 for a detailed description): (a) Carve out together with the associatedhedging positions, and use:— simplified approach; or— scenario analysis; or— internal models (chapter CA-9).(b) General market risk charge according to the delta-plus method (gamma and vega should receive separate capital charges).— Index Yes * This is the specific risk charge relating to the issuer of the instrument. Under the credit risk rules, there remains a separate capital charge for the counterparty risk.CA-6 CA-6 Foreign exchange risk — Standardised approach
CA-6.1 CA-6.1 Introduction
CA-6.1.1
A bank which holds net open positions (whether long or short) in foreign currencies is exposed to the risk that exchange rates may move against it. The open positions may be either trading positions or, simply,
exposures caused by the bank's overall assets and liabilities.CA-6.1.2
This chapter describes the standardised method for calculation of the bank's foreign exchange risk, and the capital required against that risk. The measurement of the foreign exchange risk involves, as a first step, the calculation of the net open position in each individual currency including gold6 and, as a second step, the measurement of the risks inherent in the bank's mix of long and short positions in different currencies.
6 Positions in gold should be treated as if they were foreign currency positions, rather than as
commodity positions, because the volatility of gold is more in line with that of foreign currencies and most banks manage it in a similar manner to foreign currencies.CA-6.1.3
The open positions and the capital requirements are calculated with reference to the entire business, i.e. the banking and trading books combined.
CA-6.1.4
The open positions are calculated with reference to the bank's base currency, which will be either Bahraini Dinars or United States dollars.
CA-6.1.5
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of their foreign exchange risk and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Agency for those models. The Agency's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in chapter CA-9. Banks which do not use internal models should adopt the standardised approach, as set out in detail in this chapter.
CA-6.1.6
In addition to foreign exchange risk, positions in foreign currencies may be subject to interest rate risk and credit risk which should be treated separately.
CA-6.2 CA-6.2 De minimis exemptions
CA-6.2.1
A bank doing negligible business in foreign currencies and which does not take foreign exchange positions for its own account may, at the discretion of the Agency evidenced by the Agency's prior written approval, be exempted from calculating the capital requirements on these positions. The Agency is likely to be guided by the following criteria in deciding to grant exemption to any bank:
(a) the bank's holdings or taking of positions in foreign currencies, including gold, defined as the greater of the sum of the gross long positions and the sum of the gross short positions in all foreign currencies and gold, does not exceed 100% of its eligible capital; andCA-6.2.2
The criteria listed in paragraph CA-6.2.1 above are only intended to be guidelines, and a bank will not automatically qualify for exemptions upon meeting them. The Agency may also, in its discretion, fix a minimum capital requirement for a bank which is exempted from calculating its foreign exchange risk capital requirement, to cover the risks inherent in its foreign currency business.
CA-6.2.3
The Agency may, at a future date, revoke an exemption previously granted to a bank, if the Agency is convinced that the conditions on which the exemption was granted no longer exist.
CA-6.3 CA-6.3 Calculation of net open positions
CA-6.3.1
A bank's
exposure to foreign exchange risk in any currency is its net open position in that currency, which is calculated by summing the following items:(a) the net spot position in the currency (i.e. all asset items less all liability items, including accrued interest, other income and expenses, denominated in the currency in question, assets are included gross of provisions for bad and doubtful debts, except in cases where the provisions are maintained in the same currency as the underlying assets);(b) the net forward position in the currency (i.e. all amounts to be received less all amounts to be paid under forward foreign exchange contracts, in the concerned currency, including currency futures and the principal on currencyswaps not included in the spot position);(c) guarantees and similar off-balance-sheet contingent items that are certain to be called and are likely to be irrecoverable where the provisions, if any, are not maintained in the same currency;(d) net future income/expenses not yet accrued but already fully hedged by forward foreign exchange contracts may be included provided that such anticipatoryhedging is part of the bank's formal written policy and the items are included on a consistent basis;(e) profits (i.e. the net value of income and expense accounts) held in the currency in question;(f) specific provisions held in the currency in question where the underlying asset is in a different currency, net of assets held in the currency in question where a specific provision is held in a different currency; and(g) the net delta-based equivalent of the total book of foreign currency options (subject to a separately calculated capital charge for gamma and vega as described in chapter CA-8, alternatively, options and their associated underlying positions are dealt with by one of the other methods described in chapter CA-8).All assets and liabilities, as described above, should be included at closing mid-market spot exchange rates. Marked-to-market items should be included on the basis of the current market value of the positions. However, banks which base their normal management accounting on net present values are expected to use the net present values of each position, discounted using current interest rates and valued at current spot rates, for measuring their forward currency and gold positions.
CA-6.3.2
Net positions in composite currencies, such as the SDR, may either be broken down into the component currencies according to the quotas in force and included in the net open position calculations for the individual currencies, or treated as a separate currency. In any case, the mechanism for treating composite currencies should be consistently applied.
CA-6.3.3
For calculating the net open position in gold, the bank will first express the net position (spot plus forward) in terms of the standard unit of measurement (i.e. ounces or grams) and then convert it at the current spot rate into the base currency.
CA-6.3.4
Forward currency and gold positions should be valued at current spot market exchange rates. Using forward exchange rates is inappropriate as it will result in the measured positions reflecting current interest rate differentials, to some extent.
CA-6.3.5
Where gold is part of a forward contract (i.e. quantity of gold to be received or to be delivered), any interest rate or foreign currency
exposure from the other leg of the contract should be reported as set out in chapter CA-4 or section CA-6.1 above, respectively.Structural positions
CA-6.3.6
Positions of a structural, i.e. non-dealing, nature as set out below, may be excluded from the calculation of the net open currency positions:
(a) positions are taken deliberately in order tohedge , partially or totally, against the adverse effects of exchange rate movements on the bank'scapital adequacy ratio;(b) positions related to items that are deducted from the bank's capital when calculating its capital base in accordance with the rules and guidelines in this module, such as investments in non-consolidated subsidiaries; and(c) Retained profits held for payout to parent.The Agency will consider approving the exclusion of the above positions for the purpose of calculating the capital requirement, only if the following conditions are met:
(i) the concerned bank provides adequate documentary evidence to the Agency which establishes the fact that the positions proposed to be excluded are, indeed, of a structural, i.e. non-dealing, nature and are merely intended to protect the bank'scapital adequacy ratio. For this purpose, the Agency may ask for written representations from the bank's management or Directors; and(ii) any exclusion of a position is consistently applied, with the treatment of thehedge remaining the same for the life of the associated assets or other items.Derivatives
CA-6.3.7
A currency
swap is treated as a combination of a long position in one currency and a short position in the second currency.CA-6.3.8
There are a number of alternative approaches to the calculation of the foreign exchange risk in options. As stated in section CA-6.1, with the Agency's prior written approval, a bank may choose to use internal models to measure the options risk. Extra capital charges will apply to those
option risks that the bank's internal model does not capture. The standardised framework for the calculation of options risks and the resultant capital charges is described, in detail, in chapter CA-8. Where, as explained in paragraph CA-6.3.1, theoption delta value is incorporated in the net open position, the capital charges for the otheroption risks are calculated separately.CA-6.4 CA-6.4 Calculation of the overall net open positions
CA-6.4.1
The net long or short position in each currency is converted, at the spot rate, into the reporting currency. The overall net open position is measured by aggregating the following:
(a) The sum of the net short positions or the sum of the net long positions, whichever is greater; plus(b) The net position (short or long) in gold, regardless of sign.CA-6.4.2
Where the bank is assessing its foreign exchange risk on a consolidated basis, it may be technically impractical in the case of some marginal operations to include the currency positions of a foreign
branch or subsidiary of the bank. In such cases, the internal limit for thatbranch /subsidiary, in each currency, may be used as a proxy for the positions. Thebranch /subsidiary limits should be added, without regard to sign, to the net open position in each currency involved. When this simplified approach to the treatment of currencies with marginal operations is adopted, the bank should adequately monitor the actual positions of thebranch /subsidiary against the limits, and revise the limits, if necessary, based on the results of the ex-post monitoring.CA-6.5 CA-6.5 Calculation of the capital charge
CA-6.5.1
The capital charge is 8% of the overall net open position.
CA-6.5.2
The table below illustrates the calculation of the overall net open position and the capital charge:
Example of the calculation of the foreign exchange overall net open position and the capital charge GBP EURO SAR US$ JPY Gold +100 +150 +50 –180 –20 –20 +300 –200 20 The capital charge is 8% of the higher of either the sum of the net long currency positions or the sum of the net short positions (i.e. 300) and of the net position in gold (i.e. 20) = 320 x 8% = 25.6 CA-7 CA-7 Commodities risk — Standardised approach
CA-7.1 CA-7.1 Introduction
CA-7.1.1
This chapter sets out the minimum capital requirements to cover the risk of holding or taking positions in
commodities , including precious metals, but excluding gold (which is treated as a foreign currency according to the methodology explained in chapter CA-6).CA-7.1.2
The
commodities position risk and the capital charges are calculated with reference to the entire business of a bank, i.e., the banking and trading books combined.CA-7.1.3
The
price risk incommodities is often more complex and volatile than that associated with currencies and interest rates.Commodity markets may also be less liquid than those for interest rates and currencies and, as a result, changes in supply and demand can have a more dramatic effect on price and volatility. Banks need also to guard against the risk that arises when a short position falls due before the long position. Owing to a shortage of liquidity in some markets, it might be difficult to close the short position and the bank might be "squeezed by the market". All these market characteristics ofcommodities can make price transparency and the effectivehedging of risks more difficult.CA-7.1.4
For spot or physical trading, the directional risk arising from a change in the spot price is the most important risk. However, banks using portfolio strategies involving forward and derivative contracts are exposed to a variety of additional risks, which may well be larger than the risk of a change in spot prices (directional risk). These include:
(a) 'basis risk', i.e., the risk that the relationship between the prices of similarcommodities alters through time;(b) 'interest rate risk', i.e., the risk of a change in the cost of carry for forward positions and options; and(c) 'forward gap risk', i.e., the risk that the forward price may change for reasons other than a change in interest rates.CA-7.1.5
The capital charges for
commodities risk envisaged by the rules within this chapter are intended to cover the risks identified in paragraph CA-7.1.4. In addition, however, banks face creditcounterparty risk onover-the-counter derivatives , which must be incorporated into their credit risk capital requirements. Furthermore, the funding ofcommodities positions may well open a bank to interest rate or foreign exchange risk which should be captured within the measurement framework set out in chapters CA-4 and CA-6, respectively.7
7 Where a
commodity is part of a forward contract (i.e.. a quantity ofcommodity to be received or to be delivered), any interest rate or foreign exchange risk from the other leg of the contract should be captured, within the measurement framework set out in chapters 4 and 6, respectively. However, positions which are purely of a stock financing nature (i.e., a physical stock has been sold forward and the cost of funding has been locked in until the date of the forward sale) may be omitted from thecommodities risk-calculation although they will be subject to the interest rate andcounterparty risk capital requirements.CA-7.1.6
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of their
commodities risks and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Agency for those models. The Agency's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in chapter CA-9. It is essential that the internal models methodology captures the directional risk, forward gap and interest rate risks, and the basis risk which are defined in paragraph CA-7.1.4. It is also particularly important that models take proper account of market characteristics, notably the delivery dates and the scope provided to traders to close out positions.CA-7.2 CA-7.2 Calculation of commodities positions
Netting
CA-7.2.1
Banks should first express each
commodity position (spot plus forward) in terms of the standard unit of measurement (i.e., barrels, kilograms, grams etc.). Long and short positions in acommodity are reported on a net basis for the purpose of calculating the net open position in thatcommodity . For markets which have daily delivery dates, any contracts maturing within ten days of one another may be offset. The net position in eachcommodity is then converted, at spot rates, into the bank's reporting currency.CA-7.2.2
Positions in different
commodities cannot be offset for the purpose of calculating the open positions as described in paragraph CA-7.2.1 above. However, where two or more sub-categories8 of the same category are, in effect, deliverable against each other, netting between those sub-categories is permitted. Furthermore, if two or more sub-categories of the same category are considered as close substitutes for each other, and minimum correlation of 0.9 between their price movements is clearly established over a minimum period of one year, the bank may, with the prior written approval of the Agency, net positions in those sub-categories. Banks which wish to net positions based on correlations, in the manner discussed above, will need to satisfy the Agency of the accuracy of the method which it proposes to adopt.
8
Commodities can be grouped into clans, families, sub-groups and individualcommodities . For example, a clan might be EnergyCommodities , within which Hydro-Carbons is a family with Crude Oil being a sub-group and West Texas Intermediate, Arabian Light and Brent being individualcommodities .Derivatives
CA-7.2.3
All
commodity derivatives and off-balance-sheet positions which are affected by changes incommodity prices should be included in the measurement framework forcommodities risks. This includescommodity futures,commodity swaps , and options where the "delta plus" method is used9. In order to calculate the risks,commodity derivatives are converted into notionalcommodities positions and assigned to maturities as follows(a) futures and forward contracts relating to individualcommodities should be incorporated in the measurement framework as notional amounts of barrels, kilograms etc., and should be assigned a maturity with reference to their expiry date;(b)commodity swaps where one leg is a fixed price and the other one is the current market price, should be incorporated as a series of positions equal to the notional amount of the contract, with one position corresponding to each payment on theswap and slotted into the maturity time-bands accordingly. The positions would be long positions if the bank is paying fixed and receiving floating, and short positions if vice versa. (If one of the legs involves receiving/paying a fixed or floating interest rate, thatexposure should be slotted into the appropriate repricing maturity band for the calculation of the interest rate risk, as described in chapter CA-4);(c)commodity swaps where the legs are in differentcommodities should be incorporated in the measurement framework of the respectivecommodities separately, without any offsetting. Offsetting will only be permitted if the conditions set out in paragraphs CA-7.2.1 and CA-7.2.2 are met.
9 For banks using other approaches to measure options risks, all Options and the associated underlying instruments should be excluded from both the maturity ladder approach and the simplified approach. The treatment of options is described, in detail, in chapter 8.
CA-7.3 CA-7.3 Maturity ladder approach
CA-7.3.1
A worked example of the maturity ladder approach is set out in Appendix CA 5 and the table in paragraph CA-7.3.2 illustrates the maturity time-bands of the maturity ladder for each
commodity .CA-7.3.2
The steps in the calculation of the
commodities risk by the maturity ladder approach are:(a) The net positions in individualcommodities , expressed in terms of the standard unit of measurement, are first slotted into the maturity ladder. Physical stocks are allocated to the first time-band. A separate maturity ladder is used for eachcommodity as defined in section CA-7.2 earlier in this chapter. The net positions incommodities are calculated as explained in section CA-7.2.(b) Long and short positions in each time-band are matched. The sum of the matched long and short positions is multiplied first by the spot price of thecommodity , and then by a spread rate of 1.5% for each time-band as set out in the table below. This represents the capital charge in order to capture forward gap and interest rate risk within a time-band (which, together, are sometimes referred to as curvature/spread risk).
Time-bands10 0–1 months 1–3 months 3–6 months 6–12 months 1–2 years 2–3 years over 3 years (c) The residual (unmatched) net positions from nearer time-bands are then carried forward to offset opposite positions (i.e. long against short, and vice versa) in time-bands that are further out. However, a surcharge of 0.6% of the net position carried forward is added in respect of each time-band that the net position is carried forward, to recognise that suchhedging of positions between different time-bands is imprecise. The surcharge is in addition to the capital charge for each matched amount created by carrying net positions forward, and is calculated as explained in step (b) above.(d) At the end of step (c) above, there will be either only long or only short positions, to which a capital charge of 15% will apply. The Agency recognises that there are differences in volatility between differentcommodities , but has, nevertheless, decided that one uniform capital charge for open positions in allcommodities shall apply in the interest of simplicity of the measurement, and given the fact that banks normally run rather small open positions incommodities . Banks will be required to submit, in writing, details of theircommodities business, to enable the Agency to evaluate whether the models approach should be adopted by the bank, to capture the market risk on this business.
10 For instruments, the maturity of which is on the boundary of two maturity time-bands, the instrument should be placed into the earlier maturity band. For example, instruments with a maturity of exactly one year are placed into the 6 to 12 months time-band.
CA-7.4 CA-7.4 Simplified approach
CA-7.4.1
By the simplified approach, the capital charge of 15% of the net position, long or short, in each
commodity is applied to capture directional risk. Net positions incommodities are calculated as explained in section CA-7.2.CA-7.4.2
An additional capital charge equivalent to 3% of the bank's gross positions, long plus short, in each
commodity is applied to protect the bank against basis risk, interest rate risk and forward gap risk. In valuing the gross positions incommodity derivatives for this purpose, banks should use the current spot price.CA-8 CA-8 Options risk — Standardised approach
CA-8.1 CA-8.1 Introduction
CA-8.1.1
It is recognised that the measurement of the
price risk of options is inherently a difficult task, which is further complicated by the wide diversity of banks' activities in options. The Agency has decided that the following approaches should be adopted to the measurement of options risks:(a) Banks which solely use purchased options are permitted to use the simplified (carve-out) approach described later in this chapter.(b) Banks which also write options should use either the delta-plus (buffer) approach or the scenario approach, or alternatively use a comprehensive risk management model. The Agency's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in chapter CA-9.CA-8.1.2
The scenario approach and the internal models approach are generally regarded as more satisfactory for managing and measuring options risk, as they assess risk over a range of outcomes rather than focusing on the point estimate of the 'Greek' risk parameters as in the delta-plus approach. The more significant the level and/or complexity of the bank's options trading activities, the more the bank will be expected to use a sophisticated approach to the measurement of options risks. The Agency will monitor the banks' options trading activities, and the adequacy of the risk measurement framework adopted.
CA-8.1.3
Where written
option positions arehedged by perfectly matched long positions in exactly the sameoptions , no capital charge for market risk is required in respect of those matched positions.CA-8.2 CA-8.2 Simplified approach (carve-out)
CA-8.2.1
In the simplified approach, positions for the
options and the associated underlying (hedges), cash or forward, are entirely omitted from the calculation of capital charges by the standardised methodology and are, instead, "carved out" and subject to separately calculated capital charges that incorporate both general market risk and specific risk. The capital charges thus generated are then added to the capital charges for the relevant risk category, i.e., interest rate related instruments, equities, foreign exchange andcommodities as described in chapters CA-4, CA-5, CA-6 and CA-7 respectively.CA-8.2.2
The capital charges for the carved out positions are as set out in the table below. As an example of how the calculation would work, if a bank holds 100 shares currently valued at $ 10 each, and also holds an equivalent put
option with a strike price of $ 11, the capital charge would be as follows:[$ 1,000 x 16%11 ] minus [($ 11–$ 10)12 x 100] = $ 60
A similar methodology applies to
options whose underlying is a foreign currency, an interest rate related instrument or acommodity .Simplified approach: Capital charges Position Treatment Long cash and long put
or
Short cash and long call (i.e.,hedged positions)The capital charge is:
[Market value of underlying instrument13 x Sum of specific and general market risk charges14 for the underlying] minus [Amount, if any, theoption is in the money15]
The capital charge calculated as above is bounded at zero, i.e., it cannot be a negative number.Long call
or
Long put
(i.e., nakedoption positions)The capital charge is the lesser of:
i) Market value of the underlying instrument x Sum of specific and general market risk charges for the underlying; and
ii) Market value of theoption 16.
11 8% specific risk plus 8% general market risk.
12 The amount the
option is "in the money".13 In some cases such as foreign exchange, it may be unclear which side is the "underlying instrument"; this should be taken to be the asset which would be received if the
option were exercised. In addition, the nominal value should be used for items where the market value of the underlying instrument could be zero, e.g., caps and floors, swaptions etc.14 Some options (e.g., where the underlying is an interest rate, a currency or a
commodity ) bear no specific risk, but specific risk is present in the case of options on certain interest rate related instruments (e.g., options on a corporate debtsecurity or a corporate bond index — see chapter CA-4 for the relevant capital charges), and in the case of options on equities and stock indices (see chapter CA-5 for the relevant capital charges). The capital charge for currency options is 8% and for options oncommodities is 15%.15 For options with a residual maturity of more than six months, the strike price should be compared with the forward, not the current, price. A bank unable to do this should take the "in the money" amount to be zero.
16 Where the position does not fall within the trading book options on certain foreign exchange and
commodities positions (not belonging to the trading book), it is acceptable to use the book value instead of the market value.CA-8.3 CA-8.3 Delta-plus method (buffer approach)
CA-8.3.1
Banks which write
options are allowed to include delta-weightedoption positions within the standardised methodology set out in chapters CA-4 through CA-7. Eachoption should be reported as a position equal to the market value of the underlying multiplied by the delta. The delta should be calculated by an adequate model with appropriate documentation of the process and controls, to enable the Agency to review such models, if considered necessary. A worked example of the delta-plus method is set out in Appendix CA 6.CA-8.3.2
Since delta does not sufficiently cover the risks associated with
options positions, there will be additional capital buffers to cover gamma (which measures the rate of change of delta) and vega (which measures the sensitivity of the value of anoption with respect to a change in volatility), in order to calculate the total capital charge. The gamma and vega buffers should be calculated by an adequate exchange model or the bank's proprietaryoptions pricing model, with appropriate documentation of the process and controls, to enable the Agency to review such models, if considered necessary.Treatment of delta
Where the underlying is a debt security or an interest rate
CA-8.3.4
The delta-weighted
option positions are slotted into the interest rate time-bands as set out in chapter CA-4. A two-legged approach should be used as for otherderivatives , as explained in chapter CA-4, requiring one entry at the time the underlying contract takes effect and a second at the time the underlying contract matures. A few examples to elucidate the two-legged treatment are set out below:(a) A bought calloption on a June three-month interest rate future will, in April, be considered, on the basis of its delta-equivalent value, to be a long position with a maturity of five months and a short position with a maturity of two months.(b) A writtenoption with the same underlying as in (a) above, will be included in the measurement framework as a long position with a maturity of two months and a short position with a maturity of five months.(c) A two months calloption on a bond future where delivery of the bond takes place in September will be considered in April, as being long the bond and short a five monthsdeposit , both positions being delta-weighted.CA-8.3.5
Floating rate instruments with caps or floors are treated as a combination of floating rate
securities and a series of European-styleoptions . For example, the holder of a three-year floating rate bond indexed to six month LIBOR with a cap of 10% will treat it as:(a) a debtsecurity that reprices in six months; and(b) a series of five written calloptions on an FRA with a reference rate of 10%, each with a negative sign at the time the underlying FRA takes effect and a positive sign at the time the underlying FRA matures.CA-8.3.6
The rules applying to closely matched positions, set out in paragraph CA-4.8.2, will also apply in this respect.
Where the underlying is an equity instrument
CA-8.3.7
The delta-weighted positions are incorporated in the measure of market risk described in chapter CA-5. For purposes of this calculation, each national market is treated as a separate underlying.
Options on foreign exchange and gold positions
CA-8.3.8
The net delta-based equivalent of the foreign currency and gold
options are incorporated in the measurement of theexposure for the respective currency or gold position, as described in chapter CA-6.Options on commodities
CA-8.3.9
The delta-weighted positions are incorporated in the measurement of the
commodities risk by the simplified approach or the maturity ladder approach, as described in chapter CA-7.Calculation of the gamma and vega buffers
CA-8.3.10
As explained in paragraph CA-8.3.2, in addition to the above capital charges to cover delta risk, banks are required to calculate additional capital charges to cover the gamma and vega risks. The additional capital charges are calculated as follows:
— Gamma
(a) For each individualoption position (includinghedge positions), a gamma impact is calculated according to the following formula derived from the Taylor series expansion:
Gamma impact = 0.5 x Gamma x VU where VU = variation of the underlying of the option , calculated as in (b) below(b) VU is calculated as follows:(i) For interest rateoptions 17, where the underlying is a bond, the market value of the underlying is multiplied by the risk weights set out in section CA-4.4. An equivalent calculation is carried out where the underlying is an interest rate, based on the assumed changes in yield as set out in the table in section CA-4.5;(ii) Foroptions on equities and equity indices17, the market value of the underlying is multiplied by 8%;(iii) For foreign exchange and goldoptions , the market value of the underlying is multiplied by 8%;(iv) Forcommodities options , the market value of the underlying is multiplied by 15%.(c) For the purpose of the calculation of the gamma buffer, the following positions are treated as the same underlying:(i) For interest rates, each time-band as set out in the table in section CA-4.4. Positions should be slotted into separate maturity ladders by currency. Banks using the duration method should use the time-bands as set out in the table in section CA-4.5;(ii) For equities and stock indices, each individual national market;(iii) For foreign currencies and gold, each currency pair and gold; and(d) Eachoption on the same underlying will have a gamma impact that is either positive or negative. These individual gamma impacts are summed, resulting in a net gamma impact for each underlying that is either positive or negative. Only those net gamma impacts that are negative are included in the capital calculation.(e) The total gamma capital charge is the sum of the absolute value of the net negative gamma impacts calculated for each underlying as explained in (d) above.— Vega
(f) For volatility risk (vega), banks are required to calculate the capital charges by multiplying the sum of the vegas for alloptions on the same underlying, as defined above, by a proportional shift in volatility of ±25%.(g) The total vega capital charge is the sum of the absolute value of the individual vega capital charges calculated for each underlying.
17 For interest rate and equity options, the present set of rules do not attempt to capture specific risk when calculating gamma capital charges. See section CA-8.4 for an explanation of the Agency's views on this subject.
CA-8.3.11
The capital charges for delta, gamma and vega risks described in paragraphs CA-8.3.1 through CA-8.3.10 are in addition to the specific risk capital charges which are determined separately by multiplying the delta-equivalent of each
option position by the specific risk weights set out in chapters CA-4 through CA-7.CA-8.3.12
To summarise, capital requirements for, say
OTC options , using the delta-plus method are as follows:(a)Counterparty risk capital charges (on purchasedoptions only), calculated in accordance with the credit risk regulations; PLUS(b) Specific risk capital charges (calculated as explained in paragraph CA-8.3.11); PLUS(c) Delta risk capital charges (calculated as explained in paragraphs CA-8.3.3 through CA-8.3.9) PLUS(d) Gamma and vega capital buffers (calculated as explained in paragraph CA-8.3.10).CA-8.4 CA-8.4 Scenario approach
CA-8.4.1
As stated in section CA-8.1, banks which have a significant level of
options trading activities, or have complexoptions trading strategies, are expected to use more sophisticated methods for measuring and monitoring theoptions risks. Banks with the appropriate capability will be permitted, with the prior approval of the Agency, to base the market risk capital charge foroptions portfolios and associatedhedging positions on scenario matrix analysis. Before giving its approval, the Agency will closely review the accuracy of the analysis that is constructed. Furthermore, like in the case of internal models, the banks' use of scenario analysis as part of the standardised methodology will also be subject to external validation, and to those of the qualitative standards listed in chapter CA-9 which are appropriate given the nature of the business.CA-8.4.2
The scenario matrix analysis involves specifying a fixed range of changes in the
option portfolio's risk factors and calculating changes in the value of theoption portfolio at various points along this "grid" or "matrix". For the purpose of calculating the capital charge, the bank will revalue theoption portfolio using matrices for simultaneous changes in theoption's underlying rate or price and in the volatility of that rate or price. A different matrix is set up for each individual underlying as defined in section CA-8.3 above. As an alternative, in respect of interest rateoptions , banks which are significant traders in suchoptions are permitted to base the calculation on a minimum of six sets of time-bands. When using this alternative method, not more than three of the time-bands as defined in chapter CA-4 should be combined into any one set.CA-8.4.3
The first dimension of the matrix involves a specified range of changes in the
option's underlying rate or price. The Agency has set the range for each risk category as follows:(a) Interest rate related instruments — The range for interest rates is consistent with the assumed changes in yield set out in section CA-4.5. Those banks using the alternative method of grouping time-bands into sets, as explained in paragraph CA-8.4.2, should use, for each set of time-bands, the highest of the assumed changes in yield applicable to the individual time-bands in that group. If, for example, the time-bands 3 to 4 years, 4 to 5 years and 5 to 7 years are combined, the highest assumed change in yield of these three bands would be 0.75 which would be applicable to that set.(b) For equity instruments, the range is ±8%.(c) For foreign exchange and gold, the range is ±8%.(d) Forcommodities , the range is ±15%,For all risk categories, at least seven observations (including the current observation) should be used to divide the range into equally spaced intervals.
CA-8.4.4
The second dimension of the matrix entails a change in the volatility of the underlying rate or price. A single change in the volatility of the underlying rate or price equal to a shift in volatility of ±25% is applied.
CA-8.4.5
The Agency will closely monitor the need to reset the parameters for the amounts by which the price of the underlying instrument and volatility must be shifted to form the rows and columns of the scenario matrix. For the time being, the parameters set, as above, only reflect general market risk (see paragraphs CA-8.4.10 to CA-8.4.12).
CA-8.4.6
After calculating the matrix, each cell contains the net profit or loss of the
option and the underlyinghedge instrument. The general market risk capital charge for each underlying is then calculated as the largest loss contained in the matrix.CA-8.4.7
In addition to the capital charge calculated as above, the specific risk capital charge is determined separately by multiplying the delta-equivalent of each
option position by the specific risk weights set out in chapters CA-4 through CA-7.CA-8.4.8
To summarise, capital requirements for, say
OTC options , using the scenario approach are as follows:(a)Counterparty risk capital charges (on purchasedoptions only), calculated in accordance with the credit risk regulations; PLUS(b) Specific risk capital charges (calculated as explained in paragraph CA-8.4.7); PLUS(c) Directional and volatility risk capital charges (i.e., the worst case loss from a given scenario matrix analysis).CA-8.4.9
Banks doing business in certain classes of complex exotic
options (e.g. barrieroptions involving discontinuities in deltas etc.), or inoptions at the money that are close to expiry, are required to use either the scenario approach or the internal models approach, both of which can accommodate more detailed revaluation approaches. The Agency expects the concerned banks to work with it closely to produce an agreed method, within the framework of these rules. If a bank uses scenario matrix analysis, it must be able to demonstrate that no substantially larger loss could fall between the nodes.CA-8.4.10
In drawing up the delta-plus and the scenario approaches, the Agency's present set of rules do not attempt to capture specific risk other than the delta-related elements (which are captured as explained in paragraphs CA-8.4.7 and CA-8.4.11). The Agency recognises that introduction of those other specific risk elements will make the measurement framework much more complex. On the other hand, the simplifying assumptions used in these rules will result in a relatively conservative treatment of certain
options positions.CA-8.4.11
In addition to the
options risks described earlier in this chapter, the Agency is conscious of the other risks also associated withoptions , e.g., rho or interest rate risk (the rate of change of the value of theoption with respect to the interest rate) and theta (the rate of change of the value of theoption with respect to time). While not proposing a measurement system for those risks at present, the Agency expects banks undertaking significantoptions business, at the very least, to monitor such risks closely. Additionally, banks will be permitted to incorporate rho into their capital calculations for interest rate risk, if they wish to do so.CA-9 CA-9 Use of internal models
CA-9.1 CA-9.1 Introduction
CA-9.1.1
As stated in chapter CA-1, as an alternative to the standardised approach to the measurement of market risks (which is described in chapters CA-4 through CA-8), and subject to the explicit prior approval of the Agency, banks will be allowed to use risk measures derived from their own internal models.
CA-9.1.2
This chapter describes the seven sets of conditions that should be met before a bank is allowed to use the internal models approach, namely:
(a) general criteria regarding the adequacy of the risk management system;(b) qualitative standards for internal oversight of the use of models, notably by senior management;(c) guidelines for specifying an appropriate set of market risk factors (i.e., the market rates and prices that affect the value of a bank's positions);(d) quantitative standards setting out the use of common minimum statistical parameters for measuring risk;(e) guidelines for stress testing;(f) validation procedures for external oversight of the use of models; and(g) rules for banks which use a mixture of the internal models approach and the standardised approach.CA-9.1.3
The standardised methodology, described in chapters CA-4 through CA-8, uses a "building-block" approach in which the specific risk and the general market risk arising from debt and equity positions are calculated separately. The focus of most internal models is a bank's general market risk
exposure , typically leaving specific risk (i.e.,exposures to specific issuers of debtsecurities and equities) to be measured largely through separate credit risk measurement systems. Banks using models are subject to separate capital charges for the specific risk not captured by their models, which shall be calculated by the standardised methodology. The capital charge for banks which are modelling specific risk is set out in section CA-9.10.CA-9.1.4
While the models recognition criteria described in this chapter are primarily intended for comprehensive
Value-at-Risk (VaR) models, nevertheless, the same set of criteria will be applied, to the extent that it is appropriate, to other pre-processing or valuation models the output of which is fed into the standardised measurement system, e.g., interest rate sensitivity models (from which the residual positions are fed into the duration ladders) andoption pricing models (for the calculation of the delta, gamma and vega sensitivities).CA-9.1.5
As a number of strict conditions are required to be met before internal models can be recognised by the Agency, including external validation, banks which are contemplating using internal models should submit their detailed written proposals for the Agency's approval, immediately upon receipt of these regulations.
CA-9.1.6
As the model approval process will encompass a review of both the model and its operating environment, it is not the case that a commercially produced model which is recognised for one bank will automatically be recognised for another bank.
CA-9.2 CA-9.2 General criteria
CA-9.2.1
The Agency will give its approval for the use of internal models to measure market risks only if, in addition to the detailed requirements described later in this chapter, it is satisfied that the following general criteria are met:
(a) that the bank's risk management system is conceptually sound and is implemented with integrity;(b) that the bank has, in the Agency's view, sufficient numbers of staff skilled in the use of sophisticated models not only in the trading area but also in the risk control, audit and the back office areas;(c) that the bank's models have, in the Agency's judgement, a proven track record of reasonable accuracy in measuring risk. The Agency recognises that the use of internal models is, for most banks in Bahrain, a relatively new development and, therefore, it is difficult to establish a track record of reasonable accuracy. The Agency, therefore, will require a period of initial monitoring and live testing of a bank's internal model before it is used for supervisory capital purposes; andCA-9.3 CA-9.3 Qualitative standards
CA-9.3.1
In order to ensure that banks using models have market risk management systems that are conceptually sound and implemented with integrity, the Agency has set the following qualitative criteria that banks are required to meet before they are permitted to use the models-based approach. Apart from influencing the Agency's decision to permit a bank to use internal models, where such permission is granted, the extent to which the bank meets the qualitative criteria will further influence the level at which the Agency will set the multiplication factor for that bank, referred to in section CA-9.5. Only those banks whose models, in the Agency's judgement, are in full compliance with the qualitative criteria will be eligible for application of the minimum multiplication factor of 3. The qualitative criteria include the following:
(a) The bank should have an independent risk management unit that is responsible for the design and implementation of the bank's risk management system. The unit should produce and analyse daily reports on the output of the bank's risk measurement model, including an evaluation of the relationship between the measures of riskexposure and the trading limits. This unit must be independent from the business trading units and should report directly to the senior management of the bank.(b) The independent risk management unit should conduct a regular backtesting programme, i.e. an ex-post comparison of the risk measure generated by the model against the actual daily changes in portfolio value over longer periods of time, as well as hypothetical changes based on static positions. The document issued by theBasel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 1996, titled "Supervisory framework for the use of 'backtesting' in conjunction with the internal models approach to market risk capital requirements" (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.pdf), presents in detail the approach to be applied by banks for backtesting.(c) The Board of Directors and senior management of the bank should be actively involved in the risk management process and must regard such process as an essential aspect of the business to which significant resources need to be devoted18. In this regard, the daily reports prepared by the independent risk management unit must be reviewed by a level of management with sufficient seniority and authority to enforce both reductions of positions taken by individual traders and reductions in the bank's overall riskexposure .(d) The bank's internal model must be closely integrated into the day-to-day risk management process of the bank. Its output should, accordingly, be an integral part of the process of planning, monitoring and controlling the bank's market risk profile.(e) The risk measurement system should be used in conjunction with the internal trading andexposure limits. In this regard, the trading limits should be related to the bank's risk measurement model in a manner that is consistent over time and that is well-understood by both traders and senior management.(f) A routine and rigorous programme of stress testing, along the general lines set out in section CA-9.6, should be in place as a supplement to the risk analysis based on the day-to-day output of the bank's risk measurement model. The results of stress testing should be reviewed periodically by senior management and should be reflected in the policies and limits set by management and the Board of Directors. Where stress tests reveal particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances, prompt steps should be taken to manage those risks appropriately (e.g., byhedging against that outcome or reducing the size of the bank'sexposures ).(g) The bank should have a routine in place for ensuring compliance with a documented set of internal policies, controls and procedures concerning the operation of the risk measurement system. The bank's risk measurement system must be well documented, for example, through a risk management manual that describes the basic principles of the risk management system and that provides an explanation of the empirical techniques used to measure market risk.(h) An independent review of the risk measurement system should be carried out regularly in the bank's own internal auditing process. This review should include both the activities of the business trading units and of the independent risk management unit. A review, by the internal auditor, of the overall risk management process should take place at regular intervals (ideally not less than once every six months) and should specifically address, at a minimum:(i) the adequacy of the documentation of the risk management system and process;(ii) the organisation of the risk management unit;(iii) the integration of market risk measures into daily risk management;(iv) the approval process for risk pricing models and valuation systems used by front- and back-office personnel;(v) the validation of any significant changes in the risk measurement process;(vi) the scope of market risks captured by the risk measurement model;(vii) the integrity of the management information system;(viii) the accuracy and completeness of position data;(ix) the verification of the consistency, timeliness and reliability of data sources used to run internal models, including the independence of such data sources;(x) the accuracy and appropriateness of volatility and correlation assumptions;(xi) the accuracy of valuation and risk transformation calculations;(xii) the verification of the model's accuracy through frequent backtesting as described in (b) above and in theBasel Committee's document referred to therein.
18 The report, "Risk management guidelines for derivatives", issued by the
Basel Committee in July 1994, further discusses the responsibilities of the Board of Directors and senior management.CA-9.4 CA-9.4 Specification of market risk factors
CA-9.4.1
An important part of a bank's internal market risk measurement system is the specification of an appropriate set of market risk factors, i.e. the market rates and prices that affect the value of the bank's trading positions. The risk factors contained in a market risk measurement system should be sufficient to capture the risks inherent in the bank's portfolio of on- and off-balance-sheet trading positions. Banks should follow the Agency's guidelines, set out below, for specifying the risk factors for their internal models. Where a bank has difficulty in specifying the risk factors for any currency or market within a risk category, in accordance with the following guidelines, the bank should immediately contact the Agency. The Agency will review and discuss the specific circumstances of each such case with the concerned bank, and will decide alternative methods of calculating the risks which are not captured by the bank's model.
(a) For interest rates:— There should be a set of risk factors corresponding to interest rates in each currency in which the bank has interest-rate-sensitive on- or off-balance-sheet positions.— The risk measurement system should model theyield curve using one of a number of generally accepted approaches, for example, by estimating forward rates of zero coupon yields. Theyield curve should be divided into various maturity segments in order to capture variation in the volatility of rates along theyield curve ; there will typically be one risk factor corresponding to each maturity segment. For materialexposures to interest rate movements in the major currencies and markets, banks must model theyield curve using a minimum of six factors. However, the number of risk factors used should ultimately be driven by the nature of the bank's trading strategies. For instance, a bank which has a portfolio of various types ofsecurities across many points of theyield curve and which engages in complex arbitrage strategies would require a greater number of risk factors to capture interest rate risk accurately.— The risk measurement system must incorporate separate risk factors to capture spread risk (e.g. between bonds andswaps ). A variety of approaches may be used to capture the spread risk arising from less than perfectly correlated movements between government and other fixed-income interest rates, such as specifying a completely separateyield curve for non-government fixed-income instruments (for instance,swaps or municipalsecurities ) or estimating the spread over government rates at various points along theyield curve .(b) For exchange rates (which includes gold):— The risk measurement system should incorporate risk factors corresponding to the individual foreign currencies in which the bank's positions are denominated. Since thevalue-at-risk figure calculated by the risk measurement system will be expressed in the bank's reporting currency, any net position denominated in a currency other than the reporting currency will introduce a foreign exchange risk. Thus, there must be risk factors corresponding to the exchange rate between the reporting currency and each other currency in which the bank has a significantexposure .(c) For equity prices:— There should be risk factors corresponding to each of the equity markets in which the bank holds significant positions.— At a minimum, there should be a risk factor that is designed to capture market-wide movements in equity prices (e.g., a market index). Positions in individualsecurities or in sector indices may be expressed in "beta-equivalents"19 relative to this market-wide index.— A somewhat more detailed approach would be to have risk factors corresponding to various sectors of the overall equity market (for instance, industry sectors or cyclical and non-cyclical sectors). As above, positions in individual stocks within each sector could be expressed in "beta-equivalents" relative to the sector index.— The most extensive approach would be to have risk factors corresponding to the volatility of individual equity issues.— The sophistication and nature of the modelling technique for a given market should correspond to the bank'sexposure to the overall market as well as its concentration in individual equity issues in that market.(d) Forcommodity prices:— There should be risk factors corresponding to each of thecommodity markets in which the bank holds significant positions (also see section CA-7.1).— For banks with relatively limited positions incommodity -based instruments, a straight-forward specification of risk factors is acceptable. Such a specification would likely entail one risk factor for eachcommodity price to which the bank is exposed. In cases where the aggregate positions are reasonably small, it may be acceptable to use a single risk factor for a relatively broad sub-category ofcommodities (for instance, a single risk factor for all types of oil). However, banks which propose to use this simplified approach should obtain the prior written approval of the Agency.— For more active trading, the model should also take account of variation in the "convenience yield"20 betweenderivatives positions such as forwards andswaps and cash positions in thecommodity .
19 A "beta-equivalent" position would be calculated from a market model of equity (such as the CAPM model) by regressing the return on the individual stock or sector index or the risk-free rate of return and the return on the market index.
20 The convenience yield reflects the benefits of direct ownership of the physical
commodity (for example, the ability to profit from temporary market shortages), and is affected by both market conditions and factors such as physical storage costs.CA-9.5 CA-9.5 Quantitative standards
CA-9.5.1
The following minimum quantitative standards will apply for the purpose of calculating the capital charge.
(a) "Value-at-risk " must be computed on a daily basis.(b) In calculating thevalue-at-risk , a 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval is to be used.(c) In calculating thevalue-at-risk , an instantaneous price shock equivalent to a 10-day movement in prices is to be used, i.e., the minimum "holding period" will be ten trading days. Banks may usevalue-at-risk numbers calculated according to shorter holding periods scaled up to ten days by the square root of time (for the treatment ofoptions , also see (h) below).(d) The minimum historical observation period (sample period) for calculatingvalue-at-risk is one year. For banks which use a weighting scheme or other methods for the historical observation period, the "effective" observation period must be at least one year (i.e., the weighted average time lag of the individual observations cannot be less than 6 months).
The Agency may, as an exceptional case, require a bank to calculate itsvalue-at-risk using a shorter observation period if, in the Agency's judgement, this is justified by a significant upsurge in price volatility.(e) Banks should update their data sets no less frequently than once every week and should also reassess them whenever market prices are subject to material changes.(f) No particular type of model is prescribed by the Agency. So long as each model used captures all the material risks run by the bank, as set out in section CA-9.4, banks will be free to use models based, for example, on variance-covariance matrices, historical simulations, or Monte Carlo simulations.(g) Banks shall have discretion to recognise empirical correlations within broad risk categories (i.e., interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices andcommodity prices, including relatedoptions volatilities in each risk factor category). Banks are not permitted to recognise empirical correlations across broad risk categories without the prior approval of the Agency. Banks may apply, on a case-by-case basis, for empirical correlations across broad risk categories to be recognised by the Agency, subject to its satisfaction with the soundness and integrity of the bank's system for measuring those correlations.(h) Banks' models must accurately capture the unique risks associated withoptions within each of the broad risk categories. The following criteria shall apply to the measurement ofoptions risk:— banks' models must capture the non-linear price characteristics ofoptions positions;— banks are expected to ultimately move towards the application of a full 10-day price shock tooptions positions or positions that displayoption -like characteristics. In the interim period, banks may adjust their capital measure foroptions risk through other methods, e.g., periodic simulations or stress testing;— each bank's risk measurement system must have a set of risk factors that captures the volatilities of the rates and prices underlying theoption positions, i.e., vega risk. Banks with relatively large and/or complexoptions portfolios should have detailed specifications of the relevant volatilities. This means that banks should measure the volatilities ofoptions positions broken down by different maturities.(i) Each bank must meet, on a daily basis, a capital requirement expressed as the higher of (i) and (ii) below, multiplied by a multiplication factor (see (j) below):(i) its previous day'svalue-at-risk number measured according to the parameters specified in (a) to (h) above; and(ii) an average of the dailyvalue-at-risk measures on each of the preceding sixty business days.(j) The multiplication factor will be set by the Agency, separately for each individual bank, on the basis of the Agency's assessment of the quality of the bank's risk management system, subject to an absolute minimum of 3. Banks will be required to add to the factor set by the Agency, a "plus" directly related to the ex-post performance of the model, thereby introducing a built-in positive incentive to maintain the predictive quality of the model. The plus will range from 0 to 1 based on the outcome of the bank's backtesting. If the backtesting results are satisfactory and the bank meets all of the qualitative standards set out in section CA-9.3 above, the plus factor could be zero. TheBasel Committee's document titled "Supervisory framework for the use of 'backtesting' in conjunction with the internal models approach to market risk capital requirements" (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.htm), referred to earlier in section CA-9.3, presents in detail the approach to be followed for backtesting and the plus factor. Banks are expected to strictly comply with this approach.(k) As stated earlier in section CA-9.1, banks using models will also be subject to a capital charge to cover specific risk (as defined under the standardised approach) of interest rate related instruments and equity instruments. The manner in which the specific risk capital charge is to be calculated is set out in section CA-9.10.CA-9.6 CA-9.6 Backtesting
CA-9.6.1
The contents of this section outline the key requirements as set out in the
Basel Committee's paper titled "Supervisory framework for the use of 'backtesting' in conjunction with the internal models approach to market risk capital requirements" (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.htm). The paper presents in detail the approach to be followed for backtesting by banks.Key requirements
CA-9.6.2
The contents of this paper lay down recommendations for carrying out backtesting procedures in order to determine the accuracy and robustness of bank's internal models for measuring market risk capital requirements. These backtesting procedures typically consist of a periodic comparison of the bank's daily
value-at-risk measures with the subsequent daily profit or loss ("trading outcome"). The procedure involves calculating and identifying the number of times over the prior 250 business days that observed daily trading losses exceed the bank's one-day, 99% confidence levelVaR estimate (so-called "exceptions").CA-9.6.3
Based on the number of exceptions identified from the backtesting procedures, the banks will be classified into three exception categories for the determination of the "scaling factor" to be applied to the banks' market risk measure generated by its internal models. The three categories, termed as zones and distinguished by colours into a hierarchy of responses, are listed below:
(a) Green zone(b) Yellow zone(c) Red zoneCA-9.6.4
The green zone corresponds to backtesting results that do not themselves suggest a problem with the quality or accuracy of a bank's internal model. The yellow zone encompasses results that do raise questions in this regard, but where such a conclusion is not definitive. The red zone indicates a backtesting result that almost certainly indicates a problem with a bank's risk model.
CA-9.6.5
The corresponding "scaling factors" applicable to banks falling into respective zones based on their backtesting results are shown in Table 2 of the paper mentioned in paragraph CA-9.6.1.
CA-9.7 CA-9.7 Stress testing
CA-9.7.1
Banks that use the internal models approach for calculating market risk capital requirements must have in place a rigorous and comprehensive stress testing programme. Stress testing to identify events or influences that could greatly impact the bank is a key component of a bank's assessment of its capital position.
CA-9.7.2
Banks' stress scenarios need to cover a range of factors that can create extraordinary losses or gains in trading portfolios, or make the control of risk in those portfolios very difficult. These factors include low-probability events in all major types of risks, including the various components of market, credit and operational risks. Stress scenarios need to shed light on the impact of such events on positions that display both linear and non-linear characteristics (i.e.,
options and instruments that haveoption -like characteristics).CA-9.7.3
Banks' stress tests should be both of a quantitative and qualitative nature, incorporating both market risk and liquidity aspects of market disturbances. Quantitative criteria should identify plausible stress scenarios to which banks could be exposed. Qualitative criteria should emphasise that two major goals of stress testing are to evaluate the capacity of the bank's capital to absorb potential large losses and to identify steps the bank can take to reduce its risk and conserve capital. This assessment is integral to setting and evaluating the bank's management strategy and the results of stress testing should be routinely communicated to senior management and, periodically, to the bank's Board of Directors.
CA-9.7.4
Banks should combine the use of stress scenarios as advised under (a), (b) and (c) below by the Agency, with stress tests developed by the banks themselves to reflect their specific risk characteristics. The Agency may ask banks to provide information on stress testing in three broad areas, as discussed below.
(a) Scenarios requiring no simulation by the bank
Banks should have information on the largest losses experienced during the reporting period available for review by the Agency. This loss information will be compared with the level of capital that results from a bank's internal measurement system. For example, it could provide the Agency with a picture of how many days of peak day losses would have been covered by a givenvalue-at-risk estimate.(b) Scenarios requiring simulation by the bank
Banks should subject their portfolios to a series of simulated stress scenarios and provide the Agency with the results. These scenarios could include testing the current portfolio against past periods of significant disturbance, for example, the 1987 equity crash, the ERM crises of 1992 and 1993 or the fall in the international bond markets in the first quarter of 1994, the Far East and ex-Soviet bloc equity crises of 1997–99 and the collapse of the TMT equities market of 2000–01 incorporating both the large price movements and the sharp reduction in liquidity associated with these events. A second type of scenario would evaluate the sensitivity of the bank's market riskexposure to changes in the assumptions about volatilities and correlations. Applying this test would require an evaluation of the historical range of variation for volatilities and correlations and evaluation of the bank's current positions against the extreme values of the historical range. Due consideration should be given to the sharp variation that, at times, has occurred in a matter of days in periods of significant market disturbance. The four market events, cited above as examples, all involved correlations within risk factors approaching the extreme values of 1 and –1 for several days at the height of the disturbance.(c) Scenarios developed by the bank to capture the specific characteristics of its portfolio
In addition to the general scenarios prescribed by the Agency under (a) and (b) above, each bank should also develop its own stress scenarios which it identifies as most adverse based on the characteristics of its portfolio (e.g. any significant political or economic developments that may result in a sharp move in oil prices). Banks should provide the Agency with a description of the methodology used to identify and carry out the scenarios as well as with a description of the results derived from these stress tests.CA-9.7.5
Once a stress scenario has been identified, it should be used for conducting stress tests at least once every quarter, as long as the scenario continues to be relevant to the bank's portfolio.
CA-9.7.6
The results of all stress tests should be reviewed by senior management within 15 days from the time they are available, and should be promptly reflected in the policies and limits set by management and the Board of Directors. Moreover, if the testing reveals particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances, the Agency would expect the bank to take prompt steps to manage those risks appropriately (e.g., by
hedging against that outcome or reducing the size of itsexposures ).CA-9.8 CA-9.8 External validation of models
CA-9.8.1
Before granting its approval for the use of internal models by a bank, the Agency will require that the models are validated by both the internal and external auditors of the bank. The Agency will review the validation procedures performed by the internal and external auditors, and may independently carry out further validation procedures.
CA-9.8.2
The internal validation procedures to be carried out by the internal auditors are set out in section CA-9.3. As stated in that paragraph, the internal auditor's review of the overall risk management process should take place at regular intervals (not less than once every six months). The internal auditor shall make a report to senior management and the Board of Directors, in writing, of the results of the validation procedures. The report shall be made available to the Agency for its review.
CA-9.8.3
The validation of the models by the external auditors should include, at a minimum, the following steps:
(a) verifying and ensuring that the internal validation processes described in section CA-9.3 are operating satisfactorily;(b) ensuring that the formulae used in the calculation process as well as for the pricing ofoptions and other complex instruments are validated by a qualified unit, which in all cases should be independent from the trading area;(c) checking and ensuring that the structure of the internal models is adequate with respect to the bank's activities and geographical coverage;(d) checking the results of the bank's backtesting of its internal measurement system (i.e., comparingvalue-at-risk estimates with actual profits and losses) to ensure that the model provides a reliable measure of potential losses over time; and(e) making sure that data flows and processes associated with the risk measurement system are transparent and accessible.CA-9.8.4
The external auditors should carry out their validation/review procedures, at a minimum, once every year. Based on the above procedures, the external auditors shall make a report, in writing, on the accuracy of the bank's models, including all significant findings of their work. The report shall be addressed to the senior management and/or the Board of Directors of the bank, and a copy of the report shall be made available to the Agency. The mandatory annual review by the external auditors shall be carried out during the third quarter of the calendar year, and the Agency expects to receive their final report by 30 September each year. The results of additional validation procedures carried out by the external auditors at other times during the year, should be made available to the Agency promptly.
CA-9.8.5
Banks are required to ensure that external auditors and the Agency's representatives are in a position to have easy access, whenever they judge it necessary and under appropriate procedures, to the models' specifications and parameters as well as to the results of, and the underlying inputs to, their
value-at-risk calculations.CA-9.9 CA-9.9 Letter of model recognition
CA-9.9.1
As stated in section CA-9.1, banks which propose to use internal models for the calculation of their market risk capital requirements should submit their detailed proposals, in writing, to the Agency. The Agency will review these proposals, and upon ensuring that the bank's internal models meet all the criteria for recognition set out earlier in this chapter, and after satisfying itself with the results of validation procedures carried out by the internal and external auditors and/or by itself, will issue a letter of model recognition to the bank.
CA-9.9.2
The letter of model recognition should be specific. It will set out the products covered, the method for calculating capital requirements on the products and the conditions of model recognition. In the case of pre-processing models, the bank will also be told how the output of recognised models should feed into the processing of other interest rate, equity, foreign exchange and
commodities risk. The conditions of model recognition may include additional reporting requirements. The Agency's prior written approval should be obtained for any modifications proposed to be made to the models previously recognised by the Agency. In cases where a bank proposes to apply the model to new but similar products, there will be a requirement to obtain the Agency's prior approval. In some cases, the Agency may be able to give provisional approval for the model to be applied to a new class of products, in others it will be necessary to revisit the bank.CA-9.9.3
The Agency may withdraw its approval granted for any bank's model if it believes that the conditions on which the approval was based are no longer valid or have changed significantly.
CA-9.10 CA-9.10 Combination of internal models and the standardised methodology
CA-9.10.1
Unless a bank's
exposure to a particular risk factor is insignificant, the internal models approach will, in principle, require banks to have an integrated risk measurement system that captures the broad risk factor categories (i.e., interest rates, exchange rates (which includes gold), equity prices andcommodity prices, with relatedoptions volatilities being included in each risk factor category). Thus, banks which start to use models for one or more risk factor categories will, over a reasonable period of time, be expected to extend the models to all their market risks.CA-9.10.2
A bank which has obtained the Agency's approval for the use of one or more models will no longer be able to revert to measuring the risk measured by those models according to the standardised methodology (unless the Agency withdraws its approval for the model(s), as explained in section CA-9.9). However, what constitutes a reasonable period of time for an individual bank which uses a combination of internal models and the standardised methodology to move to a comprehensive model, will be decided by the Agency after taking into account the relevant circumstances of the bank.
CA-9.10.3
Notwithstanding the goal of moving to comprehensive internal models as set out in paragraph CA-9.10.1 above, for banks which, for the time being, will be using a combination of internal models and the standardised methodology, the following conditions will apply:
(a) each broad risk factor category must be assessed using a single approach (either internal models or the standardised approach), i.e., no combination of the two methods will, in principle, be permitted within a risk factor category or across a bank's different entities for the same type of risk (see, however, the transitional provisions in section CA-1.6)21;(b) all of the criteria laid down in this chapter will apply to the models being used;(c) banks may not modify the combination of the two approaches which they are using, without justifying to the Agency that they have a valid reason for doing so, and obtaining the Agency's prior written approval;(d) no element of market risk may escape measurement, i.e. theexposure for all the various risk factors, whether calculated according to the standardised approach or internal models, would have to be captured; and(e) the capital charges assessed under the standardised approach and under the models approach should be aggregated using the simple sum method.
21 However, banks may incur risks in positions which are not captured by their models, for example, in minor currencies or in negligible business areas. Such risks should be measured according to the standard methodology.
CA-9.11 CA-9.11 Treatment of specific risk
CA-9.11.1
Banks using models will be permitted to base their specific risk capital charge on modelled estimates if they meet all of the qualitative and quantitative requirements for general risk models as well as the additional criteria set out in paragraph CA-9.11.2. Banks which are unable to meet these additional criteria will be required to base their specific risk capital charge on the full amount of the specific risk charge calculated by the standardised methodology (as illustrated in chapters CA-4 to CA-8).
CA-9.11.2
The criteria for applying modelled estimates of specific risk require that a bank's model:
• explain the historical price variation in the portfolio22;• demonstrably capture concentration (magnitude and changes in composition)23;• be robust to an adverse environment24; and• be validated through backtesting aimed at assessing whether specific risk is being accurately captured.In addition, the bank must be able to demonstrate that it has methodologies in place which allow it to adequately capture event and
default risk for its traded debt and equity positions.
22 The key measurement of model quality are "goodness-of-fit" measures which address the question of how much of the historical variation in price value is explained by the model. One measure of this type which can often be used is an R-squared measure from regression methodology. If this measure is to be used, the bank's model would be expected to be able to explain a high percentage, such as 90%, of the historical price variation or to explicitly include estimates of the residual variability not captured in the factors included in this regression. For some types of model, it may not be feasible to calculate a goodness-of-fit measure. In such an instance, a bank is expected to contact the Agency to define an acceptable alternative measure which would meet this regulatory objective.
23 The bank should be expected to demonstrate that the model is sensitive to changes in portfolio construction and that higher capital charges are attracted for portfolios that have increasing concentrations.
24 The bank should be able to demonstrate that the model will signal rising risk in an adverse environment. This could be achieved by incorporating in the historical estimation period of the model at least one full credit cycle and ensuring that the model would not have been inaccurate in modelling at least one full the downward portion of the cycle. Another approach for demonstrating this is through simulation of historical or plausible worst-case environments
CA-9.11.3
Banks which meet the criteria set out above for models but do not have methodologies in place to adequately capture event and
default risk will be required to calculate their specific risk capital charge based on the internal model measurements plus an additional prudential surcharge as defined in paragraph CA-9.11.4. The surcharge is designed to treat the modelling of specific risk on the same basis as a general market risk model that has proven deficient during backtesting. That is, the equivalent of a scaling factor of four would apply to the estimate of specific risk until such time as a bank can demonstrate that the methodologies it uses adequately capture event anddefault risk. Once a bank is able to demonstrate this, the minimum multiplication factor of three can be applied. However, a higher multiplication factor of four on the modelling of specific risk would remain possible if future backtesting results were to indicate a serious deficiency in the model.CA-9.11.4
For banks applying the surcharge, the total market risk measure will equal a minimum of three times the internal model's general and specific risk measure plus a surcharge in the amount of either:
(a) the specific risk portion of thevalue-at-risk measure which should be isolated25; or, at the bank's option,(b) thevalue-at-risk measures of sub-portfolios of debt and equity positions that contain specific risk26.Banks using option (b) above are required to identify their sub-portfolios structure ahead of time and should not change it without the Agency's prior written consent.
25 Techniques for separating general market risk and specific risk would include the following:
Equities:
The market should be identified with a single factor that is representative of the market as a whole, for example, a widely accepted broadly based stock index for the country concerned.
Banks that use factor models may assign one factor of their model, or a single linear combination of factors, as their general market risk factor.
Bonds:
The market should be identified with a reference curve for the currency concerned. For example, the curve might be a government bondyield curve or aswap curve; in any case, the curve should be based on a well-established and liquid underlying market and should be accepted by the market as a reference curve for the currency concerned.
Banks may select their own technique for identifying the specific risk component of thevalue-at-risk measure for purposes of applying the multiplier of 4. Techniques would include:• Using the incremental increase invalue-at-risk arising from the modelling of specific risk factors;• Using the difference between thevalue-at-risk measure and a measure calculated by substituting each individual equity position by a representative index; or• Using an analytic separation between general market risk and specific risk by a particular model.26 This would apply to sub-portfolios containing positions that would be subject to specific risk under the standardised approach.
CA-9.11.5
Banks which apply modelled estimates of specific risk are required to conduct backtesting aimed at assessing whether specific risk is being accurately captured. The methodology a bank should use for validating its specific risk estimates is to perform separate backtests on sub-portfolios using daily data on sub-portfolios subject to specific risk. The key sub-portfolios for this purpose are traded debt and equity positions. However, if a bank itself decomposes its trading portfolio into finer categories (e.g., emerging markets, traded corporate debt, etc.), it is appropriate to keep these distinctions for sub-portfolio backtesting purposes. Banks are required to commit to a sub-portfolio structure and stick to it unless it can be demonstrated to the Agency that it would make sense to change the structure.
CA-9.11.6
Banks are required to have in place a process to analyse exceptions identified through the backtesting of specific risk. This process is intended to serve as the fundamental way in which banks correct their models of specific risk in the event they become inaccurate. There will be a presumption that models that incorporate specific risk are "unacceptable" if the results at the sub-portfolio level produce a number of exceptions commensurate with the Red Zone27. Banks with "unacceptable" specific risk models are expected to take immediate action to correct the problem in the model and to ensure that there is a sufficient capital buffer to absorb the risk that, the backtest showed, had not been adequately captured.
27 As defined in the
Basel Committee's document titled "Supervisory framework for the use of backtesing in conjunction with the internal models approach to market risk capital requirements".CA-10 CA-10 Gearing requirements
CA-10.1 CA-10.1 Gearing
CA-10.1.1
The content of this chapter is applicable to locally incorporated banks and FCB
branches (licensed by the Agency) of foreign banks.Measurement
CA-10.1.2
Gearing ratio is measured with reference to the ratio of
deposit liabilities against the bank's capital and reserves as reported in its PIR.Gearing limit
CA-10.1.3
For Full Commercial Bank and Offshore Banking Unit licensees,
deposit liabilities should not exceed 20 times the respective bank's capital and reserves.CA-10.1.4
For Investment Bank licensees,
deposit liabilities should not exceed 10 times the respective bank's capital and reserves.CA CA Capital Adequacy (October 2007)
CA-A CA-A Introduction
CA-A.1 CA-A.1 Application
CA-A.1.1
Regulations in this Module are applicable to locally incorporated banks on both a stand-alone basis (i.e. including their foreign
branches ), and on a consolidated group basis (i.e. including their subsidiaries and any other investments which are included or consolidated into the group accounts or are required to be consolidated for regulatory purposes by the CBB).October 07CA-A.1.2
In addition to licensees mentioned in Paragraph CA-A.1.1, certain of these regulations (in particular gearing and market risk requirements) are also applicable to Bahrain
branches of foreign retail bank licensees.October 07CA-A.2 CA-A.2 Purpose
Executive Summary
CA-A.2.1
The purpose of this Module is to set out the Central Bank's
capital adequacy regulations and provide guidance on the calculation of capital requirements by locally incorporated banks. This requirement is supported by Article 44(c) of the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law (Decree No. 64 of 2006).October 07CA-A.2.2
Principle 9 of the Principles of Business requires that
conventional bank licensees maintain adequate human, financial and other resources, sufficient to run their business in an orderly manner (see Section PB-1.9). In addition, Condition 5 of CBB's Licensing Conditions (Section LR-2.5) requiresconventional bank licensees to maintain financial resources in excess of the minimum requirements specified in Module CA (Capital Adequacy).October 07CA-A.2.3
The Module also sets out the minimum gearing requirements which relevant banks (referred to in Section CA-A.1) must meet as a condition of their licensing.
October 07CA-A.2.4
The requirements specified in this Module vary according to the Category of
conventional bank licensee concerned, their inherent risk profile, and the volume and type of business undertaken. The purpose of such requirements is to ensure thatconventional bank licensees hold sufficient capital to provide some protection against unexpected losses, and otherwise allow conventional banks to effect an orderly wind-down of their operations, without loss to their depositors. The minimum capital requirements specified here may not be sufficient to absorb all unexpected losses.October 07CA-A.2.5
The Central Bank requires in particular that the relevant banks maintain adequate capital, in accordance with the requirements of this Module, against their risks.
October 07Legal Basis
CA-A.2.6
This Module contains the CBB's Directive relating to the capital adequacy of
conventional bank licensees , and is issued under the powers available to the CBB under Article 38 of the CBB Law. The Directive in this Module is applicable to allconventional bank licensees .October 07CA-A.2.7
For an explanation of the CBB's rule-making powers and different regulatory instruments, see Section UG-1.1.
October 07CA-A.3 CA-A.3 Module History
CA-A.3.1
This Module was first issued in July 2004 as part of the conventional principles volume. All requirements in this volume have been effective since this date. Any material changes that have subsequently been made to this Module are annotated with the calendar quarter date in which the change was made: Chapter UG 3 provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control. The most recent changes made to this Module are detailed in the table below:
Summary of changes
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes CA-A.2 10/07 Change categorising Module as a Directive October 07Evolution of the Module
CA-A.3.2
Prior to the development of the Rulebook, the Central Bank had issued various circulars representing regulations relating to
capital adequacy requirements. These circulars were consolidated into this Module. These circulars are listed below:Circular Ref. Date of Issue Module Ref. Circular Subject ODG/50/98 11 Sep 1998 CA-1 - CA-9 Market Risk Capital Regulations BC/07/02 26 Jun 2002 CA-1.4 Review of PIR by External Auditors OG/78/01 20 Feb 2001 CA-2.5 Monitoring of Capital Adequacy BC/01/98 10 Jan 1998 CA-2.5 Risk Asset Ratio October 07Effective date
CA-A.3.3
The contents in this Module are effective from the date depicted in the original circulars (see Paragraph CA-A.3.2) from which the requirements are compiled or from the dates mentioned in the Summary of Changes.
October 07CA-B CA-B General guidance and best practice
CA-B.1 CA-B.1 Guidance provided by other international bodies
Basel Committee: Use of 'Backtesting' in Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements
CA-B.1.1
In January 1996, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued technical guidance on the 'use of 'Backtesting' in Conjunction with the Internal Models Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements' (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.htm).October 07CA-B.1.2
This technical guidance presents a methodology for testing the accuracy of the internal models used by banks to measure market risks.
October 07CA-B.1.3
Backtesting offers the best opportunity for incorporating suitable incentives into the internal models in a consistent manner.
October 07CA-B.1.4
The Central Bank will rely upon technical guidance for its assessment and review of bank's market risk capital requirements including, but not limited to, the determination of the add-on factor.
October 07Basel Committee: The management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures – a supervisory perspective
CA-B.1.5
In March 1986, the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a paper titled 'The management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures — a supervisory perspective' (see www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc134.pdf).October 07CA-B.1.6
This paper examines off-balance-sheet risks from three angles: market/position risk, credit risk and operational/control risk. Part III of this paper examines credit risk (including control of large
exposures , settlement risk and country risk), with particular emphasis given to the assessment of the relative risks of the different types of off-balance-sheet activity.October 07CA-1 CA-1 Scope and coverage of capital charges
CA-1.1 CA-1.1 Introduction
CA-1.1.1
All locally incorporated banks are required to measure and apply capital charges in respect of their credit and market risk capital requirements.
October 07CA-1.1.2
Credit risk is defined as the potential that a bank's borrower or
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. Credit risk exists throughout the activities of a bank in the banking book and in the trading book including both on- and off-balance-sheetexposures .October 07CA-1.1.3
Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on- or off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market prices. The risks subject to the capital requirement of this Module are:
(a) The risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book: and(b) Foreign exchange andcommodities risks throughout the bank.October 07CA-1.2 CA-1.2 Measuring credit risks
CA-1.2.1
In measuring credit risk for the purpose of
capital adequacy , banks are required to apply a simple risk-weighted approach through which claims of different categories of counterparties are assigned risk weights according to broad categories of relative riskiness.October 07CA-1.2.2
The framework of weights consists of four weights – 0%, 20%, 50% and 100% for on- and off-balance-sheet items, which based on a broad-brush judgement, are applied to the different types of assets and off-balance-sheet
exposures (with the exception of derivative transactions) within the banking book.October 07CA-1.2.3
The resultant different weighted assets and off-balance-sheet
exposures are then added together to calculate the total credit-risk-weighted assets of the bank.October 07CA-1.3 CA-1.3 Measuring market risks
Trading book
CA-1.3.1
The trading book means the bank's proprietary positions in financial instruments (including positions in derivative products and off-balance-sheet instruments) which are intentionally held for short-term resale and/or which are taken on by the bank with the intention of benefiting in the short-term from actual and/or expected differences between their buying and selling prices, or from other price or interest rate variations, and positions in financial instruments arising from matched principal brokering and market making, or positions taken in order to
hedge other elements of the trading book.October 07CA-1.3.2
Each bank should agree a written policy statement with the Central Bank on which activities are normally considered trading and which, therefore, constitute the trading book.
October 07CA-1.3.3
It is expected that the trading activities will be managed and monitored by a separate unit and that such activities should be identifiable because of their intent, as defined in Paragraph CA-1.3.1 above.
October 07Interest rate and equity risk
CA-1.3.4
The capital charges for interest rate related instruments and equities will apply based on the current market values of items in a bank's trading book.
October 07Foreign exchange and commodities risk
CA-1.3.5
The capital charges for foreign exchange risk and for
commodities risk will apply to a bank's total currency andcommodity positions, with the exception of structural foreign exchange positions in accordance with Section CA-6.3 of this Module.October 07Exemptions
CA-1.3.6
Banks will be allowed certain de minimis exemptions from the capital requirements for foreign exchange risk, as described in Section CA-6.2. For the time being, there shall be no exemptions from the trading book capital requirements, or from the capital requirements for
commodities risk.October 07Hedging instruments
CA-1.3.7
A trading book
exposure may behedged , completely or partially, by an instrument that, in its own right, is not normally considered eligible to be a part of the trading book. Subject to the policy statement agreed by the bank with the Central Bank as explained in Paragraph CA-1.3.2 above, and with the prior written approval of the Central Bank, banks will be allowed to include within their market risk measure non-trading instruments (on- or off-balance-sheet) which are deliberately used tohedge the trading activities. The positions in these instruments will attractcounterparty risk capital requirements and general market risk, but not specific risk requirements.October 07CA-1.3.8
Where a financial instrument which would normally qualify as part of the trading book is used to
hedge anexposure in the banking book, it should be carved out of the trading book for the period of thehedge , and included in the banking book with theexposure it ishedging . Such instruments will be subject to the credit risk capital requirements.October 07CA-1.3.9
It is possible that general market risk arising from the trading book may
hedge positions in the banking book without reference to individual financial instruments. In such circumstances, there must nevertheless be underlying positions in the trading book. The positions in the banking book which are beinghedged must remain in the banking book, although the general market riskexposure associated with them should be incorporated within the calculation of general market risk capital requirements for the trading book (i.e. the general market risk element on the banking book side of thehedge should be added to the trading book calculation, rather than that on the trading book side of thehedge being deducted from it). As no individual financial instruments are designated, there is no resultant specific risk requirement in the trading book and the risk-weighted assets in the banking book will not be reduced. Any such arrangement for the transfer of risk must be subject to the policy statement agreed with the Central Bank as explained in Paragraph CA-1.3.2 above, and should have the specific prior written approval of the Central Bank.October 07Allocation of financial and hedging instruments
CA-1.3.10
The allocation of a financial instrument between the trading book and the banking book, or the allocation of
hedging instruments described in Paragraph CA-1.3.7 above, or the transfer of general market risk as explained in Paragraph CA-1.3.9 above, should be subject to appropriate and adequate documentation to ensure that it can be established through audit verification that the item is treated correctly for the purposes of capital requirements, in compliance with the bank's established criteria for allocating items to the trading or banking book, and subject to the policy statement agreed with the Central Bank.October 07CA-1.3.11
The Central Bank intends to carefully monitor the way in which banks allocate financial instruments and will seek, in particular, to ensure that no abusive switching designed to minimise capital charges occurs and to prevent 'gains trading' in respect of
securities which are not marked to market.October 07Review of compliance by internal and external auditors
CA-1.3.12
The bank's compliance with the established criteria for allocating items to the trading and banking books, and with the policy statement agreed with the Central Bank, should be reviewed by the bank's internal auditors at least on a quarterly basis, and by the external auditors at least once a year.
October 07CA-1.3.13
Any cases of non-compliance identified by the internal auditor should be immediately brought to the attention of the Central Bank, in writing, by the senior management of the bank. Any non-compliance identified by the external auditors, requires them to submit a written report directly to the Central Bank (in accordance with the requirements in Section CA-9.8), in addition to a report to be submitted by the management.
October 07Valuation requirements
CA-1.3.14
To establish a relevant base for measuring the market risk in the trading book, all positions should be marked to market daily, including the recognition of accruing interest, dividends or other benefits as appropriate. Banks are required to have, and discuss with the Central Bank, a written policy statement on the subject of valuing trading book positions, which in particular should address the valuation process for those items where market prices are not readily available. This policy statement should have been developed in conjunction with the bank's internal and external auditors. Having arrived at a valuation mechanism for a single position or a group of similar positions, the valuation approach should be applied consistently. In addition to the considerations of prudence and consistency, the bank's valuation policy should reflect the points set out below:
(a) A bank may mark to market positions using either a close-out valuation based on two-way prices (i.e., a long position shall be valued at its current bid price and a short position at its current offer price) or, alternatively, using a mid-market price but making a provision for the spread between bid and offer prices for different instruments. The bank must have due regard to the liquidity of the position concerned and any special factors which may adversely affect the closure of the position.(b) Where a bank has obtained the Central Bank's approval for the use of a risk assessment model in the calculation of the capital requirements foroptions (in accordance with Chapter CA-9 of these regulations), it may value itsoptions using the values derived from that model.(c) Where a bank does not use a model and the prices are not published for itsoptions positions, it must determine the market value as follows:(i) For purchasedoptions , the marked-to-market value is the product of the 'in the money' amount and the quantity underlying theoption ; and(ii) For writtenoptions , the marked-to-market value is the initial premium received for theoption plus the product of the amount by which the current 'in the money' amount exceeds either the 'in the money' amount at the time the contract was written, or zero if the contract was 'out of the money' at the time that it was written; and the quantity underlying theoption .(d) A bank must calculate the value of aswap contract or an FRA having regard to the net present value of the future cash flows of the contract, using current interest rates relevant to the periods in which the cash flows will arise.(e) Where a bank is a market maker in an instrument(s), the valuation should be the bank's own bid or offer price which should reflect the bank'sexposure to the market as a whole and its views on future prices. Where the bank is the sole market maker in a particular instrument, it should take proper care to ensure that the valuation used is prudent in all circumstances.(f) In the event that a bank is only able to access indicative prices, having regard to the fact that they are only a guide, such prices may have to be adjusted to some degree in order to arrive at a prudent valuation.(g) In the event that the bank is only able to access mid-market or single values, it should have regard to the fact that these prices will have to be adjusted to some degree in order to arrive at a prudent valuation.October 07Consolidation
CA-1.3.15
Both credit risk and market risk capital requirements will apply on a worldwide consolidated basis. Only a bank which is running a global consolidated book may apply the offsetting rules contained in the remainder of these regulations, on a consolidated basis with the prior written agreement of the Central Bank. However, where it would not be prudent to offset or net positions within the group as, for example, where there are obstacles to the quick repatriation of profits from a foreign subsidiary or where there are legal and procedural difficulties in carrying out the timely management of risks on a consolidated basis, the Central Bank will require the bank to take individual positions into account without any offsetting.
October 07CA-1.3.16
Notwithstanding that the market risk capital requirements will apply on a worldwide consolidated basis, the Central Bank retains the right to monitor the market risks of banks on a non-consolidated basis to ensure that significant imbalances within a group do not escape supervision. The Central Bank will be particularly vigilant to ensure that banks do not pass positions on reporting dates in such a way as to escape measurement.
October 07Approach to measurement
CA-1.3.17
For the measurement of their market risks, banks will have a choice, subject to the written approval of the Central Bank, between two broad methodologies. One alternative is to measure the risks in a standardised approach, using the measurement frameworks described in Chapters CA-4 to CA-8 of these regulations. Chapters CA-4 to CA-7 deal with the four risks addressed by these regulations; namely interest rate risk, equity position risk, foreign exchange risk and
commodities risk. Chapter CA-8 sets out a number of possible methods for measuring theprice risk inoptions of all kinds. The capital charge under the standardised approach is the arithmetical sum of the risk measures obtained from the measurement frameworks in Chapters CA-4 to CA-8.October 07CA-1.3.18
The standardised approach uses a 'building-block' approach in which the specific risk and the general market risk arising from interest rate and equity positions are calculated separately.
October 07CA-1.3.19
The second alternative methodology, which is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions and the use of which is, therefore, conditional upon the explicit approval of the Central Bank, is set out in detail in Chapter CA-9 including the procedure for obtaining the Central Bank's approval. This method allows banks to use risk measures derived from their own internal risk measurement models (Internal Models Approach), subject to seven sets of conditions which are described in detail in Chapter CA-9.
October 07CA-1.3.20
The focus of most internal models currently used by banks is the general market risk
exposure , typically leaving specific risk (i.e.exposures to specific issuers of debtsecurities or equities1) to be measured largely through separate credit risk measurement systems. Banks using internal models for the measurement of their market risk capital requirements will be subject to a separate capital charge for specific risk, to the extent that the model does not capture specific risk. The capital charge for banks which are modelling specific risk is set out in Chapter CA-9.
1 Specific risk includes the risk that an individual debt or equity
security moves by more or less than the general market in day-to-day trading (including periods when the whole market is volatile) and event risk (where the price of an individual debt or equitysecurity moves precipitously relative to the general market, e.g. on a take-over bid or some other shock event; such events would also include the risk of 'default ').October 07CA-1.3.21
In measuring the
price risk inoptions under the standardised approach, a number of alternatives with varying degrees of sophistication are allowed (see Chapter CA-8). The more a bank is engaged in writingoptions , the more sophisticated its measurement method needs to be. In the longer term, banks with significantoptions business will be expected to move to comprehensivevalue-at-risk models and become subject to the full range of quantitative and qualitative standards set out in Chapter CA-9.October 07CA-1.3.22
All transactions, including forward sales and purchases, shall be included in the calculation of capital requirements as from the date on which they were entered into.
October 07Monitoring
CA-1.3.23
Banks are expected to manage their market risk in such a way that the capital requirements for market risk are being met on a continuous basis, i.e. at the close of each business day and not merely at the end of each calendar quarter, both in the case of banks that use the standardised approach and those that use internal models. Banks are also expected to maintain strict risk management systems to ensure that their intra-day
exposures are not excessive.October 07CA-1.3.24
Banks' daily compliance with the capital requirements for market risk shall be verified by the independent risk management department and the internal auditor. It is expected that the external auditors will perform appropriate tests of the banks' daily compliance with the capital requirements for market risk. Where a bank fails to meet the minimum capital requirements for market risk on any business day, the Central Bank should be informed in writing. The Central Bank will then seek to ensure that the bank takes immediate measures to rectify the situation.
October 07CA-1.3.25
Besides what is stated in Paragraphs CA-1.3.2, CA-1.3.3, CA-1.3.10, CA-1.3.11, CA-1.3.19 and Section CA-1.6, the Central Bank will consider a number of other appropriate and effective measures to ensure that banks do not 'window-dress' by showing significantly lower market risk positions on reporting dates.
October 07CA-1.4 CA-1.4 Reporting
CA-1.4.1
Formal reporting, to the Central Bank, of
capital adequacy shall be made in accordance with the requirements set out under Section BR-3.1.October 07Review of Prudential Information Returns by External Auditors
CA-1.4.2
The Central Bank requires all relevant banks to request their external auditors to conduct a review of the prudential returns on a quarterly basis in accordance with the requirements set out under Section BR-3.1.
October 07CA-1.5 CA-1.5 Summary of overall capital adequacy requirement
CA-1.5.1
Each bank is expected to monitor and report the level of risk against which a capital requirement is to be applied, in accordance with Section CA-1.3 above. The bank's overall minimum capital requirement will be:
The credit risk requirements laid down by the Central Bank, excluding debt and equity
securities in the trading book and all positions incommodities , but including the creditcounterparty risk on allover-the-counter derivatives whether in the trading or the banking books: PLUS one of the following:(a) The capital charges for market risks calculated according to the measurement frameworks described in Chapters CA-4 to CA-8, summed arithmetically: OR(b) The measure of market risk derived from the models approach set out in Chapter CA-9 (with the prior written approval of the Central Bank for adopting this approach - see Chapter CA-9); OR(c) A mixture of (a) and (b) above, summed arithmetically (with the prior written approval of the Central Bank for adopting a combination of the standardised approach and the internal models approach - see Chapter CA-9).October 07CA-1.6 CA-1.6 Transitional provisions
CA-1.6.1
Banks which start to use internal models for one or more market risk categories should, over a reasonable period of time, extend the models to all of their operations, subject to the exceptions mentioned in Paragraph CA-1.6.4 below, and to move towards a comprehensive model (i.e. one which captures all market risk categories).
October 07CA-1.6.2
On a transitional basis, banks will be allowed to use a combination of the standardised approach and the internal models approach to measure their market risks provided they should cover a complete risk Category (e.g. interest rate risk or foreign exchange risk), i.e. a combination of the two methods will not be allowed within the same risk Category.2 However, for banks that are, at present, still implementing or further improving their internal models, they will be allowed some flexibility, even within risk categories, in including all their operations on a worldwide basis. This flexibility shall be subject to the specific prior written approval of the Central Bank, and such approval will be given on a case-by-case basis and reviewed by the Central Bank from time to time.
2This does not, however, apply to pre-processing techniques which are used to simplify the calculation and whose results become subject to the standardised methodology.
October 07CA-1.6.3
The Central Bank will closely monitor banks to ensure that there will be no 'cherry-picking' between the standardised approach and the models approach within a risk Category. Banks which adopt a model will not be permitted, save in exceptional circumstances, to revert to the standardised approach.
October 07CA-1.6.4
The Central Bank recognises that even a bank which uses a comprehensive model may still incur risks in positions which are not captured by their internal models3, for example, in remote locations, in minor currencies or in negligible business areas4. Any such risks that are not included in a model should be separately measured and reported using the standardised approach described in Chapters CA-4 to CA-8.
3Banks may also incur interest rate and equity risks outside of their trading activities. However, there are no explicit capital charges for the price risk in such positions.
4 For example, if a bank is hardly engaged in commodities it will not necessarily be expected to model its commodities risk.
October 07CA-1.6.5
Transitioning banks are required to move towards a comprehensive internal model approach.
October 07CA-1.6.6
The Central Bank will closely monitor the risk management practices of banks moving towards the models approach, to ensure that they will be in a position to meet all the standards once they are applying a fully-fledged model for any risk Category.
October 07CA-2 CA-2 The capital requirement
CA-2.1 CA-2.1 Introduction
CA-2.1.1
Regulatory Capital is the sum of the following three components (as defined in Rules CA-2.2.1 to CA-2.2.4), subject to the restrictions set out in Section CA-2.3:Tiers 1 and 2: May be used to support credit risk and market risk; andTier 3: May be used solely to support market risk.October 07CA-2.1.2
For a
branch of a foreign bank operating as a retail bank licensee, a designated amount of capital is required, as agreed between the CBB and the licensee, taking into consideration the gearing requirement stated in Section CA-10.1.October 07CA-2.2 CA-2.2 Definition of capital
Tier 1: Core capital
CA-2.2.1
Tier 1 capital shall consist of the sum of items (a) to (c) below, less the sum of items (d) to (e) below:
(a) Permanent shareholders' equity (including issued and fully paid ordinary shares / common stock and perpetual non-cumulative preference shares, but excluding cumulative preference shares);(b) Disclosed reserves, which are audited and approved by the shareholders, in the form of legal, general and other reserves created by appropriations of retained earnings, share premiums,capital redemption reserves and other surplus but excluding revaluation reserves; and(c) Minority interests, arising on consolidation, in the equity of subsidiaries which are less than wholly owned.
LESS:(d) Goodwill; and(e) Current year's cumulative net losses which have been reviewed or audited as per the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) by the external auditors.October 07Tier 2: Supplementary capital
CA-2.2.2
Tier 2 capital shall consist of the following items:
(a) Interim retained profits which have been reviewed as per the ISA by the external auditors;(b) Asset revaluation reserves, which arise in two ways. Firstly, these reserves can arise from the revaluation of fixed assets from time to time in line with the change in market values, and are reflected on the face of the balance sheet as a revaluation reserve. Secondly, hidden values or 'latent' revaluation reserves may be present as a result of long-term holdings of equity securities valued in the balance sheet at the historical cost of acquisition. Both types of revaluation reserve may be included in tier 2 capital, with the concurrence of the external auditors, provided that the assets are prudently valued, fully reflecting the possibility of price fluctuation and forced sale. In the case of 'latent' revaluation reserves, a discount of 55% will be applied to the difference between the historical cost book value and the market value to reflect the potential volatility of this form of unrealised capital.(c) General provisions held against future, presently unidentified losses which are freely available to meet losses which subsequently materialise and, therefore, qualify for inclusion within supplementary elements of capital, subject to a maximum of 1.25% of total risk-weighted assets (both credit and market risk-weighted assets). Provisions ascribed to impairment of particular assets or known liabilities should be excluded.(d) Hybrid instruments, which include a range of instruments which combine characteristics of equity capital and of debt, and which meet the following requirements:• They are unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up;• They are not redeemable at the initiative of the holder or without the prior consent of the Central Bank;• They are available to participate in losses without the bank being obliged to cease trading (unlike conventional subordinated debt); and• Although the capital instrument may carry an obligation to pay interest that cannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike dividends on ordinary shareholders' equity), it should allow service obligations to be deferred (as with cumulative preference shares) where the profitability of the bank would not support payment.Cumulative preference shares, having the above characteristics, would be eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital. Debt capital instruments which do not meet the above criteria may be eligible for inclusion in item (e) below.(e) Subordinated term debt, which comprises all conventional unsecured borrowing subordinated (in respect of both interest and principal) to all other liabilities of the bank except the share capital and limited life redeemable preference shares. To be eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital, subordinated debt capital instruments should have a minimum original fixed term to maturity of over five years. During the last five years to maturity, a cumulative discount (or amortisation) factor of 20% per year will be applied to reflect the diminishing value of these instruments as a continuing source of strength. Unlike instruments included in item (d) above, these instruments are not normally available to participate in the losses of a bank which continues trading. For this reason, these instruments will be limited to a maximum of 50% of tier 1 capital.(f) 45% of unrealised gains on equity securities held as available-for-sale (on an aggregate net-basis).October 07Deduction from tiers 1 and 2 capital
CA-2.2.3
The following item shall be deducted from tiers 1 and 2 capital on a pro-rata basis:
Investments in and lending of a capital nature to unconsolidated subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial activities. The assets representing the investments in subsidiary companies whose capital is deducted from that of the parent would not be included in total assets for the purpose of computing the capital ratio.October 07Tier 3: Trading book ancillary capital
CA-2.2.4
Tier 3 capital will consist of short-term subordinated debt which, if circumstances demand, needs to be capable of becoming part of the bank's permanent capital and thus be available to absorb losses in the event of insolvency. It must, therefore, at a minimum meet the following conditions:
(a) Be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid up;(b) Have an original maturity of at least two years;(c) Not be repayable before the agreed repayment date; and(d) Be subject to a lock-in clause which stipulates that neither interest nor principal may be paid (even at maturity) if such payment means that the bank falls below or remains below its minimum capital requirement.October 07CA-2.3 CA-2.3 Limits on the use of different forms of capital
Tier 1: Core capital
CA-2.3.1
Tier 1 capital should represent at least half of the total eligible capital, i.e., the sum total of tier 2 plus tier 3 eligible capital should not exceed total tier 1 eligible capital.
October 07Tier 2 : Supplementary capital
CA-2.3.2
Tier 2 elements may be substituted for tier 3 up to the tier 3 limit of 250% of tier 1 capital (as below) in so far as eligible tier 2 capital does not exceed total tier 1 capital, and long-term subordinated debt does not exceed 50% of tier 1 capital.
October 07Tier 3: Ancillary capital
CA-2.3.3
Tier 3 capital is limited to 250% of a bank's tier 1 capital that is required to support market risks. This means that a minimum of about 28.57% of market risks needs to be supported by tier 1 capital that is not required to support risks in the remainder of the book.
October 07CA-2.4 CA-2.4 Calculation of the capital ratio
CA-2.4.1
A bank should start the calculation of the capital ratio with the measure of market risk (i.e. specific risk plus general market risk) in accordance with the regulations in this Module, including interest rate risk, equity risk, foreign exchange and
commodities risks.October 07CA-2.4.2
The bank should next calculate its credit risk-weighted assets in accordance with the regulations in this Module.
October 07CA-2.4.3
The next step is to create an explicit numerical link between the capital requirements for credit and market risks. This is accomplished by multiplying the measure of market risk (calculated as stated in Paragraphs CA-2.4.1 and CA-2.4.2above) by 12.5 and adding the resulting figure to the sum of the credit risk-weighted assets. The capital ratio will then be calculated in relation to the sum of the two, using as the numerator only the eligible capital.
October 07CA-2.4.4
In calculating the eligible capital, it will be necessary first to calculate the bank's minimum capital requirement for credit risk, and only afterwards its market risk requirement, to establish how much tier 1 and tier 2 capital is available to support market risk. Eligible capital will be the sum of the whole of the bank's tier 1 capital, plus tier 2 capital under the limits set out in Section CA-2.3 above. Tier 3 capital will be regarded as eligible only if it can be used to support market risks under the conditions set out in Section CA-2.2 and CA-2.3 above. The quoted capital ratio will thus represent capital that is available to meet both credit risk and market risk. Where a bank has tier 3 capital, which meets the conditions set out in Section CA-2.2 above and which is not at present supporting market risks, it may report that excess as unused but eligible tier 3 capital alongside its capital ratio. A worked example of the calculation of the capital ratio is set out in Appendix CA-1.
October 07CA-2.5 CA-2.5 Minimum capital ratio requirement
Banking group
CA-2.5.1
On a consolidated basis, the Central Bank has set a minimum Risk Asset Ratio ('RAR') of 12.0% for all locally incorporated banks. Furthermore, on a solo basis, the parent bank of a group is required to maintain a minimum RAR of 8.0% (i.e. unconsolidated).
October 07CA-2.5.2
This means where a bank is required to complete both form PIR (Appendix BR 5) and form PIRC (Appendix BR 6), 8.0% is the minimum RAR necessary for the solo bank (PIR), and 12.0% for the consolidated bank (PIRC).
October 07Individual bank
CA-2.5.3
For banks that are required to complete only the PIR form, the Central Bank has set a minimum Risk Asset Ratio ('RAR') of 12.0%.
October 07Maintaining minimum RAR
CA-2.5.4
To clarify the effect of these minimum ratios (as identified in Paragraphs CA-2.5.1 to CA-2.5.3) on differing banking groups and individual banks, four examples (see Appendix CA-1) are given. In the examples, the parent and the subsidiary are Bahrain incorporated banks, but the cases could apply to overseas incorporated subsidiaries (with adjustment to the minimum RAR where appropriate in individual cases).
(a) Case One: Compliant solo bank - No subsidiaries (PIR only).(b) Case Two: Compliant parent bank, compliant group (PIR and PIRC).(c) Case Three: Compliant parent bank, compliant subsidiary bank, but non - compliant group.(d) Case Four: Non - compliant parent bank, compliant subsidiary bank and compliant group.For detailed workings of the above cases, refer to Appendix CA-1.
October 07CA-2.5.5
All locally incorporated banks must give the Central Bank, immediate written notification of any actual breach by such banks of either or both of the above RARs. Where such notification is given, the bank must also:
(a) Provide the Central Bank no later than one calendar week after the notification, with a written action plan setting out how the bank proposes to restore the relevant RAR(s) to the required minimum level(s) set out above and, further, describing how the bank will ensure that a breach of such RAR(s) will not occur again in the future; and(b) Report on a weekly basis thereafter on the bank's relevant RAR(s) until such RAR(s) have reached the required target level(s) set out below.October 07CA-2.5.6
In addition, the Central Bank considers it a matter of basic prudential practice that, in order to ensure that these RARs are constantly met, banks set up internal 'targets' of 12.5% (on a consolidated basis) and 8.5% (on a solo basis) to warn them of a potential fall by the bank below the Central Bank's required minimum RARs as set out above.
October 07CA-2.5.7
Where a bank's capital ratio falls below its target ratio, the General Manager should notify the Director of Banking Supervision at the Central Bank immediately. No formal action plan will be necessary, however the General Manager should explain what measures are being implemented to ensure that the bank will remain above its minimum RAR(s).
October 07CA-2.5.8
The bank will be required to submit form PIR (and PIRC where applicable) to the Central Bank on a monthly basis, until the RAR(s) exceeds its target ratio(s).
October 07CA-2.5.9
The Central Bank will notify banks in writing of any action required of them with regard to the corrective and preventive action (as appropriate) proposed by the bank pursuant to the above, as well as of any other requirement of the Central Bank in any particular case.
October 07CA-2.5.10
Banks should note that the Central Bank considers the breach of RARs to be a very serious matter. Consequently, the Central Bank may (at its discretion) subject a bank which breaches its RAR(s) to a formal licensing reappraisal. Such reappraisal may be effected either through the Central Bank's own inspection function or through the use of Reporting Accountants, as appropriate. Following such appraisal, the Central Bank will notify the bank concerned in writing of its conclusions with regard to the continued licensing of the bank.
October 07CA-2.5.11
The Central Bank recommends that the bank's compliance officer supports and cooperates with the Central Bank in the monitoring and reporting of the capital ratios and other regulatory reporting matters. Compliance officers should ensure that their banks have adequate internal systems and controls to comply with these regulations.
October 07CA-3 CA-3 Credit risk
CA-3.1 CA-3.1 Introduction
CA-3.1.1
This Chapter describes the standardised approach for the measurement of the credit risk
exposure in the bank's banking book.October 07CA-3.2 CA-3.2 Risk weighting – On-balance-sheet asset Category
CA-3.2.1
Risk weights by Category of on-balance-sheet asset are illustrated in the table below:
Risk weights Category of on-balance-sheet assets/claims 0% (a) Cash and balances with Central Banks(b) Holdings of Gold bullion and othercommodities (c) Claims on & guaranteed by:(i) The Government of Bahrain & Bahrain public sector entities(ii) Government-owned GCC companies incorporated in Bahrain(d) Claims on & guaranteed by or collateralised by cash orsecurities issued by central governments and central banks of Group A countries; and(e) Claims on the central governments and central banks of Group B countries, where denominated in national currency and funded in that currency.20% (a) Claims on and guaranteed by or collateralised bysecurities issued by multilateral development banks(b) Claims on and guaranteed by banks andsecurities firms incorporated in Group A countries(c) Claims on and guaranteed by banks incorporated in Group B countries with a residual maturity of 1 year or less(d) Claims on and guaranteed by public sector entities in Group A countries(e) Claims on and guaranteed by government-owned GCC companies incorporated outside Bahrain; and(f) Cash items in process of collection50% Claims secured by mortgage on residential property 100% (a) Claims on related parties(b) Holdings of other (non-subsidiary) banks' andsecurities firms' capital instruments(c) Claims on and guaranteed by banks incorporated in Group B countries with a residual maturity over one year(d) Claims on central governments and central banks of Group B countries (not included above)(e) Claims on and guaranteed by public sector entities of Group B countries(f) Claims on and guaranteed by government-owned companies in non-GCC countries(g) Claims on and guaranteed by private sector persons and entities in and outside Bahrain(h) Premises and equipment, real estate investments and assets not reported elsewhereOctober 07CA-3.3 CA-3.3 Risk weighting – Off-balance-sheet items
CA-3.3.1
The framework takes account of the credit risk on off-balance-sheet
exposures by applying credit conversion factors to the different types of off-balance-sheet instruments or transactions (with the exception ofderivatives ).October 07CA-3.3.2
The conversion factors are derived from the estimated size and likely occurrence of the credit
exposure , as well as the relative degree of credit risk as identified in theBasel Committee 's paper on 'The management of banks' off-balance-sheet exposures: a supervisory perspective' (see www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc134.pdf) issued in March 1986.October 07CA-3.3.3
The credit conversion factors applicable to the off-balance-sheet items are set out in the table below:
Credit Conversion factors Off-balance-sheet items 100% Direct credit substitutes, including general guarantees of indebtedness and acceptances 50% Transaction-related contingent items (e.g. performance bonds, bid bonds, warranties and standby letters of credit related to particular transactions) 20% Short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingencies (such as documentary credits collateralised by the underlying shipments) 100% Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with recourse, where the credit risk remains with the bank 100% Forward asset purchases, forward forward deposits and the unpaid part of partly-paid shares andsecurities , which represent commitments with certain draw-down50% Underwriting commitments under note issuance and revolving underwriting facilities (minus own holdings of notes underwritten) 50% Other commitments (e.g. formal standby facilities and credit lines) with an original maturity of 1 year and over 0% Similar commitments with an original maturity of up to 1 year, or which can be unconditionally cancelled at any time October 07CA-3.3.4
The applicable credit conversion factors should be multiplied by the weights applicable to the Category of the
counterparty as set out below:Risk weights Counterparty 0% Type (a) • The Government of Bahrain.• Bahrain public sector entities.• Government-owned (non-banking) GCC companies incorporated in Bahrain.• Central government and central banks of Group A countries.20% Type (b) • Banks incorporated in Bahrain or Group A countries andsecurities firms.• Banks incorporated in Group B countries (if the commitment has a residual life of 1 year or less).• Public sector entities in Group A countries.• Government-owned (non-banking) GCC companies incorporated outside Bahrain.100% Type (c) • Banks incorporated in Group B countries (if the commitment has a residual life of more than 1 year).• Central governments, central banks and public sector entities in Group B countries.• Government-owned companies incorporated in non-GCC countries.• Private sector persons and entities in Bahrain and abroad.October 07CA-3.4 CA-3.4 Treatment of derivatives contracts in the banking book
CA-3.4.1
The treatment of forwards,
swaps , purchasedoptions and similar derivative contracts needs special attention because banks are not exposed to credit risk for the full face value of their contracts, but only to the potential cost of replacing the cash flow (on contracts showing positive value) if thecounterparty defaults . The credit equivalent amounts (as referred to under Paragraph CA-3.4.13) will depend inter alia on the maturity of the contract and on the volatility of the rates and prices underlying that type of instrument.October 07CA-3.4.2
Instruments traded on exchanges may be excluded where they are subject to daily receipt and payment of cash variation margins.
October 07CA-3.4.3
Options purchasedover-the-counter are included with the same conversion factors as other instruments.October 07Interest rate contracts
CA-3.4.4
Interest rate contracts are defined to include single-currency interest rate
swaps , basisswaps , forward rate agreements, interest rate futures, interest rate options purchased and similar instruments.October 07Exchange rate contracts
CA-3.4.5
Exchange rate contracts include cross-currency interest rate
swaps , forward foreign exchange contracts, currency futures, currency options purchased and similar instruments.October 07CA-3.4.6
Exchange rate contracts with an original maturity of 14 calendar days or less may be excluded.
October 07Equity contracts
CA-3.4.7
Equity contracts include forwards,
swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts based on individual equities or on equity indices.October 07Gold contracts
CA-3.4.8
Gold contracts are treated the same as foreign exchange contracts for the purpose of calculating credit risk except that contracts with original maturity of 14 calendar days or less are included.
October 07CA-3.4.9
Precious metals other than gold receive a separate treatment (see Section BR-4.1) and include forwards,
swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts that are based on precious metals (e.g. silver, platinum, and palladium).October 07Other commodities
CA-3.4.10
Other
commodities are also treated separately (see Section BR-4.1) and include forwards,swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts based on energy contracts, agricultural contracts, base metals (e.g. aluminium, copper, and zinc), and any other non-precious metalcommodity contracts.October 07General guidance on treatment of derivatives contracts
CA-3.4.11
The following points should be noted for the treatment of certain
derivatives contracts:(a) For contracts with multiple exchange of principal, the add-on factors are to be multiplied by the number of remaining payments in the contracts.(i) For contracts that are structured to settle outstandingexposure following specified payment dates and where the terms are reset such that the market value of the contract is zero on these specified dates, the residual maturity would be set equal to the time until the next reset date.(ii) Forwards,swaps , purchased options and similar derivative contracts not covered in any of the above mentioned categories should be treated as 'othercommodities '.(iii) No potential future creditexposure (as referred to under Paragraph CA-3.4.12) would be calculated for single currency floating/floating interest rateswaps .October 07Calculation of weighted derivative exposures
CA-3.4.12
Banks should calculate their weighted
exposure under the above mentioned contracts according to the Current Exposure Method, which involves calculating the current replacement cost by marking contracts to market, thus capturing the currentexposure without any need for estimation, and then adding a factor (the 'add-on') to reflect the potential futureexposure over the remaining life of the contract.The 'add-on' factor table:
Residual maturity of contracts 1 year or less Over 1 year to 5 years Over 5 years Interest rate related contracts 0.000 0.005 0.015 Foreign exchange & gold contracts 0.010 0.050 0.075 Equity contracts 0.060 0.080 0.100 Precious metals (except gold) 0.070 0.070 0.070 Other commodities 0.120 0.120 0.150 October 07CA-3.4.13
In order to reflect
counterparty risk, the total credit equivalent amount, which results from the calculation in Paragraph CA-3.4.12 has to be broken down again according to type ofcounterparty , using the same classification into types (a), (b) and (c) given in Section CA-3.3. Finally, theexposure to each type ofcounterparty has to be weighted as 0%, 20% or 50% respectively, and the total weightedexposure calculated.October 07CA-4 CA-4 Interest rate risk - Standardised approach
CA-4.1 CA-4.1 Introduction
CA-4.1.1
This Chapter describes the standardised approach for the measurement of the interest rate risk in the bank's trading book, in order to determine the capital requirement for this risk. The interest rate
exposure captured includesexposure arising from interest-bearing and discounted financial instruments,derivatives which are based on the movement of interest rates, foreign exchange forwards, and interest rateexposure embedded inderivatives which are based on non-interest rate related instruments.October 07CA-4.1.2
For the guidance of the banks, and without being exhaustive, the following list includes financial instruments in the trading book to which interest rate risk capital requirements will apply, irrespective of whether or not the instruments carry coupons:
(a) Bonds/loan stocks, debentures etc.;(b) Non-convertible preference shares;(c) Convertiblesecurities such as preference shares and bonds, which are treated as debt instruments5;(d) Mortgage backedsecurities and other securitised assets6;(e)Certificates of Deposit ;(f) Treasury bills, local authority bills, banker's acceptances;(g) Commercial paper;(h) Euronotes, medium term notes, etc.;(i) Floating rate notes, FRCDs etc.;(j) Foreign exchange forward positions;(k)Derivatives based on the above instruments and interest rates; and(l) Interest rateexposure embedded in other financial instruments.
5See Section CA-5.1 for an explanation of the circumstances in which convertible
securities , should be treated as equity instruments. In other circumstances, they should be treated as debt instruments.6 Traded mortgage
securities and mortgage derivative products possess unique characteristics because of the risk of pre-payment. It is possible that including such products within the standardised methodology as if they were similar to other securitised assets may not capture all the risks of holding positions in them. Banks which have traded mortgagesecurities and mortgage derivative products should discuss their proposed treatment with the Central Bank and obtain the Central Bank's prior written approval for it.October 07CA-4.1.3
For instruments that deviate from the above structures, or could be considered complex, each bank should agree a written policy statement with the Central Bank about the intended treatment, on a case-by-case basis. In some circumstances, the treatment of an instrument may be uncertain, for example bonds whose coupon payments are linked to equity indices. The position risk of such instruments should be broken down into its components and allocated appropriately between the equity, interest rate and foreign exchange risk categories. Advice must be sought from the Central Bank in cases of doubt, particularly when a bank is trading an instrument for the first time.
October 07CA-4.1.4
A
security which is the subject of a repurchase orsecurities lending agreement will be treated as if it were still owned by the lender of thesecurity , i.e., it will be treated in the same manner as othersecurities positions.October 07CA-4.1.5
The minimum capital requirement is expressed in terms of two separately calculated charges, one applying to the 'specific risk' of each position, and the other to the interest rate risk in the portfolio, termed 'general market risk'. The aggregate capital requirement for interest rate risk is the sum of the general market interest rate risk capital requirements across currencies, and the specific risk capital requirements.
October 07CA-4.1.6
The specific risk capital requirement recognises that individual instruments may change in value for reasons other than shifts in the
yield curve of a given currency. The general risk capital requirement reflects the price change of these products caused by parallel and non-parallel shifts in theyield curve , as well as the difficulty of constructing perfect hedges.October 07CA-4.1.7
There is general market risk inherent in all interest rate risk positions. This may be accompanied by one or more out of specific interest rate risk,
counterparty risk, equity risk and foreign exchange risk, depending on the nature of the position. Banks should consider carefully which risks are generated by each individual position. It should be recognised that the identification of the risks will require the application of the appropriate level of technical skills and professional judgement.October 07CA-4.1.8
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of general and specific interest rate risks and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Central Bank for those models. The Central Bank's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in Chapter CA-9. Banks which do not use internal models should adopt the standardised approach to calculate the interest rate risk capital requirement, as set out in detail in this Chapter.
October 07CA-4.2 CA-4.2 Specific risk calculation
CA-4.2.1
The capital charge for specific risk is designed to protect against a movement in the price of an individual instrument, owing to factors related to the individual issuer.
October 07CA-4.2.2
In measuring the specific risk for interest rate related instruments, a bank may net, by value, long and short positions (including positions in
derivatives ) in the same debt instrument to generate the individual net position in that instrument. Instruments will be considered to be the same where the issuer is the same, they have an equivalent ranking in a liquidation, and the currency, the coupon and the maturity are the same.October 07CA-4.2.3
The specific risk capital requirement is determined by weighting the current market value of each individual net position, whether long or short, according to its allocation among the following five broad categories:
(a) Eligible central government debt instrument 0.00%(b) Qualifying items with residual maturity up to 6 months 0.25%(c) Qualifying items with residual maturity between 6 and 24 months 1.00%(d) Qualifying items with residual maturity exceeding 24 months 1.60%(e) Non-qualifying items 8.00%October 07CA-4.2.4
Eligible central 'government' debt instruments will include all forms of government paper, including bonds, treasury bills and other short-term instruments, but the Central Bank reserves the right to apply a specific risk weight to
securities issued by certain foreign governments, especially tosecurities denominated in a currency other than that of the issuing government.October 07CA-4.2.5
Governments eligible are those which are members of either the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
October 07CA-4.2.6
The 'qualifying' Category includes
securities issued by or fully guaranteed by public sector entities and multilateral development banks (refer to Appendix CA-2), plus othersecurities that are:(a) Rated investment grade by at least two internationally recognised credit rating agencies (to be agreed with the Central Bank); or(b) Deemed to be of comparable investment quality by the reporting bank, provided that the issuer is rated investment grade by at least two internationally recognised credit rating agencies (to be agreed with the Central Bank); or(c) Rated investment grade by one credit rating agency and not less than investment grade by any internationally recognised credit rating agencies (to be agreed with the Central Bank); or(d) Unrated (subject to the approval of the Central Bank), but deemed to be of comparable investment quality by the reporting bank and where the issuer hassecurities listed on a recognised stock exchange, may also be included.October 07CA-4.3 CA-4.3 General market risk calculation
CA-4.3.1
The capital requirements for general market risk are designed to capture the risk of loss arising from changes in market interest rates, i.e. the risk of parallel and non-parallel shifts in the
yield curve . A choice between two principal methods of measuring the general market risk is permitted, a 'maturity' method and a 'duration' method. In each method, the capital charge is the sum of the following four components:(a) The net short or long position in the whole trading book;(b) A small proportion of the matched positions in each time-band (the 'vertical disallowance');(c) A larger proportion of the matched positions across different time-bands (the 'horizontal disallowance'); and(d) A net charge for positions in options, where appropriate (see Chapter CA-8).October 07CA-4.3.2
Separate maturity ladders should be used for each currency and capital charges should be calculated for each currency separately and then summed, by applying the prevailing foreign exchange spot rates, with no off-setting between positions of opposite sign.
October 07CA-4.3.3
In the case of those currencies in which the value and volume of business is insignificant, separate maturity ladders for each currency are not required. Instead, the bank may construct a single maturity ladder and slot, within each appropriate time-band, the net long or short position for each currency. However, these individual net positions are to be summed within each time-band, irrespective of whether they are long or short positions, to arrive at the gross position figure for the time-band.
October 07CA-4.3.4
A combination of the two methods (referred to under Paragraph CA-4.3.1) is not permitted. Any exceptions to this rule will require the prior written approval of the Central Bank. It is expected that such approval will only be given in cases where a bank clearly demonstrates to the Central Bank, the difficulty in applying, to a definite Category of trading instruments, the method otherwise chosen by the bank as the normal method. It is further expected that the Central Bank may, in future years, consider recognising the duration method as the approved method, and the use of the maturity method may be discontinued.
October 07CA-4.4 CA-4.4 Maturity method
CA-4.4.1
A worked example of the maturity method is included in Appendix CA-3. The various time-bands and their risk weights, relevant to the maturity method, are illustrated in Paragraph CA-4.4.2(a) below.
October 07CA-4.4.2
The steps in the calculation of the general market risk for interest rate positions, under this method, are set out below:
(a) Individual long or short positions in interest-rate related instruments, includingderivatives , are slotted into a maturity ladder comprising thirteen time-bands (or fifteen time-bands in the case of zero-coupon and deep-discount instruments, defined as those with a coupon of less than 3%), on the following basis:(i) Fixed rate instruments are allocated according to their residual term to maturity (irrespective of embedded puts and calls), and whether their coupon is below 3%;(ii) Floating rate instruments are allocated according to the residual term to the next repricing date;(iii) Positions inderivatives , and all positions in repos, reverse repos and similar products are decomposed into their components within each time band. Derivative instruments are covered in greater detail in Sections CA-4.6 to CA-4.9;(iv) Opposite positions of the same amount in the same issues (but not different issues by the same issuer), whether actual or notional, can be omitted from the interest rate maturity framework, as well as closely matchedswaps , forwards, futures and FRAs which meet the conditions set out in Section CA-4.8. In other words, these positions are netted within their relevant time-bands; and(v) The Central Bank's advice must be sought on the treatment of instruments that deviate from the above structures, or which may be considered sufficiently complex to warrant the Central Bank's attention.Maturity method: time-bands and risk weightsCoupon > 3% Coupon < 3% Risk weight Zone 1 1 month or less 1 month or less 0.00% 1 to 3 months 1 to 3 months 0.20% 3 to 6 months 3 to 6 months 0.40% 6 to 12 months 6 to 12 months 0.70% Zone 2 1 to 2 years 1 to 1.9 years 1.25% 2 to 3 years 1.9 to 2.8 years 1.75% 3 to 4 years 2.8 to 3.6 years 2.25% Zone 3 4 to 5 years 3.6 to 4.3 years 2.75% 5 to 7 years 4.3 to 5.7 years 3.25% 7 to 10 years 5.7 to 7.3 years 3.75% 10 to 15 years 7.3 to 9.3 years 4.50% 15 to 20 years 9.3 to 10.6 years 5.25% > 20 years 10.6 to 12 years 6.00% 12 to 20 years 8.00% >> 20 years 12.50% (b) The market values of the individual long and short net positions in each maturity band are multiplied by the respective risk weighting factors given in Paragraph CA-4.4.2(a) above.(c) Matching of positions within each maturity band (i.e. vertical matching) is done as follows:• Where a maturity band has both weighted long and short positions, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a band) is called the unmatched weighted position for that band.(d) Matching of positions, across maturity bands, within each zone (i.e. horizontal matching - level 1), is done as follows:(e) Where a zone has both unmatched weighted long and short positions for various bands, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position for that zone. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a zone) is called the unmatched weighted position for that zone.(f) Matching of positions, across zones (i.e. horizontal matching - level 2), is done as follows:(i) The unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be offset against the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 2. The extent to which the unmatched weighted positions in zones 1 and 2 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 2.(ii) After step (i) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 2 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 2 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 2 and 3.
The calculations in steps (i) and (ii) above may be carried out in reverse order (i.e. zones 2 and 3, followed by zones 1 and 2).(iii) After steps (i) and (ii) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 1 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 3.(g) Any residual unmatched weighted positions, following the matching within and between maturity bands and zones as described above, will be summed.(h) The general interest rate risk capital requirement is the sum of:(i) Matched weighted positions in all maturity bands × 10%(ii) Matched weighted positions in zone 1 × 40%(iii) Matched weighted positions in zone 2 × 30%(iv) Matched weighted positions in zone 3 × 50%(v) Matched weighted positions between zones 1&2 × 40%(vi) Matched weighted positions between zones 2&3 × 40%(vii) Matched weighted positions between zones 1&3 × 100%(viii) Residual unmatched weighted positions × 100%
Item (i) is referred to as the vertical disallowance, items (ii) through (iv) as the first set of horizontal disallowances, and items (v) through (vii) as the second set of horizontal disallowances.October 07CA-4.5 CA-4.5 Duration method
CA-4.5.1
The duration method is an alternative approach to measuring the
exposure to parallel and non-parallel shifts in theyield curve , and recognises the use of duration as an indicator of the sensitivity of individual positions to changes in market yields. Under this method, banks may use a duration-based system for determining their general interest rate risk capital requirements for traded debt instruments and other sources of interest rateexposures includingderivatives . A worked example of the duration method is included in Appendix CA-4. The various time-bands and assumed changes in yield, relevant to the duration method, are illustrated below.October 07Duration method: time-bands and assumed changes in yield
Time-band Assumed change in yield Zone 1 1 month or less 1.00 1 to 3 months 1.00 3 to 6 months 1.00 6 to 12 months 1.00 Zone 2 1 to 1.9 years 0.90 1.9 to 2.8 years 0.80 2.8 to 3.6 years 0.75 Zone 3 3.6 to 4.3 years 0.75 4.3 to 5.7 years 0.70 5.7 to 7.3 years 0.65 7.3 to 9.3 years 0.60 9.3 to 10.6 years 0.60 10.6 to 12 years 0.60 12 to 20 years 0.60 > 20 years 0.60 October 07CA-4.5.2
Banks should notify the Central Bank of the circumstances in which they elect to use this method. Once chosen, the duration method must be consistently applied, in accordance with the requirements of Section CA-4.3.
October 07CA-4.5.3
Where a bank has chosen to use the duration method, it is possible that it will not be suitable for certain instruments. In such cases, the bank should seek the advice of the Central Bank or obtain approval for application of the maturity method to the specific Category(ies) of instruments, in accordance with the provisions of Section CA-4.3.
October 07CA-4.5.4
The steps in the calculation of the general market risk for interest rate positions, under this method, are set out below:
(a) The bank will determine the Yield-to-Maturity (YTM) for each individual net position in fixed rate and floating rate instruments, based on the current market value. The basis of arriving at individual net positions is explained in Section CA-4.4 above. The YTM for fixed rate instruments is determined without any regard to whether the instrument is coupon bearing, or whether the instrument has any embedded options. In all cases, YTM for fixed rate instruments is calculated with reference to the final maturity date and, for floating rate instruments, with reference to the next repricing date.(b) The bank will calculate, for each debt instrument, the modified duration (M) on the basis of the following formula:
M = D/(1+r) where, Sigma m t = 1 t × C/(1+r) t D (duration) = Sigma m t = 1 C/(1+r) t
r = YTM % per annum expressed as a decimal
C = Cash flow at time t
t = time at which cash flows occur, in years
m = time to maturity, in years(c) Individual net positions, at current market value, are allocated to the time-bands illustrated in Paragraph CA-4.5.1, based on their modified duration.(d) The bank will then calculate the modified duration-weighted position for each individual net position by multiplying its current market value by the modified duration and the assumed change in yield.(e) Matching of positions within each time band (i.e. vertical matching) is done as follows:• Where a time band has both weighted long and short positions, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a band) is called the unmatched weighted position for that band.(f) Matching of positions, across time bands, within each zone (i.e. horizontal matching - level 1), is done as follows:• Where a zone has both unmatched weighted long and short positions for various bands, the extent to which the one offsets the other is called the matched weighted position for that zone. The remainder (i.e. the excess of the weighted long positions over the weighted short positions, or vice versa, within a zone) is called the unmatched weighted position for that zone.(g) Matching of positions, across zones (i.e. horizontal matching - level 2), is done as follows:(i) The unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be offset against the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 2. The extent to which the unmatched weighted positions in zones 1 and 2 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 2.(ii) After step (i) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 2 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 2 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 2 and 3.
The calculations in steps (i) and (ii) above may be carried out in reverse order (i.e. zones 2 and 3, followed by zones 1 and 2).(iii) After steps (a) and (b) above, any residual unmatched weighted long or short position in zone 1 may be matched by offsetting the unmatched weighted short or long position in zone 3. The extent to which the unmatched positions in zones 1 and 3 are offsetting is described as the matched weighted position between zones 1 and 3.(h) Any residual unmatched weighted positions, following the matching within and between maturity bands and zones as described above, will be summed.(i) The general interest rate risk capital requirement is the sum of:(i) Matched weighted positions in all maturity bands × 5%(ii) Matched weighted positions in zone 1 × 40%(iii) Matched weighted positions in zone 2 × 30%(iv) Matched weighted positions in zone 3 × 30%(v) Matched weighted positions between zones 1 & 2 × 40%(vi) Matched weighted positions between zones 2 & 3 × 40%(vii) Matched weighted positions between zones 1 & 3 × 100%(viii) Residual unmatched weighted positions × 100%
Item (i) is referred to as the vertical disallowance, items (ii) through (iv) as the first set of horizontal disallowances, and items (v) through (vii) as the second set of horizontal disallowances.October 07CA-4.6 CA-4.6 Derivatives
CA-4.6.1
Banks which propose to use internal models to measure the interest rate risk inherent in
derivatives will seek the prior written approval of the Central Bank for using those models. The use of internal models to measure market risk, and the Central Bank's rules applicable to them, are discussed in detail in Chapter CA-9.October 07CA-4.6.2
Where a bank, with the prior written approval of the Central Bank, uses an interest rate sensitivity model, the output of that model is used, by the duration method, to calculate the general market risk as described in Section CA-4.5.
October 07CA-4.6.3
Where a bank does not propose to use models, it must use the techniques described in the following Paragraphs, for measuring the market risk on interest rate
derivatives . The measurement system should include all interest ratederivatives and off-balance-sheet instruments in the trading book which react to changes in interest rates (e.g. forward rate agreements, other forward contracts, bond futures, interest rate and cross-currencyswaps , options and forward foreign exchange contracts). Where a bank has obtained the approval of the Central Bank for the use of non-interest ratederivatives models, the embedded interest rateexposures should be incorporated in the standardised measurement framework described in Sections CA-4.7 to CA-4.9.October 07CA-4.6.4
Derivative positions will attract specific risk only when they are based on an underlying instrument or
security . For instance, where the underlyingexposure is an interest rateexposure , as in aswap based upon interbank rates, there will be no specific risk, but onlycounterparty risk. A similar treatment applies to FRAs, forward foreign exchange contracts and interest rate futures. However, for aswap based on a bond yield, or a futures contract based on a debtsecurity or an index representing a basket of debtsecurities , the credit risk of the issuer of the underlying bond will generate a specific risk capital requirement. Future cash flows derived from positions inderivatives will generatecounterparty risk requirements related to thecounterparty in the trade, in addition to position risk requirements (specific and general market risk) related to the underlyingsecurity .October 07CA-4.7 CA-4.7 Calculation of derivative positions
CA-4.7.1
The
derivatives should be converted to positions in the relevant underlying and become subject to specific and general market risk charges as described in Sections CA-4.2 and CA-4.3, respectively. For the purpose of calculation by the standard formulae, the amounts reported are the market values of the principal amounts of the underlying or of the notional underlying. For instruments where the apparent notional amount differs from the effective notional amount, banks should use the latter.October 07CA-4.7.2
The remaining Paragraphs in this Section include the guidelines for the calculation of positions in different categories of interest rate
derivatives . Banks which need further assistance in the calculation, particularly in relation to complex instruments, should contact the Central Bank in writing.October 07Forward foreign exchange contracts
CA-4.7.3
A forward foreign exchange position is decomposed into legs representing the paying and receiving currencies. Each of the legs is treated as if it were a zero coupon bond, with zero specific risk, in the relevant currency and included in the measurement framework as follows:
(a) If the maturity method is used, each leg is included at the notional amount.(b) If the duration method is used, each leg is included at the present value of the notional zero coupon bond.October 07Deposit futures and FRAs
CA-4.7.4
Deposit futures, forward rate agreements and other instruments where the underlying is a money market
exposure will be split into two legs as follows:(a) The first leg will represent the time to expiry of the futures contract, or settlement date of the FRA as the case may be.(b) The second leg will represent the time to expiry of the underlying instrument.(c) Each leg will be treated as a zero coupon bond with zero specific risk.(d) For deposit futures, the size of each leg is the notional amount of the underlying money marketexposure . For FRAs, the size of each leg is the notional amount of the underlying money marketexposure discounted to present value, although in the maturity method, the notional amount may be used without discounting.
For example, under the maturity method, a single 3-month Euro$ 1,000,000 deposit futures contract expiring in 3 months' time will have one leg of $ 1,000,000 representing the 8 months to contract expiry, and another leg of $ 1,000,000 in the 11 months' time-band representing the time to expiry of thedeposit underlying the futures contract.October 07Bonds futures and forwards bond transactions
CA-4.7.5
Bond futures, forward bond transactions and the forward leg of repos, reverse repos and other similar transactions will use the two-legged approach. A forward bond transaction is one where the settlement is for a period other than the prevailing norm for the market.
(a) The first leg is a zero coupon bond with zero specific risk. Its maturity is the time to expiry of the futures or forward contract. Its size is the cash flow on maturity discounted to present value, although in the maturity method, the cash flow on maturity may be used without discounting.(b) The second leg is the underlying bond. Its maturity is that of the underlying bond for fixed rate bonds, or the time to the next reset for floating rate bonds. Its size is as set out in (c) and (d) below.(c) For forward bond transactions, the underlying bond and amount is used at the present spot price.(d) For bond futures, the principal amounts for each of the two legs is reckoned as the futures price times the notional underlying bond amount.(e) Where a range of deliverable instruments may be delivered to fulfil a futures contract (at theoption of the 'short'), then the following rules are used to determine the principal amount, taking account of any conversion factors defined by the exchange:(i) The 'long' may use one of the deliverable bonds, or the notional bond on which the contract is based, as the underlying instrument, but this notional long leg may not be offset against a short cash position in the same bond.(ii) The 'short' may treat the notional underlying bond as if it were one of the deliverable bonds, and it may be offset against a short cash position in the same bond.(f) For futures contracts based on a corporate bond index, the positions will be included at the market value of the notional underlying portfolio ofsecurities .(g) Arepo (or sell-buy or stock lending) involving exchange of asecurity for cash should be represented as a cash borrowing - i.e. a short position in a government bond with maturity equal to therepo and coupon equal to therepo rate. A reverserepo (or buy-sell or stock borrowing) should be represented as a cash loan - i.e. a long position in a government bond with maturity equal to the reverserepo and coupon equal to therepo rate. These positions are referred to as 'cash legs'.(h) It should be noted that, where asecurity owned by the bank (and included in its calculation of market risk) isrepo 'd, it continues to contribute to the bank's interest rate or equity position risk calculation.October 07Swaps
CA-4.7.6
Swaps are treated as two notional positions in governmentsecurities with the relevant maturities.(a) Interest rateswaps will be decomposed into two legs, and each leg will be allocated to the maturity band equating to the time remaining to repricing or maturity. For example, an interest rateswap in which a bank is receiving floating rate interest and paying fixed is treated as a long position in a floating rate instrument of maturity equivalent to the period until the next interest fixing and a short position in a fixed rate instrument of maturity equivalent to the residual life of theswap .(b) Forswaps that pay or receive a fixed or floating interest rate against some other reference price, e.g. a stock index, the interest rate component should be slotted into the appropriate repricing or maturity Category, with the equity component being included in the equity risk measurement framework as described in Chapter CA-5.(c) For cross currencyswaps , the separate legs are included in the interest rate risk measurement for the currencies concerned, as having a fixed/floating leg in each currency. Alternatively, the two parts of a currencyswap transaction are split into forward foreign exchange contracts and treated accordingly.(d) Where aswap has a deferred start, and one or both legs have been fixed, then the fixed leg(s) will be sub-divided into the time to the commencement of the leg and the actualswap leg with fixed or floating rate. Aswap is deemed to have a deferred start when the commencement of the interest rate calculation periods is more than two business days from the transaction date, and one or both legs have been fixed at the time of the commitment. However, when aswap has a deferred start and neither leg has been fixed, there is no interest rateexposure , albeit there will becounterparty exposure .(e) Where aswap has a different structure from those discussed above, it may be necessary to adjust the underlying notional principal amount, or the notional maturity of one or both legs of the transaction.October 07CA-4.7.7
Banks with large
swap books may use alternative formulae for theseswaps to calculate the positions to be included in the maturity or duration ladder. One method would be to first convert the cash flows required by theswap into their present values. For this purpose, each cash flow should be discounted using the zero coupon yields, and a single net figure for the present value of the cash flows entered into the appropriate time-band using procedures that apply to zero or low coupon (less than 3%) instruments. An alternative method would be to calculate the sensitivity of the net present value implied by the change in yield used in the duration method (as set out in Section CA-4.5), and allocate these sensitivities into the appropriate time-bands.October 07CA-4.7.8
Banks which propose to use the approaches described in Paragraph CA-4.7.7, or any other similar alternative formulae, should obtain the prior written approval of the Central Bank. The Central Bank will consider the following factors before approving any alternative methods for calculating the
swap positions:(a) Whether the systems proposed to be used are accurate;(b) Whether the positions calculated fully reflect the sensitivity of the cash flows to interest rate changes and are entered into the appropriate time-bands; and(c) Whether the positions are denominated in the same currency.October 07CA-4.8 CA-4.8 Netting of derivative positions
Permissible offsetting of fully matched positions for both specific and general market risk
CA-4.8.1
Banks may exclude from the interest rate risk calculation, altogether, the long and short positions (both actual and notional) in identical instruments with exactly the same issuer, coupon, currency and maturity. A matched position in a future or a forward and its corresponding underlying may also be fully offset, albeit the leg representing the time to expiry of the future is included in the calculation.
October 07CA-4.8.2
When the future or the forward comprises a range of deliverable instruments, offsetting of positions in the futures or forward contract and its underlying is only permitted in cases where there is a readily identifiable underlying
security which is most profitable for the trader with a short position to deliver. The price of thissecurity , sometimes called the 'cheapest-to-deliver', and the price of the future or forward contract should, in such cases, move in close alignment. No offsetting will be allowed between positions in different currencies. The separate legs of cross-currencyswaps or forward foreign exchange contracts are treated as notional positions in the relevant instruments and included in the appropriate calculation for each currency.October 07Permissible offsetting of closely matched positions for general market risk only
CA-4.8.3
For the purpose of calculation of the general market risk, in addition to the permissible offsetting of fully matched positions as described in Paragraph CA-4.8.1 above, opposite positions giving rise to interest rate
exposure can be offset if they relate to the same underlying instruments, are of the same nominal value and are denominated in the same currency and, in addition, fulfil the following conditions:(a) For futures:
Offsetting positions in the notional or underlying instruments to which the futures contract relates should be for identical products and mature within seven days of each other.(b) Forswaps and FRAs:
The reference rate (for floating rate positions) must be identical and the coupons must be within 15 basis points of each other.(c) Forswaps , FRAs and forwards:
The next interest fixing date or, for fixed coupon positions or forwards, the residual maturity must correspond within the following limits:• less than one month: same day;• between one month and one year: within 7 days;• over one year: within 30 days.October 07CA-4.9 CA-4.9 Calculation of capital charge for derivatives
CA-4.9.1
After calculating the
derivatives positions, taking account of the permissible offsetting of matched positions, as explained in Section CA-4.8, the capital charges for specific and general market risk for interest ratederivatives are calculated in the same manner as for cash positions, as described earlier in this Chapter.Summary of treatment of interest rate derivative
Instrument Specific risk charge* General market risk charge Exchange-traded futures - Government** debt security No Yes, as two positions - Corporate debt security Yes Yes, as two positions - Index on interest rates (e.g. LIBOR) No Yes, as two positions - Index on basket of debt securities Yes Yes, as two positions OTC forwards - Government** debt security No Yes, as two positions - Corporate debt security Yes Yes, as two positions - Index on interest rates No Yes, as two positions FRAs No Yes, as two positions Swaps - Based on interbank rates No Yes, as two positions - Based on Government** bond yields No Yes, as two positions - Based on corporate bond yields Yes Yes, as two positions Forward foreign exchange No Yes, as one position in each currency Options - Government** debt security No Either (a) or (b) as below (see Chapter CA-8 for a detailed description): • Corporate debt security• Index on interest rates• FRAs, swapsYes
No
No(a) Carve out together with the associated hedging positions, and use:• simplified approach; or• scenario analysis; or• internal models (see Chapter CA-9).(b) General market risk charge according to the delta-plus method (gamma and vega should receive separate capital charges).*This is the specific risk charge relating to the issuer of the instrument. Under the credit risk rules, there remains a separate capital charge for the counterparty risk.
**As defined in Section CA-4.2.October 07CA-5 CA-5 Equity position risk - Standardised approach
CA-5.1 CA-5.1 Introduction
CA-5.1.1
This Chapter sets out the minimum capital requirements to cover the risk of holding or taking positions in equities in the bank's trading book.
October 07CA-5.1.2
For the guidance of the banks, and without being exhaustive, the following list includes financial instruments in the trading book, including forward positions, to which equity position risk capital requirements will apply:
(a) Common stocks, whether voting or non-voting;(b) Depository receipts (which should be included in the measurement framework in terms of the underlying shares);(c) Convertible preferencesecurities (non-convertible preferencesecurities are treated as bonds);(d) Convertible debtsecurities which convert into equity instruments and are, therefore, treated as equities (see Paragraph CA-5.1.3 below);(e) Commitments to buy or sell equitysecurities ;(f)Derivatives based on the above instruments.October 07CA-5.1.3
Convertible debt
securities must be treated as equities where:(a) The first date at which the conversion may take place is less than three months ahead, or the next such date (where the first date has passed) is less than a year ahead; and(b) The convertible is trading at a premium of less than 10%, where the premium is defined as the current marked-to-market value of the convertible less the marked-to-market value of the underlying equity, expressed as a percentage of the latter.
In other instances, convertibles should be treated as either equity or debtsecurities , based reasonably on their market behaviour.October 07CA-5.1.4
For instruments that deviate from the structures described in Paragraphs CA-5.1.2 and CA-5.1.3 above, or which could be considered complex, each bank should agree a written policy statement with the Central Bank about the intended treatment, on a case-by-case basis. In some circumstances, the treatment of an instrument may be uncertain, for example bonds whose coupon payments are linked to equity indices. The position risk of such instruments should be broken down into its components and allocated appropriately between the equity, interest rate and foreign exchange risk categories. Advice must be sought from the Central Bank in cases of doubt, particularly when a bank is trading an instrument for the first time.
October 07CA-5.1.5
Where equities are part of a forward contract, a future or an
option (i.e. a quantity of equities to be received or delivered), any interest rate or foreign currencyexposure from the other leg of the contract should be included in the measurement framework as described in Chapters CA-4 and CA-6, respectively.October 07CA-5.1.6
As with interest rate related instruments, the minimum capital requirement for equities is expressed in terms of two separately calculated charges, one applying to the 'specific risk' of holding a long or short position in an individual equity, and the other to the 'general market risk' of holding a long or short position in the market as a whole.
October 07CA-5.1.7
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of general and specific equity risk and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Central Bank for those models. The Central Bank's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in Chapter CA-9. Banks which do not use internal models should adopt the standardised approach to calculate the equity position risk capital requirement, as set out in detail in this Chapter.
October 07CA-5.2 CA-5.2 Calculation of equity positions
CA-5.2.1
A bank may net long and short positions in the same equity instrument, arising either directly or through
derivatives , to generate the individual net position in that instrument. For example, a future in a given equity may be offset against an opposite cash position in the same equity, albeit the interest rate risk arising out of the future should be calculated separately in accordance with the rules set out in Chapter CA-4.October 07CA-5.2.2
A bank may net long and short positions in one
tranche of an equity instrument against anothertranche only where the relevanttranches :(a) Rank pari passu in all respects; and(b) Become fungible within 180 days, and thereafter the equity instruments of onetranche can be delivered in settlement of the othertranche .October 07CA-5.2.3
Positions in depository receipts may only be netted against positions in the underlying stock if the stock is freely deliverable against the depository receipt. If a bank takes a position in depository receipts against an opposite position in the underlying equity in different markets (i.e. arbitrage), it may offset the position provided that any costs on conversion are fully taken into account. Furthermore, the foreign exchange risk arising out of these positions should be included in the measurement framework as set out in Chapter CA-6.
October 07CA-5.2.4
More detailed guidance on the treatment of equity
derivatives is set out in Section CA-5.October 07CA-5.2.5
Equity positions, arising either directly or through
derivatives , should be allocated to the country in which each equity is listed. Where an equity is listed in more than one country, the bank should discuss the appropriate country allocation with the Central Bank.October 07CA-5.3 CA-5.3 Specific risk calculation
CA-5.3.1
Specific risk is defined as the bank's gross equity positions (i.e. the sum of all long equity positions and of all short equity positions), and is calculated for each country or equity market. For each national market in which the bank holds equities, it should sum the market values of its individual net positions as determined in accordance with Section CA-5.2, irrespective of whether they are long or short positions, to produce the overall gross equity position for that market.
October 07CA-5.3.2
The capital charge for specific risk is 8%, unless the portfolio is both liquid and well-diversified, in which case the capital charge will be 4%. To qualify for the reduced 4% capital charge, the following requirements need to be met:
(a) The portfolio should be listed on a recognised stock exchange;(b) No individual equity position shall comprise more than 10% of the gross value of the country portfolio; and(c) The total value of the equity positions which individually comprise between 5% and 10% of the gross value of the country portfolio, shall not exceed 50% of the gross value of the country portfolio.October 07CA-5.4 CA-5.4 General risk calculation
CA-5.4.1
The general market risk is the difference between the sum of the long positions and the sum of the short positions (i.e. the overall net position) in each national equity market. In other words, to calculate the general market risk, the bank should sum the market value of its individual net positions for each national market, as determined in accordance with Section CA-5.2, taking into account whether the positions are long or short.
October 07CA-5.4.2
The general market equity risk measure is 8% of the overall net position in each national market.
October 07CA-5.5 CA-5.5 Equity derivatives
CA-5.5.1
For the purpose of calculating the specific and general market risk by the standardised approach, equity derivative positions should be converted into notional underlying equity positions, whether long or short. All equity
derivatives and off-balance-sheet positions which are affected by changes in equity prices should be included in the measurement framework. This includes futures andswaps on both individual equities and on stock indices.October 07CA-5.5.2
The following guidelines will apply to the calculation of positions in different categories of equity
derivatives . Banks which need further assistance in the calculation, particularly in relation to complex instruments, should contact the Central Bank.(a) Futures and forward contracts relating to individual equities should, in principle, be included in the calculation at current market prices.(b) Futures relating to stock indices should be included in the calculation, at the marked-to-market value of the notional underlying equity portfolio, i.e. as a single position based on the sum of the current market values of the underlying instruments.(c) Equityswaps are treated as two notional positions. For example, an equityswap in which a bank is receiving an amount based on the change in value of one particular equity or stock index, and paying a different index is treated as a long position in the former and a short position in the latter. Where one of theswap legs involves receiving/paying a fixed or floating interest rate, thatexposure should be slotted into the appropriate time-band for interest rate related instruments as set out in Chapter CA-4. The stock index leg should be covered by the equity treatment as set out in this Chapter.(d) Equity options and stock index options are either 'carved out' together with the associated underlying instruments, or are incorporated in the general market risk measurement framework, described in this Chapter, based on the delta-plus method. The treatment of options, being a complex issue, is dealt with in detail in Chapter CA-8.October 07CA-5.5.3
A summary of the treatment of equity
derivatives is set out in Paragraph CA-5.5.8.October 07Specific risk on positions in equity indices
CA-5.5.4
Positions in highly liquid equity indices whether they arise directly or through
derivatives , attract a 2% capital charge in addition to the general market risk, to cover factors such as execution risk.October 07CA-5.5.5
For positions in equity indices not regarded as highly liquid, the specific risk capital charge is the highest specific risk charge that would apply to any of its components, as set out in Section CA-5.3.
October 07CA-5.5.6
In the case of the futures-related arbitrage strategies set out below, the specific risk capital charge described above may be applied to only one index with the opposite position exempt from a specific risk capital charge. The strategies are as follows:
(a) Where a bank takes an opposite position in exactly the same index, at different dates or in different market centres;(b) Where a bank takes opposite positions in contracts at the same date in different but similar indices, provided the two indices contain at least 90% common components.October 07CA-5.5.7
Where a bank engages in a deliberate arbitrage strategy, in which a futures contract on a broad-based index matches a basket of stocks, it will be allowed to carve out both positions from the standardised methodology on the following conditions:
(a) The trade has been deliberately entered into, and separately controlled; and(b) The composition of the basket of stocks represents at least 90% of the index when broken down into its notional components.
In such a case, the minimum capital requirement is limited to 4% (i.e. 2% of the gross value of the positions on each side) to reflect divergence and execution risks. This applies even if all of the stocks comprising the index are held in identical proportions. Any excess value of the stocks comprising the basket over the value of the futures contract or vice versa is treated as an open long or short position.
October 07Counterparty risk
CA-5.5.8
Derivative positions may also generate
counterparty riskexposure related to thecounterparty in the trade, in addition to position risk requirements (specific and general) related to the underlying instrument, e.g.counterparty risk related toOTC trades through margin payments, fees payable or settlementexposures . The credit risk capital requirements will apply to suchcounterparty riskexposure .Summary of treatment of equity derivatives
Instrument Specific risk charge* General market risk charge Exchange-traded or OTC futures - Individual equity Yes Yes, as underlying - Index Yes (see Section CA 5.5) Yes, as underlying Options • Individual equity• IndexYes
YesEither (a) or (b) as below (Chapter CA-8 for a detailed description):
(a) Carve out together with the associated hedging positions, and use:• simplified approach; or• scenario analysis; or• internal models (Chapter CA-9).(b) General market risk charge according to the delta-plus method (gamma and vega should receive separate capital charges).* This is the specific risk charge relating to the issuer of the instrument. Under the credit risk rules, there remains a separate capital charge for the counterparty risk. October 07CA-6 CA-6 Foreign exchange risk - Standardised approach
CA-6.1 CA-6.1 Introduction
CA-6.1.1
A bank which holds net open positions (whether long or short) in foreign currencies is exposed to the risk that exchange rates may move against it. The open positions may be either trading positions or, simply,
exposures caused by the bank's overall assets and liabilities.October 07CA-6.1.2
This Chapter describes the standardised method for calculation of the bank's foreign exchange risk, and the capital required against that risk. The measurement of the foreign exchange risk involves, as a first step, the calculation of the net open position in each individual currency including gold7and, as a second step, the measurement of the risks inherent in the bank's mix of long and short positions in different currencies.
7 Positions in gold should be treated as if they were foreign currency positions, rather than as commodity positions, because the volatility of gold is more in line with that of foreign currencies and most banks manage it in similar manner to foreign currencies.
October 07CA-6.1.3
The open positions and the capital requirements are calculated with reference to the entire business, i.e. the banking and trading books combined.
October 07CA-6.1.4
The open positions are calculated with reference to the bank's base currency, which will be either Bahrain Dinars or United States dollars.
October 07CA-6.1.5
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of their foreign exchange risk and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Central Bank for those models. The Central Bank's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in Chapter CA-9. Banks which do not use internal models should adopt the standardised approach, as set out in detail in this Chapter.
October 07CA-6.1.6
In addition to foreign exchange risk, positions in foreign currencies may be subject to interest rate risk and credit risk which should be treated separately.
October 07CA-6.2 CA-6.2 De minimis exemptions
CA-6.2.1
A bank doing negligible business in foreign currencies and which does not take foreign exchange positions for its own account may, at the discretion of the Central Bank evidenced by the Central Bank's prior written approval, be exempted from calculating the capital requirements on these positions. The Central Bank is likely to be guided by the following criteria in deciding to grant exemption to any bank:
(a) The bank's holdings or taking of positions in foreign currencies, including gold, defined as the greater of the sum of the gross long positions and the sum of the gross short positions in all foreign currencies and gold, does not exceed 100% of its eligible capital; and(b) The bank's overall net open position, as defined in Paragraph CA-6.3.1, does not exceed 2% of its eligible capital as defined in Chapter CA-2.October 07CA-6.2.2
The criteria listed in Paragraph CA-6.2.1 above are only intended to be guidelines, and a bank will not automatically qualify for exemptions upon meeting them. The Central Bank may also, in its discretion, fix a minimum capital requirement for a bank which is exempted from calculating its foreign exchange risk capital requirement, to cover the risks inherent in its foreign currency business.
October 07CA-6.2.3
The Central Bank may, at a future date, revoke an exemption previously granted to a bank, if the Central Bank is convinced that the conditions on which the exemption was granted no longer exist.
October 07CA-6.3 CA-6.3 Calculation of net open positions
CA-6.3.1
A bank's
exposure to foreign exchange risk in any currency is its net open position in that currency, which is calculated by summing the following items:(a) The net spot position in the currency (i.e. all asset items less all liability items, including accrued interest, other income and expenses, denominated in the currency in question, assets are included gross of provisions for bad and doubtful debts, except in cases where the provisions are maintained in the same currency as the underlying assets);(b) The net forward position in the currency (i.e. all amounts to be received less all amounts to be paid under forward foreign exchange contracts, in the concerned currency, including currency futures and the principal on currencyswaps not included in the spot position);(c) Guarantees and similar off-balance-sheet contingent items that are certain to be called and are likely to be irrecoverable where the provisions, if any, are not maintained in the same currency;(d) Net future income/expenses not yet accrued but already fully hedged by forward foreign exchange contracts may be included provided that such anticipatoryhedging is part of the bank's formal written policy and the items are included on a consistent basis;(e) Profits (i.e. the net value of income and expense accounts) held in the currency in question;(f) Specific provisions held in the currency in question where the underlying asset is in a different currency, net of assets held in the currency in question where a specific provision is held in a different currency; and(g) The net delta-based equivalent of the total book of foreign currency options (subject to a separately calculated capital charge for gamma and vega as described in Chapter CA-8, alternatively, options and their associated underlying positions are dealt with by one of the other methods described in Chapter CA-8).All assets and liabilities, as described above, should be included at closing mid-market spot exchange rates. Marked-to-market items should be included on the basis of the current market value of the positions. However, banks which base their normal management accounting on net present values are expected to use the net present values of each position, discounted using current interest rates and valued at current spot rates, for measuring their forward currency and gold positions.
October 07CA-6.3.2
Net positions in composite currencies, such as the SDR, may either be broken down into the component currencies according to the quotas in force and included in the net open position calculations for the individual currencies, or treated as a separate currency. In any case, the mechanism for treating composite currencies should be consistently applied.
October 07CA-6.3.3
For calculating the net open position in gold, the bank will first express the net position (spot plus forward) in terms of the standard unit of measurement (i.e. ounces or grams) and then convert it at the current spot rate into the base currency.
October 07CA-6.3.4
Forward currency and gold positions should be valued at current spot market exchange rates. Using forward exchange rates is inappropriate as it will result in the measured positions reflecting current interest rate differentials, to some extent.
October 07CA-6.3.5
Where gold is part of a forward contract (i.e. quantity of gold to be received or to be delivered), any interest rate or foreign currency
exposure from the other leg of the contract should be reported as set out in Chapter CA-4 or Section CA-6.1 above, respectively.October 07Structural positions
CA-6.3.6
Positions of a structural, i.e. non-dealing, nature as set out below, may be excluded from the calculation of the net open currency positions:
(a) Positions are taken deliberately in order tohedge , partially or totally, against the adverse effects of exchange rate movements on the bank'scapital adequacy ratio;(b) Positions related to items that are deducted from the bank's capital when calculating its capital base in accordance with the rules and guidelines in this Module, such as investments in non-consolidated subsidiaries; and(c) Retained profits held for payout to parent.The Central Bank will consider approving the exclusion of the above positions for the purpose of calculating the capital requirement, only if the following conditions are met:
(i) The concerned bank provides adequate documentary evidence to the Central Bank which establishes the fact that the positions proposed to be excluded are, indeed, of a structural, i.e. non-dealing, nature and are merely intended to protect the bank'scapital adequacy ratio. For this purpose, the Central Bank may ask for written representations from the bank's management or Directors; and(ii) Any exclusion of a position is consistently applied, with the treatment of thehedge remaining the same for the life of the associated assets or other items.October 07Derivatives
CA-6.3.7
A currency
swap is treated as a combination of a long position in one currency and a short position in the second currency.October 07CA-6.3.8
There are a number of alternative approaches to the calculation of the foreign exchange risk in options. As stated in Section CA-6.1, with the Central Bank's prior written approval, a bank may choose to use internal models to measure the options risk. Extra capital charges will apply to those
option risks that the bank's internal model does not capture. The standardised framework for the calculation of options risks and the resultant capital charges is described, in detail, in Chapter CA-8. Where, as explained in Paragraph CA-6.3.1, theoption delta value is incorporated in the net open position, the capital charges for the otheroption risks are calculated separately.October 07CA-6.4 CA-6.4 Calculation of the overall net open positions
CA-6.4.1
The net long or short position in each currency is converted, at the spot rate, into the reporting currency. The overall net open position is measured by aggregating the following:
(a) The sum of the net short positions or the sum of the net long positions, whichever is greater; plus(b) The net position (short or long) in gold, regardless of sign.October 07CA-6.4.2
Where the bank is assessing its foreign exchange risk on a consolidated basis, it may be technically impractical in the case of some marginal operations to include the currency positions of a foreign
branch or subsidiary of the bank. In such cases, the internal limit for thatbranch /subsidiary, in each currency, may be used as a proxy for the positions. Thebranch /subsidiary limits should be added, without regard to sign, to the net open position in each currency involved. When this simplified approach to the treatment of currencies with marginal operations is adopted, the bank should adequately monitor the actual positions of thebranch /subsidiary against the limits, and revise the limits, if necessary, based on the results of the ex-post monitoring.October 07CA-6.5 CA-6.5 Calculation of the capital charge
CA-6.5.1
The capital charge is 8% of the overall net open position.
October 07CA-6.5.2
The table below illustrates the calculation of the overall net open position and the capital charge:
Example of the calculation of the foreign exchange overall net open position and the capital charge
GBP EURO SAR US$ JPY Gold +100 +150 +50 -180 -20 -20 +300 -200 20 The capital charge is 8% of the higher of either the sum of the net long currency positions or the sum of the net short positions (i.e. 300) and of the net position in gold (i.e. 20) = 320 x 8% = 25.6 October 07CA-7 CA-7 Commodities risk - Standardised approach
CA-7.1 CA-7.1 Introduction
CA-7.1.1
This Chapter sets out the minimum capital requirements to cover the risk of holding or taking positions in
commodities , including precious metals, but excluding gold (which is treated as a foreign currency according to the methodology explained in Chapter CA-6).October 07CA-7.1.2
The
commodities position risk and the capital charges are calculated with reference to the entire business of a bank, i.e. the banking and trading books combined.October 07CA-7.1.3
The
price risk incommodities is often more complex and volatile than that associated with currencies and interest rates.Commodity markets may also be less liquid than those for interest rates and currencies and, as a result, changes in supply and demand can have a more dramatic effect on price and volatility. Banks need also to guard against the risk that arises when a short position falls due before the long position. Owing to a shortage of liquidity in some markets, it might be difficult to close the short position and the bank might be 'squeezed by the market'. All these market characteristics ofcommodities can make price transparency and the effectivehedging of risks more difficult.October 07CA-7.1.4
For spot or physical trading, the directional risk arising from a change in the spot price is the most important risk. However, banks using portfolio strategies involving forward and derivative contracts are exposed to a variety of additional risks, which may well be larger than the risk of a change in spot prices (directional risk). These include:
(a) 'Basis risk', i.e., the risk that the relationship between the prices of similarcommodities alters through time;(b) 'Interest rate risk', i.e., the risk of a change in the cost of carry for forward positions and options; and(c) 'Forward gap risk', i.e., the risk that the forward price may change for reasons other than a change in interest rates.October 07CA-7.1.5
The capital charges for
commodities risk envisaged by the rules within this Chapter are intended to cover the risks identified in Paragraph CA-7.1.4. In addition, however, banks face creditcounterparty risk onover-the-counter derivatives , which must be incorporated into their credit risk capital requirements. Furthermore, the funding ofcommodities positions may well open a bank to interest rate or foreign exchange risk which should be captured within the measurement framework set out in Chapters CA-4 and CA-6, respectively.8
8 Where a commodity is part of a forward contract (i.e.. a quantity of commodity to be received or to be delivered), any interest rate or foreign exchange risk from the other leg of the contract should be captured, within the measurement framework set out in Chapters 4 and 6, respectively. However, positions which are purely of a stock financing nature (i.e., a physical stock has been sold forward and the cost of funding has been locked in until the date of the forward sale) may be omitted from the commodities risk-calculation although they will be subject to the interest rate and counterparty risk capital requirements.
October 07CA-7.1.6
Banks which have the intention and capability to use internal models for the measurement of their
commodities risks and, hence, for the calculation of the capital requirement, should seek the prior written approval of the Central Bank for those models. The Central Bank's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in Chapter CA-9. It is essential that the internal models methodology captures the directional risk, forward gap and interest rate risks, and the basis risk which are defined in Paragraph CA-7.1.4. It is also particularly important that models take proper account of market characteristics, notably the delivery dates and the scope provided to traders to close out positions.October 07CA-7.2 CA-7.2 Calculation of commodities positions
Netting
CA-7.2.1
Banks should first express each
commodity position (spot plus forward) in terms of the standard unit of measurement (i.e., barrels, kilograms, grams etc.). Long and short positions in acommodity are reported on a net basis for the purpose of calculating the net open position in thatcommodity . For markets which have daily delivery dates, any contracts maturing within ten days of one another may be offset. The net position in eachcommodity is then converted, at spot rates, into the bank's reporting currency.October 07CA-7.2.2
Positions in different
commodities cannot be offset for the purpose of calculating the open positions as described in Paragraph CA-7.2.1 above. However, where two or more sub-categories9of the same Category are, in effect, deliverable against each other, netting between those sub-Categories is permitted. Furthermore, if two or more sub-categories of the same Category are considered as close substitutes for each other, and minimum correlation of 0.9 between their price movements is clearly established over a minimum period of one year, the bank may, with the prior written approval of the Central Bank, net positions in those sub-categories. Banks which wish to net positions based on correlations, in the manner discussed above, will need to satisfy the Central Bank of the accuracy of the method which it proposes to adopt.
9 Commodities can be grouped into clans, families, sub-groups and individual commodities. For example, a clan might be Energy Commodities, within which Hydro-Carbons is a family with Crude Oil being a sub-group and West Texas Intermediate, Arabian Light and Brent being individual commodities.
October 07Derivatives
CA-7.2.3
All
commodity derivatives and off-balance-sheet positions which are affected by changes incommodity prices should be included in the measurement framework forcommodities risks. This includescommodity futures,commodity swaps , and options where the 'delta plus' method is used10. In order to calculate the risks,commodity derivatives are converted into notionalcommodities positions and assigned to maturities as follows:(a) Futures and forward contracts relating to individualcommodities should be incorporated in the measurement framework as notional amounts of barrels, kilograms etc., and should be assigned a maturity with reference to their expiry date;(b)Commodity swaps where one leg is a fixed price and the other one is the current market price, should be incorporated as a series of positions equal to the notional amount of the contract, with one position corresponding to each payment on theswap and slotted into the maturity time-bands accordingly. The positions would be long positions if the bank is paying fixed and receiving floating, and short positions if vice versa. (If one of the legs involves receiving/paying a fixed or floating interest rate, thatexposure should be slotted into the appropriate repricing maturity band for the calculation of the interest rate risk, as described in Chapter CA-4);(c)Commodity swaps where the legs are in differentcommodities should be incorporated in the measurement framework of the respectivecommodities separately, without any offsetting. Offsetting will only be permitted if the conditions set out in Paragraphs CA-7.2.1 and CA-7.2.2 are met.
10 For banks using other approaches to measure options risks, all Options and the associated underlying instruments should be excluded from both the maturity ladder approach and the simplified approach. The treatment of options is described, in detail, in Chapter 8.
October 07CA-7.3 CA-7.3 Maturity ladder approach
CA-7.3.1
A worked example of the maturity ladder approach is set out in Appendix CA-5 and the table in Paragraph CA-7.3.2 illustrates the maturity time-bands of the maturity ladder for each
commodity .October 07CA-7.3.2
The steps in the calculation of the
commodities risk by the maturity ladder approach are:(a) The net positions in individualcommodities , expressed in terms of the standard unit of measurement, are first slotted into the maturity ladder. Physical stocks are allocated to the first time-band. A separate maturity ladder is used for eachcommodity as defined in Section CA-7.2 earlier in this Chapter. The net positions incommodities are calculated as explained in Section CA-7.2.(b) Long and short positions in each time-band are matched. The sum of the matched long and short positions is multiplied first by the spot price of thecommodity , and then by a spread rate of 1.5% for each time-band as set out in the table below. This represents the capital charge in order to capture forward gap and interest rate risk within a time-band (which, together, are sometimes referred to as curvature/spread risk).Time-bands11 0–1 months
1–3 months
3–6 months
6–12 months
1–2 years
2–3 years
over 3 years(c) The residual (unmatched) net positions from nearer time-bands are then carried forward to offset opposite positions (i.e. long against short, and vice versa) in time-bands that are further out. However, a surcharge of 0.6% of the net position carried forward is added in respect of each time-band that the net position is carried forward, to recognise that suchhedging of positions between different time-bands is imprecise. The surcharge is in addition to the capital charge for each matched amount created by carrying net positions forward, and is calculated as explained in step (b) above.(d) At the end of step (c) above, there will be either only long or only short positions, to which a capital charge of 15% will apply. The Central Bank recognises that there are differences in volatility between differentcommodities , but has, nevertheless, decided that one uniform capital charge for open positions in allcommodities shall apply in the interest of simplicity of the measurement, and given the fact that banks normally run rather small open positions incommodities . Banks will be required to submit, in writing, details of theircommodities business, to enable the Central Bank to evaluate whether the models approach should be adopted by the bank, to capture the market risk on this business.
11 For instruments, the maturity of which is on the boundary of two maturity time-bands, the instrument should be placed into the earlier maturity band. For example, instruments with a maturity of exactly one year are placed into the 6 to 12 months time-band.
October 07CA-7.4 CA-7.4 Simplified approach
CA-7.4.1
By the simplified approach, the capital charge of 15% of the net position, long or short, in each
commodity is applied to capture directional risk. Net positions incommodities are calculated as explained in Section CA-7.2.October 07CA-7.4.2
An additional capital charge equivalent to 3% of the bank's gross positions, long plus short, in each
commodity is applied to protect the bank against basis risk, interest rate risk and forward gap risk. In valuing the gross positions incommodity derivatives for this purpose, banks should use the current spot price.October 07CA-8 CA-8 Options risk - Standardised approach
CA-8.1 CA-8.1 Introduction
CA-8.1.1
It is recognised that the measurement of the
price risk of options is inherently a difficult task, which is further complicated by the wide diversity of banks' activities in options. The Central Bank has decided that the following approaches should be adopted to the measurement of options risks:(a) Banks which solely use purchased options are permitted to use the simplified (carve-out) approach described later in this Chapter.(b) Banks which also write options should use either the delta-plus (buffer) approach or the scenario approach, or alternatively use a comprehensive risk management model. The Central Bank's detailed rules for the recognition and use of internal models are included in Chapter CA-9.October 07CA-8.1.2
The scenario approach and the internal models approach are generally regarded as more satisfactory for managing and measuring options risk, as they assess risk over a range of outcomes rather than focusing on the point estimate of the 'Greek' risk parameters as in the delta-plus approach. The more significant the level and/or complexity of the bank's options trading activities, the more the bank will be expected to use a sophisticated approach to the measurement of options risks. The Central Bank will monitor the banks' options trading activities, and the adequacy of the risk measurement framework adopted.
October 07CA-8.1.3
Where written
option positions arehedged by perfectly matched long positions in exactly the sameoptions , no capital charge for market risk is required in respect of those matched positions.October 07CA-8.2 CA-8.2 Simplified approach (carve-out)
CA-8.2.1
In the simplified approach, positions for the
options and the associated underlying (hedges), cash or forward, are entirely omitted from the calculation of capital charges by the standardised methodology and are, instead, 'carved out' and subject to separately calculated capital charges that incorporate both general market risk and specific risk. The capital charges thus generated are then added to the capital charges for the relevant risk Category, i.e., interest rate related instruments, equities, foreign exchange andcommodities as described in Chapters CA-4, CA-5, CA-6 and CA-7 respectively.October 07CA-8.2.2
The capital charges for the carved out positions are as set out in the table below. As an example of how the calculation would work, if a bank holds 100 shares currently valued at $ 10 each, and also holds an equivalent put
option with a strike price of $ 11, the capital charge would be as follows:[$ 1,000 × 16%12] minus [($ 11 - $ 10)13 × 100] = $ 60
A similar methodology applies to
options whose underlying is a foreign currency, an interest rate related instrument or acommodity .
128% specific risk plus 8% general market risk.
13 The amount the option is 'in the money'.
Simplified approach: Capital charges
Position Treatment Long cash and long put
or
Short cash and long call (i.e.hedged positions)The capital charge is:
[Market value of underlying instrument14 x Sum of specific and general market risk charges15 for the underlying] minus [Amount, if any, theoption is in the money16]
The capital charge calculated as above is bounded at zero, i.e., it cannot be a negative number.Long call
or
Long put (i.e. nakedoption positions)The capital charge is the lesser of:
i) Market value of the underlying instrument x Sum of specific and general market risk charges for the underlying; and
ii) Market value of theoption 17.
14 In some cases such as foreign exchange, it may be unclear which side is the 'underlying instrument'; this should be taken to be the asset which would be received if the option were exercised. In addition, the nominal value should be used for items where the market value of the underlying instrument could be zero, e.g., caps and floors, swaptions etc.
15 Some options (e.g., where the underlying is an interest rate, a currency or a commodity) bear no specific risk, but specific risk is present in the case of options on certain interest rate related instruments (e.g., options on a corporate debt security or a corporate bond index - see Chapter CA-4 for the relevant capital charges), and in the case of options on equities and stock indices (see Chapter CA-5 for the relevant capital charges). The capital charge for currency options is 8% and for options on commodities is 15%.
16 For options with a residual maturity of more than six months, the strike price should be compared with the forward, not the current, price. A bank unable to do this should take the 'in the money' amount to be zero.
17 Where the position does not fall within the trading book options on certain foreign exchange and commodities positions not belonging to the trading book), it is acceptable to use the book value instead of the market value.
October 07CA-8.3 CA-8.3 Delta-plus method (buffer approach)
CA-8.3.1
Banks which write
options are allowed to include delta-weightedoption positions within the standardised methodology set out in Chapters CA-4 through CA-7. Eachoption should be reported as a position equal to the market value of the underlying multiplied by the delta. The delta should be calculated by an adequate model with appropriate documentation of the process and controls, to enable the Central Bank to review such models, if considered necessary. A worked example of the delta-plus method is set out in Appendix CA-6.October 07CA-8.3.2
Since delta does not sufficiently cover the risks associated with
options positions, there will be additional capital buffers to cover gamma (which measures the rate of change of delta) and vega (which measures the sensitivity of the value of anoption with respect to a change in volatility), in order to calculate the total capital charge. The gamma and vega buffers should be calculated by an adequate exchange model or the bank's proprietaryoptions pricing model, with appropriate documentation of the process and controls, to enable the Central Bank to review such models, if considered necessary.October 07Treatment of delta
Where the underlying is a debt security or an interest rate
CA-8.3.4
The delta-weighted
option positions are slotted into the interest rate time-bands as set out in Chapter CA-4. A two-legged approach should be used as for otherderivatives , as explained in Chapter CA-4, requiring one entry at the time the underlying contract takes effect and a second at the time the underlying contract matures. A few examples to elucidate the two-legged treatment are set out below:(a) A bought calloption on a June three-month interest rate future will, in April, be considered, on the basis of its delta-equivalent value, to be a long position with a maturity of five months and a short position with a maturity of two months.(b) A writtenoption with the same underlying as in (a) above, will be included in the measurement framework as a long position with a maturity of two months and a short position with a maturity of five months.(c) A two months calloption on a bond future where delivery of the bond takes place in September will be considered in April, as being long the bond and short a five monthsdeposit , both positions being delta-weighted.October 07CA-8.3.5
Floating rate instruments with caps or floors are treated as a combination of floating rate
securities and a series of European-styleoptions . For example, the holder of a three-year floating rate bond indexed to six month LIBOR with a cap of 10% will treat it as:(a) A debtsecurity that reprices in six months; and(b) A series of five written calloptions on an FRA with a reference rate of 10%, each with a negative sign at the time the underlying FRA takes effect and a positive sign at the time the underlying FRA matures.October 07CA-8.3.6
The rules applying to closely matched positions, set out in Paragraph CA-4.8.2, will also apply in this respect.
October 07Where the underlying is an equity instrument
CA-8.3.7
The delta-weighted positions are incorporated in the measure of market risk described in Chapter CA-5. For purposes of this calculation, each national market is treated as a separate underlying.
October 07Options on foreign exchange and gold positions
CA-8.3.8
The net delta-based equivalent of the foreign currency and gold
options are incorporated in the measurement of theexposure for the respective currency or gold position, as described in Chapter CA-6.October 07Options on commodities
CA-8.3.9
The delta-weighted positions are incorporated in the measurement of the
commodities risk by the simplified approach or the maturity ladder approach, as described in Chapter CA-7.October 07Calculation of the gamma and vega buffers
CA-8.3.10
As explained in Paragraph CA-8.3.2, in addition to the above capital charges to cover delta risk, banks are required to calculate additional capital charges to cover the gamma and vega risks. The additional capital charges are calculated as follows:
• Gamma(a) For each individualoption position (includinghedge positions), a gamma impact is calculated according to the following formula derived from the Taylor series expansion:
Gamma impact = 0.5 × Gamma × VU
where VU = variation of the underlying of theoption , calculated as in (b) below(b) VU is calculated as follows:(i) For interest rateoptions 18, where the underlying is a bond, the market value of the underlying is multiplied by the risk weights set out in Section CA-4.4. An equivalent calculation is carried out where the underlying is an interest rate, based on the assumed changes in yield as set out in the table in Section CA-4.5;(ii) Foroptions on equities and equity indices18, the market value of the underlying is multiplied by 8%;(iii) For foreign exchange and goldoptions , the market value of the underlying is multiplied by 8%;(iv) Forcommodities options , the market value of the underlying is multiplied by 15%.(c) For the purpose of the calculation of the gamma buffer, the following positions are treated as the same underlying:(i) For interest rates, each time-band as set out in the table in Section CA-4.4. Positions should be slotted into separate maturity ladders by currency. Banks using the duration method should use the time-bands as set out in the table in Section CA-4.5;(ii) For equities and stock indices, each individual national market;(iii) For foreign currencies and gold, each currency pair and gold; and(d) Eachoption on the same underlying will have a gamma impact that is either positive or negative. These individual gamma impacts are summed, resulting in a net gamma impact for each underlying that is either positive or negative. Only those net gamma impacts that are negative are included in the capital calculation.(e) The total gamma capital charge is the sum of the absolute value of the net negative gamma impacts calculated for each underlying as explained in (d) above.• Vega(f) For volatility risk (vega), banks are required to calculate the capital charges by multiplying the sum of the vegas for alloptions on the same underlying, as defined above, by a proportional shift in volatility of ±25%.(g) The total vega capital charge is the sum of the absolute value of the individual vega capital charges calculated for each underlying.
18 For interest rate and equity options, the present set of rules do not attempt to capture specific risk when calculating gamma capital charges. See Section CA-8.4 for an explanation of the Central Bank's views on this subject.
October 07CA-8.3.11
The capital charges for delta, gamma and vega risks described in Paragraphs CA-8.3.1 through CA-8.3.10 are in addition to the specific risk capital charges which are determined separately by multiplying the delta-equivalent of each
option position by the specific risk weights set out in Chapters CA-4 through CA-7.October 07CA-8.3.12
To summarise, capital requirements for, say
OTC options , using the delta-plus method are as follows:(a)Counterparty risk capital charges (on purchasedoptions only), calculated in accordance with the credit risk regulations; PLUS(b) Specific risk capital charges (calculated as explained in Paragraph CA-8.3.11); PLUS(c) Delta risk capital charges (calculated as explained in Paragraphs CA-8.3.3 through CA-8.3.9) PLUS(d) Gamma and vega capital buffers (calculated as explained in Paragraph CA-8.3.10).October 07CA-8.4 CA-8.4 Scenario approach
CA-8.4.1
As stated in Section CA-8.1, banks which have a significant level of
options trading activities, or have complexoptions trading strategies, are expected to use more sophisticated methods for measuring and monitoring theoptions risks. Banks with the appropriate capability will be permitted, with the prior approval of the Central Bank, to base the market risk capital charge foroptions portfolios and associatedhedging positions on scenario matrix analysis. Before giving its approval, the Central Bank will closely review the accuracy of the analysis that is constructed. Furthermore, like in the case of internal models, the banks' use of scenario analysis as part of the standardised methodology will also be subject to external validation, and to those of the qualitative standards listed in Chapter CA-9 which are appropriate given the nature of the business.October 07CA-8.4.2
The scenario matrix analysis involves specifying a fixed range of changes in the
option portfolio's risk factors and calculating changes in the value of theoption portfolio at various points along this 'grid' or 'matrix'. For the purpose of calculating the capital charge, the bank will revalue theoption portfolio using matrices for simultaneous changes in theoption 's underlying rate or price and in the volatility of that rate or price. A different matrix is set up for each individual underlying as defined in Section CA-8.3 above. As an alternative, in respect of interest rateoptions , banks which are significant traders in suchoptions are permitted to base the calculation on a minimum of six sets of time-bands. When using this alternative method, not more than three of the time-bands as defined in Chapter CA-4 should be combined into any one set.October 07CA-8.4.3
The first dimension of the matrix involves a specified range of changes in the
option 's underlying rate or price. The Central Bank has set the range for each risk Category as follows:(a) Interest rate related instruments - The range for interest rates is consistent with the assumed changes in yield set out in Section CA-4.5. Those banks using the alternative method of grouping time-bands into sets, as explained in Paragraph CA-8.4.2, should use, for each set of time-bands, the highest of the assumed changes in yield applicable to the individual time-bands in that group. If, for example, the time-bands 3 to 4 years, 4 to 5 years and 5 to 7 years are combined, the highest assumed change in yield of these three bands would be 0.75 which would be applicable to that set.(b) For equity instruments, the range is ±8%.(c) For foreign exchange and gold, the range is ±8%.(d) Forcommodities, the range is ±15%,For all risk categories, at least seven observations (including the current observation) should be used to divide the range into equally spaced intervals.
October 07CA-8.4.4
The second dimension of the matrix entails a change in the volatility of the underlying rate or price. A single change in the volatility of the underlying rate or price equal to a shift in volatility of ±25% is applied.
October 07CA-8.4.5
The Central Bank will closely monitor the need to reset the parameters for the amounts by which the price of the underlying instrument and volatility must be shifted to form the rows and columns of the scenario matrix. For the time being, the parameters set, as above, only reflect general market risk (see Paragraphs CA-8.4.10 to CA-8.4.12).
October 07CA-8.4.6
After calculating the matrix, each cell contains the net profit or loss of the
option and the underlyinghedge instrument. The general market risk capital charge for each underlying is then calculated as the largest loss contained in the matrix.October 07CA-8.4.7
In addition to the capital charge calculated as above, the specific risk capital charge is determined separately by multiplying the delta-equivalent of each
option position by the specific risk weights set out in Chapters CA-4 through CA-7.October 07CA-8.4.8
To summarise, capital requirements for, say
OTC options , using the scenario approach are as follows:(a)Counterparty risk capital charges (on purchasedoptions only), calculated in accordance with the credit risk regulations; PLUS(b) Specific risk capital charges (calculated as explained in Paragraph CA-8.4.7); PLUS(c) Directional and volatility risk capital charges (i.e., the worst case loss from a given scenario matrix analysis).October 07CA-8.4.9
Banks doing business in certain classes of complex exotic
options (e.g. barrieroptions involving discontinuities in deltas etc.), or inoptions at the money that are close to expiry, are required to use either the scenario approach or the internal models approach, both of which can accommodate more detailed revaluation approaches. The Central Bank expects the concerned banks to work with it closely to produce an agreed method, within the framework of these rules. If a bank uses scenario matrix analysis, it must be able to demonstrate that no substantially larger loss could fall between the nodes.October 07CA-8.4.10
In drawing up the delta-plus and the scenario approaches, the Central Bank's present set of rules do not attempt to capture specific risk other than the delta-related elements (which are captured as explained in Paragraphs CA-8.4.7 and CA-8.4.11). The Central Bank recognises that introduction of those other specific risk elements will make the measurement framework much more complex. On the other hand, the simplifying assumptions used in these rules will result in a relatively conservative treatment of certain
options positions.October 07CA-8.4.11
In addition to the
options risks described earlier in this Chapter, the Central Bank is conscious of the other risks also associated withoptions , e.g. rho or interest rate risk (the rate of change of the value of theoption with respect to the interest rate) and theta (the rate of change of the value of theoption with respect to time). While not proposing a measurement system for those risks at present, the Central Bank expects banks undertaking significantoptions business, at the very least, to monitor such risks closely. Additionally, banks will be permitted to incorporate rho into their capital calculations for interest rate risk, if they wish to do so.October 07CA-9 CA-9 Use of internal models
CA-9.1 CA-9.1 Introduction
CA-9.1.1
As stated in Chapter CA-1, as an alternative to the standardised approach to the measurement of market risks (which is described in Chapters CA-4 through CA-8), and subject to the explicit prior approval of the Central Bank, banks will be allowed to use risk measures derived from their own internal models.
October 07CA-9.1.2
This Chapter describes the seven sets of conditions that should be met before a bank is allowed to use the internal models approach, namely:
(a) General criteria regarding the adequacy of the risk management system;(b) Qualitative standards for internal oversight of the use of models, notably by senior management;(c) Guidelines for specifying an appropriate set of market risk factors (i.e. the market rates and prices that affect the value of a bank's positions);(d) Quantitative standards setting out the use of common minimum statistical parameters for measuring risk;(e) Guidelines for stress testing;(f) Validation procedures for external oversight of the use of models; and(g) Rules for banks which use a mixture of the internal models approach and the standardised approach.October 07CA-9.1.3
The standardised methodology, described in Chapters CA-4 through CA-8, uses a 'building-block' approach in which the specific risk and the general market risk arising from debt and equity positions are calculated separately. The focus of most internal models is a bank's general market risk
exposure , typically leaving specific risk (i.e.exposures to specific issuers of debtsecurities and equities) to be measured largely through separate credit risk measurement systems. Banks using models are subject to separate capital charges for the specific risk not captured by their models, which shall be calculated by the standardised methodology. The capital charge for banks which are modelling specific risk is set out in Section CA-9.10.October 07CA-9.1.4
While the models recognition criteria described in this Chapter are primarily intended for comprehensive
Value-at-Risk (VaR) models, nevertheless, the same set of criteria will be applied, to the extent that it is appropriate, to other pre-processing or valuation models the output of which is fed into the standardised measurement system, e.g., interest rate sensitivity models (from which the residual positions are fed into the duration ladders) andoption pricing models (for the calculation of the delta, gamma and vega sensitivities).October 07CA-9.1.5
As a number of strict conditions are required to be met before internal models can be recognised by the Central Bank, including external validation, banks which are contemplating using internal models should submit their detailed written proposals for the Central Bank's approval, immediately upon receipt of these regulations.
October 07CA-9.1.6
As the model approval process will encompass a review of both the model and its operating environment, it is not the case that a commercially produced model which is recognised for one bank will automatically be recognised for another bank.
October 07CA-9.2 CA-9.2 General criteria
CA-9.2.1
The Central Bank will give its approval for the use of internal models to measure market risks only if, in addition to the detailed requirements described later in this Chapter, it is satisfied that the following general criteria are met:
(a) That the bank's risk management system is conceptually sound and is implemented with integrity;(b) That the bank has, in the Central Bank's view, sufficient numbers of staff skilled in the use of sophisticated models not only in the trading area but also in the risk control, audit and the back office areas;(c) That the bank's models have, in the Central Bank's judgement, a proven track record of reasonable accuracy in measuring risk. The Central Bank recognises that the use of internal models is, for most banks in Bahrain, a relatively new development and, therefore, it is difficult to establish a track record of reasonable accuracy. The Central Bank, therefore, will require a period of initial monitoring and live testing of a bank's internal model before it is used for supervisory capital purposes; and(d) That the bank regularly conducts stress tests as outlined in Section CA-9.7 and conducts backtesting as described in Section CA-9.6.October 07CA-9.3 CA-9.3 Qualitative standards
CA-9.3.1
In order to ensure that banks using models have market risk management systems that are conceptually sound and implemented with integrity, the Central Bank has set the following qualitative criteria that banks are required to meet before they are permitted to use the models-based approach. Apart from influencing the Central Bank's decision to permit a bank to use internal models, where such permission is granted, the extent to which the bank meets the qualitative criteria will further influence the level at which the Central Bank will set the multiplication factor for that bank, referred to in Section CA-9.5. Only those banks whose models, in the Central Bank's judgement, are in full compliance with the qualitative criteria will be eligible for application of the minimum multiplication factor of 3. The qualitative criteria include the following:
(a) The bank should have an independent risk management unit that is responsible for the design and implementation of the bank's risk management system. The unit should produce and analyse daily reports on the output of the bank's risk measurement model, including an evaluation of the relationship between the measures of riskexposure and the trading limits. This unit must be independent from the business trading units and should report directly to the senior management of the bank.(b) The independent risk management unit should conduct a regular backtesting programme, i.e. an ex-post comparison of the risk measure generated by the model against the actual daily changes in portfolio value over longer periods of time, as well as hypothetical changes based on static positions. The document issued by theBasel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 1996, titled 'Supervisory framework for the use of 'backtesting' in conjunction with the internal models approach to market risk capital requirements' (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.htm), presents in detail the approach to be applied by banks for backtesting.(c) The Board of Directors and senior management of the bank should be actively involved in the risk management process and must regard such process as an essential aspect of the business to which significant resources need to be devoted19. In this regard, the daily reports prepared by the independent risk management unit must be reviewed by a level of management with sufficient seniority and authority to enforce both reductions of positions taken by individual traders and reductions in the bank's overall riskexposure .(d) The bank's internal model must be closely integrated into the day-to-day risk management process of the bank. Its output should, accordingly, be an integral part of the process of planning, monitoring and controlling the bank's market risk profile.(e) The risk measurement system should be used in conjunction with the internal trading andexposure limits. In this regard, the trading limits should be related to the bank's risk measurement model in a manner that is consistent over time and that is well-understood by both traders and senior management.(f) A routine and rigorous programme of stress testing, along the general lines set out in Section CA-9.6, should be in place as a supplement to the risk analysis based on the day-to-day output of the bank's risk measurement model. The results of stress testing should be reviewed periodically by senior management and should be reflected in the policies and limits set by management and the Board of Directors. Where stress tests reveal particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances, prompt steps should be taken to manage those risks appropriately (e.g. byhedging against that outcome or reducing the size of the bank'sexposures ).(g) The bank should have a routine in place for ensuring compliance with a documented set of internal policies, controls and procedures concerning the operation of the risk measurement system. The bank's risk measurement system must be well documented, for example, through a risk management manual that describes the basic principles of the risk management system and that provides an explanation of the empirical techniques used to measure market risk.(h) An independent review of the risk measurement system should be carried out regularly in the bank's own internal auditing process. This review should include both the activities of the business trading units and of the independent risk management unit. A review, by the internal auditor, of the overall risk management process should take place at regular intervals (ideally not less than once every six months) and should specifically address, at a minimum:(i) The adequacy of the documentation of the risk management system and process;(ii) The organisation of the risk management unit;(iii) The integration of market risk measures into daily risk management;(iv) The approval process for risk pricing models and valuation systems used by front- and back-office personnel;(v) The validation of any significant changes in the risk measurement process;(vi) The scope of market risks captured by the risk measurement model;(vii) The integrity of the management information system;(viii) The accuracy and completeness of position data;(ix) The verification of the consistency, timeliness and reliability of data sources used to run internal models, including the independence of such data sources;(x) The accuracy and appropriateness of volatility and correlation assumptions;(xi) The accuracy of valuation and risk transformation calculations;(xii) The verification of the model's accuracy through frequent backtesting as described in (b) above and in theBasel Committee 's document referred to therein.
19 The report, 'Risk management guidelines for
derivatives ', issued by theBasel Committee in July 1994, further discusses the responsibilities of the board of Directors and senior management.October 07CA-9.4 CA-9.4 Specification of market risk factors
CA-9.4.1
An important part of a bank's internal market risk measurement system is the specification of an appropriate set of market risk factors, i.e. the market rates and prices that affect the value of the bank's trading positions. The risk factors contained in a market risk measurement system should be sufficient to capture the risks inherent in the bank's portfolio of on- and off-balance-sheet trading positions. Banks should follow the Central Bank's guidelines, set out below, for specifying the risk factors for their internal models. Where a bank has difficulty in specifying the risk factors for any currency or market within a risk Category, in accordance with the following guidelines, the bank should immediately contact the Central Bank. The Central Bank will review and discuss the specific circumstances of each such case with the concerned bank, and will decide alternative methods of calculating the risks which are not captured by the bank's model.
(a) For interest rates:• There should be a set of risk factors corresponding to interest rates in each currency in which the bank has interest-rate-sensitive on- or off-balance-sheet positions.• The risk measurement system should model theyield curve using one of a number of generally accepted approaches, for example, by estimating forward rates of zero coupon yields. Theyield curve should be divided into various maturity segments in order to capture variation in the volatility of rates along theyield curve ; there will typically be one risk factor corresponding to each maturity segment. For materialexposures to interest rate movements in the major currencies and markets, banks must model theyield curve using a minimum of six factors. However, the number of risk factors used should ultimately be driven by the nature of the bank's trading strategies. For instance, a bank which has a portfolio of various types ofsecurities across many points of theyield curve and which engages in complex arbitrage strategies would require a greater number of risk factors to capture interest rate risk accurately.• The risk measurement system must incorporate separate risk factors to capture spread risk (e.g. between bonds andswaps ). A variety of approaches may be used to capture the spread risk arising from less than perfectly correlated movements between government and other fixed-income interest rates, such as specifying a completely separateyield curve for non-government fixed-income instruments (for instance,swaps or municipalsecurities ) or estimating the spread over government rates at various points along theyield curve .(b) For exchange rates (which includes gold):• The risk measurement system should incorporate risk factors corresponding to the individual foreign currencies in which the bank's positions are denominated. Since thevalue-at-risk figure calculated by the risk measurement system will be expressed in the bank's reporting currency, any net position denominated in a currency other than the reporting currency will introduce a foreign exchange risk. Thus, there must be risk factors corresponding to the exchange rate between the reporting currency and each other currency in which the bank has a significantexposure .(c) For equity prices:• There should be risk factors corresponding to each of the equity markets in which the bank holds significant positions.• At a minimum, there should be a risk factor that is designed to capture market-wide movements in equity prices (e.g. a market index). Positions in individualsecurities or in sector indices may be expressed in 'beta-equivalents'20relative to this market-wide index.• A somewhat more detailed approach would be to have risk factors corresponding to various sectors of the overall equity market (for instance, industry sectors or cyclical and non-cyclical sectors). As above, positions in individual stocks within each sector could be expressed in 'beta-equivalents' relative to the sector index.• The most extensive approach would be to have risk factors corresponding to the volatility of individual equity issues.• The sophistication and nature of the modelling technique for a given market should correspond to the bank'sexposure to the overall market as well as its concentration in individual equity issues in that market.(d) Forcommodity prices:• There should be risk factors corresponding to each of thecommodity markets in which the bank holds significant positions (also see Section CA-7.1).• For banks with relatively limited positions incommodity -based instruments, a straight-forward specification of risk factors is acceptable. Such a specification would likely entail one risk factor for eachcommodity price to which the bank is exposed. In cases where the aggregate positions are reasonably small, it may be acceptable to use a single risk factor for a relatively broad sub-Category ofcommodities (for instance, a single risk factor for all types of oil). However, banks which propose to use this simplified approach should obtain the prior written approval of the Central Bank.• For more active trading, the model should also take account of variation in the 'convenience yield'21betweenderivatives positions such as forwards andswaps and cash positions in thecommodity .
20 A 'beta-equivalent' position would be calculated from a market model of equity (such as the CAPM model) by regressing the return on the individual stock or sector index or the risk-free rate of return and the return on the market index.
21 The convenience yield reflects the benefits of direct ownership of the physical commodity (for example, the ability to profit from temporary market shortages), and is affected by both market conditions and factors such as physical storage costs.
October 07CA-9.5 CA-9.5 Quantitative standards
CA-9.5.1
The following minimum quantitative standards will apply for the purpose of calculating the capital charge.
(a) 'Value-at-risk ' must be computed on a daily basis.(b) In calculating thevalue-at-risk , a 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval is to be used.(c) In calculating thevalue-at-risk , an instantaneous price shock equivalent to a 10-day movement in prices is to be used, i.e., the minimum 'holding period' will be ten trading days. Banks may usevalue-at-risk numbers calculated according to shorter holding periods scaled up to ten days by the square root of time (for the treatment ofoptions , also see (h) below).(d) The minimum historical observation period (sample period) for calculatingvalue-at-risk is one year. For banks which use a weighting scheme or other methods for the historical observation period, the 'effective' observation period must be at least one year (i.e. the weighted average time lag of the individual observations cannot be less than 6 months).
The Central Bank may, as an exceptional case, require a bank to calculate itsvalue-at-risk using a shorter observation period if, in the Central Bank's judgement, this is justified by a significant upsurge in price volatility.(e) Banks should update their data sets no less frequently than once every week and should also reassess them whenever market prices are subject to material changes.(f) No particular type of model is prescribed by the Central Bank. So long as each model used captures all the material risks run by the bank, as set out in Section CA-9.4, banks will be free to use models based, for example, on variance-covariance matrices, historical simulations, or Monte Carlo simulations.(g) Banks shall have discretion to recognise empirical correlations within broad risk categories (i.e., interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices andcommodity prices, including relatedoptions volatilities in each risk factor Category). Banks are not permitted to recognise empirical correlations across broad risk categories without the prior approval of the Central Bank. Banks may apply, on a case-by-case basis, for empirical correlations across broad risk categories to be recognised by the Central Bank, subject to its satisfaction with the soundness and integrity of the bank's system for measuring those correlations.(h) Banks' models must accurately capture the unique risks associated withoptions within each of the broad risk categories. The following criteria shall apply to the measurement ofoptions risk:• Banks' models must capture the non-linear price characteristics ofoptions positions;• Banks are expected to ultimately move towards the application of a full 10-day price shock tooptions positions or positions that displayoption -like characteristics. In the interim period, banks may adjust their capital measure foroptions risk through other methods, e.g. periodic simulations or stress testing;• Each bank's risk measurement system must have a set of risk factors that captures the volatilities of the rates and prices underlying theoption positions, i.e. vega risk. Banks with relatively large and/or complexoptions portfolios should have detailed specifications of the relevant volatilities. This means that banks should measure the volatilities ofoptions positions broken down by different maturities.(i) Each bank must meet, on a daily basis, a capital requirement expressed as the higher of (i) and (ii) below, multiplied by a multiplication factor (see (j) below):(i) Its previous day'svalue-at-risk number measured according to the parameters specified in (a) to (h) above; and(ii) An average of the dailyvalue-at-risk measures on each of the preceding sixty business days.(j) The multiplication factor will be set by the Central Bank, separately for each individual bank, on the basis of the Central Bank's assessment of the quality of the bank's risk management system, subject to an absolute minimum of 3. Banks will be required to add to the factor set by the Central Bank, a 'plus' directly related to the ex-post performance of the model, thereby introducing a built-in positive incentive to maintain the predictive quality of the model. The plus will range from 0 to 1 based on the outcome of the bank's backtesting. If the backtesting results are satisfactory and the bank meets all of the qualitative standards set out in Section CA-9.3 above, the plus factor could be zero. TheBasel Committee 's document titled 'Supervisory framework for the use of 'backtesting' in conjunction with the internal models approach to market risk capital requirements' (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.htm), referred to earlier in Section CA-9.3, presents in detail the approach to be followed for backtesting and the plus factor. Banks are expected to strictly comply with this approach.(k) As stated earlier in Section CA-9.1, banks using models will also be subject to a capital charge to cover specific risk (as defined under the standardised approach) of interest rate related instruments and equity instruments. The manner in which the specific risk capital charge is to be calculated is set out in Section CA-9.10.October 07CA-9.6 CA-9.6 Backtesting
CA-9.6.1
The contents of this Section outline the key requirements as set out in the
Basel Committee 's paper titled 'Supervisory framework for the use of 'backtesting' in conjunction with the internal models approach to market risk capital requirements' (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs22.htm). The paper presents in detail the approach to be followed for backtesting by banks.October 07Key requirements
CA-9.6.2
The contents of this paper lay down recommendations for carrying out backtesting procedures in order to determine the accuracy and robustness of bank's internal models for measuring market risk capital requirements. These backtesting procedures typically consist of a periodic comparison of the bank's daily
value-at-risk measures with the subsequent daily profit or loss ('trading outcome'). The procedure involves calculating and identifying the number of times over the prior 250 business days that observed daily trading losses exceed the bank's one-day, 99% confidence levelVaR estimate (so-called 'exceptions').October 07CA-9.6.3
Based on the number of exceptions identified from the backtesting procedures, the banks will be classified into three exception categories for the determination of the 'scaling factor' to be applied to the banks' market risk measure generated by its internal models. The three categories, termed as zones and distinguished by colours into a hierarchy of responses, are listed below:
(a) Green zone(b) Yellow zone(c) Red zoneOctober 07CA-9.6.4
The green zone corresponds to backtesting results that do not themselves suggest a problem with the quality or accuracy of a bank's internal model. The yellow zone encompasses results that do raise questions in this regard, but where such a conclusion is not definitive. The red zone indicates a backtesting result that almost certainly indicates a problem with a bank's risk model.
October 07CA-9.6.5
The corresponding 'scaling factors' applicable to banks falling into respective zones based on their backtesting results are shown in Table 2 of the paper mentioned in Paragraph CA-9.6.1.
October 07CA-9.7 CA-9.7 Stress testing
CA-9.7.1
Banks that use the internal models approach for calculating market risk capital requirements must have in place a rigorous and comprehensive stress testing programme. Stress testing to identify events or influences that could greatly impact the bank is a key component of a bank's assessment of its capital position.
October 07CA-9.7.2
Banks' stress scenarios need to cover a range of factors that can create extraordinary losses or gains in trading portfolios, or make the control of risk in those portfolios very difficult. These factors include low-probability events in all major types of risks, including the various components of market, credit and operational risks. Stress scenarios need to shed light on the impact of such events on positions that display both linear and non-linear characteristics (i.e.,
options and instruments that haveoption -like characteristics).October 07CA-9.7.3
Banks' stress tests should be both of a quantitative and qualitative nature, incorporating both market risk and liquidity aspects of market disturbances. Quantitative criteria should identify plausible stress scenarios to which banks could be exposed. Qualitative criteria should emphasise that two major goals of stress testing are to evaluate the capacity of the bank's capital to absorb potential large losses and to identify steps the bank can take to reduce its risk and conserve capital. This assessment is integral to setting and evaluating the bank's management strategy and the results of stress testing should be routinely communicated to senior management and, periodically, to the bank's Board of Directors.
October 07CA-9.7.4
Banks should combine the use of stress scenarios as advised under (a), (b) and (c) below by the Central Bank, with stress tests developed by the banks themselves to reflect their specific risk characteristics. The Central Bank may ask banks to provide information on stress testing in three broad areas, as discussed below.
(a) Scenarios requiring no simulation by the bank
Banks should have information on the largest losses experienced during the reporting period available for review by the Central Bank. This loss information will be compared with the level of capital that results from a bank's internal measurement system. For example, it could provide the Central Bank with a picture of how many days of peak day losses would have been covered by a givenvalue-at-risk estimate.(b) Scenarios requiring simulation by the bank
Banks should subject their portfolios to a series of simulated stress scenarios and provide the Central Bank with the results. These scenarios could include testing the current portfolio against past periods of significant disturbance, for example, the 1987 equity crash, the ERM crises of 1992 and 1993 or the fall in the international bond markets in the first quarter of 1994, the Far East and ex-Soviet bloc equity crises of 1997-99 and the collapse of the TMT equities market of 2000-01 incorporating both the large price movements and the sharp reduction in liquidity associated with these events. A second type of scenario would evaluate the sensitivity of the bank's market riskexposure to changes in the assumptions about volatilities and correlations. Applying this test would require an evaluation of the historical range of variation for volatilities and correlations and evaluation of the bank's current positions against the extreme values of the historical range. Due consideration should be given to the sharp variation that, at times, has occurred in a matter of days in periods of significant market disturbance. The four market events, cited above as examples, all involved correlations within risk factors approaching the extreme values of 1 and -1 for several days at the height of the disturbance.(c) Scenarios developed by the bank to capture the specific characteristics of its portfolio
In addition to the general scenarios prescribed by the Central Bank under (a) and (b) above, each bank should also develop its own stress scenarios which it identifies as most adverse based on the characteristics of its portfolio (e.g. any significant political or economic developments that may result in a sharp move in oil prices). Banks should provide the Central Bank with a description of the methodology used to identify and carry out the scenarios as well as with a description of the results derived from these stress tests.October 07CA-9.7.5
Once a stress scenario has been identified, it should be used for conducting stress tests at least once every quarter, as long as the scenario continues to be relevant to the bank's portfolio.
October 07CA-9.7.6
The results of all stress tests should be reviewed by senior management within 15 days from the time they are available, and should be promptly reflected in the policies and limits set by management and the Board of Directors. Moreover, if the testing reveals particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances, the Central Bank would expect the bank to take prompt steps to manage those risks appropriately (e.g., by
hedging against that outcome or reducing the size of itsexposures ).October 07CA-9.8 CA-9.8 External validation of models
CA-9.8.1
Before granting its approval for the use of internal models by a bank, the Central Bank will require that the models are validated by both the internal and external auditors of the bank. The Central Bank will review the validation procedures performed by the internal and external auditors, and may independently carry out further validation procedures.
October 07CA-9.8.2
The internal validation procedures to be carried out by the internal auditors are set out in Section CA-9.3. As stated in that Paragraph, the internal auditor's review of the overall risk management process should take place at regular intervals (not less than once every six months). The internal auditor shall make a report to senior management and the Board of Directors, in writing, of the results of the validation procedures. The report shall be made available to the Central Bank for its review.
October 07CA-9.8.3
The validation of the models by the external auditors should include, at a minimum, the following steps:
(a) Verifying and ensuring that the internal validation processes described in Section CA-9.3 are operating satisfactorily;(b) Ensuring that the formulae used in the calculation process as well as for the pricing ofoptions and other complex instruments are validated by a qualified unit, which in all cases should be independent from the trading area;(c) Checking and ensuring that the structure of the internal models is adequate with respect to the bank's activities and geographical coverage;(d) Checking the results of the bank's backtesting of its internal measurement system (i.e. comparingvalue-at-risk estimates with actual profits and losses) to ensure that the model provides a reliable measure of potential losses over time; and(e) Making sure that data flows and processes associated with the risk measurement system are transparent and accessible.October 07CA-9.8.4
The external auditors should carry out their validation/review procedures, at a minimum, once every year. Based on the above procedures, the external auditors shall make a report, in writing, on the accuracy of the bank's models, including all significant findings of their work. The report shall be addressed to the senior management and/or the Board of Directors of the bank, and a copy of the report shall be made available to the Central Bank. The mandatory annual review by the external auditors shall be carried out during the third quarter of the calendar year, and the Central Bank expects to receive their final report by 30 September each year. The results of additional validation procedures carried out by the external auditors at other times during the year, should be made available to the Central Bank promptly.
October 07CA-9.8.5
Banks are required to ensure that external auditors and the Central Bank's representatives are in a position to have easy access, whenever they judge it necessary and under appropriate procedures, to the models' specifications and parameters as well as to the results of, and the underlying inputs to, their
value-at-risk calculations.October 07CA-9.9 CA-9.9 Letter of model recognition
CA-9.9.1
As stated in Section CA-9.1, banks which propose to use internal models for the calculation of their market risk capital requirements should submit their detailed proposals, in writing, to the Central Bank. The Central Bank will review these proposals, and upon ensuring that the bank's internal models meet all the criteria for recognition set out earlier in this Chapter, and after satisfying itself with the results of validation procedures carried out by the internal and external auditors and/or by itself, will issue a letter of model recognition to the bank.
October 07CA-9.9.2
The letter of model recognition should be specific. It will set out the products covered, the method for calculating capital requirements on the products and the conditions of model recognition. In the case of pre-processing models, the bank will also be told how the output of recognised models should feed into the processing of other interest rate, equity, foreign exchange and
commodities risk. The conditions of model recognition may include additional reporting requirements. The Central Bank's prior written approval should be obtained for any modifications proposed to be made to the models previously recognised by the Central Bank. In cases where a bank proposes to apply the model to new but similar products, there will be a requirement to obtain the Central Bank's prior approval. In some cases, the Central Bank may be able to give provisional approval for the model to be applied to a new class of products, in others it will be necessary to revisit the bank.October 07CA-9.9.3
The Central Bank may withdraw its approval granted for any bank's model if it believes that the conditions on which the approval was based are no longer valid or have changed significantly.
October 07CA-9.10 CA-9.10 Combination of internal models and the standardised methodology
CA-9.10.1
Unless a bank's
exposure to a particular risk factor is insignificant, the internal models approach will, in principle, require banks to have an integrated risk measurement system that captures the broad risk factor categories (i.e. interest rates, exchange rates (which includes gold), equity prices andcommodity prices, with relatedoptions volatilities being included in each risk factor Category). Thus, banks which start to use models for one or more risk factor categories will, over a reasonable period of time, be expected to extend the models to all their market risks.October 07CA-9.10.2
A bank which has obtained the Central Bank's approval for the use of one or more models will no longer be able to revert to measuring the risk measured by those models according to the standardised methodology (unless the Central Bank withdraws its approval for the model(s), as explained in Section CA-9.9). However, what constitutes a reasonable period of time for an individual bank which uses a combination of internal models and the standardised methodology to move to a comprehensive model, will be decided by the Central Bank after taking into account the relevant circumstances of the bank.
October 07CA-9.10.3
Notwithstanding the goal of moving to comprehensive internal models as set out in Paragraph CA-9.10.1 above, for banks which, for the time being, will be using a combination of internal models and the standardised methodology, the following conditions will apply:
(a) Each broad risk factor Category must be assessed using a single approach (either internal models or the standardised approach), i.e. no combination of the two methods will, in principle, be permitted within a risk factor Category or across a bank's different entities for the same type of risk (see, however, the transitional provisions in Section CA-1.6)22;(b) All of the criteria laid down in this Chapter will apply to the models being used;(c) Banks may not modify the combination of the two approaches which they are using, without justifying to the Central Bank that they have a valid reason for doing so, and obtaining the Central Bank's prior written approval;(d) No element of market risk may escape measurement, i.e. theexposure for all the various risk factors, whether calculated according to the standardised approach or internal models, would have to be captured; and(e) The capital charges assessed under the standardised approach and under the models approach should be aggregated using the simple sum method.
22 However, banks may incur risks in positions which are not captured by their models, for example, in minor currencies or in negligible business areas. Such risks should be measured according to the standard methodology.
October 07CA-9.11 CA-9.11 Treatment of specific risk
CA-9.11.1
Banks using models will be permitted to base their specific risk capital charge on modelled estimates if they meet all of the qualitative and quantitative requirements for general risk models as well as the additional criteria set out in Paragraph CA-9.11.2. Banks which are unable to meet these additional criteria will be required to base their specific risk capital charge on the full amount of the specific risk charge calculated by the standardised methodology (as illustrated in Chapters CA-4 to CA-8).
October 07CA-9.11.2
The criteria for applying modelled estimates of specific risk require that a bank's model:
• Explain the historical price variation in the portfolio23;• Demonstrably capture concentration (magnitude and changes in composition)24;• Be robust to an adverse environment25; and• Be validated through backtesting aimed at assessing whether specific risk is being accurately captured.In addition, the bank must be able to demonstrate that it has methodologies in place which allow it to adequately capture event and
default risk for its traded debt and equity positions.
23 The key measurement of model quality are 'goodness-of-fit' measures which address the question of how much of the historical variation in price value is explained by the model. One measure of this type which can often be used is an R-squared measure from regression methodology. If this measure is to be used, the bank's model would be expected to be able to explain a high percentage, such as 90%, of the historical price variation or to explicitly include estimates of the residual variability not captured in the factors included in this regression. For some types of model, it may not be feasible to calculate a goodness-of-fit measure. In such an instance, a bank is expected to contact the Central Bank to define an acceptable alternative measure which would meet this regulatory objective.
24 The bank should be expected to demonstrate that the model is sensitive to changes in portfolio construction and that higher capital charges are attracted for portfolios that have increasing concentrations.
25 The bank should be able to demonstrate that the model will signal rising risk in an adverse environment. This could be achieved by incorporating in the historical estimation period of the model at least one full credit cycle and ensuring that the model would not have been inaccurate in modelling at least one full the downward portion of the cycle. Another approach for demonstrating this is through simulation of historical or plausible worst-case environments.
October 07CA-9.11.3
Banks which meet the criteria set out above for models but do not have methodologies in place to adequately capture event and
default risk will be required to calculate their specific risk capital charge based on the internal model measurements plus an additional prudential surcharge as defined in Paragraph CA-9.11.4. The surcharge is designed to treat the modelling of specific risk on the same basis as a general market risk model that has proven deficient during backtesting. That is, the equivalent of a scaling factor of four would apply to the estimate of specific risk until such time as a bank can demonstrate that the methodologies it uses adequately capture event anddefault risk. Once a bank is able to demonstrate this, the minimum multiplication factor of three can be applied. However, a higher multiplication factor of four on the modelling of specific risk would remain possible if future backtesting results were to indicate a serious deficiency in the model.October 07CA-9.11.4
For banks applying the surcharge, the total market risk measure will equal a minimum of three times the internal model's general and specific risk measure plus a surcharge in the amount of either:
(a) The specific risk portion of thevalue-at-risk measure which should be isolated26; or, at the bank's option,(b) Thevalue-at-risk measures of sub-portfolios of debt and equity positions that contain specific risk27.Banks using option (b) above are required to identify their sub-portfolios structure ahead of time and should not change it without the Central Bank's prior written consent.
26Techniques for separating general market risk and specific risk would include the following:
Equities:
The market should be identified with a single factor that is representative of the market as a whole, for example, a widely accepted broadly based stock index for the country concerned.
Banks that use factor models may assign one factor of their model, or a single linear combination of factors, as their general market risk factor.
Bonds:
The market should be identified with a reference curve for the currency concerned. For example, the curve might be a government bond
yield curve or aswap curve; in any case, the curve should be based on a well-established and liquid underlying market and should be accepted by the market as a reference curve for the currency concerned.Banks may select their own technique for identifying the specific risk component of the
value-at-risk measure for purposes of applying the multiplier of 4. Techniques would include:• Using the incremental increase invalue-at-risk arising from the modelling of specific risk factors;• Using the difference between thevalue-at-risk measure and a measure calculated by substituting each individual equity position by a representative index; or• Using an analytic separation between general market risk and specific risk by a particular model.27 This would apply to sub-portfolios containing positions that would be subject to specific risk under the standardised approach.
October 07CA-9.11.5
Banks which apply modelled estimates of specific risk are required to conduct backtesting aimed at assessing whether specific risk is being accurately captured. The methodology a bank should use for validating its specific risk estimates is to perform separate backtests on sub-portfolios using daily data on sub-portfolios subject to specific risk. The key sub-portfolios for this purpose are traded debt and equity positions. However, if a bank itself decomposes its trading portfolio into finer categories (e.g. emerging markets, traded corporate debt, etc.), it is appropriate to keep these distinctions for sub-portfolio backtesting purposes. Banks are required to commit to a sub-portfolio structure and stick to it unless it can be demonstrated to the Central Bank that it would make sense to change the structure.
October 07CA-9.11.6
Banks are required to have in place a process to analyse exceptions identified through the backtesting of specific risk. This process is intended to serve as the fundamental way in which banks correct their models of specific risk in the event they become inaccurate. There will be a presumption that models that incorporate specific risk are 'unacceptable' if the results at the sub-portfolio level produce a number of exceptions commensurate with the Red Zone28. Banks with 'unacceptable' specific risk models are expected to take immediate action to correct the problem in the model and to ensure that there is a sufficient capital buffer to absorb the risk that, the backtest showed, had not been adequately captured.
October 07CA-10 CA-10 Gearing requirements
CA-10.1 CA-10.1 Gearing
CA-10.1.1
The content of this Chapter is applicable to locally incorporated banks and Bahrain retail bank
branches of foreign banks.October 07Measurement
CA-10.1.2
The Gearing ratio is measured with reference to the ratio of
deposit liabilities against the bank's capital and reserves as reported in its PIR.October 07Gearing limit
CA-10.1.3
For Retail Bank and Wholesale Bank licensees,
deposit liabilities should not exceed 20 times the respective bank's capital and reserves.October 07CA CA Capital Adequacy (April 2008)
PART 1: PART 1: Definition of Capital
CA-A CA-A Introduction
CA-A.1 CA-A.1 Application
CA-A.1.1
Rules in this Module are applicable to locally incorporated banks (hereinafter referred to as "the banks") on both a stand-alone (i.e. including their foreign branches) and on a consolidated group basis (i.e. including their subsidiaries and any other investments which are included or consolidated into the group accounts or which are required to be consolidated or aggregated for regulatory purposes by the Central Bank of Bahrain ('CBB').
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.1.2
If the banks have investments in banking, securities, financial, insurance and/or commercial entities, the banks will also need to apply rules set out in the Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module (Module PCD) for the calculation of their solo and consolidated Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR).
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.1.3
Certain of the requirements relating to gearing (See Chapter CA-15) also apply to Bahrain branches of foreign retail bank licensees.
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.2 CA-A.2 Purpose
Executive Summary
CA-A.2.1
The purpose of this module is to set out the CBB's
capital adequacy Rules and provide guidance on the risk measurements for the calculation of capital requirements by locally incorporated banks. This requirement is supported by Article 44(c) of the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law (Decree No. 64 of 2006).Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.2.2
Principle 9 of the Principles of Business requires that
conventional bank licensees maintain adequate human, financial and other resources, sufficient to run their business in an orderly manner (see Section PB-1.9). In addition, Condition 5 of CBB's Licensing Conditions (Section LR-2.5) requiresconventional bank licensees to maintain financial resources in excess of the minimum requirements specified in Module CA (Capital Adequacy).Apr 08CA-A.2.3
This Module also sets out the minimum gearing requirements which relevant banks (referred to in Section CA-A.1) must meet as a condition of their licensing.
Apr 08CA-A.2.4
The requirements specified in this Module vary according to the Category of
conventional bank licensee concerned, their inherent risk profile, and the volume and type of business undertaken. The purpose of such requirements is to ensure thatconventional bank licensees hold sufficient capital to provide some protection against unexpected losses, and otherwise allow conventional banks to effect an orderly wind-down of their operations, without loss to their depositors. The minimum capital requirements specified here may not be sufficient to absorb all unexpected losses.Apr 08CA-A.2.5
The CBB requires in particular that the banks maintain adequate capital, in accordance with the requirements of this Module, against their risks.
Apr 08CA-A.2.6
This module provides support for certain other parts of the Rulebook, mainly:
(a) Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements;(b) Licensing and Authorisation Requirements;(c) CBB Reporting Requirements;(d) Credit Risk Management;(e) Operational Risk Management;(f) High Level Controls:(g) Relationship with Audit Firms; and(h) Penalties and Fines.Apr 08Legal Basis
CA-A.2.7
This Module contains the CBB's Directive (as amended from time to time) relating to the capital adequacy of
conventional bank licensees , and is issued under the powers available to the CBB under Article 38 of the CBB Law. The Directive in this Module is applicable to allconventional bank licensees .Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.2.8
For an explanation of the CBB's rule-making powers and different regulatory instruments, see Section UG-1.1.
Adopted: January 2011CA-A.3 CA-A.3 Capital Adequacy Ratio
CA-A.3.1
Historically, on a consolidated basis, the CBB has set a minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio ("CAR") of 12.0% for all locally incorporated banks. Furthermore, on a solo basis, the parent bank has been required to maintain a minimum CAR of 8.0% (i.e. unconsolidated). The arrangements outlined below will apply once banks have been subject to a Pillar 2 risk profile assessment by the CBB or an acceptable audit firm. Until such an assessment has been completed, the existing 12% and 8% minimum capital ratio requirements (as outlined in Module CA-2.5 October 2006 edition) will remain in place.
Apr 08CA-A.3.2
CAR is calculated by applying the regulatory capital to the numerator and risk-weighted assets to the denominator.
Apr 08CA-A.3.3
All locally incorporated banks are required to maintain a capital ratio both on a solo (and a consolidated basis where applicable) above the minimum "trigger" CAR of 8%. Failure to remain above the trigger ratio will result in Enforcement and other measures as outlined in Section CA-1.4.
Apr 08CA-A.3.4
All locally incorporated banks will be required to maintain capital ratios above individually set "target" CARs on a solo and on a consolidated basis. These target CARs will be set at an initial minimum of 8.5% and may in the case of high risk banks be set at levels above the 12.5% target ratio set prior to January 2008. Failure to remain above the target ratio will result in Enforcement and other measures as outlined in Section CA-1.4.
Apr 08Eligible Capital
CA-A.3.5
Banks are allowed three classes of capital (see section CA-2.1) to meet their capital requirements for credit, operational and market risk, as set out below:
Tier 1: Core capital — May be used to support credit, operational and market risk
Tier 2: Supplementary capital — May be used to support credit, operational and market risk; and
Tier 3: Ancillary capital — May be used solely to support market risk.
Apr 08Risk-weighted Assets
CA-A.3.6
Total risk-weighted assets are determined by:
(a) Multiplying the capital requirements for market risk and operational risk by 12.5; and(b) Adding the resulting figures to the sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk.Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.3.7
For the measurement of their credit risks, banks have a choice, subject to the written approval of the CBB, between two broad methodologies:
(a) One alternative is to measure the risks in a standardised approach, applying the measurement framework described in Chapter CA-3 of this Module; and(b) The second methodology (i.e. internal ratings-based approach) is set out in detail in Chapter CA-5 including the procedure for obtaining the CBB's approval. This methodology is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. The use of this methodology is, therefore, conditional upon the explicit approval of the CBB.Amended: April 2011
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.3.8
Credit risk — Securitization framework is set out in Chapter CA-6. Banks must apply the securitisation framework for determining regulatory capital requirements on exposures arising from traditional and synthetic securitisations or similar structures that contain features common to both.
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.3.9
For the measurement of their operational risks, banks have a choice, subject to the written approval of the CBB, between two broad methodologies:
(a) One alternative is to measure the risks in a basic indicator approach, applying the measurement framework described in Chapter CA-7 of this Module; and(b) The second alternative methodology (i.e. the standardised approach) is set out in detail in Chapter CA-7 including the procedure for obtaining the CBB's approval. This methodology is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions (as outlined in Module OM).The use of this methodology is, therefore, conditional upon the explicit approval of the CBB.Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.3.10
For the measurement of their market risk, banks have a choice, subject to the written approval of the CBB, between two broad methodologies:
(a) One alternative is to measure the risks in a standardised approach, applying the measurement frameworks described in Chapters CA-9 to CA-13 of this Module; and(b) The second alternative methodology (i.e. the internal models approach) is set out in detail in Chapter CA-14 including the procedure for obtaining the CBB's approval. This methodology is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. The use of this methodology is, therefore, conditional upon the explicit approval of the CBB.Amended: April 2011
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4 CA-A.4 Transitional Arrangements
CA-A.4.1
For banks applying the IRB approach for credit risk, there will be a capital floor following implementation of this Module. Banks must calculate the difference between: (i) the floor as defined in Paragraph CA-A.4.2 and (ii) the amount as calculated according to Paragraph CA-A.4.3. If the floor amount is larger, banks are required to add 12.5 times the difference to the risk-weighted assets.
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4.2
The capital floor is based on previous capital adequacy Rules issued by CBB dated July 2004. It is derived by applying an adjustment factor to the following amount: (i) 8% of the risk-weighted assets, (ii) plus Tier 1 and Tier 2 deductions. The adjustment factor for banks applying the foundation IRB approach for the year 2008 is 95%. The adjustment factor for the year 2009 is 90%, and for the year 2010 is 80%. The following table illustrates the application of the adjustment factors. Additional transitional arrangements including parallel calculation are set out in Paragraphs CA-5.2.45 to CA-5.2.51.
2008 2009 2010 Foundation IRB approach 95% 90% 80% Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4.3
In the years in which the floor applies, banks must also calculate (i) 8% of total risk-weighted assets as calculated under this Module, (ii) less the difference between total provisions and expected loss amount as described in Section CA-5.7, and (iii) plus other Tier 1 and Tier 2 deductions.
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4.4
These prudential floors are also applicable to banks that that do not complete the transition to IRB approach in the years specified in Paragraph CA-2.4.2 to provide time to ensure that individual bank implementations of the IRB approach are sound. However, CBB may develop appropriate bank-by-bank floors periodically.
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4.5
Banks which start to use internal models for market risk for one or more risk categories should, over a reasonable period of time, extend the models to all of their operations, subject to the exceptions mentioned in Paragraph CA-A.4.6 below, and move towards a comprehensive model (i.e., one which captures all market risk categories).
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4.6
On a transitional basis, banks will be allowed to use a combination of the standardised approach and the internal models approach to measure their market risks provided they should cover a complete risk category (e.g., interest rate risk or foreign exchange risk), i.e., a combination of the two methods will not be allowed within the same risk category1. However, banks presently implementing or further improving their internal models will be allowed some flexibility (including within risk categories) in including all their operations on a worldwide basis. This flexibility shall be subject to the specific prior written approval of the CBB, and such approval will be given on a case-by-case basis and reviewed by the CBB from time to time.
1 This does not, however, apply to pre-processing techniques which are used to simplify the calculation and whose results become subject to the standardised methodology.
Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4.7
The CBB will closely monitor banks to ensure that there will be no "cherry-picking" between the standardised approach and the models approach for market risk within a risk category. Banks which adopt a model will not be permitted, save in exceptional circumstances, to revert to the standardised approach.
Apr 08CA-A.4.8
The CBB recognises that even a bank which uses a comprehensive model for market risk may still incur risks in positions which are not captured by their internal models2, for example, in remote locations, in minor currencies or in negligible business areas3. Any such risks that are not included in a model should be separately measured and reported using the standardised approach described in Chapters CA-9 to CA-13.
2 Banks may also incur interest rate and equity risks outside of their trading activities. However, there are no explicit capital charges for the
price risk in such positions.3 For example, if a bank is hardly at all engaged in
commodities it will not necessarily be expected to model itscommodities risk.Amended: January 2011
Apr 08CA-A.4.9
Transitioning banks are required to move towards a comprehensive internal model approach for market risk.
Apr 08CA-A.4.10
The CBB will closely monitor the risk management practices of banks moving towards the models approach for market risk, to ensure that they are in a position to meet all standards once they apply a full-fledged model for any risk category.
Apr 08CA-A.5 CA-A.5 Module History
CA-A.5.1
This module was first issued in July 2004 as part of the conventional principles volume. Any material changes that have subsequently been made to this module are annotated with the calendar quarter date in which the changes were made. Chapter UG-3 provides further guidance on Rulebook maintenance and version control.
Amended: January 2011CA-A.5.1A
The most recent changes are detailed in the Table below.
Summary of Changes
Module Ref. Change Date Description of Changes CA-A.2 10/07 Change categorising Module as a Directive CA-1 to CA-8 01/08 Extensive changes to implement Basel II CA-3.4 04/08 Recognition and mapping of grades for Capital Intelligence CA-3.2.15–18 01/09 New guidance and rules on SMEs CA-A 01/2011 Various minor amendments to ensure consistency in CBB Rulebook. CA-A.2.7 01/2011 Clarified legal basis. CA-6, CA-8, CA-9, CA-10, CA-14 & CA-16 01/2012 Changes in respect of July 2009 and February 2011 amendments to Basel II. CA-3.2.10 and CA-3.2.11A 04/2012 Amendment made for claims on banks dealing with self-liquidating letters of credit. CA-2.1.5, CA-2.1.5A and CA-2.1.5B 04/2013 Clarified Rules dealing with subordinated debt issued. CA-2.1.5(h) 10/2013 Added Rule to include limited general provision against unidentified future losses as part of Tier 2. CA-11.3.7 10/2013 Clarified Rules for excluding positions of a structural nature from the calculation of the net open currency positions. Evolution of Module
CA-A.5.2
Prior to the development of this Module, the CBB had issued various circulars representing regulations relating to
capital adequacy requirements. These circulars and their incorporation into this module are listed below:Circular Ref. Date of Issue Module Ref. Circular Subject ODG/50/98 11 Sep 1998 CA-8 – CA-14 Market Risk Capital Regulations BC/07/02 26 Jun 2002 CA-1.5 Review of PIR by External Auditors OG/78/01 20 Feb 2001 CA-A.3 & CA-1.4 Monitoring of Capital Adequacy BC/01/98 10 Jan 1998 CA-A.3 & CA-1.4 Capital Adequacy Ratio Apr 08CA-A.5.3
The contents retained from the previous Module (Capital Adequacy – Conventional Banks) are effective from the date depicted in the above circulars (see Paragraph CA-A.5.2) or from the dates mentioned in the Summary of Changes. The remainder of the updated Module is effective from January 01, 2008.
Apr 08CA-1 CA-1 Scope and Coverage of Capital Charges
CA-1.1 CA-1.1 Application
CA-1.1.1
All locally incorporated banks are required to measure and apply capital charges with respect to their credit, operational and market risks capital requirements.
Apr 08CA-1.1.2
Credit risk is defined as the potential that a bank's borrower or
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. Credit risk exists throughout the activities of a bank in the banking book and in the trading book and includes both on- and off-balance-sheetexposures. Apr 08CA-1.1.3
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk,2 but excludes strategic and reputational risk.
2 Legal risk includes, but is not limited to, exposure to fines, penalties, or punitive damages resulting from supervisory actions, as well as private settlements.
Apr 08CA-1.1.4
Market risk is defined as the risk of loss in on- or off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market prices. The risks subject to the capital requirement of this module are:
(a) The risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book; and(b) Foreign exchange and commodities risks throughout the bank.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-1.2 CA-1.2 Monitoring of Risks
CA-1.2.1
Banks are required to manage their risks, especially market risk, in such a way that the capital requirements are being met on a continuous basis, i.e. at the close of each business day and not merely at the end of each calendar quarter. Banks are also required to maintain strict risk management systems to ensure that their intra-day
exposures are not excessive.Apr 08CA-1.2.2
Banks' daily compliance with the capital requirements for credit and market risk must be verified by the independent risk management department and the internal auditor. It is expected that the external auditors will perform appropriate tests of the banks' daily compliance with the capital requirements for credit and market risk. Where a bank fails to meet the minimum capital requirements for credit and market risk on any business day, the CBB must be informed in writing by no later than the following business day. The CBB will then seek to ensure that the bank takes immediate measures to rectify the situation.
Apr 08CA-1.3 CA-1.3 Investments in other Entities and Consolidation
CA-1.3.1
The banks must also apply rules set in the Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module where the bank has significant investments (as defined in the aforementioned Module) in other entities.
Apr 08CA-1.3.2
These capital adequacy regulations must be applied on a worldwide consolidated basis as well as on a solo basis. Guidance on consolidation and related matters is provided in the Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module.
Apr 08CA-1.4 CA-1.4 Reporting
CA-1.4.1
Formal reporting, to the CBB, of capital adequacy must be made in accordance with the requirements set out under section BR-3.1.
Apr 08CA-1.4.2
Where a bank's CAR falls below its individual target ratio either on a solo basis (or on a consolidated basis), the General Manager of the bank must notify the CBB by the following business day, however no formal action plan will be necessary. The General Manager must explain what measures are being implemented to ensure that the bank will remain above its minimum target CAR(s).
Apr 08CA-1.4.3
The bank will be required to submit form PIR (and PIRC where applicable) to the CBB on a monthly basis, until the concerned CAR exceeds its target ratio.
Apr 08CA-1.4.4
The CBB will notify banks in writing of any action required of them with regard to the corrective and preventive action (as appropriate) proposed by the bank pursuant to the above, as well as of any other requirement of the CBB in any particular case.
Apr 08CA-1.4.5
All locally incorporated banks must provide the CBB, with immediate written notification (i.e. by no later than the following business day) of any actual breach of the minimum trigger CAR of 8%. Where such notification is given, the bank must also provide the CBB:
(a) No later than one calendar week after the notification, with a written action plan setting out how the bank proposes to restore the relevant CAR(s) to the required minimum level(s) set out above and, further, describing how the bank will ensure that a breach of such CAR(s) will not occur again in the future; and(b) Report on a weekly basis thereafter on the bank's relevant CAR(s) until such CAR(s) have reached the required target level(s) described above.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-1.4.6
Banks must note that the CBB considers the breach of CARs to be a very serious matter. Consequently, the CBB may (at its discretion) subject a bank which breaches its CAR(s) to a formal licensing reappraisal. Such reappraisal may be effected either through the CBB's own inspection function or through the use of Reporting Accountants, as appropriate. Following such appraisal, the CBB will notify the bank concerned in writing of its conclusions with regard to the continued licensing of the bank.
Apr 08CA-1.4.7
The CBB recommends that the bank's compliance officer support and cooperate with the CBB in the monitoring and reporting of the CARs and other regulatory reporting matters. Compliance officers should ensure that their banks have adequate internal systems and controls to comply with these regulations.
Apr 08CA-1.5 CA-1.5 Review of Prudential Information Returns by External Auditors
CA-1.5.1
The CBB requires all relevant banks to request their external auditors to conduct a review of the prudential returns on a quarterly basis in accordance with the requirements set out under section BR-3.1. However, if a bank provides prudential returns without any reservation from auditors for two consecutive quarters, it can apply for exemption from such review for a period to be decided by CBB.
Apr 08CA-2 CA-2 Regulatory Capital
CA-2.1 CA-2.1 Regulatory Capital
Tier 1: Core Capital
CA-2.1.1
Tier 1 capital shall consist of the sum of items (a) to (f) below, less the sum of items (g) to (k) below:
(a) Issued and fully paid ordinary shares and perpetual non-cumulative preference shares, but excluding cumulative preference shares;(b) Certain innovative capital instruments such as instruments with step-ups, subject to the fulfilment of criteria given in paragraph CA-2.1.2 to CA-2.1.4 and the limit given in paragraph CA-2.2.2.(c) Disclosed reserves, including:• General reserves• Legal / statutory reserves• Share premium• Capital redemption reserve• Excluding fair value reserves3(d) Retained profit brought forward;(e) Unrealized net gains arising from fair valuing equities4; and(f) Minority interest in subsidiaries Tier 1 equity. arising on consolidation, in the equity of subsidiaries which are less than wholly owned. Further guidance on minority interests is provided in paragraphs PCD-A.2.11, PCD-1.1.3 and PCD-1.1.4 of the Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module.LESS:
(g) Goodwill;(h) Current interim cumulative net losses;(i) Unrealized gross losses arising from fair valuing equity securities5;(j) Other deductions made on a pro-rata basis between Tier 1 and Tier 2;(k) Reciprocal cross holdings of other banks' capital.
3 This refers to unrealised fair value gains reported directly in equity (such gross gains are included in Tier 2).
4 This refers to unrealised net fair value gains taken through P&L (which have been audited). Please note that the unrealised net gains related to unlisted equities taken through P&L arising on or after January 1, 2008 will be subject to 55% discount as stated in CA-2.1.5(c)ii.
5 This refers to both 'net losses taken through P&L' and 'gross losses reported directly in equity'.
Apr 08CA-2.1.2
Certain innovative capital instruments agreed to on a case by case basis by CBB, where the underlying instrument meets the following requirements which must, at a minimum, be fulfilled by all instruments in Tier 1:
(a) Issued and fully paid;(b) Non-cumulative;(c) Able to absorb losses within the bank on a going-concern basis;(d) Junior to depositors, general creditors, and subordinated debt of the bank;(e) Permanent;(f) Neither be secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or related entity or other arrangement that legally or economically enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-vis bank creditors;(g) Callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum of five years, with CBB approval and under the condition that it will be replaced with capital of same or better quality, unless the CBB determines that the bank has capital that is more than adequate to cover its risks.(h) The main features of such instruments must be easily understood and publicly disclosed;(i) Proceeds must be immediately available without limitation to the issuing bank;(j) The bank must have discretion over the amount and timing of distributions, subject only to prior waiver of distributions on the bank's common stock, and banks must have full access to waived payments; and(k) Distributions can only be paid out of distributable items; where distributions are pre-set they may not be reset based on the credit standing of the issuer.Apr 08CA-2.1.3
Moderate step-ups in such instruments meeting the requirements set forth above, are permitted, in conjunction with a call option, only if the moderate step-up occurs at a minimum of ten years after the issue date and if it results in an increase over the initial rate that is no greater than either;
(a) 100 basis points, less the swap spread between the initial index basis and the stepped-up index basis; or(b) 50% of the initial credit spread, less the swap spread between the initial index basis and the stepped-up index basis.Apr 08CA-2.1.4
The terms of the instrument should provide for no more than one rate step-up over the life of the instrument. The swap spread should be fixed as of the pricing date and reflect the differential in pricing on that date between the initial reference security or rate and the stepped-up reference security or rate.
Apr 08Tier 2: Supplementary Capital
CA-2.1.5
Tier 2 capital shall consist of the following items:
(a) Current interim profits which have been reviewed as per the ISA by the external auditors;(b)Asset revaluation reserves which arise from the revaluation of fixed assets from time to time in line with the change in market values, and are reflected on the face of the balance sheet as a revaluation reserve. Similarly, gains may also arise from revaluation of Investment Properties (real estate). These reserves (including the net gains on investment properties) may be included in Tier 2 capital, with the concurrence of the external auditors, provided that the assets are prudently valued, fully reflecting the possibility of price fluctuation and forced sale. A discount of 55% must be applied to the difference between the historical cost book value and the market value to reflect the potential volatility of this form of unrealised capital;(c) Unrealized gains arising from fair valuing equities:(i) For unrealized gross gains reported directly in equity, a discount factor of 55% will be applied before inclusion in Tier 2 capital. Note for gross losses, the whole amount of such loss should be deducted from the Tier 1 capital;(ii) For unrealized net gains reported in income, a discount factor of 55% will apply on any such unrealized net gains from unlisted equity instruments before inclusion in Tier 1 capital (for audited gains) or Tier 2 capital (for reviewed gains) as appropriate. This discount factor will be applied to the incremental net gains related to unlisted equities arising on or after January 1, 2008;(d) Banks should note that the Central Bank will discuss the applicability of the discount factor under paragraph (c) above with individual banks. This discount factor relating to CA-2.1.5(c)ii may be reassessed by the CBB if the bank arranges an independent review (which has been performed for the bank's systems and controls relating to FV gains on financial instruments) and meets all the requirements of the paper 'Supervisory guidance on the use of the fair value option for financial instruments by banks' issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in June 2006;(e) Banks applying the IRB approach for securitisation exposures or the PD/LGD approach for equity exposures must first deduct the expected loss (EL) amounts subject to the corresponding conditions in paragraphs CA-6.4.4 and CA-5.7.13, respectively. Banks applying the IRB approach for other asset classes must compare (i) the amount of total eligible provisions, as defined in paragraph CA-5.7.7, with (ii) the total expected losses amount as calculated within the IRB approach and defined in paragraph CA-5.7.2. Where the total expected loss amount exceeds total eligible provisions, banks must deduct the difference. Deduction must be on the basis of 50% from Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 2. Where the total expected loss amount is less than total eligible provisions, as explained in paragraphs CA-5.7.7 to CA-5.7.10, banks may recognise the difference in Tier 2 capital up to a maximum of 0.6% of credit risk-weighted assets. The provisions in excess of 0.6% of credit risk-weighted assets will be deducted from the risk-weighted assets of the related portfolio to which these provisions relate;(f)Hybrid instruments , which include a range of instruments that combine characteristics of equity capital and debt, and which meet the following requirements:• They are unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up;• They are not redeemable at the initiative of the holder or without the prior consent of the CBB;• They are available to participate in losses without the bank being obliged to cease trading (unlike conventional subordinated debt); and• Although the capital instrument may carry an obligation to pay interest that cannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike dividends on ordinary shareholders' equity), it should allow service obligations to be deferred (as with cumulative preference shares) where the profitability of the bank would not support payment. Cumulative preference shares, having the above characteristics, would be eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 capital. Debt capital instruments which do not meet the above criteria may be eligible for inclusion in item (g);(g) Subordinated term debt, which comprises all conventional unsecured borrowing subordinated (with respect to both interest and principal) to all other liabilities of the bank except the share capital and limited life redeemable preference shares. To be eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 capital, subordinated debt capital instruments should have a minimum original fixed term to maturity of over five years. During the last five years to maturity, a cumulative discount (or amortisation) factor of 20% per year will be applied to reflect the diminishing value of these instruments as a continuing source of strength. Unlike instruments included in item (f) above, these instruments are not normally available to participate in the losses of a bank which continues trading. For this reason, these instruments will be limited to a maximum of 50% of Tier 1 capital. Subordinated debt instruments must also satisfy the conditions outlined in paragraphs CA-2.1.2 (a), (f), (h), (i), (j), CA-2.1.3 and CA-2.1.4; and(h) Loan loss provisions held against future, presently unidentified losses and are freely available to meet such losses which subsequently materialise. Such general provisions/general loan-loss reserves eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 will be limited to a maximum of 1.25 percentage points of credit risk-weighted risk assets. Provisions ascribed to identified deterioration of particular assets or known liabilities, whether individual or grouped, must be excluded.Amended: October 2013
Amended: April 2013
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-2.1.5A
A bank may not exercise a call on a subordinated debt issue, partially or in full, prior to the end of its term, unless it has received the CBB's prior written approval, and there is a clear statement in support of the call in the original documentation.
Added: April 2013CA-2.1.5B
Where Paragraph CA-2.1.5A applies, the CBB will take into consideration whether the bank has received confirmation from its external auditor that the bank will continue to satisfy the CBB's capital adequacy requirements after such early call and the bank has sufficient liquidity to repay the debt. This can be done by assessing the impact of such redemption on the capital adequacy ratio of the bank.
Added: April 2013Tier 3: Market Risk Ancillary Capital
CA-2.1.6
Tier 3 capital will consist of short-term subordinated debt which, if circumstances demand, must be capable of becoming part of the bank's permanent capital and thus be available to absorb losses in the event of insolvency. It must therefore, at a minimum, meet the following conditions:
(a) Be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid up;(b) Have an original maturity of at least two years;(c) Not be repayable before the agreed repayment date; and(d) Be subject to a lock-in clause which stipulates that neither interest nor principal may be paid (even at maturity) if such payment means that the bank falls below or remains below its minimum capital requirement.Apr 08CA-2.2 CA-2.2 Limits on the Use of Different Forms of Capital
Tier 1: Core Capital
CA-2.2.1
Tier 1 capital must represent at least half of the total eligible capital after all adjustments to all elements of capital, have been made. i.e., the sum total of Tier 2 plus Tier 3 eligible capital must not exceed total Tier 1 eligible capital.
Apr 08CA-2.2.2
The CBB expects banks to meet the minimum CARs without undue reliance on innovative instruments, including instruments that have a step-up. Accordingly, the aggregate of issuances of non-common equity Tier 1 instruments with any explicit feature, (other than a pure call option), which might lead to the instrument being redeemed is limited (at issuance) to 15% of the consolidated bank's Tier 1 capital.
Apr 08CA-2.2.3
The limits on innovative Tier 1 instruments and Tier 2 subordinated debt are based on the amount of Tier 1 capital after deduction of goodwill pursuant to the Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module (see Appendix CA-1 for an example how to calculate the 15% limit for innovative Tier 1 instruments and Appendix PCD-2 of PCD module for an example of the deduction effects and the caps).
Apr 08Tier 2: Supplementary Capital
CA-2.2.4
Tier 2 elements may be substituted for Tier 3 up to the Tier 3 limit of 250% of Tier 1 capital (as below) in so far as eligible Tier 2 capital does not exceed total Tier 1 capital, and long-term subordinated debt does not exceed 50% of Tier 1 capital after deduction of goodwill.
Apr 08Tier 3: Ancillary Capital
CA-2.2.5
Tier 3 capital is limited to 250% of a bank's Tier 1 capital that is required to support market risks. This means that a minimum of about 28.57% of market risks needs to be supported by Tier 1 capital that is not required to support risks in the remainder of the book.
Apr 08CA-2.2.6
Banks are entitled to use Tier 3 capital solely to support market risks as defined in chapters CA-9 to CA-14. This means that any capital requirement arising in respect of credit and counterparty risk, including the credit counterparty risk in respect of derivatives in both trading and banking books, needs to be met by Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.
Apr 08PART 2: PART 2: Credit Risk
CA-3 CA-3 Credit Risk — The Standardized Approach
CA-3.1 CA-3.1 Overview
CA-3.1.1
Basel II identifies two methodologies for calculating capital requirements for credit risk. This module sets out the rules relating to the standardized approach. The internal rating-based approach (IRB) and securitization framework are presented in a separate module. The standardized approach makes use of external credit assessments6 as a means of calculating the risk weight for an exposure to a counterparty.
6 The notations follow the methodology used by one institution, Standard & Poor's. The use of Standard & Poor's credit ratings is an example only; those of some other external credit assessment institutions could equally well be used. The ratings used throughout this document, therefore, do not express any preferences or determinations on external assessment institutions by CBB.
Apr 08CA-3.1.2
The credit equivalent amount of Securities Financing Transactions (SFT)7 and OTC derivatives that expose a bank to counterparty credit risk8 is to be calculated under the rules set forth in Appendix CA-2.
7 Securities Financing Transactions (SFT) are transactions such as repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, security lending and borrowing, and margin lending transactions, where the value of the transactions depends on the market valuations and the transactions are often subject to margin agreements.
8 The counterparty credit risk is defined as the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows. An economic loss would occur if the transactions or portfolio of transactions with the counterparty has a positive economic value at the time of default. Unlike a firm's exposure to credit risk through a loan, where the exposure to credit risk is unilateral and only the lending bank faces the risk of loss, the counterparty credit risk creates a bilateral risk of loss: the market value of the transaction can be positive or negative to either counterparty to the transaction. The market value is uncertain and can vary over time with the movement of underlying market factors.
Apr 08CA-3.1.3
In determining the risk weights in the standardised approach, banks must use assessments by only those external credit assessment institutions which are recognised as eligible for capital purposes by CBB in accordance with the criteria defined in section CA-3.4.
Apr 08CA-3.1.4
Exposures must be risk-weighted net of specific provisions and taking eligible financial collateral. Where a discount is applied on fair value of an asset (as explained in CA-2.1.5), the value of the asset will be adjusted to exclude that discount part. Refer to appendix CA-17.
Apr 08CA-3.2 CA-3.2 Segregation of Claims
Claims on Sovereigns
CA-3.2.1
Claims on governments of GCC member states (hereinafter referred to as GCC) and their central banks can be risk weighted at 0%. Claims on other sovereigns and their central banks are given a preferential risk weighting of 0% where such claims are denominated and funded in the relevant domestic currency of that sovereign/central bank (e.g. if a Bahraini bank has a claim on government of Australia and the loan is denominated and funded in Australian dollar, it will be risk weighted at 0%). Such preferential risk weight for claims on GCC/other sovereigns and their central banks will be allowed only if the relevant supervisor also allows 0% risk weighting to claims on its sovereign and central bank.
Apr 08CA-3.2.2
Claims on sovereigns other than those referred to in the previous paragraph must be assigned risk weights as follows:
Credit Assessment AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% Apr 08Claims on International Organizations
CA-3.2.3
Claims on the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank must receive a 0% risk weight.
Apr 08Claims on Non-central Government Public Sectors Entities (PSEs)
CA-3.2.4
Claims on the Bahraini PSEs listed in Appendix CA-18 will be treated as claims on the government of Bahrain.
Apr 08CA-3.2.5
Where other supervisors also treat claims on named PSEs as claims on their sovereigns, claims to those PSEs are treated as claims on the respective sovereigns as outlined in paragraphs CA-3.2.1 and CA-3.2.2 above. These PSE's must be shown on a list maintained by the concerned central bank or financial regulator. Where PSE's are not on such a list, they must be subject to the treatment outlined in paragraph CA-3.2.6 below.
Apr 08CA-3.2.6
Claims on all other (foreign) PSEs (i.e. not having sovereign treatment) denominated and funded in the home currency of the sovereign must be risk weighted as allowed by their home country supervisors, provided the sovereign carries rating BBB- or above. Claims on PSEs with no explicit home country weighting or to PSEs in countries of BB+ sovereign rating and below are subject to ECAI ratings as per the following table:
Credit Assessment AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% Apr 08Claims on Multilateral Development Banks (MDB's)
CA-3.2.8
MDB's currently eligible for a 0% risk weight are: the World Bank Group comprised of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Investment Fund (EIF), the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEDB), the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA), Council of European Resettlement Fund (CERF) and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED).
Apr 08CA-3.2.9
The claims on MDB's, which do not qualify for the 0% risk weighting, should be assigned risk weights as follows:
Banks Credit Quality Grades AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Un-rated Risk weights 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50% Apr 08Claims on Banks
CA-3.2.10
Claims on banks must be risk weighted as given in the following table. No claim on an unrated bank may receive a risk weight lower than that applied to claims on its sovereign of incorporation (see Guidance in Paragraph CA-3.2.11A for self-liquidating letters of credit).
Banks Credit Quality Grades AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Un-rated Standard risk weights 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50% Preferential risk weight 20% 20% 20% 50% 150% 20% Amended: April 2012
April 2008CA-3.2.11
Short-term claims on locally incorporated banks may be assigned a risk weighting of 20% where such claims on the banks are of an original maturity of 3 months or less denominated and funded in either BD or US$. A preferential risk weight that is one category more favourable than the standard risk weighting may be assigned to claims on foreign banks licensed in Bahrain of an original maturity of 3 months or less denominated and funded in the relevant domestic currency (other than claims on banks that are rated below B-). Such preferential risk weight for short-term claims on banks licensed in other jurisdictions will be allowed only if the relevant supervisor also allows this preferential risk weighting to short-term claims on its banks.
Apr 08CA-3.2.11A
Self-liquidating letters of credit issued or confirmed by an unrated bank will be allowed a risk weighting of 50% or 20% without reference to the risk weight of the sovereign of incorporation. All other claims will be subject to the 'sovereign floor' of the country of incorporation of the concerned issuing or confirming bank.
Added: April 2012CA-3.2.12
Claims with an (contractual) original maturity under 3 months that are expected to be rolled over (i.e. where the effective maturity is longer than 3 months) will not qualify for a preferential treatment for capital adequacy purposes.
Apr 08Claims on Investment Firms
CA-3.2.13
Claims on category one and category two investment firms which are subject to direct supervisory and regulatory provisions from the CBB may be treated as claims on banks for risk weighting purposes but without the use of preferential risk weight for short-term claims. Claims on category three investment firms must be treated as claims on corporates for risk weighting purposes. Claims on investment firms in other jurisdictions will be treated as claims on corporates for risk weighting purposes. However, if the bank can demonstrate that the concerned investment firm is subject to a Basel II equivalent capital adequacy regime and is treated as a bank for risk weighting purposes by its home regulator, then claims on such investment firms may be treated as claims on banks.
Apr 08Claims on Corporates, including Insurance Companies
CA-3.2.14
Risk weighting for corporates including insurance companies is as follows:
Credit assessment AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BB- Below BB- Unrated Risk weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% Apr 08CA-3.2.15
Risk weighting for unrated (corporate) claims will be reviewed and where appropriate, may be increased by the CBB. Credit facilities to small/medium enterprises may be placed in the regulatory retail portfolio in limited cases below.
Amended January 2009
Apr 08Claims included in the Regulatory Retail Portfolios
CA-3.2.16
No claim on any unrated corporate, where said corporate originates from a foreign jurisdiction, may be given a risk weight lower than that assigned to a corporate within its own jurisdiction, and in no case will it be below 100%.
Apr 08CA-3.2.17
Retail claims that are included in the regulatory retail portfolio must be risk weighted at 75%, except as provided in CA-3.2.23 for the past due loans.
Apr 08CA-3.2.18
To be included in the regulatory retail portfolio, claims must meet the following criteria:
(a) Orientation — the exposure is to an individual person or persons or to a small business. A small business is a Bahrain-based business with annual turnover below BD 2mn;(b) Product — The exposure takes the form of any of the following: revolving credits and lines of credit (including credit cards and overdrafts), personal term loans and leases (e.g. auto leases, student loans) and small business facilities. Securities (such as bonds and equities), whether listed or not, are specifically excluded from this category. Mortgage loans will be excluded if they qualify for treatment as claims secured by residential property (see below). Loans for purchase of shares are also excluded from the regulatory retail portfolios;(c) Granularity — The regulatory retail portfolio is sufficiently diversified to a degree that reduces the risks in the portfolio, warranting a 75% risk weight. No aggregate exposure to one counterpart9 can exceed 0.2% of the overall regulatory retail portfolio; and(d) The maximum aggregated retail exposure to one counterpart must not exceed an absolute limit of BD 250,000.
9 Aggregated exposure means gross amount (i.e. not taking any credit risk mitigation into account) of all forms of debt exposures (e.g. loans or commitments) that individually satisfy the three other criteria. In addition, "to one counterpart" means one or several entities that may be considered as a single beneficiary (e.g. in the case of a small business that is affiliated to another small business, the limit would apply to the bank's aggregated exposure on both businesses).
Amended: April 2011
Amended January 2009
Apr 08Claims Secured by Residential Property
CA-3.2.19
Lending fully secured by first mortgages on residential property that is or will be occupied by the borrower, or that is leased, must carry a risk weighting of 75%. However, if the bank can justify foreclosure or repossession for a claim, the risk weight allowed will be 35%. To get this lower risk weight the bank must obtain a satisfactory legal opinion that foreclosure or repossession is possible without any impediment.
Apr 08Claims Secured by Commercial Real Estate
CA-3.2.20
Claims secured by mortgages on commercial real estate are subject to a minimum of 100% risk weight. If the borrower is rated below BB-, the risk-weight corresponding to the rating of the borrower must be applied.
Apr 08Past Due Loans
CA-3.2.21
The unsecured portion of any loan (other than a qualifying residential mortgage loan) that is past due for more than 90 days, net of specific provisions (including partial write-offs), must be risk-weighted as follows:
(a)150% risk weight when specific provisions are less than 20% of the outstanding amount of the loan; and(b)100% risk weight when specific provisions are greater than 20% of the outstanding amount of the loan.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-3.2.22
For the purposes of defining the secured portion of a past due loan, eligible collateral and guarantees will be the same as for credit risk mitigation purposes.
Apr 08CA-3.2.23
Past due retail loans are to be excluded from the overall regulatory retail portfolio when assessing the granularity criterion, for risk-weighting purposes.
Apr 08CA-3.2.24
In the case of qualifying residential mortgage loans, when such loans are past due for more than 90 days, they must be risk weighted at 100% net of specific provisions.
Apr 08Higher-risk Categories
CA-3.2.25
Holdings of securitization tranches that are rated between BB+ and BB- are risk weighted at 350%.
Apr 08Investments in Equities and Funds
CA-3.2.26
Investments in listed equities must be risk weighted at 100% while equities other than listed must be risk weighted at 150%.
Apr 08CA-3.2.27
Investments in funds (e.g. mutual funds, Collective Investment Undertakings etc.) must be risk weighted as follows:
• If the instrument (e.g. units) is rated, it should be risk-weighted according to its external rating (for risk-weighting, it must be treated as a "claim on corporate");• If not rated, such investment should be treated as an equity investment and risk weighted accordingly (i.e. 100% for listed and 150% for others);• The bank can apply to CBB for using the look-through approach for such investments if it can demonstrate that the look-through approach is more appropriate to the circumstances of the bank;• If there are no voting rights attached to investment in funds, the investment will not be subjected to consolidation and deduction requirements (except large exposure limits);• For the purpose of determining "large exposure limit" for investment in funds, the look-through approach should be used (even if the look-through approach is not used to risk weight the investment).Apr 08CA-3.2.28
CBB may enforce a bank to adopt one of the IRB treatments for equities if the CBB considers that bank's equity portfolio is significant.
Apr 08Holdings of Real Estate
CA-3.2.29
All holdings of real estate by banks (i.e. owned directly or by way of investments in Real Estate Companies, subsidiaries or associate companies or other arrangements such as trusts, funds or REITs) must be risk-weighted at 200%. Premises occupied by the bank may be weighted at 100%. Investments in Real Estate Companies will be subject to the materiality thresholds for commercial companies described in Module PCD and therefore any holdings which amount to 15% or more of regulatory capital will be subject to deduction. The holdings below the 15% threshold will be weighted at 200%.
Apr 08Other Assets
CA-3.2.30
Gold bullion held in own vaults or on an allocated basis to the extent backed by bullion liabilities may be treated as cash and therefore risk-weighted at 0%. In addition, cash items in the process of collection must be risk-weighted at 20%. The standard risk weight for all other assets will be 100%. Investments in regulatory capital instruments issued by banks or investment firms must be risk weighted at a minimum of 100%, unless they are deducted from the capital base according to the Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module.
Apr 08Underwriting of Non-trading Book Items
CA-3.2.31
Where a bank has acquired assets on its balance sheet in the banking book which it is intending to place with third parties under a formal arrangement and is underwriting the placement, the following risk weightings apply during the underwriting period (which may not last for more than 90 days). Once the underwriting period has expired, the usual risk weights should apply:
(a) For holdings of private equity, a risk weighting of 100% will apply instead of the usual 150% (see CA-3.2.26); and(b) For holdings of Real Estate, a risk weight of 100% will apply instead of the usual 200% risk weight (see CA-3.2.29).Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-3.3 CA-3.3 Off-balance Sheet Items
CA-3.3.1
Off-balance-sheet items must be converted into credit exposure equivalents applying credit conversion factors (CCFs). Counterparty risk weightings for OTC derivative transactions will not be subject to any specific ceiling.
Apr 08CA-3.3.2
Commitments with an original maturity of up to one year and commitments with an original maturity of over one year will receive a CCF of 20% and 50%, respectively.
Apr 08CA-3.3.3
Any commitments that are unconditionally cancellable at any time by the bank without prior notice, or that are subject to automatic cancellation due to deterioration in a borrowers' creditworthiness, will receive a 0% CCF.
Apr 08CA-3.3.4
Direct credit substitutes, e.g. general guarantees of indebtedness (including standby letters of credit serving as financial guarantees for loans and securities) and acceptances (including endorsements with the character of acceptances) must receive a CCF of 100%.
Apr 08CA-3.3.5
Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with recourse, where the credit risk remains with the bank, must receive a CCF of 100%.
Apr 08CA-3.3.6
A CCF of 100% must be applied to the lending of banks' securities or the posting of securities as collateral by banks, including instances where these arise out of repo-style transactions (i.e. repurchase/reverse repurchase and securities lending/securities borrowing transactions). See Section CA-4.3 for the calculation of risk-weighted assets where the credit converted exposure is secured by eligible collateral.
Apr 08CA-3.3.7
Forward asset purchases, forward deposits and partly-paid shares and securities, which represent commitments with certain drawdown must receive a CCF of 100%.
Apr 08CA-3.3.8
Certain transaction-related contingent items (e.g. performance bonds, bid bonds, warranties and standby letters of credit related to particular transactions) must receive CCF of 50%.
Apr 08CA-3.3.9
Note issuance facilities and revolving underwriting facilities must receive a CCF of 50%.
Apr 08CA-3.3.10
For short-term self-liquidating trade letters of credit arising from the movement of goods, a 20% CCF must be applied to both issuing and confirming banks.
Apr 08CA-3.3.11
Where there is an undertaking to provide a commitment on an off-balance sheet item, banks are to apply the lower of the two applicable CCF's.
Apr 08CA-3.3.12
Credit equivalent amount of OTC derivatives and SFTs that expose a bank to counterparty credit risk must be calculated as per Appendix CA-2.
Apr 08CA-3.3.13
Banks must closely monitor securities, commodities, and foreign exchange transactions that have failed, starting the first day they fail. A capital charge to failed transactions must be calculated in accordance with CBB guidelines set forth in Appendix CA-4.
Apr 08CA-3.3.14
With regard to unsettled securities, commodities, and foreign exchange transactions, banks are encouraged to develop, implement and improve systems for tracking and monitoring the credit risk exposure arising from unsettled transactions as appropriate for producing management information that facilitates action on a timely basis.
Apr 08CA-3.3.15
Furthermore, when such transactions are not processed through a delivery-versus-payment (DvP) or payment-versus-payment (PvP) mechanism, banks must calculate a capital charge as set forth in Appendix CA-4.
Apr 08CA-3.4 CA-3.4 External Credit Assessments
The Recognition Process and Eligibility Criteria
CA-3.4.1
CBB will assess all External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI) according to the six criteria below. Any failings, in whole or in part, to satisfy these to the fullest extent will result in the respective ECAI's methodology and associated resultant rating not being accepted by the CBB:
(a) Objectivity: The methodology for assigning credit assessments must be rigorous, systematic, and subject to some form of validation based on historical experience. Moreover, assessments must be subject to ongoing review and responsive to changes in financial condition. Before being recognized by the CBB, an assessment methodology for each market segment, including rigorous back testing, must have been established for an absolute minimum of one year and with a preference of three years;(b) Independence: An ECAI must show independence and should not be subject to political or economic pressures that may influence the rating. The assessment process should be as free as possible from any constraints that could arise in situations where the composition of the board of directors, political pressure, the shareholder structure of the assessment institution or any other aspect could be seen as creating a conflict of interest;(c) International access/Transparency: The individual assessments should be available to both domestic and foreign institutions with legitimate interests and at equivalent terms. The general methodology used by the ECAI has to be publicly available;(d) Disclosure: An ECAI is required to disclose the following information: its assessment methodologies, including the definition of default, the time horizon, and the meaning of each rating; the actual default rates experienced in each assessment category; and the transitions of the assessments, e.g. the likelihood of a slide in the ratings of an exposure from one class to another over time;(e) Resources: An ECAI must have sufficient resources to carry out high quality credit assessments. These resources should allow for substantial ongoing contact with senior and operational levels within the entities assessed in order to add value to the credit assessments. Such assessments will be based on methodologies combining qualitative and quantitative approaches; and(f) Credibility: Credibility, to a certain extent, can derive from the criteria above. In addition, the reliance on an ECAI's external credit assessments by independent parties (investors, insurers, trading partners) may be evidence of the credibility of the assessments of an ECAI. The credibility of an ECAI will also be based on the existence of internal procedures to prevent the misuse of confidential information. In order to be eligible for recognition, an ECAI does not have to assess firms in more than one country.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-3.4.2
The CBB recognizes Standard and Poor's, Moody's, Fitch IBCA and Capital Intelligence as eligible ECAIs. With respect to the possible recognition of other rating agencies as eligible ECAIs, CBB will update this paragraph subject to the rating agencies satisfying the eligibility requirements. (See Appendix 16 for mapping of eligible ECAIs).
Apr 08CA-3.4.3
Banks must use the chosen ECAIs and their ratings consistently for each type of claim, for both risk weighting and risk management purposes. Banks will not be allowed to "cherry-pick" the assessments provided by different eligible ECAIs.
Apr 08CA-3.4.4
Banks must disclose ECAIs that they use for the risk weighting of their assets by type of claims, the risk weights associated with the particular rating grades as determined by CBB through the mapping process as well as the aggregated risk-weighted assets for each risk weight based on the assessments of each eligible ECAI.
Apr 08Multiple Assessments
CA-3.4.5
If there are two assessments by eligible ECAIs chosen by a bank which map into different risk weights, the higher risk weight must be applied.
Apr 08CA-3.4.6
If there are three or more assessments by eligible ECAIs chosen by a bank which map into different risk weights, the assessments corresponding to the two lowest risk weights should be referred to and the higher of those two risk weights must be applied.
Apr 08Issuer Versus Issues Assessment
CA-3.4.7
Where a bank invests in a particular issue that has an issue-specific assessment, the risk weight of the claim will be based on this assessment. Where the bank's claim is not an investment in a specific assessed issue, the following general principles apply:
(a) In circumstances where the borrower has a specific assessment for an issued debt — but the bank's claim is not an investment in this particular debt — a high quality credit assessment (one which maps into a risk weight lower than that which applies to an unrated claim) on that specific debt may only be applied to the bank's un-assessed claim if this claim ranks pari passu or senior to the claim with an assessment in all respects. If not, the credit assessment cannot be used and the un-assessed claim will receive the risk weight for unrated claims; and(b) In circumstances where the borrower has an issuer assessment, this assessment typically applies to senior unsecured claims on that issuer. Consequently, only senior claims on that issuer will benefit from a high quality issuer assessment. Other un-assessed claims of a highly assessed issuer will be treated as unrated. If either the issuer or a single issue has a low quality assessment (mapping into a risk weight equal to or higher than that which applies to unrated claims), an un-assessed claim on the same counterparty will be assigned the same risk weight as is applicable to the low quality assessment.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-3.4.8
Whether the bank intends to rely on an issuer- or an issue-specific assessment, the assessment must take into account and reflect the entire amount of credit risk exposure the bank has with regard to all payments owed to it.10
10 For example, if a bank is owed both principal and interest, the assessment must fully take into account and reflect the credit risk associated with repayment of both principal and interest.
Apr 08CA-3.4.9
In order to avoid any double counting of credit enhancement factors, no recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques will be taken into account if the credit enhancement is already reflected in the issue specific rating (see paragraph CA-4.1.5).
Apr 08Domestic Currency and Foreign Currency Assessments
CA-3.4.10
Where unrated exposures are risk weighted based on the rating of an equivalent exposure to that borrower, the general rule is that foreign currency ratings would be used for exposures in foreign currency. Domestic currency ratings, if separate, would only be used to risk weight claims denominated in the domestic currency.
Apr 08CA-3.4.11
However, when an exposure arises through a bank's participation in a loan that has been extended, or has been guaranteed against convertibility and transfer risk, by certain MDBs, its convertibility and transfer risk can be considered by CBB, on a case by case basis, to be effectively mitigated. To qualify, MDBs must have preferred creditor status recognised in the market and be included in MDB's qualifying for 0% risk rate under CA-3.2.8. In such cases, for risk weighting purposes, the borrower's domestic currency rating may be used instead of its foreign currency rating. In the case of a guarantee against convertibility and transfer risk, the local currency rating can be used only for the portion that has been guaranteed. The portion of the loan not benefiting from such a guarantee will be risk-weighted based on the foreign currency rating.
Apr 08Short-term/Long-term Assessments
CA-3.4.12
For risk-weighting purposes, short-term assessments are deemed to be issue-specific. They can only be used to derive risk weights for claims arising from the rated facility. They cannot be generalised to other short-term claims, except under the conditions of paragraph CA-3.4.14. In no event can a short-term rating be used to support a risk weight for an unrated long-term claim. Short-term assessments may only be used for short-term claims against banks and corporates. The table below provides a framework for banks' exposures to specific short-term facilities, such as a particular issuance of commercial paper:
Credit assessment A-1/P-111 A-2/P-2 A-3/P-3 Others12 Risk weight 20% 50% 100% 150%
11The notations follow the methodology used by Standard & Poor's and by Moody's Investors Service. The A-1 rating of Standard & Poor's includes both A-1+ and A-1-.
12This category includes all non-prime and B or C ratings.
Apr 08CA-3.4.13
If a short-term rated facility attracts a 50% risk-weight, unrated short-term claims cannot attract a risk weight lower than 100%. If an issuer has a short-term facility with an assessment that warrants a risk weight of 150%, all unrated claims, whether long-term or short-term, should also receive a 150% risk weight, unless the bank uses recognised credit risk mitigation techniques for such claims.
Apr 08CA-3.4.14
For short-tem claims on banks, the interaction with specific short-term assessments is expected to be the following:
(a) The general preferential treatment for short-term claims, as defined under paragraphs CA-3.2.11 and CA-3.2.12, applies to all claims on banks of up to three months original maturity when there is no specific short-term claim assessment;(b) When there is a short-term assessment and such an assessment maps into a risk weight that is more favourable (i.e. lower) or identical to that derived from the general preferential treatment, the short-term assessment should be used for the specific claim only. Other short-term claims would benefit from the general preferential treatment; and(c) When a specific short-term assessment for a short term claim on a bank maps into a less favourable (higher) risk weight, the general short-term preferential treatment for inter-bank claims cannot be used. All unrated short-term claims should receive the same risk weighting as that implied by the specific short-term assessment.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-3.4.15
When a short-term assessment is to be used, the institution making the assessment needs to meet all of the eligibility criteria for recognising ECAIs as presented in paragraph CA-3.4.1 in terms of its short-term assessment.
Apr 08Level of Application of the Assessment
CA-3.4.16
External assessments for one entity within a corporate group must not be used to risk weight other entities within the same group.
Apr 08Unsolicited Ratings
CA-3.4.17
As a general rule, banks should use solicited ratings from eligible ECAIs but they are also allowed to use unsolicited ratings in the same way as solicited ratings. However, there may be the potential for ECAIs to use unsolicited ratings to put pressure on entities to obtain solicited ratings. If such behaviour is identified, CBB may disallow the use of unsolicited ratings.
Apr 08CA-4 CA-4 Credit Risk — The Standardized Approach — Credit Risk Mitigation
CA-4.1 CA-4.1 Overarching Issues
Introduction
CA-4.1.1
Banks use a number of techniques to mitigate the credit risks to which they are exposed. For example, exposures may be collateralised by first priority claims, in whole or in part with cash or securities, a loan exposure may be guaranteed by a third party, or a bank may buy a credit derivative to offset various forms of credit risk. Additionally banks may agree to net loans owed to them against deposits from the same counterparty. Off-balance sheet items will first be converted into on-balance sheet equivalents prior to the CRM being applied.
Apr 08General remarks
CA-4.1.2
The framework set out in this sub-section of "General remarks" is applicable to all banking book exposures. Certain additional types of collateral are also eligible under the IRB approach (see paragraph CA-5.3.20 and others).
Apr 08CA-4.1.3
The comprehensive approach for the treatment of collateral (see paragraphs CA-4.2.12 to CA-4.2.20 and CA-4.3.1 to CA-4.3.32) will also be applied to calculate the counterparty risk charges for OTC derivatives and repo-style transactions booked in the trading book.
Apr 08CA-4.1.4
No transaction in which CRM techniques are used should receive a higher capital requirement than an otherwise identical transaction where such techniques are not used.
Apr 08CA-4.1.5
The effects of CRM will not be double counted. Therefore, no additional recognition of CRM for regulatory capital purposes will be applicable on claims for which an issue-specific rating is used that already reflects that CRM. As stated in paragraph CA-3.4.8 of the section on the standardised approach, principal-only ratings will also not be allowed within the framework of CRM.
Apr 08CA-4.1.6
While the use of CRM techniques reduces or transfers credit risk, it simultaneously may increase other risks (residual risks). Residual risks include legal, operational, liquidity and market risks. Therefore, it is imperative that banks employ robust procedures and processes to control these risks, including strategy; consideration of the underlying credit; valuation; policies and procedures; systems; control of roll-off risks; and management of concentration risk arising from the bank's use of CRM techniques and its interaction with the bank's overall credit risk profile. Where these risks are not adequately controlled, the CBB may impose additional capital charges or take supervisory actions.
Apr 08CA-4.1.7
Market Discipline requirements must also be observed for banks to obtain capital relief in respect of any CRM techniques.
Apr 08Legal Certainty
CA-4.1.8
In order for banks to obtain capital relief for any use of CRM techniques, the following minimum standards for legal documentation must be met.
Apr 08CA-4.1.9
All documentation used in collateralised transactions and for documenting on- balance sheet netting, guarantees and credit derivatives must be binding on all parties and legally enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. Banks must have conducted sufficient legal review to verify this and have a well founded legal basis to reach this conclusion, and undertake such further review as necessary to ensure continuing enforceability.
Apr 08CA-4.2 CA-4.2 Overview of Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques13
Collateralised Transactions
CA-4.2.1
A collateralised transaction is one in which:
(a) Banks have a credit exposure or potential credit exposure; and(b) That credit exposure or potential credit exposure is hedged in whole or in part by collateral posted by a counterparty14 or by a third party on behalf of the counterparty.
13 See Appendix CA-5 for an overview of methodologies for the capital treatment of transactions secured by financial collateral under the standardised and IRB approaches.
14 In this section "counterparty" is used to denote a party to whom a bank has an on- or off-balance sheet credit exposure or a potential credit exposure. That exposure may, for example, take the form of a loan of cash or securities (where the counterparty would traditionally be called the borrower), of securities posted as collateral, of a commitment or of exposure under an OTC derivatives contract.
Apr 08CA-4.2.2
Where banks take eligible financial collateral (e.g. cash or securities, more specifically defined in paragraphs CA-4.3.1 and CA-4.3.2), they are allowed to reduce their credit exposure to a counterparty when calculating their capital requirements to take account of the risk mitigating effect of the collateral.
Apr 08Overall Framework and Minimum Conditions
CA-4.2.3
Banks may opt for either the simple approach, which substitutes the risk weighting of the collateral for the risk weighting of the counterparty for the collateralised portion of the exposure (generally subject to a 20% floor), or for the comprehensive approach, which allows fuller offset of collateral against exposures, by effectively reducing the exposure amount by the value ascribed to the collateral. Banks may operate under either, but not both, approaches in the banking book, but only under the comprehensive approach in the trading book. Partial collateralisation is recognised in both approaches. Mismatches in the maturity of the underlying exposure and the collateral will only be allowed under the comprehensive approach.
Apr 08CA-4.2.4
However, before capital relief will be granted in respect of any form of collateral, the standards set out below in paragraphs CA-4.2.5 to CA-4.2.8 must be met under either approach.
Apr 08CA-4.2.5
In addition to the general requirements for legal certainty set out in paragraphs CA-4.1.8 and CA-4.1.9, the legal mechanism by which collateral is pledged or transferred must ensure that the bank has the right to liquidate or take legal possession of it, in a timely manner, in the event of the default, insolvency or bankruptcy (or one or more otherwise-defined credit events set out in the transaction documentation) of the counterparty (and, where applicable, of the custodian holding the collateral). Furthermore banks must take all steps necessary to fulfil those requirements under the law applicable to the bank's interest in the collateral for obtaining and maintaining an enforceable security interest, e.g. by registering it with a registrar, or for exercising a right to net or set off in relation to title transfer collateral.
Apr 08CA-4.2.6
In order for collateral to provide protection, the credit quality of the counterparty and the value of the collateral must not have a material positive correlation. For example, securities issued by the counterparty — or by any related group entity — would provide little protection and so would be ineligible.
Apr 08CA-4.2.7
Banks must have clear and robust procedures for the timely liquidation of collateral to ensure that any legal conditions required for declaring the default of the counterparty and liquidating the collateral are observed, and that collateral can be liquidated promptly.
Apr 08CA-4.2.8
Where the collateral is held by a custodian, banks must take reasonable steps to ensure that the custodian segregates the collateral from its own assets.
Apr 08CA-4.2.9
A capital requirement will be applied to a bank on either side of the collateralised transaction: for example, both repos and reverse repos will be subject to capital requirements. Likewise, both sides of a securities lending and borrowing transaction will be subject to explicit capital charges, as will the posting of securities in connection with a derivative exposure or other borrowing.
Apr 08CA-4.2.10
Where a bank, acting as agent, arranges a repo-style transaction (i.e. repurchase/reverse repurchase and securities lending/borrowing transactions) between a customer and a third party and provides a guarantee to the customer that the third party will perform on its obligations, then the risk to the bank is the same as if the bank had entered into the transaction as a principal. In such circumstances, a bank will be required to calculate capital requirements as if it were itself the principal.
Apr 08The Simple Approach
The Comprehensive Approach
CA-4.2.12
In the comprehensive approach, when taking collateral, banks must calculate their adjusted exposure to a counterparty for capital adequacy purposes in order to take account of the effects of that collateral. Using haircuts, banks are required to adjust both the amount of the exposure to the counterparty and the value of any collateral received in support of that counterparty to take account of possible future fluctuations in the value of either15, occasioned by market movements. This will produce volatility adjusted amounts for both exposure and collateral. Unless either side of the transaction is cash, the volatility adjusted amount for the exposure will be higher than the exposure and for the collateral it will be lower.
15 Exposure amounts may vary where, for example, securities are being lent.
Apr 08CA-4.2.13
Additionally where the exposure and collateral are held in different currencies an additional downwards adjustment must be made to the volatility adjusted collateral amount to take account of possible future fluctuations in exchange rates.
Apr 08CA-4.2.14
Where the volatility-adjusted exposure amount is greater than the volatility-adjusted collateral amount (including any further adjustment for foreign exchange risk), banks shall calculate their risk-weighted assets as the difference between the two multiplied by the risk weight of the counterparty. The framework for performing these calculations is set out in paragraphs CA-4.3.3 to CA-4.3.6.
Apr 08CA-4.2.15
Banks must use standard haircuts given in paragraph CA-4.3.7 unless allowed to use models under CA-4.3.22.
Apr 08CA-4.2.16
The size of the individual haircuts will depend on the type of instrument, type of transaction and the frequency of marking-to-market and re-margining. For example, repo- style transactions subject to daily marking-to-market and to daily re-margining will receive a haircut based on a 5-business day holding period and secured lending transactions with daily mark-to-market and no re-margining clauses will receive a haircut based on a 20-business day holding period. These haircut numbers will be scaled up using the square root of time formula depending on the frequency of remargining or marking-to-market.
Apr 08CA-4.2.17
For certain types of repo-style transactions (broadly speaking government bond repos as defined in paragraphs CA-4.3.14 and CA-4.3.15), the CBB may allow banks using standard haircuts not to apply these haircuts in calculating the exposure amount after risk mitigation.
Apr 08CA-4.2.18
The effect of master netting agreements covering repo-style transactions can be recognised for the calculation of capital requirements subject to the conditions in paragraph CA-4.3.17.
Apr 08CA-4.2.19
As an alternative to standard haircuts banks may, subject to approval from CBB, use VaR models for calculating potential price volatility for repo-style transactions and other similar SFTs, as set out in paragraphs CA-4.3.22 to CA-4.3.25 below. Alternatively, subject to approval from the CBB's, they may also calculate, for these transactions, an expected positive exposure, as set forth in Appendix CA-2 of this Module.
Apr 08On-balance Sheet Netting
CA-4.2.20
Where banks have legally enforceable netting arrangements for loans and deposits they may calculate capital requirements on the basis of net credit exposures subject to the conditions in paragraph CA-4.4.1.
Apr 08Guarantees and Credit Derivatives
CA-4.2.21
Where guarantees or credit derivatives are direct, explicit, irrevocable and unconditional, and the CBB is satisfied that banks fulfil certain minimum operational conditions relating to risk management processes they may allow banks to take account of such credit protection in calculating capital requirements.
Apr 08CA-4.2.22
A range of guarantors and protection providers are recognised, as shown in paragraph CA-4.5.7. A substitution approach will be applied. Thus only guarantees issued by or protection provided by entities with a lower risk weight than the counterparty will lead to reduced capital charges since the protected portion of the counterparty exposure is assigned the risk weight of the guarantor or protection provider, whereas the uncovered portion retains the risk weight of the underlying counterparty.
Apr 08Maturity Mismatch
CA-4.2.24
Where the residual maturity of the CRM is less than that of the underlying credit exposure a maturity mismatch occurs. Where there is a maturity mismatch and the CRM has an original maturity of less than one year, the CRM is not recognised for capital purposes. In other cases where there is a maturity mismatch, partial recognition is given to the CRM for regulatory capital purposes as detailed below in paragraphs CA-4.6.1 to CA-4.6.4. Under the simple approach for collateral maturity mismatches will not be allowed.
Apr 08CA-4.3 CA-4.3 Collateral
Eligible Financial Collateral
CA-4.3.1
The following collateral instruments are eligible for recognition in the simple approach:
(a) Cash (as well as certificates of deposit or comparable instruments issued by the lending bank) on deposit with the bank which is incurring the counterparty exposure;16,17(b) Gold;(c) Debt securities rated by a recognised external credit assessment institution where these are either:(i) At least BB- when issued by sovereigns or PSEs that are treated as sovereigns by the CBB; or(ii) At least BBB- when issued by other entities (including banks and securities firms); or(iii) At least A-3/P-3 for short-term debt instruments.(d) Debt securities not rated by a recognised external credit assessment institution where these are:(i) Issued by a bank; and(ii) Listed on a recognised exchange; and(iii) Classified as senior debt; and(iv) All rated issues of the same seniority by the issuing bank must be rated at least BBB- or A-3/P-3 by a recognised external credit assessment institution; and(v) The bank holding the securities as collateral has no information to suggest that the issue justifies a rating below BBB- or A-3/P-3 (as applicable); and(vi) The CBB is sufficiently confident about the market liquidity of the security.(e) Equities (including convertible bonds) that are included in a main index; and(f) Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and mutual funds where:(i) A price for the units is publicly quoted daily; and(ii) The UCITS/mutual fund is limited to investing in the instruments listed in this paragraph18.
16 Cash funded credit linked notes issued by the bank against exposures in the banking book which fulfil the criteria for credit derivatives will be treated as cash collateralised transactions.
17When cash on deposit, certificates of deposit or comparable instruments issued by the lending bank are held as collateral at a third-party bank in a non-custodial arrangement, if they are openly pledged/assigned to the lending bank and if the pledge /assignment is unconditional and irrevocable, the exposure amount covered by the collateral (after any necessary haircuts for currency risk) will receive the risk weight of the third-party bank.
18 However, the use or potential use by a UCITS/mutual fund of derivative instruments solely to hedge investments listed in this paragraph and paragraph CA-4.3.2 shall not prevent units in that UCITS /mutual fund from being eligible financial collateral.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.2
The following collateral instruments are eligible for recognition in the comprehensive approach:
(a) All of the instruments in paragraph CA-4.3.1;(b) Equities (including convertible bonds) which are not included in a main index but which are listed on a recognised exchange;(c) UCITS/mutual funds which include such equities.Apr 08The Comprehensive Approach
Calculation of Capital Requirement
CA-4.3.3
For a collateralised transaction, the exposure amount after risk mitigation is calculated as follows:
E* = Max {0, [E × (1 + He) - C × (1 - Hc - Hfx)]}
where:
E* = The exposure value after risk mitigation
E = Current value of the exposure
He = Haircut appropriate to the exposure
C = The current value of the collateral received
Hc = Haircut appropriate to the collateral
Hfx = Haircut appropriate for currency mismatch between the collateral and exposure
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.4
The exposure amount after risk mitigation will be multiplied by the risk weight of the counterparty to obtain the risk-weighted asset amount for the collateralised transaction.
Apr 08CA-4.3.5
The treatment for transactions where there is a mismatch between the maturity of the counterparty exposure and the collateral is given in paragraphs CA-4.6.1 to CA-4.6.4.
Apr 08CA-4.3.6
Where the collateral is a basket of assets, the haircut on the basket will be
H = Σi ai Hi , where ai is the weight of the asset (as measured by units of currency) in the i basket and Hi the haircut applicable to that asset.
Apr 08Standard Haircuts
CA-4.3.7
These are the standard haircuts (assuming daily mark-to-market, daily re-margining and a 10-business day holding period), expressed as percentages:
Issue rating for debt securities Residual Maturity Sovereigns19,20 Other issuers21 AAA to AA-/A-1 ≤1 year 0.5 1 >1 year, ≤5 years 2 4 > 5 years 4 8 A+ to BBB-/ A-2/A-3/P-3 and unrated bank securities per para. CA-4.3.1(d) ≤1 year 1 2 >1 year, ≤5 years 3 6 > 5 years 6 12 BB+ to BB- All 15 Main index equities (including convertible bonds) and Gold 15 Other equities (including convertible bonds) listed on a recognised exchange 25 UCITS/Mutual funds Highest haircut applicable to any security in which the fund can invest Cash in the same currency22 0
19 Includes PSEs which are treated as sovereigns by the CBB.
20 Multilateral development banks receiving a 0% risk weight will be treated as sovereigns.
21 Includes PSEs which are not treated as sovereigns by CBB.
22 Eligible cash collateral specified in paragraph CA-4.3.1 (a).
Apr 08CA-4.3.8
The standard haircut for currency risk where exposure and collateral are denominated in different currencies is 8% (also based on a 10-business day holding period and daily mark-to-market).
Apr 08CA-4.3.9
For transactions in which the bank lends non-eligible instruments (e.g. non-investment grade corporate debt securities), the haircut to be applied on the exposure should be the same as the one for equity traded on a recognised exchange that is not part of a main index.
Apr 08Adjustment for Different Holding Periods and Non Daily Mark-to-market or re-Margining
CA-4.3.10
For some transactions, depending on the nature and frequency of the revaluation and re-margining provisions, different holding periods are appropriate. The framework for collateral haircuts distinguishes between repo-style transactions (i.e. repo/reverse repos and securities lending/borrowing), "other capital-market-driven transactions" (i.e. OTC derivatives transactions and margin lending) and secured lending. In capital-market-driven transactions and repo-style transactions, the documentation contains remargining clauses; in secured lending transactions, it generally does not.
Apr 08CA-4.3.11
The minimum holding period for various products is summarised in the following table.
Transaction type Minimum holding period Condition Repo-style transaction five business days daily re-margining Other capital market transactions ten business days daily re-margining Secured lending twenty business days daily revaluation Apr 08CA-4.3.12
When the frequency of remargining or revaluation is longer than the minimum, the minimum haircut numbers will be scaled up depending on the actual number of business days between remargining or revaluation using the square root of time formula below:
where:
H = Haircut
HM = Haircut under the minimum holding period
TM = Minimum holding period for the type of transaction
NR = Actual number of business days between remargining for capital market transactions or revaluation for secured transactions.
When a bank calculates the volatility on a TN day holding period which is different from the specified minimum holding period TM, the HM will be calculated using the square root of time formula:
TN = Holding period used by the bank for deriving HN
HN = Haircut based on the holding period TN
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.13
For example, for banks using the standard CBB haircuts, the 10-business day haircuts provided in paragraph CA-4.3.7 will be the basis and this haircut will be scaled up or down depending on the type of transaction and the frequency of re-margining or revaluation using the formula below:
where:
H = Haircut
H10 = 10-business day standard CBB haircut for instrument
NR = Actual number of business days between re-margining for capital
= Market transactions or revaluation for secured transactions.TM = Minimum holding period for the type of transaction
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Conditions for Zero H
CA-4.3.14
For repo-style transactions where the following conditions are satisfied, and the counterparty is a core market participant, banks are not required to apply the haircuts specified in the comprehensive approach and may instead apply a haircut of zero. This carve-out will not be available for banks using the modelling approaches as described in paragraphs CA-4.3.22 to CA-4.3.25:
(a) Both the exposure and the collateral are cash or a sovereign security or PSE security qualifying for a 0% risk weight in the standardised approach;(b) Both the exposure and the collateral are denominated in the same currency;(c) Either the transaction is overnight or both the exposure and the collateral are marked-to-market daily and are subject to daily re margining;(d) Following a counterparty's failure to re-margin, the time that is required between the last mark-to-market before the failure to re-margin and the liquidation23 of the collateral is considered to be no more than four business days;(e) The transaction is settled across a settlement system proven for that type of transaction;(f) The documentation covering the agreement is standard market documentation for repo-style transactions in the securities concerned;(g) The transaction is governed by documentation specifying that if the counterparty fails to satisfy an obligation to deliver cash or securities or to deliver margin or otherwise defaults, then the transaction is immediately terminable; and(h) Upon any default event, regardless of whether the counterparty is insolvent or bankrupt, the bank has the unfettered, legally enforceable right to immediately seize and liquidate the collateral for its benefit.
23 This does not require the bank to always liquidate the collateral but rather to have the capability to do so within the given time frame.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.15
Core market participants include the following entities:
(a) Sovereigns, central banks and PSEs;(b) Banks and securities firms;(c) Other financial companies (including insurance companies) eligible for a 20% risk weight in the standardised approach;(d) Regulated mutual funds that are subject to capital or leverage requirements;(e) Regulated pension funds; and(f) Recognised clearing organisations.Apr 08CA-4.3.16
Where a supervisor has applied a specific carve-out to repo-style transactions in securities issued by its domestic government, then banks incorporated in Bahrain are allowed to adopt the same approach to the same transactions.
Apr 08Treatment of Repo-style Transactions Covered under Master Netting Agreements
CA-4.3.17
The effects of bilateral netting agreements covering repo-style transactions will be recognised on a counterparty-by-counterparty basis if the agreements are legally enforceable in each relevant jurisdiction upon the occurrence of an event of default and regardless of whether the counterparty is insolvent or bankrupt. In addition, netting agreements must:
(a) Provide the non-defaulting party the right to terminate and close-out in a timely manner all transactions under the agreement upon an event of default, including in the event of insolvency or bankruptcy of the counterparty;(b) Provide for the netting of gains and losses on transactions (including the value of any collateral) terminated and closed out under it so that a single net amount is owed by one party to the other;(c) Allow for the prompt liquidation or setoff of collateral upon the event of default; and(d) Be, together with the rights arising from the provisions required in (a) to (c) above, legally enforceable in each relevant jurisdiction upon the occurrence of an event of default and regardless of the counterparty's insolvency or bankruptcy.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.18
Netting across positions in the banking and trading book will only be recognised when the netted transactions fulfill the following conditions:
(a) All transactions are marked to market daily24; and(b) The collateral instruments used in the transactions are recognised as eligible financial collateral in the banking book.
24The holding period for the haircuts will depend as in other repo-style transactions on the frequency of margining.
Apr 08CA-4.3.19
The formula in paragraph CA-4.3.3 will be adapted to calculate the capital requirements for transactions with netting agreements.
Apr 08CA-4.3.20
For banks using the standard haircuts, the framework below will apply to take into account the impact of master netting agreements.
E* = Max {0, [(Σ(E) - Σ(C)) + Σ (ES × HS) +Σ (EFX × HFX)]}25
Where:
E* = The exposure value after risk mitigation
E = Current value of the exposure
C = The value of the collateral received
ES = Absolute value of the net position in a given security
HS = Haircut appropriate to ES
EFX = Absolute value of the net position in a currency different from the settlement currency
HFX = Haircut appropriate for currency mismatch
25The starting point for this formula is the formula in paragraph CA-4.3.3 which can also be presented as the following: E* = max {0, [(E - C) + (E x He) + (C x Hc) + (C x Hfx)]}
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.21
The intention here is to obtain a net exposure amount after netting of the exposures and collateral and have an add-on amount reflecting possible price changes for the securities involved in the transactions and for foreign exchange risk if any. The net long or short position of each security included in the netting agreement will be multiplied by the appropriate haircut. All other rules regarding the calculation of haircuts stated in paragraphs CA-4.3.3 to CA-4.3.16 equivalently apply for banks using bilateral netting agreements for repo-style transactions.
Apr 08Use of Models
CA-4.3.22
As an alternative to the use of standard haircuts, CBB may allow banks to use a VaR models approach to reflect the price volatility of the exposure and collateral for repo-style transactions, taking into account correlation effects between security positions. This approach would apply to repo-style transactions covered by bilateral netting agreements on a counterparty-by-counterparty basis. At the discretion of CBB, firms are also eligible to use the VaR model approach for margin lending transactions, if the transactions are covered under a bilateral master netting agreement that meets the requirements of paragraphs CA-4.3.17 and CA-4.3.18. The VaR models approach is available to banks that have received CBB's recognition for an internal market risk model under the chapter CA-14. Banks which have not received CBB's recognition for use of models under the chapter CA-14 can separately apply for CBB's recognition to use their internal VaR models for calculation of potential price volatility for repo-style transactions. Internal models will only be accepted when a bank can prove the quality of its model to CBB through the backtesting of its output using one year of historical data. Banks must meet the model validation requirement of paragraph 43 of Appendix CA-2 to use VaR for repo-style and other SFTs. In addition, other transactions similar to repo-style transactions (like prime brokerage) and that meet the requirements for repo-style transactions, are also eligible to use the VaR models approach provided the model used meets the operational requirements set forth in Section I.F of Appendix CA-2.
Apr 08CA-4.3.23
The quantitative and qualitative criteria for recognition of internal market risk models for repo-style transactions and other similar transactions are in principle the same as under Chapter CA-14. With regard to the holding period, the minimum will be 5- business days for repo-style transactions, rather than the 10-business days under the Market Risk Amendment. For other transactions eligible for the VaR models approach, the 10- business day holding period will be retained. The minimum holding period should be adjusted upwards for market instruments where such a holding period would be inappropriate given the liquidity of the instrument concerned.
Apr 08CA-4.3.24
The calculation of the exposure E* for banks using their internal model will be the following:
E* = Max {0, [(ΣE - ΣC) + VaR output from internal model]}
In calculating capital requirements banks will use the previous business day's VaR number.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.25
Subject to CBB's approval, instead of using the VaR approach, banks may also calculate an expected positive exposure for repo-style and other similar SFTs, in accordance with the Internal Model Method set out in Appendix CA-2 of this Module.
Apr 08The Simple Approach
Minimum Conditions
CA-4.3.26
For collateral to be recognised in the simple approach, the collateral must be pledged for at least the life of the exposure and it must be marked to market and revalued with a minimum frequency of six months. Those portions of claims collateralised by the market value of recognised collateral receive the risk weight applicable to the collateral instrument. The risk weight on the collateralised portion will be subject to a floor of 20% except under the conditions specified in paragraphs CA-4.3.27 to CA-4.3.29. The remainder of the claim should be assigned to the risk weight appropriate to the counterparty. A capital requirement will be applied to banks on either side of the collateralised transaction: for example, both repos and reverse repos will be subject to capital requirements.
Apr 08Exceptions to the Risk Weight Floor
CA-4.3.27
Transactions which fulfil the criteria outlined in paragraph CA-4.3.14 and are with a core market participant, as defined in paragraph CA-4.3.15, receive a risk weight of 0%. If the counterparty to the transactions is not a core market participant the transaction should receive a risk weight of 10%.
Apr 08CA-4.3.28
OTC derivative transactions subject to daily mark-to-market, collateralised by cash and where there is no currency mismatch receive a 0% risk weight. Such transactions collateralised by sovereign or PSE securities qualifying for a 0% risk weight in the standardised approach will receive a 10% risk weight.
Apr 08CA-4.3.29
The 20% floor for the risk weight on a collateralised transaction will not be applied and a 0% risk weight can be applied where the exposure and the collateral are denominated in the same currency, and either:
(a) The collateral is cash on deposit as defined in paragraph CA-4.3.1(a); or(b) The collateral is in the form of sovereign/PSE securities eligible for a 0% risk weight, and its market value has been discounted by 20%.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Collateralised OTC Derivatives Transactions
CA-4.3.30
Under the Current Exposure Method, the calculation of the counterparty credit risk charge for an individual contract will be as follows:
Counterparty charge = [(RC + add-on) - CA] × r × 8%
Where:
RC = The replacement cost,
Add-on = The amount for potential future exposure calculated in CBB's 2004 Rule Book.
CA = The volatility adjusted collateral amount under the comprehensive approach prescribed in paragraphs CA-4.3.3 to CA-4.3.16, or zero if no eligible collateral is applied to the transaction, and
r = The risk weight of the counterparty.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.3.31
When effective bilateral netting contracts are in place, RC will be the net replacement cost and the add-on will be ANet as calculated according to paragraph 96 (i) to 96 (vi) of Appendix 2. The haircut for currency risk (Hfx) should be applied when there is a mismatch between the collateral currency and the settlement currency. Even in the case where there are more than two currencies involved in the exposure, collateral and settlement currency, a single haircut assuming a 10-business day holding period scaled up as necessary depending on the frequency of mark-to-market will be applied.
Apr 08CA-4.3.32
As an alternative to the Current Exposure Method for the calculation of the counterparty credit risk charge, banks may also use the Standardised Method and, subject to CBB's approval, the Internal Model Method as set out in Appendix CA-2 of this Module.
Apr 08CA-4.4 CA-4.4 On-balance Sheet Netting
CA-4.4.1
Where a bank:
(a) Has a well-founded legal basis for concluding that the netting or offsetting agreement is enforceable in each relevant jurisdiction regardless of whether the counterparty is insolvent or bankrupt;(b) Is able at any time to determine those assets and liabilities with the same counterparty that are subject to the netting agreement;(c) Monitors and controls its roll-off risks; and(d) Monitors and controls the relevant exposures on a net basis,it may use the net exposure of loans and deposits as the basis for its capital adequacy calculation in accordance with the formula in paragraph CA-4.3.3. Assets (loans) are treated as exposure and liabilities (deposits) as collateral. The haircuts will be zero except when a currency mismatch exists. A 10-business day holding period will apply when daily mark-to- market is conducted and all the requirements contained in paragraphs CA-4.3.7, CA-4.3.13, and CA-4.6.1 to CA-4.6.4 will apply.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.5 CA-4.5 Guarantees and Credit Derivatives
Operational Requirements
Operational Requirements Common to Guarantees and Credit Derivatives
CA-4.5.1
A guarantee (counter-guarantee) or credit derivative must represent a direct claim on the protection provider and must be explicitly referenced to specific exposures or a pool of exposures, so that the extent of the cover is clearly defined and incontrovertible. Other than non-payment by a protection purchaser of money due in respect of the credit protection contract it must be irrevocable; there must be no clause in the contract that would allow the protection provider unilaterally to cancel the credit cover or that would increase the effective cost of cover as a result of deteriorating credit quality in the hedged exposure26. It must also be unconditional; there should be no clause in the protection contract outside the direct control of the bank that could prevent the protection provider from being obliged to pay out in a timely manner in the event that the original counterparty fails to make the payment(s) due.
26 Note that the irrevocability condition does not require that the credit protection and the exposure be maturity matched; rather that the maturity agreed ex ante may not be reduced ex post by the protection provider. Paragraph CA-4.6.2 sets forth the treatment of call options in determining remaining maturity for credit protection.
Apr 08Additional Operational Requirements for Guarantees
CA-4.5.2
In addition to the legal certainty requirements in paragraphs CA-4.1.8 and CA-4.1.9 above, in order for a guarantee to be recognised, the following conditions must be satisfied:
(a) On the qualifying default/non-payment of the counterparty, the bank may in a timely manner pursue the guarantor for any monies outstanding under the documentation governing the transaction. The guarantor may make one lump sum payment of all monies under such documentation to the bank, or the guarantor may assume the future payment obligations of the counterparty covered by the guarantee. The bank must have the right to receive any such payments from the guarantor without first having to take legal actions in order to pursue the counterparty for payment;(b) The guarantee is an explicitly documented obligation assumed by the guarantor; and(c) Except as noted in the following sentence, the guarantee covers all types of payments the underlying obligor is expected to make under the documentation governing the transaction, for example notional amount, margin payments etc. Where a guarantee covers payment of principal only, interests and other uncovered payments should be treated as an unsecured amount in accordance with paragraph CA-4.5.10.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Additional Operational Requirements for Credit Derivatives
CA-4.5.3
In order for a credit derivative contract to be recognised, the following conditions must be satisfied:
(a) The credit events specified by the contracting parties must at a minimum cover:• failure to pay the amounts due under terms of the underlying obligation that are in effect at the time of such failure (with a grace period that is closely in line with the grace period in the underlying obligation);• bankruptcy, insolvency or inability of the obligor to pay its debts, or its failure or admission in writing of its inability generally to pay its debts as they become due, and analogous events; and• restructuring of the underlying obligation involving forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest or fees that results in a credit loss event (i.e. charge-off, specific provision or other similar debit to the profit and loss account). When restructuring is not specified as a credit event, refer to paragraph CA-4.5.4.(b) If the credit derivative covers obligations that do not include the underlying obligation, section (g) below governs whether the asset mismatch is permissible;(c) The credit derivative shall not terminate prior to expiration of any grace period required for a default on the underlying obligation to occur as a result of a failure to pay, subject to the provisions of paragraph CA-4.6.2;(d) Credit derivatives allowing for cash settlement are recognised for capital purposes insofar as a robust valuation process is in place in order to estimate loss reliably. There must be a clearly specified period for obtaining post-credit- event valuations of the underlying obligation. If the reference obligation specified in the credit derivative for purposes of cash settlement is different than the underlying obligation, section (g) below governs whether the asset mismatch is permissible;(e) If the protection purchaser's right/ability to transfer the underlying obligation to the protection provider is required for settlement, the terms of the underlying obligation must provide that any required consent to such transfer may not be unreasonably withheld;(f) The identity of the parties responsible for determining whether a credit event has occurred must be clearly defined. This determination must not be the sole responsibility of the protection seller. The protection buyer must have the right/ability to inform the protection provider of the occurrence of a credit event;(g) A mismatch between the underlying obligation and the reference obligation under the credit derivative (i.e. the obligation used for purposes of determining cash settlement value or the deliverable obligation) is permissible if (1) the reference obligation ranks pari passu with or is junior to the underlying obligation, and (2) the underlying obligation and reference obligation share the same obligor (i.e. the same legal entity) and legally enforceable cross-default or cross-acceleration clauses are in place; and(h) A mismatch between the underlying obligation and the obligation used for purposes of determining whether a credit event has occurred is permissible if (1) the latter obligation ranks pari passu with or is junior to the underlying obligation, and (2) the underlying obligation and reference obligation share the same obligor (i.e. the same legal entity) and legally enforceable cross-default or cross- acceleration clauses are in place.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.5.4
When the restructuring of the underlying obligation is not covered by the credit derivative, but the other requirements in paragraph CA-4.5.3 are met, partial recognition of the credit derivative will be allowed. If the amount of the credit derivative is less than or equal to the amount of the underlying obligation, 60% of the amount of the hedge can be recognised as covered. If the amount of the credit derivative is larger than that of the underlying obligation, then the amount of eligible hedge is capped at 60% of the amount of the underlying obligation27.
27 The 60% recognition factor is provided as an interim treatment, which the CBB may refine in the future.
Apr 08CA-4.5.5
Only credit default swaps and total return swaps that provide credit protection equivalent to guarantees will be eligible for recognition. The following exception applies. Where a bank buys credit protection through a total return swap and records the net payments received on the swap as net income, but does not record offsetting deterioration in the value of the asset that is protected (either through reductions in fair value or by an addition to reserves), the credit protection will not be recognised. The treatment of first-to-default and second-to-default products is covered separately in paragraphs CA-4.7.2 to CA-4.7.5.
Apr 08CA-4.5.6
Other types of credit derivatives will not be eligible for recognition at this time28.
28Cash funded credit linked notes issued by the bank against exposures in the banking book which fulfill the criteria for credit derivatives will be treated as cash collateralised transactions.
Apr 08Range of Eligible Guarantors (counter-guarantors)/Protection Providers
CA-4.5.7
Credit protection given by the following entities will be recognised:
(a) Sovereign entities29, PSEs, banks30 and securities firms with a lower risk weight than the counterparty;(b) Other entities rated A- or better. This would include credit protection provided by parent, subsidiary and affiliate companies when they have a lower risk weight than the obligor.
29 This includes the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Community, as well as those MDBs referred to in footnote 24.
30 This includes other MDBs.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Risk Weights
CA-4.5.8
The protected portion is assigned the risk weight of the protection provider. The uncovered portion of the exposure is assigned the risk weight of the underlying counterparty.
Apr 08CA-4.5.9
Materiality thresholds on payments below which no payment is made in the event of loss are equivalent to retained first loss positions and must be deducted in full from the capital of the bank purchasing the credit protection.
Apr 08Proportional Cover
CA-4.5.10
Where the amount guaranteed, or against which credit protection is held, is less than the amount of the exposure, and the secured and unsecured portions are of equal seniority, i.e. the bank and the guarantor share losses on a pro-rata basis capital relief will be afforded on a proportional basis: i.e. the protected portion of the exposure will receive the treatment applicable to eligible guarantees/credit derivatives, with the remainder treated as unsecured.
Apr 08Tranched Cover
CA-4.5.11
Where the bank transfers a portion of the risk of an exposure in one or more tranches to a protection seller or sellers and retains some level of risk of the loan and the risk transferred and the risk retained are of different seniority, banks may obtain credit protection for either the senior tranches (e.g. second loss portion) or the junior tranche (e.g. first loss portion). In this case the rules as set out in CA-6 (Credit risk — securitisation framework) will apply.
Apr 08Currency Mismatches
CA-4.5.12
Where the credit protection is denominated in a currency different from that in which the exposure is denominated — i.e. there is a currency mismatch — the amount of the exposure deemed to be protected will be reduced by the application of a haircut HFX, i.e.
GA = G × (1 - HFX)
Where:
G = Nominal amount of the credit protection
HFX = Haircut appropriate for currency mismatch between the credit protection and underlying obligation.
The appropriate haircut based on a 10-business day holding period (assuming daily marking-to-market) will be applied. If a bank uses the standard haircuts it will be 8%. The haircuts must be scaled up using the square root of time formula, depending on the frequency of revaluation of the credit protection as described in paragraph CA-4.3.12.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Sovereign Guarantees and Counter-guarantees
CA-4.5.13
Portions of claims guaranteed by the entities detailed in paragraph CA-3.2.1 above, where the guarantee is denominated in the domestic currency (and US$ in case of a guarantee provided by the Government of Bahrain and CBB) may get a 0% risk-weighting. A claim may be covered by a guarantee that is indirectly counter-guaranteed by such entities. Such a claim may be treated as covered by a sovereign guarantee provided that:
(a) The sovereign counter-guarantee covers all credit risk elements of the claim;(b) Both the original guarantee and the counter-guarantee meet all operational requirements for guarantees, except that the counter-guarantee need not be direct and explicit to the original claim; and(c) CBB is satisfied that the cover is robust and that no historical evidence suggests that the coverage of the counter-guarantee is less than effectively equivalent to that of a direct sovereign guarantee.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.6 CA-4.6 Maturity Mismatches
CA-4.6.1
For the purposes of calculating risk-weighted assets, a maturity mismatch occurs when the residual maturity of a hedge is less than that of the underlying exposure.
Apr 08Definition of Maturity
CA-4.6.2
The maturity of the underlying exposure and the maturity of the hedge should both be defined conservatively. The effective maturity of the underlying should be gauged as the longest possible remaining time before the counterparty is scheduled to fulfill its obligation, taking into account any applicable grace period. For the hedge, embedded options which may reduce the term of the hedge should be taken into account so that the shortest possible effective maturity is used. Where a call is at the discretion of the protection seller, the maturity will always be at the first call date. If the call is at the discretion of the protection buying bank but the terms of the arrangement at origination of the hedge contain a positive incentive for the bank to call the transaction before contractual maturity, the remaining time to the first call date will be deemed to be the effective maturity. For example, where there is a step-up in cost in conjunction with a call feature or where the effective cost of cover increases over time even if credit quality remains the same or increases, the effective maturity will be the remaining time to the first call.
Apr 08Risk Weights for Maturity Mismatches
CA-4.6.3
As outlined in paragraph CA-4.2.24, hedges with maturity mismatches are only recognised when their original maturities are greater than or equal to one year. As a result, the maturity of hedges for exposures with original maturities of less than one year must be matched to be recognised. In all cases, hedges with maturity mismatches will no longer be recognised when they have a residual maturity of three months or less.
Apr 08CA-4.6.4
When there is a maturity mismatch with recognised credit risk mitigants (collateral, on-balance sheet netting, guarantees and credit derivatives) the following adjustment will be applied.
Pa = P × (t - 0.25) / (T - 0.25)
Where:
Pa = Value of the credit protection adjusted for maturity mismatch.
P = Credit protection (e.g. collateral amount, guarantee amount) adjusted for any haircuts.
t = Min (T, residual maturity of the credit protection arrangement) expressed in years.
T = Min (5, residual maturity of the exposure) expressed in years.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-4.7 CA-4.7 Other Items Related to the Treatment of CRM Techniques
Treatment of Pools of CRM Techniques
CA-4.7.1
In the case where a bank has multiple CRM techniques covering a single exposure (e.g. a bank has both collateral and guarantee partially covering an exposure), the bank will be required to subdivide the exposure into portions covered by each type of CRM technique (e.g. portion covered by collateral, portion covered by guarantee) and the risk-weighted assets of each portion must be calculated separately. When credit protection provided by a single protection provider has differing maturities, they must be subdivided into separate protection as well.
Apr 08First-to-default Credit Derivatives
CA-4.7.2
There are cases where a bank obtains credit protection for a basket of reference names and where the first default among the reference names triggers the credit protection and the credit event also terminates the contract. In this case, the bank may recognise regulatory capital relief for the asset within the basket with the lowest risk-weighted amount, but only if the notional amount is less than or equal to the notional amount of the credit derivative.
Apr 08CA-4.7.3
With regard to the bank providing credit protection through such an instrument, if the product has an external credit assessment from an eligible credit assessment institution, the risk weight in paragraph CA-6.4.8 applied to securitisation tranches will be applied. If the product is not rated by an eligible external credit assessment institution, the risk weights of the assets included in the basket will be aggregated up to a maximum of 1250% and multiplied by the nominal amount of the protection provided by the credit derivative to obtain the risk-weighted asset amount.
Apr 08Second-to-default Credit Derivatives
CA-4.7.4
In the case where the second default among the assets within the basket triggers the credit protection, the bank obtaining credit protection through such a product will only be able to recognise any capital relief if first-default-protection has also be obtained or when one of the assets within the basket has already defaulted.
Apr 08CA-4.7.5
For banks providing credit protection through such a product, the capital treatment is the same as in paragraph CA-4.7.3 above with one exception. The exception is that, in aggregating the risk weights, the asset with the lowest risk weighted amount can be excluded from the calculation.
Apr 08CA-5 CA-5 Credit Risk — The Internal Ratings-Based Approach
CA-5.1 CA-5.1 Overview
CA-5.1.1
This chapter of the Capital Adequacy Module describes the IRB approach to credit risk. Subject to certain minimum conditions and disclosure requirements, banks that have received CBB's approval to use the IRB approach may rely on their own internal estimates of risk components in determining the capital requirement for a given exposure. The risk components include measures of the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD), and effective maturity (M). In most cases, banks are required to use a value given by the CBB as opposed to an internal estimate for one or more of the risk components.
Apr 08CA-5.1.2
The IRB approach is based on measures of unexpected losses (UL) and expected losses (EL). The risk-weight functions produce capital requirements for the UL portion. Expected losses are treated separately, as outlined in paragraph CA-2.1.5 and section CA-5.7.
Apr 08CA-5.1.3
In this chapter, the asset classes are defined first. Adoption of the IRB approach across all asset classes is also discussed early in this section, as are transitional arrangements. The risk components, each of which is defined later in this section, serve as inputs to the risk-weight functions that have been developed for separate asset classes. For example, there is a risk-weight function for corporate exposures and another one for qualifying revolving retail exposures. The treatment of each asset class begins with a presentation of the relevant risk-weight function(s) followed by the risk components and other relevant factors, such as the treatment of credit risk mitigants. The legal certainty standards for recognising CRM as set out in Section CA-4.1 apply for both the foundation and advanced IRB approaches. The minimum requirements that banks must satisfy to use the IRB approach are presented at the end of this chapter starting at section CA-5.8, paragraph CA-5.8.1.
Apr 08CA-5.1.4
A scaling factor of 1.06 must be applied to the risk-weighted assets for credit risk assessed under the IRB approach.
Apr 08CA-5.2 CA-5.2 Mechanics of the IRB Approach
CA-5.2.1
In sub-section 1, the risk components (e.g. PD and LGD) and asset classes (e.g. corporate exposures and retail exposures) of the IRB approach are defined. Sub-section 2 provides a description of the risk components to be used by banks by asset class. Sub-sections 3 and 4 discuss a bank's adoption of the IRB approach and transitional arrangements, respectively. In cases where an IRB treatment is not specified, the risk weight for those other exposures is 100%, except when a 0% risk weight applies under the standardised approach, and the resulting risk-weighted assets are assumed to represent UL only.
Apr 081. Categorisation of Exposures
CA-5.2.2
Under the IRB approach, banks must categorise banking-book exposures into broad classes of assets with different underlying risk characteristics, subject to the definitions set out below. The classes of assets are (a) corporate, (b) sovereign, (c) bank, (d) retail, and (e) equity. Within the corporate asset class, five sub-classes of specialised lending are separately identified. Within the retail asset class, three sub-classes are separately identified. Within the corporate and retail asset classes, a distinct treatment for purchased receivables may also apply provided certain conditions are met.
Apr 08CA-5.2.3
Some banks may use different classifications to those listed above in their internal risk management and measurement systems. While it is not the intention of the CBB to require banks to change the way in which they manage their business and risks, banks are required to apply the appropriate treatment to each exposure for the purposes of deriving their minimum capital requirement. Banks must demonstrate to CBB that their methodology for assigning exposures to different classes is appropriate and consistent over time.
Apr 08CA-5.2.4
For a discussion of the IRB treatment of securitisation exposures, see chapter CA-6.
Apr 08(i) Definition of Corporate Exposures
CA-5.2.5
In general, a corporate exposure is defined as a debt obligation of a corporation, partnership, or proprietorship. Banks are permitted to distinguish separately exposures to small- and medium-sized entities (SME), as defined in paragraph CA-5.3.4.
Apr 08CA-5.2.6
Within the corporate asset class, five sub-classes of specialised lending (SL) are identified. Such lending possesses all the following characteristics, either in legal form or economic substance:
(a) The exposure is typically to an entity (often a special purpose entity (SPE)) which was created specifically to finance and/or operate physical assets;(b) The borrowing entity has little or no other material assets or activities, and therefore little or no independent capacity to repay the obligation, apart from the income that it receives from the asset(s) being financed;(c) The terms of the obligation give the lender a substantial degree of control over the asset(s) and the income that it generates; and(d) As a result of the preceding factors, the primary source of repayment of the obligation is the income generated by the asset(s), rather than the independent capacity of a broader commercial enterprise.Apr 08CA-5.2.7
The five sub-classes of specialised lending are project finance, object finance, commodities finance, income-producing real estate, and high-volatility commercial real estate. Each of these sub-classes is defined below.
Apr 08Project Finance
CA-5.2.8
Project finance (PF) is a method of funding in which the lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a single project, both as the source of repayment and as security for the exposure. This type of financing is usually for large, complex and expensive installations that might include, for example, power plants, chemical processing plants, mines, transportation infrastructure, environment, and telecommunications infrastructure. Project finance may take the form of financing of the construction of a new capital installation, or refinancing of an existing installation, with or without improvements.
Apr 08CA-5.2.9
In such transactions, the lender is usually paid solely or almost exclusively out of the money generated by the contracts for the facility's output, such as the electricity sold by a power plant. The borrower is usually an SPE that is not permitted to perform any function other than developing, owning, and operating the installation. The consequence is that repayment depends primarily on the project's cash flow and on the collateral value of the project's assets. In contrast, if repayment of the exposure depends primarily on a well established, diversified, credit-worthy, contractually obligated end user for repayment, it is considered a secured exposure to that end-user.
Apr 08Object Finance
CA-5.2.10
Object finance (OF) refers to a method of funding the acquisition of physical assets (e.g. ships, aircraft, satellites, railcars, and fleets) where the repayment of the exposure is dependent on the cash flows generated by the specific assets that have been financed and pledged or assigned to the lender. A primary source of these cash flows might be rental or lease contracts with one or several third parties. In contrast, if the exposure is to a borrower whose financial condition and debt-servicing capacity enables it to repay the debt without undue reliance on the specifically pledged assets, the exposure should be treated as a collateralised corporate exposure.
Apr 08Commodities Finance
CA-5.2.11
Commodities finance (CF) refers to structured short-term lending to finance reserves, inventories, or receivables of exchange-traded commodities (e.g. crude oil, metals, or crops), where the exposure will be repaid from the proceeds of the sale of the commodity and the borrower has no independent capacity to repay the exposure. This is the case when the borrower has no other activities and no other material assets on its balance sheet. The structured nature of the financing is designed to compensate for the weak credit quality of the borrower. The exposure's rating reflects its self-liquidating nature and the lender's skill in structuring the transaction rather than the credit quality of the borrower.
Apr 08CA-5.2.12
The CBB believes that such lending can be distinguished from exposures financing the reserves, inventories, or receivables of other more diversified corporate borrowers. Banks are able to rate the credit quality of the latter type of borrowers based on their broader ongoing operations. In such cases, the value of the commodity serves as a risk mitigant rather than as the primary source of repayment.
Apr 08Income-producing Real Estate
CA-5.2.13
Income-producing real estate (IPRE) refers to a method of providing funding to real estate (such as, office buildings to let, retail space, multifamily residential buildings, industrial or warehouse space, and hotels) where the prospects for repayment and recovery on the exposure depend primarily on the cash flows generated by the asset. The primary source of these cash flows would generally be lease or rental payments or the sale of the asset. The borrower may be, but is not required to be, an SPE, an operating company focused on real estate construction or holdings, or an operating company with sources of revenue other than real estate. The distinguishing characteristic of IPRE versus other corporate exposures that are collateralised by real estate is the strong positive correlation between the prospects for repayment of the exposure and the prospects for recovery in the event of default, with both depending primarily on the cash flows generated by a property.
Apr 08High-volatility Commercial Real Estate
CA-5.2.14
High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) lending is the financing of commercial real estate that exhibits higher loss rate volatility (i.e. higher asset correlation) compared to other types of SL. HVCRE includes:
(a) Commercial real estate exposures secured by properties of types that are categorised by the CBB periodically as sharing higher volatilities in portfolio default rates;(b) Loans financing any of the land acquisition, development and construction (ADC) phases for properties of those types in such jurisdictions; and(c) Loans financing ADC of any other properties where the source of repayment at origination of the exposure is either the future uncertain sale of the property or cash flows whose source of repayment is substantially uncertain (e.g. the property has not yet been leased to the occupancy rate prevailing in that geographic market for that type of commercial real estate), unless the borrower has substantial equity at risk.Apr 08CA-5.2.15
Where other supervisors categorise certain types of commercial real estate exposures as HVCRE in their jurisdictions, Bahraini banks are also required to classify such exposures in those jurisdictions as HVCRE.
Apr 08(ii) Definition of Sovereign Exposures
CA-5.2.16
This asset class covers all exposures to counterparties treated as sovereigns under the standardised approach. This includes sovereigns (and their central banks), certain PSEs identified as sovereigns in the standardised approach, MDBs that are given a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach, and the entities referred to in paragraph CA-3.2.3.
Apr 08(iii) Definition of Bank Exposures
CA-5.2.17
This asset class covers exposures to banks and those investment firms outlined in paragraph CA-3.2.13. Bank exposures also include claims on domestic PSEs that are treated like claims on banks under the standardised approach, and MDBs that are not assigned a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach.
Apr 08(iv) Definition of Retail Exposures
CA-5.2.18
An exposure is categorised as a retail exposure if it meets all of the following criteria:
Nature of Borrower or Low Value of Individual Exposures
(a) Exposures to individuals — such as revolving credits and lines of credit (e.g. credit cards, overdrafts, and retail facilities secured by financial instruments) as well as personal term loans and leases (e.g. installment loans, auto loans and leases, student and educational loans, personal finance, and other exposures with similar characteristics). There will be an exposure threshold of BD250,000 to distinguish between retail and corporate exposures;(b) Residential mortgage loans (including first and subsequent liens, term loans and revolving home equity lines of credit) are eligible for retail treatment regardless of exposure size so long as the credit is extended to an individual that is an owner- occupier of the property (with buildings containing only a few rental units — otherwise they are treated as corporate). Loans secured by a single or small number of condominium or co-operative residential housing units in a single building or complex also fall within the scope of the residential mortgage category. CBB may set limits on the maximum number of housing units per exposure, on a case by case basis;(c) Loans extended to small businesses and managed as retail exposures are eligible for retail treatment provided the total exposure of the banking group to a small business borrower (on a consolidated basis where applicable) is less than BD 250,000 . Small business loans extended through or guaranteed by an individual are subject to the same exposure threshold; and(d) CBB will provide flexibility in the practical application of such thresholds such that banks are not forced to develop extensive new information systems simply for the purpose of ensuring perfect compliance. CBB will however, check on regular basis to ensure that such flexibility (and the implied acceptance of exposure amounts in excess of the thresholds that are not treated as violations) is not being abused.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Large Number of Exposures
CA-5.2.19
The exposure must be one of a large pool of exposures, which are managed by the bank on a pooled basis. CBB may, on a case by case basis, set a minimum number of exposures within a pool for exposures in that pool to be treated as retail:
(a) Small business exposures below BD 250,000 may be treated as retail exposures if the bank treats such exposures in its internal risk management systems consistently over time and in the same manner as other retail exposures. This requires that such an exposure be originated in a similar manner to other retail exposures. Furthermore, it must not be managed individually in a way comparable to corporate exposures, but rather as part of a portfolio segment or pool of exposures with similar risk characteristics for purposes of risk assessment and quantification. However, this does not preclude retail exposures from being treated individually at some stages of the risk management process. The fact that an exposure is rated individually does not by itself deny the eligibility as a retail exposure.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.2.20
Within the retail asset class category, banks are required to identify separately three sub-classes of exposures: (a) exposures secured by residential properties as defined above, (b) qualifying revolving retail exposures, as defined in the following paragraph, and (c) all other retail exposures.
Apr 08(v) Definition of Qualifying Revolving Retail Exposures
CA-5.2.21
All of the following criteria must be satisfied for a sub-portfolio to be treated as a qualifying revolving retail exposure (QRRE). These criteria must be applied at a sub-portfolio level consistent with the bank's segmentation of its retail activities generally. Segmentation at the national or country level (or below) should be the general rule:
(a) The exposures are revolving, unsecured, and uncommitted (both contractually and in practice). In this context, revolving exposures are defined as those where customers' outstanding balances are permitted to fluctuate based on their decisions to borrow and repay, up to a limit established by the bank;(b) The exposures are to individuals;(c) The maximum exposure to a single individual in the sub-portfolio is BD 25,000 or less;(d) Because the asset correlation assumptions for the QRRE risk-weight function are markedly below those for the other retail risk-weight function at low PD values, banks must demonstrate that the use of the QRRE risk-weight function is constrained to portfolios that have exhibited low volatility of loss rates, relative to their average level of loss rates, especially within the low PD bands. CBB will review the relative volatility of loss rates across the QRRE subportfolios, as well as the aggregate QRRE portfolio;(e) Data on loss rates for the sub-portfolio must be retained in order to allow analysis of the volatility of loss rates; and(f) CBB must concur that treatment as a qualifying revolving retail exposure is consistent with the underlying risk characteristics of the sub-portfolio.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08(vi) Definition of Equity Exposures
CA-5.2.22
In general, equity exposures are defined on the basis of the economic substance of the instrument. They include both direct and indirect ownership interests,31 whether voting or non-voting, in the assets and income of a commercial enterprise or of a financial institution that is not consolidated or deducted pursuant to Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module. An instrument is considered to be an equity exposure if it meets all of the following requirements:
(a) It is irredeemable in the sense that the return of invested funds can be achieved only by the sale of the investment or sale of the rights to the investment or by the liquidation of the issuer;(b) It does not embody an obligation on the part of the issuer; and(c) It conveys a residual claim on the assets or income of the issuer.
31 Indirect equity interests include holdings of derivative instruments tied to equity interests, and holdings in corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies or other types of enterprises that issue ownership interests and are engaged principally in the business of investing in equity instruments.
Apr 08CA-5.2.23
Additionally any of the following instruments must be categorised as an equity exposure:
(a) An instrument with the same structure as those permitted as Tier 1 capital for banking organisations;(b) An instrument that embodies an obligation on the part of the issuer and meets any of the following conditions:• The issuer may defer indefinitely the settlement of the obligation;• The obligation requires (or permits at the issuer's discretion) settlement by issuance of a fixed number of the issuer's equity shares;• The obligation requires (or permits at the issuer's discretion) settlement by issuance of a variable number of the issuer's equity shares and (ceteris paribus) any change in the value of the obligation is attributable to, comparable to, and in the same direction as, the change in the value of a fixed number of the issuer's equity shares;32 or,• The holder has the option to require that the obligation be settled in equity shares, unless either (i) in the case of a traded instrument, the CBB is content that the bank has demonstrated that the instrument trades more like the debt of the issuer than like its equity, or (ii) in the case of non- traded instruments, the CBB is content that the bank has demonstrated that the instrument should be treated as a debt position. In cases (i) and (ii), the bank may decompose the risks for regulatory purposes, with the consent of the CBB.
32For certain obligations that require or permit settlement by issuance of a variable number of the issuer's equity shares, the change in the monetary value of the obligation is equal to the change in the fair value of a fixed number of equity shares multiplied by a specified factor. Those obligations meet the conditions of this bullet if both the factor and the referenced number of shares are fixed. For example, an issuer may be required to settle an obligation by issuing shares with a value equal to three times the appreciation in the fair value of 1,000 equity shares. That obligation is considered to be the same as an obligation that requires settlement by issuance of shares equal to the appreciation in the fair value of 3,000 equity shares.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.2.24
Debt obligations and other securities, partnerships, derivatives or other vehicles structured with the intent of conveying the economic substance of equity ownership are considered an equity holding.33 This includes liabilities from which the return is linked to that of equities.34 Conversely, equity investments that are structured with the intent of conveying the economic substance of debt holdings or securitisation exposures would not be considered an equity holding.
33Equities that are recorded as a loan but arise from a debt/equity swap made as part of the orderly realisation or restructuring of the debt are included in the definition of equity holdings. However, these instruments may not attract a lower capital charge than would apply if the holdings remained in the debt portfolio.
34Such liabilities are not required to be included where they are directly hedged by an equity holding, such that the net position does not involve material risk.
Apr 08CA-5.2.25
The CBB may, on a case by case basis, re-characterise debt holdings as equities for regulatory purposes or otherwise ensure the proper treatment of holdings.
Apr 08(vii) Definition of Eligible Purchased Receivables
CA-5.2.26
Eligible purchased receivables are divided into retail and corporate receivables as defined below.
Apr 08Retail Receivables
CA-5.2.27
Purchased retail receivables, provided the purchasing bank complies with the IRB rules for retail exposures, are eligible for the top-down approach as permitted within the existing standards for retail exposures. The bank must also apply the minimum operational requirements as set forth in sections CA-5.6 and CA-5.8.
Apr 082. Foundation and Advanced Approaches
CA-5.2.29
For each of the asset classes covered under the IRB framework, there are three key elements:
(a) Risk components — estimates of risk parameters provided by banks some of which are CBB's estimates;(b) Risk-weight functions — the means by which risk components are transformed into risk-weighted assets and therefore capital requirements; and(c) Minimum requirements — the minimum standards that must be met in order for a bank to use the IRB approach for a given asset class.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.2.30
The CBB has decided to allow only the foundation approach for corporate, sovereign and bank asset classes. However, banks are required to adopt the advanced approach for retail asset class. Under the foundation approach, as a general rule, banks provide their own estimates of PD and rely on CBB's estimates for other risk components. Under the advanced approach, banks provide more of their own estimates of PD, LGD and EAD, and their own calculation of M, subject to meeting minimum standards. For both the foundation and advanced approaches, banks must always use the risk-weight functions provided in this chapter for the purpose of deriving capital requirements. The full suite of approaches is described below.
Apr 08(i) Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.2.31
For corporate, sovereign and bank exposures only the foundation approach is allowed under which banks must provide their own estimates of PD associated with each of their borrower grades, but must use CBB's estimates for the other relevant risk components. The other risk components are LGD, EAD and M.35
35 As noted in section CA-5.3.45, CBB may require/allow banks using the foundation approach to calculate M using the definition provided in section CA-5.3.46 to CA-5.3.50.
Apr 08CA-5.2.32
There is an exception to this general rule for the five sub-classes of assets identified as SL.
Apr 08The SL Categories: PF, OF, CF, IPRE, and HVCRE
CA-5.2.33
Banks that do not meet the requirements for the estimation of PD under the corporate foundation approach for their SL assets are required to map their internal risk grades to five supervisory categories, each of which is associated with a specific risk weight. This version is termed the 'supervisory slotting criteria approach'.
Apr 08CA-5.2.34
Banks that meet the requirements for the estimation of PD are able to use the foundation approach to corporate exposures to derive risk weights for all classes of SL exposures except HVCRE. Subject to CBB's discretion, on a case by case basis, banks meeting the requirements for HVCRE exposure are able to use a foundation approach that is similar in all respects to the corporate approach, with the exception of a separate risk-weight function as described in paragraph CA-5.3.11.
Apr 08(ii) Retail Exposures
CA-5.2.35
For retail exposures, banks must provide their own estimates of PD, LGD and EAD. There is no distinction between a foundation and advanced approach for this asset class.
Apr 08(iii) Equity Exposures
(iv) Eligible Purchased Receivables
CA-5.2.37
The treatment potentially straddles two asset classes. For eligible corporate receivables, only the foundation approach is available subject to certain operational requirements being met. For eligible retail receivables, as with the retail asset class, there is no distinction between a foundation and advanced approach.
Apr 083. Adoption of the IRB Approach Across Asset Classes
CA-5.2.38
Once a bank adopts an IRB approach for part of its holdings, it is expected to extend it across the entire banking group. The CBB recognises however, that, for many banks, it may not be practicable for various reasons to implement the IRB approach across all material asset classes and business units at the same time. Furthermore, once on IRB, data limitations may mean that banks can meet the standards for the use of own estimates of LGD and EAD for some but not all of their business units at the same time. CBB will expect banks to define their business units in line with asset classes given in this chapter, however banks can apply to CBB for exemption from this rule.
Apr 08CA-5.2.39
As such, CBB allows banks to adopt a phased rollout of the IRB approach across the banking group. The phased rollout includes (i) adoption of IRB across asset classes within the same business unit (or in the case of retail exposures across individual sub-classes); and (ii) adoption of IRB across business units in the same banking group. However, when a bank adopts an IRB approach for an asset class within a particular business unit (or in the case of retail exposures for an individual sub-class), it must apply the IRB approach to all exposures within that asset class (or sub-class) in that unit.
Apr 08CA-5.2.40
A bank must produce an implementation plan, specifying to what extent and when it intends to roll out IRB approaches across significant asset classes (or sub-classes in the case of retail) and business units over time. The plan should be exacting, yet realistic, and must be agreed with the CBB. It should be driven by the practicality and feasibility of moving to the more advanced approaches, and not motivated by a desire to adopt an approach that minimises its capital charge. During the roll-out period, CBB will ensure that no capital relief is granted for intra-group transactions which are designed to reduce a banking group's aggregate capital charge by transferring credit risk among entities on the standardised approach, foundation and advanced IRB approaches. This includes, but is not limited to, asset sales or cross guarantees.
Apr 08CA-5.2.41
Some exposures in non-significant business units as well as asset classes (or sub-classes in the case of retail) that are immaterial in terms of size and perceived risk profile may be exempt from the requirements in the previous two paragraphs, subject to CBB's approval. Capital requirements for such operations will be determined according to the standardised approach, with the CBB determining whether a bank should hold more capital for such positions.
Apr 08CA-5.2.42
Notwithstanding the above, once a bank has adopted the IRB approach for all or part of any of the corporate, bank, sovereign, or retail asset classes, it will be required to adopt the IRB approach for its equity exposures at the same time, subject to materiality. Further, once a bank has adopted the general IRB approach for corporate exposures, it will be required to adopt the IRB approach for the SL sub-classes within the corporate exposure class.
Apr 08CA-5.2.43
Banks adopting an IRB approach are expected to continue to employ an IRB approach. A voluntary return to the standardised approach is permitted only in extraordinary circumstances, such as divestiture of a large fraction of the bank's credit- related business, and approval must be obtained from the CBB.
Apr 08CA-5.2.44
Given the data limitations associated with SL exposures, a bank may remain on the supervisory slotting criteria approach for one or more of the PF, OF, CF, IPRE or HVCRE sub-classes, and move to the foundation approach for other sub-classes within the corporate asset class.
Apr 084. Transition Arrangements
(i) Parallel Calculation
CA-5.2.45
Banks adopting the foundation IRB (advanced IRB for retail class) approach are required to calculate their capital requirement using these approaches, as well as the capital adequacy regulations issued by CBB dated July 2004 for the time period specified in section CA-A.4. The transition period for adoption of IRB will begin from the publication of this Module. Parallel calculation for banks adopting the foundation IRB approach to credit risk will start in the year beginning year-end 2007.
Apr 08(ii) Corporate, Sovereign, Bank, and Retail Exposures
CA-5.2.46
The transition period starts on the date of implementation of this Module and will last for 3 years from that date. During the transition period, the following minimum requirements can be relaxed:
(a) For corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures under the foundation approach, paragraph CA-5.8.74, the requirement that, regardless of the data source, banks must use at least five years of data to estimate the PD; and(b) For retail exposures, paragraph CA-5.8.77, the requirement that regardless of the data source banks must use at least five years of data to estimate loss characteristics (EAD, and either expected loss (EL) or PD and LGD).(c) For corporate, sovereign, bank, and retail exposures, paragraph CA-5.8.56, the requirement that a bank must demonstrate it has been using a rating system that was broadly in line with the minimum requirements articulated in this document for at least three years prior to qualification.(d) The applicable aforementioned transitional arrangements also apply to the PD/LGD approach to equity. There are no transitional arrangements for the market-based approach to equity.Apr 08CA-5.2.47
Under these transitional arrangements for IRB, banks must have a minimum of two years of data at the implementation of this Module. This requirement will increase by one year for each of three years of transition.
Apr 08CA-5.2.48
Owing to the potential for very long-run cycles in house prices which short-term data may not adequately capture, during this transition period, LGDs for retail exposures secured by residential properties cannot be set below 10% for any sub-segment of exposures to which the formula in paragraph CA-5.4.3 is applied.36 During the transition period the CBB will review the potential need for continuation of this floor.
36 The 10% LGD floor shall not apply, however, to sub-segments that are subject to/benefit from sovereign guarantees. Further, the existence of the floor does not imply any waiver of the requirements of LGD estimation as laid out in the minimum requirements starting with section CA-5.8.79.
Apr 08(iii) Equity Exposures
CA-5.2.49
For a maximum of ten years, CBB may, on a case by case basis, exempt from the IRB treatment particular equity investments held at the time of the publication of this Module. This exemption period will begin from the publication of this Module. The exempted position is measured as the number of shares as of that date and any additional arising directly as a result of owning those holdings, as long as they do not increase the proportional share of ownership in a portfolio company.
Apr 08CA-5.2.50
If an acquisition increases the proportional share of ownership in a specific holding (e.g. due to a change of ownership initiated by the investing company subsequent to the publication of this Module) the exceeding part of the holding is not subject to the exemption. Nor will the exemption apply to holdings that were originally subject to the exemption, but have been sold and then bought back.
Apr 08CA-5.2.51
Equity holdings covered by these transitional provisions will be subject to the capital requirements of the standardised approach.
Apr 08CA-5.3 CA-5.3 Rules for Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.3.1
This section presents the method of calculating the unexpected loss (UL) capital requirements for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures. As discussed in proceeding paragraphs, one risk-weight function is provided for determining the capital requirement for all three asset classes with one exception. Supervisory risk weights are provided for each of the specialised lending sub-classes of corporates, and a separate risk-weight function is also provided for HVCRE. Then the risk components are discussed. The method of calculating expected losses, and for determining the difference between that measure and provisions is described in section CA-5.7.
Apr 081. Risk-weighted Assets for Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
(i) Formula for Derivation of Risk-weighted Assets
CA-5.3.2
The derivation of risk-weighted assets is dependent on estimates of the PD, LGD, EAD and, in some cases, effective maturity (M), for a given exposure. Paragraphs CA-5.3.45 to CA-5.3.50 discuss the circumstances in which the maturity adjustment applies.
Apr 08CA-5.3.3
Throughout this section, PD and LGD are measured as decimals, and EAD is measured as currency (e.g. euros), except where explicitly noted otherwise. For exposures not in default, the formula for calculating risk-weighted assets is:37, 38
Correlation (R) = 0.12 × (1 - EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-50)) + 0.24 × [1 - (1 - EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-50))]
Maturity adjustment (b) = (0.11852 - 0.05478 × ln(PD))^2
Capital requirement39 (K) = [LGD × N[(1 - R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] - PD x LGD] x (1 - 1.5 x b)^-1 × (1 + (M - 2.5) × b)
Risk-weighted assets (RWA) = K × 12.5 × EAD
The capital requirement (K) for a defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero and the difference between its LGD (described in paragraph CA-5.8.79) and the bank's best estimate of expected loss (described in paragraph CA-5.8.82). The risk-weighted asset amount for the defaulted exposure is the product of K, 12.5, and the EAD.
Illustrative risk weights are shown in Appendix CA-6.
37Ln denotes the natural logarithm.
38N(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable (i.e. the probability that a normal random variable with mean zero and variance of one is less than or equal to x). G(z) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable (i.e. the value of x such that N(x) = z). The normal cumulative distribution function and the inverse of the normal cumulative distribution function are, for example, available in Excel as the functions NORMSDIST and NORMSINV.
39If this calculation results in a negative capital charge for any individual sovereign exposure, banks must apply a zero capital charge for that exposure.
Apr 08(ii) Firm-size Adjustment for Small- and Medium-sized Entities (SME)
CA-5.3.4
Under the IRB approach for corporate credits, banks will be permitted to separately distinguish exposures to SME borrowers (defined as corporate exposures, being an unlisted or unincorporated enterprise where the reported annual sales for the consolidated group of which the firm is a part is less than BD 2 million) from those to large firms. A firm-size adjustment (i.e. 0.04 x (1 - (S - 0.2)/1.8)) is made to the corporate risk weight formula for exposures to SME borrowers. S is expressed as total annual sales in millions of BD with values of S falling in the range of equal to or less than BD 2 million or greater than or equal to BD 0.2 million. Reported sales of less than 0.2 million BD will be treated as if they were equivalent to 0.2 million BD for the purposes of the firm-size adjustment for SME borrowers.
Correlation (R) = 0.12 × (1 - EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-50)) + 0.24 × [1 - (1 - EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-50))] - 0.04 × (1 - (S-0.2) / 1.8)
Apr 08CA-5.3.5
Banks are allowed, as a failsafe, to substitute total assets of the consolidated group for total sales in calculating the SME threshold and the firm-size adjustment. However, total assets should be used only when total sales are not a meaningful indicator of firm size. The criteria for definition of SME will be assessed by CBB on a regular basis. The external auditors are required to assess the reasonableness of identification criteria.
Apr 08(iii) Risk Weights for Specialised Lending
Risk Weights for PF, OF, CF, and IPRE
CA-5.3.6
Banks that do not meet the requirements for the estimation of PD under the corporate IRB approach will be required to map their internal grades to five supervisory categories, each of which is associated with a specific risk weight. The slotting criteria on which this mapping must be based are provided in Appendix CA-7. The risk weights for unexpected losses associated with each supervisory category are:
Supervisory Categories and UL Risk Weights for other SL Exposures
Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default 70% 90% 115% 250% 0% Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.3.7
Although banks are expected to map their internal ratings to the supervisory categories for specialised lending using the slotting criteria provided in Appendix CA-7, each supervisory category broadly corresponds to a range of external credit assessments as outlined below.
Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default BBB- or better BB+ or BB BB- or B+ B to C- Not applicable Apr 08CA-5.3.8
Banks that meet the requirements for the estimation of PD will be able to use the general foundation approach for the corporate asset class to derive risk weights for SL sub- classes.
Apr 08Risk Weights for HVCRE
CA-5.3.9
Banks that do not meet the requirements for estimation of PD, must map their internal grades to five supervisory categories, each of which is associated with a specific risk weight. The slotting criteria on which this mapping must be based are the same as those for IPRE, as provided in Appendix CA-7. The risk weights associated with each category are:
Supervisory Categories and UL Risk Weights for High-volatility Commercial Real Estate
Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default 95% 120% 140% 250% 0% Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.3.10
As indicated in paragraph CA-5.3.7, each supervisory category broadly corresponds to a range of external credit assessments.
Apr 08CA-5.3.11
Banks that meet the requirements for the estimation of PD will use the same formula for the derivation of risk weights that is used for other SL exposures, except that they will apply the following asset correlation formula:
Correlation (R) = 0.12 x (1 - EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-50)) + 0.30 x [1 - (1 - EXP(-50 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-50))]
Apr 08(iv) Calculation of Risk-weighted Assets for Exposures Subject to the Double Default Framework
CA-5.3.12
For hedged exposures to be treated within the scope of the double default framework, capital requirements may be calculated according to paragraphs CA-5.3.13 to CA-5.3.16.
Apr 08CA-5.3.13
The capital requirement for a hedged exposure subject to the double default treatment (KDD) is calculated by multiplying K0 as defined below by a multiplier depending on the PD of the protection provider (PDg):
KDD = K0 . ( 0.15 + 160 . PDg)
Apr 08CA-5.3.14
K0 is calculated in the same way as a capital requirement for an unhedged corporate exposure (as defined in paragraphs CA-5.3.3 and CA-5.3.4), but using different parameters for LGD and the maturity adjustment.
Apr 08CA-5.3.15
PDo and PDg are the probabilities of default of the obligor and guarantor, respectively, both subject to the PD floor set out in paragraph CA-5.3.17. The correlation Pos is calculated according to the formula for correlation (R) in paragraph CA-5.3.3 (or, if applicable, paragraph CA-5.3.4), with PD being equal to PDo, and LGDg is the LGD of a comparable direct exposure to the guarantor (i.e. consistent with paragraph CA-5.3.29, the LGD associated with an unhedged facility to the guarantor or the unhedged facility to the obligor, depending upon whether in the event both the guarantor and the obligor default during the life of the hedged transaction available evidence and the structure of the guarantee indicate that the amount recovered would depend on the financial condition of the guarantor or obligor, respectively; in estimating either of these LGDs, a bank may recognise collateral posted exclusively against the exposure or credit protection, respectively, in a manner consistent with paragraphs CA-5.3.31 or CA-5.3.8 and CA-5.8.79 to CA-5.8.83, as applicable). There may be no consideration of double recovery in the LGD estimate. The maturity adjustment coefficient b is calculated according to the formula for maturity adjustment (b) in paragraph CA-5.3.3, with PD being the minimum of PDo and PDg M is the effective maturity of the credit protection, which may under no circumstances be below the one-year floor if the double default framework is to be applied.
Apr 08CA-5.3.16
The risk-weighted asset amount is calculated in the same way as for unhedged exposures, i.e
RWADD = KDD × 12.5 × EADg
Apr 082. Risk Components
(i) Probability of Default (PD)
CA-5.3.17
For corporate and bank exposures, the PD is the greater of the one-year PD associated with the internal borrower grade to which that exposure is assigned, or 0.03%. For sovereign exposures, the PD is the one-year PD associated with the internal borrower grade to which that exposure is assigned. The PD of borrowers assigned to a default grade(s), consistent with the reference definition of default, is 100%. The minimum requirements for the derivation of the PD estimates associated with each internal borrower grade are outlined in paragraphs CA-5.8.72 to CA-5.8.74.
Apr 08(ii) Loss Given Default (LGD)
— Treatment of Unsecured Claims and Non-recognised Collateral
CA-5.3.18
Under the foundation approach, senior claims on corporates, sovereigns and banks not secured by recognised collateral will be assigned a 45% LGD.
Apr 08CA-5.3.19
All subordinated claims on corporates, sovereigns and banks must be assigned a 75% LGD. A subordinated loan is a facility that is expressly subordinated to another facility. This also includes economic subordination, such as cases where the facility is unsecured and the bulk of the borrower's assets are used to secure other exposures. CBB will review subordinated claims on a case by case basis. In case the subordinated claim (i) is on a banking, securities or other financial entity and (ii) exceeds (when combined with other investments in regulatory capital instruments of the investee) 20% of the concerned investee's eligible regulatory capital, such holding must be treated as described in Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements Module.
Apr 08— Collateral under the Foundation Approach
CA-5.3.20
In addition to the eligible financial collateral recognised in the standardised approach, under the foundation IRB approach some other forms of collateral, known as eligible IRB collateral, are also recognised. These include receivables, specified commercial and residential real estate (CRE/RRE), and other collateral, where they meet the minimum requirements set out in paragraphs CA-5.8.119 to CA-5.8.134.40 For eligible financial collateral, the requirements are identical to the operational standards as set out in chapter CA-4.
40 The LGD applied to the collateralised portion of such exposures, subject to the limitations set out in paragraphs CA-4.2.1 to CA-4.3.25 of the standardised approach, will be set at 35%. The LGD applied to the remaining portion of this exposure will be set at 45%.
Apr 08— Methodology for Recognition of Eligible Financial Collateral under the Foundation Approach
CA-5.3.21
The methodology for the recognition of eligible financial collateral closely follows that outlined in the comprehensive approach to collateral in the standardised approach in paragraphs CA-4.3.3 to CA-4.3.25. The simple approach to collateral presented in the standardised approach will not be available to banks applying the IRB approach.
Apr 08CA-5.3.22
Following the comprehensive approach, the effective loss given default (LGD*) applicable to a collateralised transaction can be expressed as follows, where:
(a) LGD is that of the senior unsecured exposure before recognition of collateral (45%);(b) E is the current value of the exposure (i.e. cash lent or securities lent or posted);(c) E* is the exposure value after risk mitigation as determined in paragraphs CA-4.3.3 to CA-4.3.6 of the standardised approach. This concept is only used to calculate LGD*. Banks must continue to calculate EAD without taking into account the presence of any collateral, unless otherwise specified.LGD* = LGD × (E* / E)
Apr 08CA-5.3.23
Banks that qualify for the foundation IRB approach may calculate E* using any of the ways specified under the comprehensive approach for collateralised transactions under the standardised approach.
Apr 08CA-5.3.24
Where repo-style transactions are subject to a master netting agreement, a bank may choose not to recognise the netting effects in calculating capital. Banks that want to recognise the effect of master netting agreements on such transactions for capital purposes must satisfy the criteria provided in paragraph CA-4.3.17 and CA-4.3.18 of the standardised approach. The bank must calculate E* in accordance with paragraphs CA-4.3.20 and 4.3.21 or CA-4.3.22 to 4.3.25 and equate this to EAD. The impact of collateral on these transactions may not be reflected through an adjustment to LGD.
Apr 08— Carve Out from the Comprehensive Approach
— Methodology for Recognition of Eligible IRB Collateral
CA-5.3.26
The methodology for determining the effective LGD under the foundation approach for cases where banks have taken eligible IRB collateral to secure a corporate exposure is as follows:
(a) Exposures where the minimum eligibility requirements are met, but the ratio of the current value of the collateral received (C) to the current value of the exposure (E) is below a threshold level of C* (i.e. the required minimum collateralisation level for the exposure) would receive the appropriate LGD for unsecured exposures or those secured by collateral which is not eligible financial collateral or eligible IRB collateral;(b) Exposures where the ratio of C to E exceeds a second, higher threshold level of C** (i.e. the required level of over-collateralisation for full LGD recognition) would be assigned an LGD according to the following table.The following table displays the applicable LGD and required over-collateralisation levels for the secured parts of senior exposures:
Minimum LGD for Secured Portion of Senior Exposures
Minimum LGD Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required level of over-collateralisation for full LGD recognition (C**) Eligible Financial collateral 0% 0% n.a. Receivables 35% 0% 125% CRE/RRE 35% 30% 140% Other collateral41 40% 30% 140% (a) Senior exposures are to be divided into fully collateralised and un-collateralised portions;(b) The part of the exposure considered to be fully collateralised, C/C**, receives the LGD associated with the type of collateral;(c) The remaining part of the exposure is regarded as unsecured and receives an LGD of 45%.
41 Other collateral excludes physical assets acquired by the bank as a result of a loan default.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08— Methodology for the Treatment of Pools of Collateral
CA-5.3.27
The methodology for determining the effective LGD of a transaction under the foundation approach where banks have taken both financial collateral and other eligible IRB collateral is aligned to the treatment in the standardised approach and based on the following guidance:
(a) In the case where a bank has obtained multiple forms of CRM, it will be required to subdivide the adjusted value of the exposure (after the haircut for eligible financial collateral) into portions each covered by only one CRM type. That is, the bank must divide the exposure into the portion covered by eligible financial collateral, the portion covered by receivables, the portion covered by CRE/RRE collateral, a portion covered by other collateral, and an unsecured portion, where relevant;(b) Where the ratio of the sum of the value of CRE/RRE and other collateral to the reduced exposure (after recognising the effect of eligible financial collateral and receivables collateral) is below the associated threshold level (i.e. the minimum degree of collateralisation of the exposure), the exposure would receive the appropriate unsecured LGD value of 45%; and(c) The risk-weighted assets for each fully secured portion of exposure must be calculated separately.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08— Treatment of Certain Repo-style Transactions
CA-5.3.28
Banks that want to recognise the effects of master netting agreements on repo-style transactions for capital purposes must apply the methodology outlined in paragraph CA-5.3.24 for determining E* for use as the EAD.
Apr 08— Treatment of Guarantees and Credit Derivatives
CA-5.3.29
CRM in the form of guarantees and credit derivatives must not reflect the effect of double default (see paragraph CA-5.8.93). As such, to the extent that the CRM is recognised by the bank, the adjusted risk weight will not be less than that of a comparable direct exposure to the protection provider. Consistent with the standardised approach, banks may choose not to recognise credit protection if doing so would result in a higher capital requirement.
Apr 08CA-5.3.30
The approach to guarantees and credit derivatives closely follows the treatment under the standardised approach as specified in paragraphs CA-4.5.1 to CA-4.5.13. The range of eligible guarantors is the same as under the standardised approach except that companies that are internally rated and associated with a PD equivalent to A- or better may also be recognised. To receive recognition, the requirements outlined in paragraphs CA-4.5.1 to CA-4.5.6 must be met.
Apr 08CA-5.3.31
Eligible guarantees from eligible guarantors will be recognised as follows:
(a) For the covered portion of the exposure, a risk weight is derived by taking:• the risk-weight function appropriate to the type of guarantor, and• the PD appropriate to the guarantor's borrower grade, or some grade between the underlying obligor and the guarantor's borrower grade if the bank deems a full substitution treatment not to be warranted.(b) The bank may replace the LGD of the underlying transaction with the LGD applicable to the guarantee taking into account seniority and any collateralisation of a guaranteed commitment.Apr 08CA-5.3.32
The uncovered portion of the exposure is assigned the risk weight associated with the underlying obligor.
Apr 08CA-5.3.33
Where partial coverage exists, or where there is a currency mismatch between the underlying obligation and the credit protection, it is necessary to split the exposure into a covered and an uncovered amount. The treatment in this approach follows that outlined in the standardised approach in paragraphs CA-4.5.10 to CA-4.5.12, and depends upon whether the cover is proportional or tranched.
Apr 08CA-5.3.34
A bank using an IRB approach has the option of using the substitution approach in determining the appropriate capital requirement for an exposure. However, for exposures hedged by one of the following instruments the double default framework according to paragraphs CA-5.3.12 to CA-5.3.16 may be applied subject to the additional operational requirements set out in paragraph CA-5.3.39. A bank may decide separately for each eligible exposure to apply either the double default framework or the substitution approach:
(a) Single-name, unfunded credit derivatives (e.g. credit default swaps) or single-name guarantees;(b) First-to-default basket products — the double default treatment will be applied to the asset within the basket with the lowest risk-weighted amount; and(c) nth-to-default basket products — the protection obtained is only eligible for consideration under the double default framework if eligible (n-1)th default protection has also been obtained or where (n-1) of the assets within the basket have already defaulted.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08— Operational Requirements for Recognition of Double Default
CA-5.3.35
The double default framework is only applicable where the following conditions are met:
(a) The risk weight that is associated with the exposure prior to the application of the framework does not already factor in any aspect of the credit protection;(b) The entity selling credit protection is a bank42, investment firm or insurance company (but only those that are in the business of providing credit protection, including mono-lines, re-insurers, and non-sovereign credit export agencies43), referred to as a financial firm, that:• It is regulated in a manner broadly equivalent to that in this Module (where there is appropriate supervisory oversight and transparency/market discipline), or externally rated as at least investment grade by a credit rating agency deemed suitable for this purpose by CBB;• Had an internal rating with a PD equivalent to or lower than that associated with an external A- rating at the time the credit protection for an exposure was first provided or for any period of time thereafter; and• Has an internal rating with a PD equivalent to or lower than that associated with an external investment-grade rating.(c) The underlying obligation is:• A corporate exposure as defined in paragraphs CA-5.2.5 to CA-5.2.15 (excluding specialised lending exposures for which the supervisory slotting criteria approach described in paragraphs CA-5.3.6 to CA-5.3.11 is being used); or• A claim on a PSE that is not a sovereign exposure as defined in paragraph CA-5.2.16; or• A loan extended to a small business and classified as a retail exposure as defined in paragraph CA-5.2.18.(d) The underlying obligor is not:• A financial firm as defined in (b); or• A member of the same group as the protection provider.(e) The credit protection meets the minimum operational requirements for such instruments as outlined in paragraphs CA-4.5.1 to CA-4.5.5;(f) In keeping with paragraph CA-4.5.2 for guarantees, for any recognition of double default effects for both guarantees and credit derivatives a bank must have the right and expectation to receive payment from the credit protection provider without having to take legal action in order to pursue the counterparty for payment. To the extent possible, a bank must take steps to satisfy itself that the protection provider is willing to pay promptly if a credit event should occur;(g) The purchased credit protection absorbs all credit losses incurred on the hedged portion of an exposure that arise due to the credit events outlined in the contract;(h) If the payout structure provides for physical settlement, then there must be legal certainty with respect to the deliverability of a loan, bond, or contingent liability. If a bank intends to deliver an obligation other than the underlying exposure, it must ensure that the deliverable obligation is sufficiently liquid so that the bank would have the ability to purchase it for delivery in accordance with the contract;(i) The terms and conditions of credit protection arrangements must be legally confirmed in writing by both the credit protection provider and the bank;(j) In the case of protection against dilution risk, the seller of purchased receivables must not be a member of the same group as the protection provider; and(k) There is no excessive correlation between the creditworthiness of a protection provider and the obligor of the underlying exposure due to their performance being dependent on common factors beyond the systematic risk factor. The bank has a process to detect such excessive correlation. An example of a situation in which such excessive correlation would arise is when a protection provider guarantees the debt of a supplier of goods or services and the supplier derives a high proportion of its income or revenue from the protection provider.
42 This does not include PSEs and MDBs, even though claims on these may be treated as claims on banks according to paragraph CA-5.2.17.
43By non-sovereign it is meant that credit protection in question does not benefit from any explicit sovereign counter-guarantee.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08(iii) Exposure at Default (EAD)
CA-5.3.36
The following sections apply to both on and off-balance sheet positions. All exposures are measured gross of specific provisions or partial write-offs. The EAD on drawn amounts should not be less than the sum of (i) the amount by which a bank's regulatory capital would be reduced if the exposure were written-off fully, and (ii) any specific provisions and partial write-offs. When the difference between the instrument's EAD and the sum of (i) and (ii) is positive, this amount is termed a discount. The calculation of risk-weighted assets is independent of any discounts. Under the limited circumstances described in paragraph CA-5.7.7, discounts may be included in the measurement of total eligible provisions for purposes of the EL-provision calculation set out in section CA-5.7.
Apr 08Exposure Measurement for On-balance Sheet Items
CA-5.3.37
On-balance sheet netting of loans and deposits will be recognised subject to the same conditions as under the standardised approach (see paragraph CA-4.4.1). Where currency or maturity mismatched on-balance sheet netting exists, the treatment follows the standardised approach, as set out in paragraphs CA-4.5.12 and CA-4.6.1 to CA-4.6.4.
Apr 08Exposure Measurement for Off-balance Sheet Items (with the Exception of FX and Interest-rate, Equity, and Commodity-related Derivatives)
CA-5.3.38
For off-balance sheet items, exposure is calculated as the committed but undrawn amount multiplied by a CCF.
Apr 08CA-5.3.39
The types of instruments and the CCFs applied to them are the same as those in the standardised approach, as outlined in paragraphs CA-3.3.1 to CA-3.3.15 with the exception of commitments, Note Issuance Facilities (NIFs) and Revolving Underwriting Facilities (RUFs).
Apr 08CA-5.3.40
A CCF of 75% will be applied to commitments, NIFs and RUFs regardless of the maturity of the underlying facility. This does not apply to those facilities which are uncommitted, that are unconditionally cancellable, or that effectively provide for automatic cancellation, for example due to deterioration in a borrower's creditworthiness, at any time by the bank without prior notice. A CCF of 0% will be applied to these facilities.
Apr 08CA-5.3.41
The amount to which the CCF is applied is the lower of the value of the unused committed credit line, and the value that reflects any possible constraining availability of the facility, such as the existence of a ceiling on the potential lending amount which is related to a borrower's reported cash flow. If the facility is constrained in this way, the bank must have sufficient line monitoring and management procedures to support this contention.
Apr 08CA-5.3.42
In order to apply a 0% CCF for unconditionally and immediately cancellable corporate overdrafts and other facilities, banks must demonstrate that they actively monitor the financial condition of the borrower, and that their internal control systems are such that they could cancel the facility upon evidence of a deterioration in the credit quality of the borrower.
Apr 08CA-5.3.43
Where a commitment is obtained on another off-balance sheet exposure, banks under the foundation approach are to apply the lower of the applicable CCFs.
Apr 08Exposure Measurement for Transactions that Expose Banks to Counterparty Credit risk
CA-5.3.44
Measures of exposure for SFTs and OTC derivatives that expose banks to counterparty credit risk under the IRB approach will be calculated as per the rules set forth in Appendix CA-2 of this Module.
Apr 08(iv) Effective Maturity (M)
CA-5.3.45
Effective maturity (M) will be 2.5 years except for repo-style transactions where the effective maturity will be 6 months. However, banks can apply to CBB for approval to measure M for each facility using the definition provided below.
Apr 08CA-5.3.46
Except as noted in proceeding paragraph, M is defined as the greater of one year and the remaining effective maturity in years as defined below. In all cases, M will be no greater than 5 years:
(a) For an instrument subject to a determined cash flow schedule, effective maturity M is defined as:
where CFt denotes the cash flows (principal, interest payments and fees) contractually payable by the borrower in period t.(b) If a bank is not in a position to calculate the effective maturity of the contracted payments as noted above, it is allowed to use a more conservative measure of M such as that it equals the maximum remaining time (in years) that the borrower is permitted to take to fully discharge its contractual obligation (principal, interest, and fees) under the terms of loan agreement. Normally, this will correspond to the nominal maturity of the instrument; and(c) For derivatives subject to a master netting agreement, the weighted average maturity of the transactions should be used when applying the explicit maturity adjustment. Further, the notional amount of each transaction should be used for weighting the maturity.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.3.47
The one-year floor does not apply to certain short-term exposures, comprising fully or nearly-fully collateralised44 capital market-driven transactions (i.e. OTC derivatives transactions and margin lending) and repo-style transactions (i.e. repos/reverse repos and securities lending/borrowing) with an original maturity of less then one year, where the documentation contains daily remargining clauses. For all eligible transactions the documentation must require daily revaluation, and must include provisions that must allow for the prompt liquidation or setoff of the collateral in the event of default or failure to re-margin. The maturity of such transactions must be calculated as the greater of one-day, and the effective maturity (M, consistent with the definition above).
44 The intention is to include both parties of a transaction meeting these conditions where neither of the parties is systematically under-collateralised.
Apr 08CA-5.3.48
In addition to the transactions considered in the preceding paragraph above, other short-term exposures with an original maturity of less than one year that are not part of a bank's ongoing financing of an obligor are eligible for exemption from the one-year floor. Such transactions include:
(a) Some capital market-driven transactions and repo-style transactions that might not fall within the scope of the preceding paragraph;(b) Some short-term self-liquidating trade transactions. Import and export letters of credit and similar transactions could be accounted for at their actual remaining maturity;(c) Some exposures arising from settling securities purchases and sales. This could also include overdrafts arising from failed securities settlements provided that such overdrafts do not continue more than a short, fixed number of business days;(d) Some exposures arising from cash settlements by wire transfer, including overdrafts arising from failed transfers provided that such overdrafts do not continue more than a short, fixed number of business days;(e) Some exposures to banks arising from foreign exchange settlements; and(f) Some short-term loans and deposits.Apr 08CA-5.3.49
For transactions falling within the scope of paragraph CA-5.3.47 subject to a master netting agreement, the weighted average maturity of the transactions should be used when applying the explicit maturity adjustment. A floor equal to the minimum holding period for the transaction type set out in paragraph CA-4.3.11 will apply to the average. Where more than one transaction type is contained in the master netting agreement a floor equal to the highest holding period will apply to the average. Further, the notional amount of each transaction should be used for weighting maturity.
Apr 08CA-5.3.50
Where there is no explicit adjustment, the effective maturity (M) assigned to all exposures is set at 2.5 years unless otherwise specified in paragraph CA-5.3.45.
Apr 08CA-5.4 CA-5.4 Rules for Retail Exposures
CA-5.4.1
This section presents in detail the method of calculating the UL capital requirements for retail exposures. The first sub-section provides three risk-weight functions, one for residential mortgage exposures, a second for qualifying revolving retail exposures, and a third for other retail exposures. Second sub-section presents the risk components to serve as inputs to the risk- weight functions. The method of calculating expected losses, and for determining the difference between that measure and provisions is described in section CA-5.7.
Apr 081. Risk-weighted Assets for Retail Exposures
CA-5.4.2
There are three separate risk-weight functions for retail exposures, as defined in paragraphs CA-5.4.3 to CA-5.4.5. Risk weights for retail exposures are based on separate assessments of PD and LGD as inputs to the risk-weight functions. None of the three retail risk-weight functions contains an explicit maturity adjustment. Throughout this section, PD and LGD are measured as decimals, and EAD is measured as currency.
Apr 08(i) Residential Mortgage Exposures
CA-5.4.3
For exposures defined in paragraph CA-5.2.18 that are not in default and are secured or partly secured45 by residential mortgages, risk weights will be assigned based on the following formula:
Correlation (R) = 0.15
Capital requirement (K) = LGD × N[(1 - R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] - PD x LGD
Risk-weighted assets = K x 12.5 x EAD
The capital requirement (K) for a defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero and the difference between its LGD (described in paragraph CA-5.8.79) and the bank's best estimate of expected loss (described in paragraph CA-5.8.82). The risk-weighted asset amount for the defaulted exposure is the product of K, 12.5, and the EAD.
45 This means that risk weights for residential mortgages also apply to the unsecured portion of such residential mortgages.
Apr 08(ii) Qualifying Revolving Retail Exposures
CA-5.4.4
For qualifying revolving retail exposures as defined in paragraph CA-5.2.21 that are not in default, risk weights are defined based on the following formula:
Correlation (R) = 0.04
Capital requirement (K) = LGD × N[(1 - R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] - PD x LGD
Risk-weighted assets = K x 12.5 x EAD
The capital requirement (K) for a defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero and the difference between its LGD (described in paragraph CA-5.8.79) and the bank's best estimate of expected loss (described in paragraph CA-5.8.82). The risk-weighted asset amount for the defaulted exposure is the product of K, 12.5, and the EAD.
Apr 08(iii) Other Retail Exposures
CA-5.4.5
For all other retail exposures that are not in default, risk weights are assigned based on the following function, which allows correlation to vary with PD:
Correlation (R) = 0.03 × (1 - EXP(-35 × PD)) / (1 - EXP(-35)) + 0.16 × [1 - (1 - EXP(-35 × PD))/(1 - EXP(-35))]
Capital requirement (K) = LGD × N[(1 - R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 - R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] - PD x LGD
Risk-weighted assets = K × 12.5 × EAD
The capital requirement (K) for a defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero and the difference between its LGD (described in paragraph CA-5.8.79) and the bank's best estimate of expected loss (described in paragraph CA-5.8.82). The risk-weighted asset amount for the defaulted exposure is the product of K, 12.5, and the EAD.
Illustrative risk weights are shown in Appendix CA-6.
Apr 082. Risk Components
(i) Probability of Default (PD) and Loss Given Default (LGD)
CA-5.4.6
For each identified pool of retail exposures, banks are expected to provide an estimate of the PD and LGD associated with the pool, subject to the minimum requirements as set out in section CA-5.8. Additionally, the PD for retail exposures is the greater of the one- year PD associated with the internal borrower grade to which the pool of retail exposures is assigned or 0.03%.
Apr 08(ii) Recognition of Guarantees and Credit Derivatives
CA-5.4.7
Banks may reflect the risk-reducing effects of guarantees and credit derivatives, either in support of an individual obligation or a pool of exposures, through an adjustment of either the PD or LGD estimate, subject to the minimum requirements in paragraphs CA-5.8.91 to CA-5.8.100. Whether adjustments are done through PD or LGD, they must be done in a consistent manner for a given guarantee or credit derivative type.
Apr 08CA-5.4.8
Consistent with the requirements outlined above for corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures, banks must not include the effect of double default in such adjustments. The adjusted risk weight must not be less than that of a comparable direct exposure to the protection provider. Consistent with the standardised approach, banks may choose not to recognise credit protection if doing so would result in a higher capital requirement.
Apr 08(iii) Exposure at Default (EAD)
CA-5.4.9
Both on and off-balance sheet retail exposures are measured gross of specific provisions or partial write-offs. The EAD on drawn amounts should not be less than the sum of (i) the amount by which a bank's regulatory capital would be reduced if the exposure were written-off fully, and (ii) any specific provisions and partial write-offs. When the difference between the instrument's EAD and the sum of (i) and (ii) is positive, this amount is termed a discount. The calculation of risk-weighted assets is independent of any discounts. Under the limited circumstances described in paragraph CA-5.7.7, discounts may be included in the measurement of total eligible provisions for purposes of the EL-provision calculation set out in Section CA-5.7.
Apr 08CA-5.4.10
On-balance sheet netting of loans and deposits of a bank to or from a retail customer will be permitted subject to the same conditions outlined in paragraph CA-4.4.1 of the standardised approach. For retail off-balance sheet items, banks must use their own estimates of CCFs provided the minimum requirements in paragraphs CA-5.8.84 to CA-5.8.87 and CA-5.8.90 are satisfied.
Apr 08CA-5.4.11
For retail exposures with uncertain future drawdown such as credit cards, banks must take into account their history and/or expectation of additional drawings prior to default in their overall calibration of loss estimates. In particular, where a bank does not reflect conversion factors for undrawn lines in its EAD estimates, it must reflect in its LGD estimates the likelihood of additional drawings prior to default. Conversely, if the bank does not incorporate the possibility of additional drawings in its LGD estimates, it must do so in its EAD estimates.
Apr 08CA-5.4.12
When only the drawn balances of retail facilities have been securitised, banks must ensure that they continue to hold required capital against their share (i.e. seller's interest) of undrawn balances related to the securitised exposures using the IRB approach to credit risk. This means that for such facilities, banks must reflect the impact of CCFs in their EAD estimates rather than in the LGD estimates. For determining the EAD associated with the seller's interest in the undrawn lines, the undrawn balances of securitised exposures would be allocated between the seller's and investors' interests on a pro rata basis, based on the proportions of the seller's and investors' shares of the securitised drawn balances. The investors' share of undrawn balances related to the securitised exposures is subject to the treatment in paragraph CA-6.4.32.
Apr 08CA-5.4.13
To the extent that foreign exchange and interest rate commitments exist within a bank's retail portfolio for IRB purposes, banks are not permitted to provide their internal assessments of credit equivalent amounts. Instead, the rules for the standardised approach continue to apply.
Apr 08CA-5.5 CA-5.5 Rules for Equity Exposures
CA-5.5.1
This section presents the method of calculating the UL capital requirements for equity exposures. The first sub-section discusses (a) the market-based approach (which is further sub- divided into a simple risk weight method and an internal models method), and (b) the PD/LGD approach. The risk components are provided in the second sub-section. The method of calculating expected losses, and for determining the difference between that measure and provisions is described in section CA-5.7.
Apr 081. Risk-weighted Assets for Equity Exposures
CA-5.5.2
Risk-weighted assets for equity exposures in the trading book are subject to the market risk capital rules detailed in chapter CA-10.
Apr 08CA-5.5.3
There are two approaches to calculate risk-weighted assets for equity exposures not held in the trading book: a market-based approach and a PD/LGD approach. Banks are permitted to select the approach subject to approval of CBB. Certain equity holdings are excluded as defined in paragraphs CA-5.5.18 to CA-5.5.20 and are subject to the capital charges required under the standardised approach.
Apr 08CA-5.5.4
Banks' choices must be made consistently, and in particular not determined by regulatory arbitrage considerations.
Apr 08(i) Market-based Approach
CA-5.5.5
Under the market-based approach, institutions are permitted to calculate the minimum capital requirements for their banking book equity holdings using one or both of two separate and distinct methods: a simple risk weight method or an internal models method. The method used should be consistent with the amount and complexity of the institution's equity holdings and commensurate with the overall size and sophistication of the institution. CBB may require the use of either method based on the individual circumstances of a bank.
Apr 08— Simple Risk Weight Method
CA-5.5.6
Under the simple risk weight method, a 300% risk weight is to be applied to equity holdings that are publicly traded and a 400% risk weight is to be applied to all other equity holdings. A publicly traded holding is defined as any equity security traded on a recognised security exchange.
Apr 08CA-5.5.7
Short cash positions and derivative instruments held in the banking book are permitted to offset long positions in the same individual stocks provided that these instruments have been explicitly designated as hedges of specific equity holdings and that they have remaining maturities of at least one year. Other short positions are to be treated as if they are long positions with the relevant risk weight applied to the absolute value of each position. In the context of maturity mismatched positions, the methodology is that for corporate exposures.
Apr 08Internal Models Method
CA-5.5.8
IRB banks may use, or may be required by CBB to use, internal risk measurement models to calculate the risk-based capital requirement. Under this alternative, banks must hold capital equal to the potential loss on the institution's equity holdings as derived using internal value-at-risk models subject to the 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval of the difference between quarterly returns and an appropriate risk-free rate computed over a long-term sample period. The capital charge would be incorporated into an institution's risk-based CAR through the calculation of risk-weighted equivalent assets.
Apr 08CA-5.5.9
The risk weight used to convert holdings into risk-weighted equivalent assets would be calculated by multiplying the derived capital charge by 12.5 (i.e. the inverse of the minimum 8% risk-based capital requirement). Capital charges calculated under the internal models method may be no less than the capital charges that would be calculated under the simple risk weight method using a 200% risk weight for publicly traded equity holdings and a 300% risk weight for all other equity holdings. These minimum capital charges would be calculated separately using the methodology of the simple risk weight approach. Further, these minimum risk weights are to apply at the individual exposure level rather than at the portfolio level.
Apr 08CA-5.5.10
A bank may be permitted by CBB to employ different market-based approaches to different portfolios based on appropriate considerations and where the bank itself uses different approaches internally.
Apr 08CA-5.5.11
Banks are permitted to recognise guarantees but not collateral obtained on an equity position wherein the capital requirement is determined through use of the market-based approach.
Apr 08(ii) PD/LGD Approach
CA-5.5.12
The minimum requirements and methodology for the PD/LGD approach for equity exposures (including equity of companies that are included in the retail asset class) are the same as those for the IRB foundation approach for corporate exposures subject to the following specifications:
(a) The bank's estimate of the PD of a corporate entity in which it holds an equity position must satisfy the same requirements as the bank's estimate of the PD of a corporate entity where the bank holds debt.46 If a bank does not hold debt of the company in whose equity it has invested, and does not have sufficient information on the position of that company to be able to use the applicable definition of default in practice but meets the other standards, a 1.5 scaling factor will be applied to the risk weights derived from the corporate risk-weight function, given the PD set by the bank. If, however, the bank's equity holdings are material and it is permitted to use a PD/LGD approach for regulatory purposes but the bank has not yet met the relevant standards, the simple risk-weight method under the market-based approach will apply;(b) An LGD of 90% would be assumed in deriving the risk weight for equity exposures; and(c) For these purposes, the risk weight is subject to a five-year maturity adjustment whether or not the bank is using the explicit approach to maturity elsewhere in its IRB portfolio.
46 In practice, if there is both an equity exposure and an IRB credit exposure to the same counterparty, a default on the credit exposure would thus trigger a simultaneous default for regulatory purposes on the equity exposure.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.5.13
Under the PD/LGD approach, minimum risk weights as set out in section CA-5.5.14 and CA-5.5.15 apply. When the sum of UL and EL associated with the equity exposure results in less capital than would be required from application of one of the minimum risk weights, the minimum risk weights must be used. In other words, the minimum risk weights must be applied, if the risk weights calculated according to the preceding paragraph plus the EL associated with the equity exposure multiplied by 12.5 are smaller than the applicable minimum risk weights.
Apr 08CA-5.5.14
A minimum risk weight of 100% applies for the following types of equities for as long as the portfolio is managed in the manner outlined below:
(a) Public equities where the investment is part of a long-term customer relationship, any capital gains are not expected to be realised in the short term and there is no anticipation of (above trend) capital gains in the long term. It is expected that in almost all cases, the institution will have lending and/or general banking relationships with the portfolio company so that the estimated probability of default is readily available. Given their long-term nature, specification of an appropriate holding period for such investments merits careful consideration. In general, it is expected that the bank will hold the equity over the long term (at least five years); and(b) Private equities where the returns on the investment are based on regular and periodic cash flows not derived from capital gains and there is no expectation of future (above trend) capital gain or of realising any existing gain.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.5.15
For all other equity positions, including net short positions (as defined in section CA-5.5.7), capital charges calculated under the PD/LGD approach may be no less than the capital charges that would be calculated under a simple risk weight method using a 200% risk weight for publicly traded equity holdings and a 300% risk weight for all other equity holdings.
Apr 08CA-5.5.16
The maximum risk weight for the PD/LGD approach for equity exposures is 1250%. This maximum risk weight can be applied, if risk weights calculated according to section CA-5.5.12 plus the EL associated with the equity exposure multiplied by 12.5 exceed the 1250% risk weight. Alternatively, banks may deduct the entire equity exposure amount, assuming it represents the EL amount, 50% from Tier 1 capital and 50% from Tier 2 capital.
Apr 08CA-5.5.17
Hedging for PD/LGD equity exposures is, as for corporate exposures, subject to an LGD of 90% on the exposure to the provider of the hedge. For these purposes equity positions will be treated as having a five-year maturity.
Apr 08(iii) Exclusions to the Market-based and PD/LGD Approaches
CA-5.5.18
Banks are allowed to exclude equity holdings in entities whose debt obligations qualify for a zero risk weight under the standardised approach to credit risk from the IRB approaches to equity (including those publicly sponsored entities where a zero risk weight can be applied).
Apr 08CA-5.5.19
Equity exposures of a bank can be excluded from the IRB treatment based on materiality as defined in the following paragraph.
Apr 08CA-5.5.20
The equity exposures of a bank are considered material if their aggregate value exceeds, on average over the prior year, 10% of bank's Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital. This materiality threshold is lowered to 5% of a bank's Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital if the equity portfolio consists of less than 10 individual holdings. CBB may use lower materiality thresholds in future.
Apr 082. Risk Components
CA-5.5.21
In general, the measure of an equity exposure on which capital requirements is based is the value presented in the financial statements, which may include unrealised revaluation gains. Thus, for example, equity exposure measures will be:
(a) For investments held at fair value with changes in value flowing directly through income and into regulatory capital and where a discount is applied on fair value (as explained in CA-2.1.5), the exposure is equal to the fair value adjusted to exclude that discount part. Refer to appendix CA-17;(b) For investments held at fair value with changes in value not flowing through income but into a tax-adjusted separate component of equity and where a discount is applied on fair value (as explained in CA-2.1.5), the exposure is equal to the fair value adjusted to exclude that discount part. Refer to appendix CA-17; and(c) For investments held at cost or at the lower of cost or market, exposure is equal to the cost or market value presented in the balance sheet.47
47 If "latent gain" is allowed on such investment (as explained in CA-2.1.5), the cost will be adjusted to include that allowed gain.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.5.22
Holdings in funds containing both equity investments and other non-equity types of investments can be either treated, in a consistent manner, as a single investment based on the majority of the fund's holdings or, where possible, as separate and distinct investments in the fund's component holdings based on a look-through approach.
Apr 08CA-5.5.23
Where only the investment mandate of the fund is known, the fund can still be treated as a single investment. For this purpose, it is assumed that the fund first invests, to the maximum extent allowed under its mandate, in the asset classes attracting the highest capital requirement, and then continues making investments in descending order until the maximum total investment level is reached. The same approach can also be used for the look-through approach, but only where the bank has rated all the potential constituents of such a fund.
Apr 08CA-5.6 CA-5.6 Rules for Purchased Receivables
CA-5.6.1
This section presents the method of calculating the UL capital requirements for purchased receivables. For such assets, there are IRB capital charges for both default risk and dilution risk. The first sub-section discusses the calculation of risk-weighted assets for default risk. The calculation of risk-weighted assets for dilution risk is provided in the second sub-section. The method of calculating expected losses, and for determining the difference between that measure and provisions, is described in section CA-5.7.
Apr 081. Risk-weighted Assets for Default Risk
CA-5.6.2
For receivables belonging unambiguously to one asset class, the IRB risk weight for default risk is based on the risk-weight function applicable to that particular exposure type, as long as the bank meets the qualification standards for this particular risk-weight function. For example, if banks cannot comply with the standards for qualifying revolving retail exposures (defined in paragraph CA-5.2.21), they should use the risk-weight function for other retail exposures. For hybrid pools containing mixtures of exposure types, if the purchasing bank cannot separate the exposures by type, the risk-weight function producing the highest capital requirements for the exposure types in the receivable pool applies.
Apr 08(i) Purchased Retail Receivables
CA-5.6.3
For purchased retail receivables, a bank must meet the risk quantification standards for retail exposures but can utilise external and internal reference data to estimate the PDs and LGDs. The estimates for PD and LGD (or EL) must be calculated for the receivables on a stand-alone basis; that is, without regard to any assumption of recourse or guarantees from the seller or other parties.
Apr 08(ii) Purchased Corporate Receivables
CA-5.6.4
For purchased corporate receivables, the purchasing bank is required to apply the existing IRB risk quantification standards for the bottom-up approach.
Apr 082. Risk-weighted Assets for Dilution Risk
CA-5.6.5
Dilution refers to the possibility that the receivable amount is reduced through cash or non-cash credits to the receivable's obligor.48 For both corporate and retail receivables, unless the bank demonstrates to the CBB that the dilution risk for the purchasing bank is immaterial, the treatment of dilution risk must be the following: at the level of either the pool as a whole (top-down approach) or the individual receivables making up the pool (bottom-up approach), the purchasing bank will estimate the one-year EL for dilution risk, also expressed in percentage of the receivables amount. Banks can utilise external and internal data to estimate EL. As with the treatments of default risk, this estimate must be computed on a stand-alone basis; that is, under the assumption of no recourse or other support from the seller or third-party guarantors. For the purpose of calculating risk weights for dilution risk, the corporate risk-weight function must be used with the following settings: the PD must be set equal to the estimated EL, and the LGD must be set at 100%. An appropriate maturity treatment applies when determining the capital requirement for dilution risk.
48 Examples include offsets or allowances arising from returns of goods sold, disputes regarding product quality, possible debts of the borrower to a receivables obligor, and any payment or promotional discounts offered by the borrower (e.g. a credit for cash payments within 30 days).
Apr 08CA-5.6.6
This treatment will be applied regardless of whether the underlying receivables are corporate or retail exposures.
Apr 083. Treatment of Purchase Price Discounts for Receivables
CA-5.6.7
In many cases, the purchase price of receivables will reflect a discount (not to be confused with the discount concept defined in paragraphs CA-5.3.40 and CA-5.4.9) that provides first loss protection for default losses, dilution losses or both (see paragraph CA-6.4.73). To the extent a portion of such a purchase price discount will be refunded to the seller, this refundable amount may be treated as first loss protection under the IRB securitisation framework. Non- refundable purchase price discounts for receivables do not affect either the EL-provision calculation in section CA-5.7 or the calculation of risk-weighted assets.
Apr 08CA-5.6.8
When collateral or partial guarantees obtained on receivables provide first loss protection (collectively referred to as mitigants in this paragraph), and these mitigants cover default losses, dilution losses, or both, they may also be treated as first loss protection under the IRB securitisation framework (see paragraph CA-6.4.73). When the same mitigant covers both default and dilution risk, banks using the Supervisory Formula that are able to calculate an exposure-weighted LGD must do so as defined in paragraph CA-6.4.79.
Apr 084. Recognition of Credit Risk Mitigants
CA-5.6.9
Credit risk mitigants will be recognised generally using the same type of framework as set forth in paragraphs CA-5.3.33 to CA-5.3.37. In particular, a guarantee provided by the seller or a third party will be treated using the existing IRB rules for guarantees, regardless of whether the guarantee covers default risk, dilution risk, or both:
(a) If the guarantee covers both the pool's default risk and dilution risk, the bank will substitute the risk weight for an exposure to the guarantor in place of the pool's total risk weight for default and dilution risk;(b) If the guarantee covers only default risk or dilution risk, but not both, the bank will substitute the risk weight for an exposure to the guarantor in place of the pool's risk weight for the corresponding risk component (default or dilution). The capital requirement for the other component will then be added; and(c) If a guarantee covers only a portion of the default and/or dilution risk, the uncovered portion of the default and/or dilution risk will be treated as per the existing CRM rules for proportional or tranched coverage (i.e. the risk weights of the uncovered risk components will be added to the risk weights of the covered risk components).Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.6.10
If protection against dilution risk has been purchased, and the conditions of paragraphs CA-5.3.38 and CA-5.3.39 are met, the double default framework may be used for the calculation of the risk-weighted asset amount for dilution risk. In this case, paragraphs CA-5.3.12 to CA-5.3.16 apply with PDo being equal to the estimated EL, LGDg being equal to 100 percent, and effective maturity being set according to paragraph CA-5.6.6.
Apr 08CA-5.7 CA-5.7 Treatment of Expected Losses and Recognition of Provisions
CA-5.7.1
This section discusses the method by which the difference between provisions (specific provisions and collective impairment provisions) and expected losses may be included in or must be deducted from regulatory capital, as outlined in paragraph CA-2.1.5 (e). However any excess provision representing impairment loss will not be allowed to be included in regulatory capital.
Apr 081. Calculation of Expected Losses
CA-5.7.2
A bank must sum the EL amount (defined as EL multiplied by EAD) associated with its exposures (excluding the EL amount associated with equity exposures under the PD/LGD approach and securitisation exposures) to obtain a total EL amount. While the EL amount associated with equity exposures subject to the PD/LGD approach is excluded from the total EL amount, paragraphs CA-5.7.3 and CA-5.7.13 apply to such exposures. The treatment of EL for securitisation exposures is described in paragraph CA-6.4.4.
Apr 08(i) Expected Loss for Exposures other than SL Subject to the Supervisory Slotting Criteria
CA-5.7.3
Banks must calculate an EL as PD x LGD for corporate, sovereign, bank, and retail exposures both not in default and not treated as hedged exposures under the double default treatment. For corporate, sovereign, bank, and retail exposures that are in default, banks must use their best estimate of expected loss as defined in paragraph CA-5.8.82 and banks on the foundation approach must use the CBB's LGD. For SL exposures subject to the supervisory slotting criteria EL is calculated as described in paragraphs CA-5.7.4 and CA-5.7.5. For equity exposures subject to the PD/LGD approach, the EL is calculated as PD x LGD unless paragraphs CA-5.5.13 to CA-5.5.16 apply. Securitisation exposures do not contribute to the EL amount, as set out in paragraph CA-6.4.4. For all other exposures, including hedged exposures under the double default treatment, the EL is zero.
Apr 08(ii) Expected Loss for SL Exposures Subject to the Supervisory Slotting Criteria
CA-5.7.4
For SL exposures subject to the supervisory slotting criteria, the EL amount is determined by multiplying 8% by the risk-weighted assets produced from the appropriate risk weights, as specified below, multiplied by EAD.
Apr 08Supervisory Categories and EL Risk Weights for other SL Exposures
CA-5.7.5
The risk weights for SL, other than HVCRE, are as follows:
Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default 5% 10% 35% 100% 625% Apr 08Supervisory Categories and EL Risk Weights for HVCRE
CA-5.7.6
The risk weights for HVCRE are as follows:
Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default 5% 5% 35% 100% 625% Apr 082. Calculation of Provisions
(i) Exposures subject to IRB Approach
CA-5.7.7
Total eligible provisions are defined as the sum of all provisions (specific provisions and collective impairment provisions) that are attributed to exposures treated under the IRB approach. In addition, total eligible provisions may include any discounts on defaulted assets. Specific provisions set aside against equity and securitisation exposures must not be included in total eligible provisions.
Apr 08(ii) Portion of Exposures Subject to the Standardised Approach to Credit Risk
CA-5.7.8
Banks using the standardised approach for a portion of their credit risk exposures, either on a transitional basis (as defined in paragraphs CA-5.2.44 and CA-5.2.45), or on a permanent basis if the exposures subject to the standardised approach are immaterial (paragraph CA-5.2.46), must determine the portion of collective impairment provisions attributed to the standardised or IRB treatment of provisions (see section CA-2.1 (d) according to the methods outlined in paragraphs CA-5.7.9 and CA-5.7.10.)
Apr 08CA-5.7.9
Banks should generally attribute total provisions on a pro rata basis according to the proportion of credit risk-weighted assets subject to the standardised and IRB approaches. However, when one approach to determining credit risk-weighted assets (i.e. standardised or IRB approach) is used exclusively within an entity, provisions booked within the entity may be attributed to that approach.
Apr 08CA-5.7.10
Subject to CBB's discretion, banks using both the standardised and IRB approaches may rely on their internal methods for allocating provisions for recognition in capital under either the standardised or IRB approach, subject to the following conditions. Where the internal allocation method is made available, the CBB will establish the standards surrounding their use. Banks will need to obtain prior approval from CBB to use an internal allocation method for this purpose.
Apr 083. Treatment of EL and Provisions
CA-5.7.11
As specified in paragraph CA-2.1.5 (e), banks using the IRB approach must compare the total amount of total eligible provisions (as defined in paragraph CA-5.7.7) with the total EL amount as calculated within the IRB approach (as defined in paragraph CA-5.7.2).
Apr 08CA-5.7.12
Where the calculated EL amount is lower than the provisions of the bank, CBB will consider whether the EL fully reflects the conditions in the market in which it operates before allowing the difference to be included in Tier 2 capital. If specific provisions exceed the EL amount on defaulted assets this assessment also needs to be made before using the difference to offset the EL amount on non-defaulted assets.
Apr 08CA-5.7.13
The EL amount for equity exposures under the PD/LGD approach is deducted 50% from Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 2. Provisions or write-offs for equity exposures under the PD/LGD approach will not be used in the EL-provision calculation. The treatment of EL and provisions related to securitisation exposures is outlined in paragraph CA-6.4.4.
Apr 08CA-5.8 CA-5.8 Minimum Requirements for IRB Approach
CA-5.8.1
This section presents the minimum requirements for entry and on-going use of the IRB approach. The minimum requirements are set out in 12 separate sections concerning: (a) composition of minimum requirements, (b) compliance with minimum requirements, (c) rating system design, (d) risk rating system operations, (e) corporate governance and oversight, (f) use of internal ratings, (g) risk quantification, (h) validation of internal estimates, (i) CBB's LGD and EAD estimates, (j) requirements for recognition of leasing, (k) calculation of capital charges for equity exposures, and (l) disclosure requirements. It may be helpful to note that the minimum requirements cut across asset classes. Therefore, more than one asset class may be discussed within the context of a given minimum requirement.
Apr 081. Composition of Minimum Requirements
CA-5.8.2
To be eligible for the IRB approach a bank must demonstrate to CBB that it meets certain minimum requirements at the outset and on an ongoing basis. Many of these requirements are in the form of objectives that a qualifying bank's risk rating systems must fulfill. The focus is on banks' abilities to rank order and quantify risk in a consistent, reliable and valid fashion.
Apr 08CA-5.8.3
The overarching principle behind these requirements is that rating and risk estimation systems and processes provide for a meaningful assessment of borrower and transaction characteristics; a meaningful differentiation of risk; and reasonably accurate and consistent quantitative estimates of risk. Furthermore, the systems and processes must be consistent with internal use of these estimates. CBB will periodically develop detailed review procedures to ensure that banks' systems and controls are adequate to serve as the basis for the IRB approach.
Apr 08CA-5.8.4
The minimum requirements set out in this section apply to all asset classes unless noted otherwise. The standards related to the process of assigning exposures to borrower or facility grades (and the related oversight, validation, etc.) apply equally to the process of assigning retail exposures to pools of homogenous exposures, unless noted otherwise.
Apr 08CA-5.8.5
The minimum requirements set out in this section apply to both foundation and advanced approaches unless noted otherwise. Generally, all IRB banks must produce their own estimates of PD49 and must adhere to the overall requirements for rating system design, operations, controls, and corporate governance, as well as the requisite requirements for estimation and validation of PD measures. Banks using their own estimates of LGD and EAD for retail exposures must also meet the incremental minimum requirements for these risk factors included in paragraphs CA-5.8.79 to CA-5.8.100.
49 Banks are not required to produce their own estimates of PD for certain equity exposures and certain exposures that fall within the SL sub-class.
Apr 082. Compliance with Minimum Requirements
CA-5.8.6
To be eligible for an IRB approach, a bank must demonstrate to CBB that it meets the IRB requirements in this sub-section, at the outset and on an ongoing basis. Banks' overall credit risk management practices must also be consistent with the evolving sound practice guidelines issued by the Basel Committee (See www.bis.org for guidance) and CBB periodically.
Apr 08CA-5.8.7
There may be circumstances when a bank is not in complete compliance with all the minimum requirements. Where this is the case, the bank must produce a plan for a timely return to compliance, and seek approval from CBB, or the bank must demonstrate that the effect of such non-compliance is immaterial in terms of the risk posed to the institution. Failure to produce an acceptable plan or satisfactorily implement the plan or to demonstrate immateriality will lead CBB to reconsider the bank's eligibility for the IRB approach. Furthermore, for the duration of any non-compliance, CBB will consider the need for the bank to hold additional capital or take other appropriate supervisory action.
Apr 083. Rating System Design
CA-5.8.8
The term "rating system" comprises all of the methods, processes, controls, and data collection and IT systems that support the assessment of credit risk, the assignment of internal risk ratings, and the quantification of default and loss estimates.
Apr 08CA-5.8.9
Within each asset class, a bank may utilise multiple rating methodologies/systems. For example, a bank may have customised rating systems for specific industries or market segments (e.g. middle market, and large corporate). If a bank chooses to use multiple systems, the rationale for assigning a borrower to a rating system must be documented and applied in a manner that best reflects the level of risk of the borrower. Banks must not allocate borrowers across rating systems inappropriately to minimise regulatory capital requirements (i.e. cherry-picking by choice of rating system). Banks must demonstrate that each system used for IRB purposes is in compliance with the minimum requirements at the outset and on an ongoing basis.
Apr 08(i) Rating Dimensions
— Standards for Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.8.10
A qualifying IRB rating system must have two separate and distinct dimensions: (i) the risk of borrower default, and (ii) transaction-specific factors.
Apr 08CA-5.8.11
The first dimension must be oriented to the risk of borrower default. Separate exposures to the same borrower must be assigned to the same borrower grade, irrespective of any differences in the nature of each specific transaction. There are two exceptions to this. Firstly, in the case of country transfer risk, where a bank may assign different borrower grades depending on whether the facility is denominated in local or foreign currency. Secondly, when the treatment of associated guarantees to a facility may be reflected in an adjusted borrower grade. In either case, separate exposures may result in multiple grades for the same borrower. A bank must articulate in its credit policy the relationship between borrower grades in terms of the level of risk each grade implies. Perceived and measured risk must increase as credit quality declines from one grade to the next. The policy must articulate the risk of each grade in terms of both a description of the probability of default risk typical for borrowers assigned the grade and the criteria used to distinguish that level of credit risk.
Apr 08CA-5.8.12
The second dimension must reflect transaction-specific factors, such as collateral, seniority, product type, etc. This requirement can be fulfilled by the existence of a facility dimension, which reflects both borrower and transaction-specific factors. For example, a rating dimension that reflects EL by incorporating both borrower strength (PD) and CBB's loss severity (LGD) considerations would qualify.
Apr 08CA-5.8.13
Banks using the supervisory slotting criteria for the SL sub-class are exempt from this two-dimensional requirement for these exposures. Given the interdependence between borrower/transaction characteristics in SL, banks may satisfy the requirements under this heading through a single rating dimension that reflects EL by incorporating both borrower strength (PD) and CBB's loss severity (LGD) considerations. This exemption does not apply to banks using the general corporate foundation approach for the SL sub- class.
Apr 08— Standards for Retail Exposures
CA-5.8.14
Rating systems for retail exposures must be oriented to both borrower and transaction risk, and must capture all relevant borrower and transaction characteristics. Banks must assign each exposure that falls within the definition of retail for IRB purposes into a particular pool. Banks must demonstrate that this process provides for a meaningful differentiation of risk, provides for a grouping of sufficiently homogenous exposures, and allows for accurate and consistent estimation of loss characteristics at pool level.
Apr 08CA-5.8.15
For each pool, banks must estimate PD, LGD, and EAD. Multiple pools may share identical PD, LGD and EAD estimates. At a minimum, banks must consider the following risk drivers when assigning exposures to a pool:
(a) Borrower risk characteristics (e.g. borrower type, demographics such as age/occupation);(b) Transaction risk characteristics, including product and/or collateral types (e.g. loan to value measures, seasoning, guarantees; and seniority (first vs. second lien)). Banks must explicitly address cross-collateral provisions where present.(c) Delinquency of exposure: Banks are expected to separately identify exposures that are delinquent and those that are not.Apr 08(ii) Rating Structure
— Standards for Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.8.16
A bank must have a meaningful distribution of exposures across grades with no excessive concentrations, on both its borrower-rating and its facility-rating scales.
Apr 08CA-5.8.17
To meet this objective, a bank must have a minimum of seven borrower grades for non-defaulted borrowers and one for those that have defaulted. Banks with lending activities focused on a particular market segment may satisfy this requirement with the minimum number of grades; CBB may require banks, which lend to borrowers of diverse credit quality, to have a greater number of borrower grades.
Apr 08CA-5.8.18
A borrower grade is defined as an assessment of borrower risk on the basis of a specified and distinct set of rating criteria, from which estimates of PD are derived. The grade definition must include both a description of the degree of default risk typical for borrowers assigned the grade and the criteria used to distinguish that level of credit risk. Furthermore, "+" or "-" modifiers to alpha or numeric grades will only qualify as distinct grades if the bank has developed complete rating descriptions and criteria for their assignment, and separately quantifies PDs for these modified grades.
Apr 08CA-5.8.19
Banks with loan portfolios concentrated in a particular market segment and range of default risk must have enough grades within that range to avoid undue concentrations of borrowers in particular grades. Significant concentrations within a single grade or grades must be supported by convincing empirical evidence that the grade or grades cover reasonably narrow PD bands and that the default risk posed by all borrowers in a grade fall within that band.
Apr 08CA-5.8.20
Banks using the supervisory slotting criteria for the SL asset classes must have at least four grades for non-defaulted borrowers, and one for defaulted borrowers. The requirements for SL exposures that qualify for the corporate foundation approach are the same as those for general corporate exposures.
Apr 08— Standards for Retail Exposures
CA-5.8.21
For each pool identified, the bank must be able to provide quantitative measures of loss characteristics (PD, LGD, and EAD) for that pool. The level of differentiation for IRB purposes must ensure that the number of exposures in a given pool is sufficient so as to allow for meaningful quantification and validation of the loss characteristics at the pool level. There must be a meaningful distribution of borrowers and exposures across pools. A single pool must not include an undue concentration of the bank's total retail exposure.
Apr 08(iii) Rating Criteria
CA-5.8.22
A bank must have specific rating definitions, processes and criteria for assigning exposures to grades within a rating system. The rating definitions and criteria must be both plausible and intuitive and must result in a meaningful differentiation of risk:
(a) The grade descriptions and criteria must be sufficiently detailed to allow those charged with assigning ratings to consistently assign the same grade to borrowers or facilities posing similar risk. This consistency should exist across lines of business, departments and geographic locations. If rating criteria and procedures differ for different types of borrowers or facilities, the bank must monitor for possible inconsistency, and must alter rating criteria to improve consistency when appropriate;(b) Written rating definitions must be clear and detailed enough to allow third parties to understand the assignment of ratings, such as internal audit or an equally independent function and supervisors, to replicate rating assignments and evaluate the appropriateness of the grade/pool assignments; and(c) The criteria must also be consistent with the bank's internal lending standards and its policies for handling troubled borrowers and facilities.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.8.23
To ensure that banks are consistently taking into account available information, they must use all relevant and material information in assigning ratings to borrowers and facilities. Information must be current. The less information a bank has, the more conservative must be its assignments of exposures to borrower and facility grades or pools. An external rating can be the primary factor determining an internal rating assignment; however, the bank must ensure that it considers other relevant information.
Apr 08— SL Product Lines within the Corporate Asset Class
CA-5.8.24
Banks using the supervisory slotting criteria for SL exposures must assign exposures to their internal rating grades based on their own criteria, systems and processes, subject to compliance with the requisite minimum requirements. Banks must then map these internal rating grades into the five supervisory rating categories. Tables 1 to 4 in Appendix CA-7 provide, for each sub-class of SL exposures, the general assessment factors and characteristics exhibited by the exposures that fall under each of the supervisory categories. Each lending activity has a unique table describing the assessment factors and characteristics.
Apr 08CA-5.8.25
The CBB recognises that the criteria that banks use to assign exposures to internal grades will not perfectly align with criteria that define the supervisory categories; however, banks must demonstrate that their mapping process has resulted in an alignment of grades which is consistent with the preponderance of the characteristics in the respective supervisory category. Banks must take special care to ensure that any overrides of their internal criteria do not render the mapping process ineffective.
Apr 08(iv) Rating Assignment Horizon
CA-5.8.26
Although the time horizon used in PD estimation is one year (as described in paragraph CA-5.8.59), banks are expected to use a longer time horizon in assigning ratings.
Apr 08CA-5.8.27
A borrower rating must represent the bank's assessment of the borrower's ability and willingness to contractually perform despite adverse economic conditions or the occurrence of unexpected events. For example, a bank may base rating assignments on specific, appropriate stress scenarios. Alternatively, a bank may take into account borrower characteristics that are reflective of the borrower's vulnerability to adverse economic conditions or unexpected events, without explicitly specifying a stress scenario. The range of economic conditions that are considered when making assessments must be consistent with current conditions and those that are likely to occur over a business cycle within the respective industry/geographic region.
Apr 08CA-5.8.28
Given the difficulties in forecasting future events and the influence they will have on a particular borrower's financial condition, a bank must take a conservative view of projected information. Furthermore, where limited data are available, a bank must adopt a conservative bias to its analysis.
Apr 08(v) Use of Models
CA-5.8.29
The requirements in this sub-section apply to statistical models and other mechanical methods used to assign borrower or facility ratings or in estimation of PDs, LGDs, or EADs. Credit scoring models and other mechanical rating procedures generally use only a subset of available information. Although mechanical rating procedures may sometimes avoid some of the idiosyncratic errors made by rating systems in which human judgement plays a large role, mechanical use of limited information also is a source of rating errors. Credit scoring models and other mechanical procedures are permissible as the primary or partial basis of rating assignments, and may play a role in the estimation of loss characteristics. Sufficient human judgement and human oversight is necessary to ensure that all relevant and material information, including that which is outside the scope of the model, is also taken into consideration, and that the model is used appropriately:
(a) The burden is on the bank to satisfy CBB that a model or procedure has good predictive power and that regulatory capital requirements will not be distorted as a result of its use. The variables that are input to the model must form a reasonable set of predictors. The model must be accurate on average across the range of borrowers or facilities to which the bank is exposed and there must be no known material biases;(b) The bank must have in place a process for vetting data inputs into a statistical default or loss prediction model which includes an assessment of the accuracy, completeness and appropriateness of the data specific to the assignment of an approved rating;(c) The bank must demonstrate that the data used to build the model are representative of the population of the bank's actual borrowers or facilities;(d) When combining model results with human judgement, the judgement must take into account all relevant and material information not considered by the model. The bank must have written guidance describing how human judgement and model results are to be combined;(e) The bank must have procedures for human review of model-based rating assignments. Such procedures should focus on finding and limiting errors associated with known model weaknesses and must also include credible ongoing efforts to improve the model's performance; and(f) The bank must have a regular cycle of model validation that includes monitoring of model performance and stability; review of model relationships; and testing of model outputs against outcomes.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08(vi) Documentation of Rating System Design
CA-5.8.30
Banks must document in writing their rating systems' design and operational details. The documentation must evidence banks' compliance with the minimum standards, and must address topics such as portfolio differentiation, rating criteria, responsibilities of parties that rate borrowers and facilities, definition of what constitutes a rating exception, parties that have authority to approve exceptions, frequency of rating reviews, and management oversight of the rating process. A bank must document the rationale for its choice of internal rating criteria and must be able to provide analyses demonstrating that rating criteria and procedures are likely to result in ratings that meaningfully differentiate risk. Rating criteria and procedures must be periodically reviewed to determine whether they remain fully applicable to the current portfolio and to external conditions. In addition, a bank must document a history of major changes in the risk rating process, and such documentation must support identification of changes made to the risk rating process subsequent to the last CBB's review. The organisation of rating assignment, including the internal control structure, must also be documented.
Apr 08CA-5.8.31
Banks must document the specific definitions of default and loss used internally and demonstrate consistency with the reference definitions set out in paragraphs CA-5.8.63 to CA-5.8.71.
Apr 08CA-5.8.32
If the bank employs statistical models in the rating process, the bank must document their methodologies. This material must:
(a) Provide a detailed outline of the theory, assumptions and/or mathematical and empirical basis of the assignment of estimates to grades, individual obligors, exposures, or pools, and the data source(s) used to estimate the model;(b) Establish a rigorous statistical process (including out-of-time and out-of-sample performance tests) for validating the model; and(c) Indicate any circumstances under which the model does not work effectively.Apr 08CA-5.8.33
Use of a model obtained from a third-party vendor that claims proprietary technology is not a justification for exemption from documentation or any other of the requirements for internal rating systems. The burden is on the model's vendor and the bank to satisfy CBB.
Apr 084. Risk Rating System Operations
(i) Coverage of Ratings
CA-5.8.34
For corporate, sovereign, and bank exposures, each borrower and all recognised guarantors must be assigned a rating and each exposure must be associated with a facility rating as part of the loan approval process. Similarly, for retail, each exposure must be assigned to a pool as part of the loan approval process.
Apr 08CA-5.8.35
Each separate legal entity to which the bank is exposed must be separately rated. A bank must have policies acceptable to CBB regarding the treatment of individual entities in a connected group including circumstances under which the same rating may or may not be assigned to some or all related entities.
Apr 08(ii) Integrity of Rating Process
— Standards for Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.8.36
Rating assignments and periodic rating reviews must be completed or approved by a party that does not directly stand to benefit from the extension of credit. Independence of the rating assignment process can be achieved by the bank through a range of practices that will be carefully reviewed by CBB. These operational processes must be documented in the bank's procedures and incorporated into bank policies. Credit policies and underwriting procedures must reinforce and foster the independence of the rating process.
Apr 08CA-5.8.37
Borrowers and facilities must have their ratings refreshed at least on an annual basis. Certain credits, especially higher risk borrowers or problem exposures, must be subject to more frequent review. In addition, banks must initiate a new rating if material information on the borrower or facility comes to light.
Apr 08— Standards for Retail Exposures
CA-5.8.38
A bank must review the loss characteristics and delinquency status of each identified risk pool on at least an annual basis. It must also review the status of individual borrowers within each pool as a means of ensuring that exposures continue to be assigned to the correct pool. This requirement may be satisfied by review of a representative sample of exposures in the pool.
Apr 08(iii) Overrides
CA-5.8.39
For rating assignments based on expert judgement, banks must clearly articulate the situations in which bank officers may override the outputs of the rating process, including how and to what extent such overrides can be used and by whom. For model-based ratings, the bank must have guidelines and processes for monitoring cases where human judgement has overridden the model's rating, variables were excluded or inputs were altered. These guidelines must include identifying personnel that are responsible for approving these overrides. Banks must identify overrides and separately track their performance.
Apr 08(iv) Data Maintenance
CA-5.8.40
A bank must collect and store data on key borrower and facility characteristics to provide effective support to its internal credit risk measurement and management process, to enable the bank to meet the other requirements in this section, and to serve as a basis for CBB reporting. These data should be sufficiently detailed to allow retrospective re-allocation of obligors and facilities to grades, for example if increasing sophistication of the internal rating system suggests that finer segregation of portfolios can be achieved.
Furthermore, banks must collect and retain data on aspects of their internal ratings as may be required under disclosure requirements specified by CBB periodically.
Apr 08— For Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.8.41
Banks must maintain rating histories on borrowers and recognised guarantors, including the rating since the borrower/guarantor was assigned an internal grade, the dates the ratings were assigned, the methodology and key data used to derive the rating and the person/model responsible. The identity of borrowers and facilities that default, and the timing and circumstances of such defaults, must be retained. Banks must also retain data on the PDs and realised default rates associated with rating grades and ratings migration in order to track the predictive power of the borrower rating system.
Apr 08CA-5.8.42
Banks under the foundation approach which utilise CBB's estimates are encouraged to retain the relevant data (i.e. data on loss and recovery experience for corporate exposures under the foundation approach, data on realised losses for banks using the supervisory slotting criteria for SL).
Apr 08— For Retail Exposures
CA-5.8.43
Banks must retain data used in the process of allocating exposures to pools, including data on borrower and transaction risk characteristics used either directly or through use of a model, as well as data on delinquency. Banks must also retain data on the estimated PDs, LGDs and EADs, associated with pools of exposures. For defaulted exposures, banks must retain the data on the pools to which the exposure was assigned over the year prior to default and the realised outcomes on LGD and EAD.
Apr 08(v) Stress Tests used in Assessment of Capital Adequacy
CA-5.8.44
An IRB bank must have in place sound stress testing processes for use in the assessment of capital adequacy. Stress testing must involve identifying possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on a bank's credit exposures and assessment of the bank's ability to withstand such changes. Examples of scenarios that could be used are (i) economic or industry downturns; (ii) market-risk events; and (iii) liquidity conditions.
Apr 08CA-5.8.45
In addition to the more general tests described above, the bank must perform a credit risk stress test to assess the effect of certain specific conditions on its IRB regulatory capital requirements. The test to be employed would be one chosen by the bank, subject to CBB's review. The test to be employed must be meaningful and reasonably conservative. Individual banks may develop different approaches to undertaking this stress test requirement, depending on their circumstances. For this purpose, the objective is not to require banks to consider worst-case scenarios. The bank's stress test in this context should, however, consider at least the effect of mild recession scenarios. In this case, one example might be to use two consecutive quarters of zero growth to assess the effect on the bank's PDs, LGDs and EADs, taking account — on a conservative basis — of the bank's international diversification.
Apr 08CA-5.8.46
Banks using the double default framework must consider as part of their stress testing framework the impact of a deterioration in the credit quality of protection providers, in particular the impact of protection providers falling outside the eligibility criteria due to rating changes. Banks should also consider the impact of the default of one but not both of the obligor and protection provider, and the consequent increase in risk and capital requirements at the time of that default.
Apr 08CA-5.8.47
Whatever method is used, the bank must include a consideration of the following sources of information. First, a bank's own data should allow estimation of the ratings migration of at least some of its exposures. Second, banks should consider information about the impact of smaller deterioration in the credit environment on a bank's ratings, giving some information on the likely effect of bigger, stress circumstances. Third, banks should evaluate evidence of ratings migration in external ratings. This would include the bank broadly matching its buckets to rating categories.
Apr 08CA-5.8.48
CBB may issue guidance to banks on how the tests to be used for this purpose should be designed, bearing in mind conditions in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The results of the stress test may indicate no difference in the capital calculated under the IRB rules described in this section of this chapter if the bank already uses such an approach for its internal rating purposes. Where a bank operates in several markets, it does not need to test for such conditions in all of those markets, but a bank must stress portfolios containing the vast majority of its total exposures.
Apr 085. Corporate Governance and Oversight
(i) Corporate Governance
CA-5.8.49
All material aspects of the rating and estimation processes must be approved by the bank's board of directors or a designated committee thereof and senior management. These parties must possess a general understanding of the bank's risk rating system and detailed comprehension of its associated management reports. Senior management must provide notice to the board of directors or a designated committee thereof of material changes or exceptions from established policies that will materially impact the operations of the bank's rating system.
Apr 08CA-5.8.50
Senior management also must have a good understanding of the rating system's design and operation, and must approve material differences between established procedure and actual practice. Management must also ensure, on an ongoing basis, that the rating system is operating properly. Management and staff in the credit control function must meet regularly to discuss the performance of the rating process, areas needing improvement, and the status of efforts to improve previously identified deficiencies.
Apr 08CA-5.8.51
Internal ratings must be an essential part of the reporting to these parties. Reporting must include risk profile by grade, migration across grades, estimation of the relevant parameters per grade, and comparison of realised default rates (and LGDs and EADs for retail asset class) against expectations. Reporting frequencies may vary with the significance and type of information and the level of the recipient.
Apr 08(ii) Credit Risk Control
CA-5.8.52
Banks must have independent credit risk control units that are responsible for the design or selection, implementation and performance of their internal rating systems. The unit(s) must be functionally independent from the personnel and management functions responsible for originating exposures. Areas of responsibility must include:
(a) Testing and monitoring internal grades;(b) Production and analysis of summary reports from the bank's rating system, to include historical default data sorted by rating at the time of default and one year prior to default, grade migration analyses, and monitoring of trends in key rating criteria;(c) Implementing procedures to verify that rating definitions are consistently applied across departments and geographic areas;(d) Reviewing and documenting any changes to the rating process, including the reasons for the changes; and(e) Reviewing the rating criteria to evaluate if they remain predictive of risk. Changes to the rating process, criteria or individual rating parameters must be documented and retained for CBB to review.Apr 08CA-5.8.53
A credit risk control unit must actively participate in the development, selection, implementation and validation of rating models. It must assume oversight and supervision responsibilities for any models used in the rating process, and ultimate responsibility for the ongoing review and alterations to rating models.
Apr 08(iii) Internal and External Audit
CA-5.8.54
Internal audit or an equally independent function must review at least bi-annually the bank's rating system and its operations, including the operations of the credit function and the estimation of PDs, LGDs and EADs. Areas of review include adherence to all applicable minimum requirements. Internal audit must document its findings. External auditors are also required to conduct above-mentioned review on an annual basis.
Apr 086. Use of Internal Ratings
CA-5.8.55
Internal ratings and default and loss estimates should play an essential role in the credit approval, risk management, internal capital allocations, and corporate governance functions of banks using the IRB approach. Ratings systems and estimates designed and implemented exclusively for the purpose of qualifying for the IRB approach and used only to provide IRB inputs are not acceptable. It is recognised that banks will not necessarily be using exactly the same estimates for both IRB and all internal purposes. For example, pricing models are likely to use PDs and LGDs relevant to the life of the asset. Where there are such differences, a bank must document them and demonstrate their reasonableness to the CBB.
Apr 08CA-5.8.56
A bank must have a credible track record in the use of internal ratings information. Thus, the bank must demonstrate that it has been using a rating system that was broadly in line with the minimum requirements articulated in this section for at least the three years prior to qualification. For the retail asset class, banks must demonstrate that they have been estimating and employing LGDs and EADs in a manner that is broadly consistent with the minimum requirements for use of own estimates of LGDs and EADs for at least the three years prior to qualification. Improvements to a bank's rating system will not render a bank non-compliant with the three-year requirement.
Apr 087. Risk Quantification
(i) Overall Requirements for Estimation
— Structure and Intent
CA-5.8.57
This section addresses the broad standards for own-estimates of PD, LGD, and EAD. Generally, all banks using the IRB approaches must estimate a PD50 for each internal borrower grade for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures or for each pool in the case of retail exposures.
50 Banks are not required to produce their own estimates of PD for certain equity exposures and certain exposures that fall within the SL sub-classes.
Apr 08CA-5.8.58
PD estimates must be a long-run average of one-year default rates for borrowers in the grade, with the exception of retail exposures (see below). Requirements specific to PD estimation are provided in paragraphs CA-5.8.72 to CA-5.8.78. For retail asset class banks must estimate an appropriate LGD (as defined in paragraphs CA-5.8.79 to CA-5.8.83) for each of its retail pools and must also estimate an appropriate long- run default-weighted average EAD for each of its facilities as defined in paragraphs CA-5.8.84 and CA-5.8.85. Requirements specific to EAD estimation appear in paragraphs CA-5.8.84 to CA-5.8.89.
Apr 08CA-5.8.59
Internal estimates of PD, LGD, and EAD must incorporate all relevant, material and available data, information and methods. A bank may utilise internal data and data from external sources (including pooled data). Where internal or external data is used, the bank must demonstrate that its estimates are representative of long run experience.
Apr 08CA-5.8.60
Estimates must be grounded in historical experience and empirical evidence, and not based purely on subjective or judgmental considerations. Any changes in lending practice or the process for pursuing recoveries over the observation period must be taken into account. A bank's estimates must promptly reflect the implications of technical advances and new data and other information, as it becomes available. Banks must review their estimates on a yearly basis or more frequently.
Apr 08CA-5.8.61
The population of exposures represented in the data used for estimation, and lending standards in use when the data were generated, and other relevant characteristics should be closely matched to or at least comparable with those of the bank's exposures and standards. The bank must also demonstrate that economic or market conditions that underlie the data are relevant to current and foreseeable conditions. For estimates of LGD and EAD, banks must take into account paragraphs CA-5.8.79 to CA-5.8.89. The number of exposures in the sample and the data period used for quantification must be sufficient to provide the bank with confidence in the accuracy and robustness of its estimates. The estimation technique must perform well in out-of-sample tests.
Apr 08CA-5.8.62
In general, estimates of PDs, LGDs, and EADs are likely to involve unpredictable errors. In order to avoid over-optimism, a bank must add to its estimates a margin of conservatism that is related to the likely range of errors. Where methods and data are less satisfactory and the likely range of errors is larger, the margin of conservatism must be larger. CBB may allow some flexibility in application of the required standards for data that are collected prior to the date of implementation of this Module. However, banks must demonstrate to CBB that appropriate adjustments have been made to achieve broad equivalence to the data without such flexibility. Data collected beyond the date of implementation must conform to the minimum standards unless otherwise stated.
Apr 08(ii) Definition of Default
CA-5.8.63
A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when either or both of the two following events have taken place:
(a) The bank considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the banking group in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as realising security (if held); and(b) The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the banking group. Overdrafts will be considered as being past due once the customer has breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than current outstandings.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.8.64
The elements to be taken as indications of unlikeliness to pay include:
(a) The bank puts the credit obligation on non-accrued status;(b) The bank makes a charge-off or account-specific provision resulting from a significant perceived decline in credit quality subsequent to the bank taking on the exposure;51(c) The bank sells the credit obligation at a material credit-related economic loss;(d) The bank consents to a distressed restructuring of the credit obligation where this is likely to result in a diminished financial obligation caused by the material forgiveness, or postponement, of principal, interest or (where relevant) fees;52(e) The bank has filed for the obligor's bankruptcy or a similar order in respect of the obligor's credit obligation to the banking group; and(f) The obligor has sought or has been placed in bankruptcy or similar protection where this would avoid or delay repayment of the credit obligation to the banking group.
51Specific provisions on equity exposures set aside for price risk do not signal default.
52Including, in the case of equity holdings assessed under a PD/LGD approach, such distressed restructuring of the equity itself.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.8.65
CBB will periodically provide appropriate guidance as to how these elements must be implemented and monitored.
Apr 08CA-5.8.66
For retail exposures, the definition of default can be applied at the level of a particular facility, rather than at the level of the obligor. As such, default by a borrower on one obligation does not require a bank to treat all other obligations to the banking group as defaulted.
Apr 08CA-5.8.67
A bank must record actual defaults on IRB exposure classes using this reference definition. A bank must also use the reference definition for its estimation of PDs, and (where relevant) LGDs and EADs. In arriving at these estimations, a bank may use external data available to it that is not itself consistent with that definition, subject to the requirements set out in paragraph CA-5.8.75. However, in such cases, banks must demonstrate to CBB that appropriate adjustments to the data have been made to achieve broad equivalence with the reference definition. This same condition would apply to any internal data used up to implementation of this Module. Internal data (including that pooled by banks) used in such estimates beyond the date of implementation of this Module must be consistent with the reference definition.
Apr 08CA-5.8.68
If the bank considers that a previously defaulted exposure's status is such that no trigger of the reference definition any longer applies, the bank must rate the borrower and estimate LGD as they would for a non-defaulted facility. Should the reference definition subsequently be triggered, a second default would be deemed to have occurred.
Apr 08(iii) Re-ageing
CA-5.8.69
The bank must have clearly articulated and documented policies in respect of the counting of days past due, in particular in respect of the re-ageing of the facilities and the granting of extensions, deferrals, renewals and rewrites to existing accounts. At a minimum, the re-ageing policy must include: (a) approval authorities and reporting requirements; (b) minimum age of a facility before it is eligible for re-ageing; (c) delinquency levels of facilities that are eligible for re-ageing; (d) maximum number of re-ageings per facility; and (e) a reassessment of the borrower's capacity to repay. These policies must be applied consistently over time, and must support the 'use test' (i.e. if a bank treats a re-aged exposure in a similar fashion to other delinquent exposures more than the past-due cut off point, this exposure must be recorded as in default for IRB purposes). The CBB may choose to establish more specific requirements on re-ageing for banks.
Apr 08(iv) Treatment of Overdrafts
CA-5.8.70
Authorised overdrafts must be subject to a credit limit set by the bank and brought to the knowledge of the client. Any break of this limit must be monitored; if the account were not brought under the limit after 90 days, it would be considered as defaulted. Non-authorised overdrafts will be associated with a zero limit for IRB purposes. Thus, days past due commence once any credit is granted to an unauthorised customer; if such credit were not repaid within 90, the exposure would be considered in default. Banks must have in place rigorous internal policies for assessing the creditworthiness of customers who are offered overdraft accounts.
Apr 08(v) Definition of Loss for all Asset Classes
CA-5.8.71
The definition of loss used in estimating LGD is economic loss. When measuring economic loss, all relevant factors should be taken into account. This must include material discount effects and material direct and indirect costs associated with collecting on the exposure. Banks must not simply measure the loss recorded in accounting records, although they must be able to compare accounting and economic losses. The bank's own workout and collection expertise significantly influences their recovery rates and must be reflected in their LGD estimates, but adjustments to estimates for such expertise must be conservative until the bank has sufficient internal empirical evidence of the impact of its expertise.
Apr 08(vi) Requirements Specific to PD Estimation
— Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.8.72
Banks must use information and techniques that take appropriate account of the long-run experience when estimating the average PD for each rating grade. For example, banks may use one or more of the three specific techniques set out below: internal default experience, mapping to external data, and statistical default models.
Apr 08CA-5.8.73
Banks may have a primary technique and use others as a point of comparison and potential adjustment. CBB will not be satisfied by mechanical application of a technique without supporting analysis. Banks must recognise the importance of judgmental considerations in combining results of techniques and in making adjustments for limitations of techniques and information:
(a) A bank may use data on internal default experience for the estimation of PD. A bank must demonstrate in its analysis that the estimates are reflective of underwriting standards and of any differences in the rating system that generated the data and the current rating system. Where only limited data are available, or where underwriting standards or rating systems have changed, the bank must add a greater margin of conservatism in its estimate of PD. The use of pooled data across institutions may also be recognised. A bank must demonstrate that the internal rating systems and criteria of other banks in the pool are comparable with its own;(b) Banks may associate or map their internal grades to the scale used by an external credit assessment institution or similar institution and then attribute the default rate observed for the external institution's grades to the bank's grades. Mappings must be based on a comparison of internal rating criteria to the criteria used by the external institution and on a comparison of the internal and external ratings of any common borrowers. Biases or inconsistencies in the mapping approach or underlying data must be avoided. The external institution's criteria underlying the data used for quantification must be oriented to the risk of the borrower and not reflect transaction characteristics. The bank's analysis must include a comparison of the default definitions used, subject to the requirements in paragraph CA-5.8.63 to CA-5.8.68. The bank must document the basis for the mapping; and(c) A bank is allowed to use a simple average of default-probability estimates for individual borrowers in a given grade, where such estimates are drawn from statistical default prediction models. The bank's use of default probability models for this purpose must meet the standards specified in paragraph CA-5.8.29.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.8.74
Irrespective of whether a bank is using external, internal, or pooled data sources, or a combination of the three, for its PD estimation, the length of the underlying historical observation period used must be at least five years for at least one source. If the available observation period spans a longer period for any source, and this data are relevant and material, this longer period must be used.
Apr 08— Retail Exposures
CA-5.8.75
Given the bank-specific basis of assigning exposures to pools, banks must regard internal data as the primary source of information for estimating loss characteristics. Banks are permitted to use external data or statistical models for quantification provided a strong link can be demonstrated between (a) the bank's process of assigning exposures to a pool and the process used by the external data source, and (b) between the bank's internal risk profile and the composition of the external data. In all cases banks must use all relevant and material data sources as points of comparison.
Apr 08CA-5.8.76
One method for deriving long-run average estimates of PD and default-weighted average loss rates given default (as defined in paragraph CA-5.8.79) for retail would be based on an estimate of the expected long-run loss rate. A bank may (i) use an appropriate PD estimate to infer the long-run default-weighted average loss rate given default, or (ii) use a long-run default-weighted average loss rate given default to infer the appropriate PD. In either case, it is important to recognise that the LGD used for the IRB capital calculation cannot be less than the long-run default-weighted average loss rate given default and must be consistent with the concepts defined in paragraph CA-5.8.79.
Apr 08CA-5.8.77
Irrespective of whether banks are using external, internal, pooled data sources, or a combination of the three, for their estimation of loss characteristics, the length of the underlying historical observation period used must be at least five years. If the available observation spans a longer period for any source, and these data are relevant, this longer period must be used. A bank need not give equal importance to historic data if it can convince CBB that more recent data are a better predictor of loss rates.
Apr 08CA-5.8.78
The CBB recognises that seasoning can be quite material for some long-term retail exposures characterised by seasoning effects that peak several years after origination. Banks must anticipate the implications of rapid exposure growth and take steps to ensure that their estimation techniques are accurate, and that their current capital level and earnings and funding prospects are adequate to cover their future capital needs. In order to avoid gyrations in their required capital positions arising from short-term PD horizons, banks are also encouraged to adjust PD estimates upward for anticipated seasoning effects, provided such adjustments are applied in a consistent fashion over time. The CBB may make such adjustments mandatory.
Apr 08(vii) Requirements Specific to Own-LGD Estimates
CA-5.8.79
A bank must estimate an LGD for each facility that aims to reflect economic downturn conditions where necessary to capture the relevant risks. This LGD cannot be less than the long-run default-weighted average loss rate given default calculated based on the average economic loss of all observed defaults within the data source for that type of facility. In addition, a bank must take into account the potential for the LGD of the facility to be higher than the default-weighted average during a period when credit losses are substantially higher than average. For certain types of exposures, loss severities may not exhibit such cyclical variability and LGD estimates may not differ materially (or possibly at all) from the long-run default-weighted average. However, for other exposures, this cyclical variability in loss severities may be important and banks will need to incorporate it into their LGD estimates. For this purpose, banks may use averages of loss severities observed during periods of high credit losses, forecasts based on appropriately conservative assumptions, or other similar methods. Appropriate estimates of LGD during periods of high credit losses might be formed using either internal and/or external data. CBB will continue to monitor and encourage the development of appropriate approaches to this issue.
Apr 08CA-5.8.80
In its analysis, the bank must consider the extent of any dependence between the risk of the borrower and that of the collateral or collateral provider. Cases where there is a significant degree of dependence must be addressed in a conservative manner. Any currency mismatch between the underlying obligation and the collateral must also be considered and treated conservatively in the bank's assessment of LGD.
Apr 08CA-5.8.81
LGD estimates must be grounded in historical recovery rates and, when applicable, must not solely be based on the collateral's estimated market value. This requirement recognises the potential inability of banks to gain both control of their collateral and liquidate it expeditiously. To the extent, that LGD estimates take into account the existence of collateral, banks must establish internal requirements for collateral management, operational procedures, legal certainty and risk management process that are generally consistent with those required for the standardised approach.
Apr 08CA-5.8.82
Recognising the principle that realised losses can at times systematically exceed expected levels, the LGD assigned to a defaulted asset should reflect the possibility that the bank would have to recognise additional, unexpected losses during the recovery period. For each defaulted asset, the bank must also construct its best estimate of the expected loss on that asset based on current economic circumstances and facility status. The amount, if any, by which the LGD on a defaulted asset exceeds the bank's best estimate of expected loss on the asset represents the capital requirement for that asset, and should be set by the bank on a risk-sensitive basis in accordance with paragraphs CA-5.3.3 and CA-5.4.3 to CA-5.4.5. Instances where the best estimate of expected loss on a defaulted asset is less than the sum of specific provisions and partial charge-offs on that asset will attract CBB's scrutiny and must be justified by the bank.
Apr 08CA-5.8.83
The minimum data observation period for LGD estimates for retail exposures is five years. The less data a bank has, the more conservative it must be in its estimation. A bank need not give equal importance to historic data if it can demonstrate to CBB that more recent data are a better predictor of loss rates.
Apr 08(viii) Requirements Specific to Own-EAD Estimates
CA-5.8.84
EAD for an on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet item is defined as the expected gross exposure of the facility upon default of the obligor. For on-balance sheet items, banks must estimate EAD at no less than the current drawn amount, subject to recognising the effects of on-balance sheet netting as specified in the foundation approach. The minimum requirements for the recognition of netting are the same as those under the foundation approach. The additional minimum requirements for internal estimation of EAD under the advanced approach for retail class, therefore, focus on the estimation of EAD for off-balance sheet items (excluding transactions that expose banks to counterparty credit risk as set out in Appendix CA-2). Banks must have established procedures in place for the estimation of EAD for off-balance sheet items for retail asset class. These must specify the estimates of EAD to be used for each facility type. Banks estimates of EAD should reflect the possibility of additional drawings by the borrower up to and after the time a default event is triggered. Where estimates of EAD differ by facility type, the delineation of these facilities must be clear and unambiguous.
Apr 08CA-5.8.85
Advanced approach banks must assign an estimate of EAD for each facility. It must be an estimate of the long-run default-weighted average EAD for similar facilities and borrowers over a sufficiently long period of time, but with a margin of conservatism appropriate to the likely range of errors in the estimate. If a positive correlation can reasonably be expected between the default frequency and the magnitude of EAD, the EAD estimate must incorporate a larger margin of conservatism. Moreover, for exposures for which EAD estimates are volatile over the economic cycle, the bank must use EAD estimates that are appropriate for an economic downturn, if these are more conservative than the long- run average. For banks that have been able to develop their own EAD models, this could be achieved by considering the cyclical nature, if any, of the drivers of such models. Other banks may have sufficient internal data to examine the impact of previous recession(s). However, some banks may only have the option of making conservative use of external data.
Apr 08CA-5.8.86
The criteria by which estimates of EAD are derived must be plausible and intuitive, and represent what the bank believes to be the material drivers of EAD. The choices must be supported by credible internal analysis by the bank. The bank must be able to provide a breakdown of its EAD experience by the factors it sees as the drivers of EAD. A bank must use all relevant and material information in its derivation of EAD estimates. Across facility types, a bank must review its estimates of EAD when material new information comes to light and at least on an annual basis.
Apr 08CA-5.8.87
Due consideration must be paid by the bank to its specific policies and strategies adopted in respect of account monitoring and payment processing. The bank must also consider its ability and willingness to prevent further drawings in circumstances short of payment default, such as covenant violations or other technical default events. Banks must also have adequate systems and procedures in place to monitor facility amounts, current outstandings against committed lines and changes in outstandings per borrower and per grade. The bank must be able to monitor outstanding balances on a daily basis.
Apr 08CA-5.8.88
For transactions that expose banks to counterparty credit risk, estimates of EAD must fulfill the requirements set forth in Appendix CA-2 of this Module.
Apr 08CA-5.8.89
The minimum data observation period for EAD estimates for retail exposures is five years. The less data a bank has, the more conservative it must be in its estimation. A bank need not give equal importance to historic data if it can demonstrate to CBB that more recent data are a better predictor of drawdowns.
Apr 08(ix) Minimum Requirements for Assessing Effect of Guarantees and Credit Derivatives
— Standards for Corporate, Sovereign, and Bank Exposures
CA-5.8.90
The minimum requirements outlined in paragraphs CA-5.8.91 to CA-5.8.100 apply to banks using the foundation LGD estimates with the following exceptions:
(a) The bank is not able to use an 'LGD-adjustment' option; and(b) The range of eligible guarantees and guarantors is limited to those outlined in paragraph CA-5.3.34.Apr 08— Standards for Retail Exposures
a. Guarantees
CA-5.8.91
Where guarantees exist, either in support of an individual obligation or a pool of exposures, a bank may reflect the risk-reducing effect either through its estimates of PD or LGD, provided this is done consistently. In adopting one or the other technique, a bank must adopt a consistent approach, both across types of guarantees and over time.
Apr 08CA-5.8.92
In all cases, both the borrower and all recognised guarantors must be assigned a borrower rating at the outset and on an ongoing basis. A bank must follow all minimum requirements for assigning borrower ratings set out in this section, including the regular monitoring of the guarantor's condition and ability and willingness to honour its obligations. Consistent with the requirements in section CA-5.8.43, a bank must retain all relevant information on the assignment of an exposure to a pool, and the estimation of PD.
Apr 08CA-5.8.93
In no case can the bank assign the guaranteed exposure an adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted risk weight would be lower than that of a comparable, direct exposure to the guarantor. Neither criteria nor rating processes are permitted to consider possible favourable effects of imperfect expected correlation between default events for the borrower and guarantor for purposes of regulatory minimum capital requirements. As such, the adjusted risk weight must not reflect the risk mitigation of "double default."
Apr 08b. Eligible Guarantors and Guarantees
CA-5.8.94
There are no restrictions on the types of eligible guarantors. The bank must, however, have clearly specified criteria for the types of guarantors it will recognise for regulatory capital purposes.
Apr 08CA-5.8.95
The guarantee must be evidenced in writing, non-cancellable on the part of the guarantor, in force until the debt is satisfied in full (to the extent of the amount and tenor of the guarantee) and legally enforceable against the guarantor in a jurisdiction where the guarantor has assets to attach and enforce a judgement. However, in contrast to the foundation approach to corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures, guarantees prescribing conditions under which the guarantor may not be obliged to perform (conditional guarantees) may be recognised under certain conditions. Specifically, the onus is on the bank to demonstrate that the assignment criteria adequately address any potential reduction in the risk mitigation effect.
Apr 08c. Adjustment Criteria
CA-5.8.96
A bank must have clearly specified criteria for adjusting borrower grades or LGD estimates (or in the case of retail and eligible purchased receivables, the process of allocating exposures to pools) to reflect the impact of guarantees for regulatory capital purposes. These criteria must be as detailed as the criteria for assigning exposures to grades consistent with paragraphs CA-5.8.22 and CA-5.8.23, and must follow all minimum requirements for assigning borrower or facility ratings set out in this section.
Apr 08CA-5.8.97
The criteria must be plausible and intuitive, and must address the guarantor's ability and willingness to perform under the guarantee. The criteria must also address the likely timing of any payments and the degree to which the guarantor's ability to perform under the guarantee is correlated with the borrower's ability to repay. The bank's criteria must also consider the extent to which residual risk to the borrower remains, for example a currency mismatch between the guarantee and the underlying exposure.
Apr 08CA-5.8.98
In adjusting borrower grades or LGD estimates (or in the case of retail and eligible purchased receivables, the process of allocating exposures to pools), banks must take all relevant available information into account.
Apr 08d. Credit Derivatives
CA-5.8.99
The minimum requirements for guarantees are relevant also for single-name credit derivatives. Additional considerations arise in respect of asset mismatches. The criteria used for assigning adjusted borrower grades or LGD estimates (or pools) for exposures hedged with credit derivatives must require that the asset on which the protection is based (the reference asset) cannot be different from the underlying asset, unless the conditions outlined in the foundation approach are met.
Apr 08CA-5.8.100
In addition, the criteria must address the payout structure of the credit derivative and conservatively assess the impact this has on the level and timing of recoveries. The bank must also consider the extent to which other forms of residual risk remain.
Apr 08(x) Requirements Specific to Estimating PD and LGD (or EL) for Qualifying Purchased Receivables
CA-5.8.101
The following minimum requirements for risk quantification must be satisfied for any purchased retail receivables making use of the top-down treatment of default risk and/or the IRB treatments of dilution risk.
Apr 08CA-5.8.102
The purchasing bank will be required to group the receivables into sufficiently homogeneous pools so that accurate and consistent estimates of PD and LGD (or EL) for default losses and EL estimates of dilution losses can be determined. In general, the risk bucketing process will reflect the seller's underwriting practices and the heterogeneity of its customers. In addition, methods and data for estimating PD, LGD, and EL must comply with the existing risk quantification standards for retail exposures. In particular, quantification should reflect all information available to the purchasing bank regarding the quality of the underlying receivables, including data for similar pools provided by the seller, by the purchasing bank, or by external sources. The purchasing bank must determine whether the data provided by the seller are consistent with expectations agreed upon by both parties concerning, for example, the type, volume and on-going quality of receivables purchased. Where this is not the case, the purchasing bank is expected to obtain and rely upon more relevant data.
Apr 08— Minimum Operational Requirements
CA-5.8.103
A bank purchasing receivables has to justify confidence that current and future advances can be repaid from the liquidation of (or collections against) the receivables pool. To qualify for the top-down treatment of default risk, the receivable pool and overall lending relationship should be closely monitored and controlled. Specifically, a bank will have to demonstrate the following:
Apr 08— Legal Certainty
CA-5.8.104
The structure of the facility must ensure that under all foreseeable circumstances the bank has effective ownership and control of the cash remittances from the receivables, including incidences of seller or servicer distress and bankruptcy. When the obligor makes payments directly to a seller or servicer, the bank must verify regularly that payments are forwarded completely and within the contractually agreed terms. As well, ownership over the receivables and cash receipts should be protected against bankruptcy 'stays' or legal challenges that could materially delay the lender's ability to liquidate/assign the receivables or retain control over cash receipts.
Apr 08— Effectiveness of Monitoring Systems
CA-5.8.105
The bank must be able to monitor both the quality of the receivables and the financial condition of the seller and servicer. In particular:
(a) The bank must (i) assess the correlation among the quality of the receivables and the financial condition of both the seller and servicer, and (ii) have in place internal policies and procedures that provide adequate safeguards to protect against such contingencies, including the assignment of an internal risk rating for each seller and servicer;(b) The bank must have clear and effective policies and procedures for determining seller and servicer eligibility. The bank or its agent must conduct periodic reviews of sellers and servicers in order to verify the accuracy of reports from the seller/servicer, detect fraud or operational weaknesses, and verify the quality of the seller's credit policies and servicer's collection policies and procedures. The findings of these reviews must be well documented;(c) The bank must have the ability to assess the characteristics of the receivables pool, including (i) over-advances; (ii) history of the seller's arrears, bad debts, and bad debt allowances; (iii) payment terms, and (iv) potential contra accounts;(d) The bank must have effective policies and procedures for monitoring on an aggregate basis single-obligor concentrations both within and across receivables pools; and(e) The bank must receive timely and sufficiently detailed reports of receivables ageings and dilutions to (i) ensure compliance with the bank's eligibility criteria and advancing policies governing purchased receivables, and (ii) provide an effective means with which to monitor and confirm the seller's terms of sale (e.g. invoice date ageing) and dilution.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08— Effectiveness of Work-out Systems
CA-5.8.106
An effective programme requires systems and procedures not only for detecting deterioration in the seller's financial condition and deterioration in the quality of the receivables at an early stage, but also for addressing emerging problems pro-actively. In particular:
(a) The bank should have clear and effective policies, procedures, and information systems to monitor compliance with (i) all contractual terms of the facility (including covenants, advancing formulas, concentration limits, early amortisation triggers, etc.) as well as (ii) the bank's internal policies governing advance rates and receivables eligibility. The bank's systems should track covenant violations and waivers as well as exceptions to established policies and procedures;(b) To limit inappropriate draws, the bank should have effective policies and procedures for detecting, approving, monitoring, and correcting over-advances; and(c) The bank should have effective policies and procedures for dealing with financially weakened sellers or servicers and/or deterioration in the quality of receivable pools. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, early termination triggers in revolving facilities and other covenant protections, a structured and disciplined approach to dealing with covenant violations, and clear and effective policies and procedures for initiating legal actions and dealing with problem receivables.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08— Effectiveness of Systems for Controlling Collateral, Credit Availability and Cash
CA-5.8.107
The bank must have clear and effective policies and procedures governing the control of receivables, credit, and cash. In particular:
(a) Written internal policies must specify all material elements of the receivables purchase programme, including the advancing rates, eligible collateral, necessary documentation, concentration limits, and how cash receipts are to be handled. These elements should take appropriate account of all relevant and material factors, including the seller's/servicer's financial condition, risk concentrations, and trends in the quality of the receivables and the seller's customer base; and(b) Internal systems must ensure that funds are advanced only against specified supporting collateral and documentation (such as servicer attestations, invoices, shipping documents, etc.).Amended: April 2011
Apr 08— Compliance with the Bank's Internal Policies and Procedures
CA-5.8.108
Given the reliance on monitoring and control systems to limit credit risk, the bank must have an effective internal process for assessing compliance with all critical policies and procedures, including:
(a) Regular internal and/or external audits of all critical phases of the bank's receivables purchase programme; and(b) Verification of the separation of duties (i) between the assessment of the seller/servicer and the assessment of the obligor and (ii) between the assessment of the seller/servicer and the field audit of the seller/servicer.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.8.109
A bank's effective internal process for assessing compliance with all critical policies and procedures should also include evaluations of back office operations, with particular focus on qualifications, experience, staffing levels, and supporting systems.
Apr 088. Validation of Internal Estimates
CA-5.8.110
Banks must have a robust system in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of rating systems, processes, and the estimation of all relevant risk components. A bank must demonstrate to CBB that the internal validation process enables it to assess the performance of internal rating and risk estimation systems consistently and meaningfully.
Apr 08CA-5.8.111
Banks must regularly compare realised default rates with estimated PDs for each grade and be able to demonstrate that the realised default rates are within the expected range for that grade. Banks using the advanced IRB approach must complete such analysis for their estimates of LGDs and EADs. Such comparisons must make use of historical data that are over as long a period as possible. The methods and data used in such comparisons by the bank must be clearly documented by the bank. This analysis and documentation must be updated at least annually.
Apr 08CA-5.8.112
Banks must also use other quantitative validation tools and comparisons with relevant external data sources. The analysis must be based on data that are appropriate to the portfolio, are updated regularly, and cover a relevant observation period. Banks' internal assessments of the performance of their own rating systems must be based on long data histories, covering a range of economic conditions, and ideally one or more complete business cycles.
Apr 08CA-5.8.113
Banks must demonstrate that quantitative testing methods and other validation methods do not vary systematically with the economic cycle. Changes in methods and data (both data sources and periods covered) must be clearly and thoroughly documented.
Apr 08CA-5.8.114
Banks must have well-articulated internal standards for situations where deviations in realised PDs, LGDs and EADs from expectations become significant enough to call the validity of the estimates into question. These standards must take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability in default experiences. Where realised values continue to be higher than expected values, banks must revise estimates upward to reflect their default and loss experience.
Apr 08CA-5.8.115
Where banks rely on the CBB's, rather than internal estimates of risk parameters, they are encouraged to compare realised LGDs and EADs to those set by the CBB. The information on realised LGDs and EADs should form part of the bank's assessment of economic capital.
Apr 089. CBB's LGD and EAD estimates
CA-5.8.116
Banks under the foundation IRB approach, which do not meet the requirements for own-estimates of LGD and EAD, above, must meet the minimum requirements described in the standardised approach to receive recognition for eligible financial collateral (as set out in chapter CA-4). They must meet the following additional minimum requirements in order to receive recognition for additional collateral types.
Apr 08(i) Definition of Eligibility of CRE and RRE as Collateral
CA-5.8.117
Eligible CRE and RRE collateral for corporate, sovereign and bank exposures are defined as:
(a) Collateral where the risk of the borrower is not materially dependent upon the performance of the underlying property or project, but rather on the underlying capacity of the borrower to repay the debt from other sources. As such, repayment of the facility is not materially dependent on any cash flow generated by the underlying CRE/RRE serving as collateral;53 and(b) Additionally, the value of the collateral pledged must not be materially dependent on the performance of the borrower. This requirement is not intended to preclude situations where purely macro-economic factors affect both the value of the collateral and the performance of the borrower.
53 If the CBB ascertains that public housing policy is supportive of certain real estate sectors, considering them to be an important part of housing market in Bahrain, by means of guarantees or other credit support from government agencies, then mortgage on such multifamily residential real estate can be recognised as eligible collateral for corporate exposures.
Apr 08CA-5.8.118
In light of the generic description above and the definition of corporate exposures, income producing real estate that falls under the SL asset class is specifically excluded from recognition as collateral for corporate exposures.
Apr 08(ii) Operational Requirements for Eligible CRE/RRE
CA-5.8.119
Subject to meeting the definition above, CRE and RRE will be eligible for recognition as collateral for corporate claims only if all of the following operational requirements are met:
(a) Legal enforceability: any claim on a collateral taken must be legally enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions, and any claim on collateral must be properly filed on a timely basis. Collateral interests must reflect a perfected lien (i.e. all legal requirements for establishing the claim have been fulfilled). Furthermore, the collateral agreement and the legal process underpinning it must be such that they provide for the bank to realise the value of the collateral within a reasonable timeframe;(b) Objective market value of collateral: the collateral must be valued at or less than the current fair value under which the property could be sold under private contract between a willing seller and an arm's-length buyer on the date of valuation;(c) Frequent revaluation: the bank is expected to monitor the value of the collateral on a frequent basis and at a minimum once every year. More frequent monitoring is suggested where the market is subject to significant changes in conditions. Statistical methods of evaluation (e.g. reference to house price indices, sampling) may be used to update estimates or to identify collateral that may have declined in value and that may need re-appraisal. A qualified professional must evaluate the property when information indicates that the value of the collateral may have declined materially relative to general market prices or when a credit event, such as default, occurs; and(d) Junior liens: Junior liens may be taken into account where there is no doubt that the claim for collateral is legally enforceable and constitutes an efficient credit risk mitigant. When recognised, junior liens are to be treated using the C*/C** threshold, which is used for senior liens. In such cases, the C* and C** are calculated by taking into account the sum of the junior lien and all more senior liens.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.8.120
Additional collateral management requirements are as follows:
(a) The types of CRE and RRE collateral accepted by the bank and lending policies (advance rates) when this type of collateral is taken must be clearly documented;(b) The bank must take steps to ensure that the property taken as collateral is adequately insured against damage or deterioration;(c) The bank must monitor on an ongoing basis the extent of any permissible prior claims (e.g. tax) on the property; and(d) The bank must appropriately monitor the risk of environmental liability arising in respect of the collateral, such as the presence of toxic material on a property.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08(iii) Requirements for Recognition of Financial Receivables
— Definition of Eligible Receivables
CA-5.8.121
Eligible financial receivables are claims with an original maturity of less than or equal to one year where repayment will occur through the commercial or financial flows related to the underlying assets of the borrower. This includes both self-liquidating debt arising from the sale of goods or services linked to a commercial transaction and general amounts owed by buyers, suppliers, renters, national and local governmental authorities, or other non-affiliated parties not related to the sale of goods or services linked to a commercial transaction. Eligible receivables do not include those associated with securitisations, sub- participations or credit derivatives.
Apr 08— Operational Requirements
a. Legal Certainty
CA-5.8.122
The legal mechanism by which collateral is given must be robust and ensure that the lender has clear rights over the proceeds from the collateral.
Apr 08CA-5.8.123
Banks must take all steps necessary to fulfill local requirements in respect of the enforceability of security interest, e.g. by registering a security interest with a registrar. There should be a framework that allows the potential lender to have a perfected first priority claim over the collateral.
Apr 08CA-5.8.124
All documentation used in collateralised transactions must be binding on all parties and legally enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. Banks must have conducted sufficient legal review to verify this and have a well founded legal basis to reach this conclusion, and undertake such further review as necessary to ensure continuing enforceability.
Apr 08CA-5.8.125
The collateral arrangements must be properly documented, with a clear and robust procedure for the timely collection of collateral proceeds. Banks' procedures should ensure that any legal conditions required for declaring the default of the customer and timely collection of collateral are observed. In the event of the obligor's financial distress or default, the bank must have legal authority to sell or assign the receivables to other parties without consent of the receivables' obligors.
Apr 08b. Risk Management
CA-5.8.126
The bank must have a sound process for determining the credit risk in the receivables. Such a process should include, among other things, analyses of the borrower's business and industry (e.g. effects of the business cycle) and the types of customers with whom the borrower does business. Where the bank relies on the borrower to ascertain the credit risk of the customers, the bank must review the borrower's credit policy to ascertain its soundness and credibility.
Apr 08CA-5.8.127
The margin between the amount of the exposure and the value of the receivables must reflect all appropriate factors, including the cost of collection, concentration within the receivables pool pledged by an individual borrower, and potential concentration risk within the bank's total exposures.
Apr 08CA-5.8.128
The bank must maintain a continuous monitoring process that is appropriate for the specific exposures (either immediate or contingent) attributable to the collateral to be utilised as a risk mitigant. This process may include, as appropriate and relevant, ageing reports, control of trade documents, borrowing base certificates, frequent audits of collateral, confirmation of accounts, control of the proceeds of accounts paid, analyses of dilution (credits given by the borrower to the issuers) and regular financial analysis of both the borrower and the issuers of the receivables, especially in the case when a small number of large-sized receivables are taken as collateral. Observance of the bank's overall concentration limits should be monitored. Additionally, compliance with loan covenants, environmental restrictions, and other legal requirements should be reviewed on a regular basis.
Apr 08CA-5.8.129
The receivables pledged by a borrower should be diversified and not be unduly correlated with the borrower. Where the correlation is high, e.g. where some issuers of the receivables are reliant on the borrower for their viability or the borrower and the issuers belong to a common industry, the attendant risks should be taken into account in the setting of margins for the collateral pool as a whole. Receivables from affiliates of the borrower (including subsidiaries and employees) will not be recognised as risk mitigants.
Apr 08CA-5.8.130
The bank should have a documented process for collecting receivable payments in distressed situations. The requisite facilities for collection should be in place, even when the bank normally looks to the borrower for collections.
Apr 08c. Requirements for Recognition of other Collateral
CA-5.8.131
CBB may, on a case by case basis, allow for recognition of the credit risk mitigating effect of certain other physical collateral if the bank can demonstrate that such collateral meets the following two standards:
(a) Existence of liquid markets for disposal of collateral in an expeditious and economically efficient manner; and(b) Existence of well established, publicly available market prices for the collateral. CBB will seek to ensure that the amount a bank receives when collateral is realised does not deviate significantly from these market prices.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-5.8.132
In order for a given bank to receive recognition for additional physical collateral, it must meet all the standards in paragraphs CA-5.8.119 and CA-5.8.120, subject to the following modifications:
(a) First Claim: Only first liens on, or charges over, collateral are permissible. As such, the bank must have priority over all other lenders to the realised proceeds of the collateral;(b) The loan agreement must include detailed descriptions of the collateral plus detailed specifications of the manner and frequency of revaluation;(c) The types of physical collateral accepted by the bank and policies and practices in respect of the appropriate amount of each type of collateral relative to the exposure amount must be clearly documented in internal credit policies and procedures and available for examination and/or audit review;(d) Bank credit policies with regard to the transaction structure must address appropriate collateral requirements relative to the exposure amount, the ability to liquidate the collateral readily, the ability to establish objectively a price or market value, the frequency with which the value can readily be obtained (including a professional appraisal or valuation), and the volatility of the value of the collateral. The periodic revaluation process must pay particular attention to "fashion-sensitive" collateral to ensure that valuations are appropriately adjusted downward of fashion, or model-year, obsolescence as well as physical obsolescence or deterioration; and(e) In cases of inventories (e.g. raw materials, work-in-process, finished goods, dealers' inventories of autos) and equipment, the periodic revaluation process must include physical inspection of the collateral.Amended: April 2011
Apr 0810. Requirements for Recognition of Leasing
CA-5.8.133
Leases other than those that expose the bank to residual value risk (see paragraph CA-5.8.134) will be accorded the same treatment as exposures collateralised by the same type of collateral. The minimum requirements for the collateral type must be met (CRE/RRE or other collateral). In addition, the bank must also meet the following standards:
(a) Robust risk management on the part of the lessor with respect to the location of the asset, the use to which it is put, its age, and planned obsolescence;(b) A robust legal framework establishing the lessor's legal ownership of the asset and its ability to exercise its rights as owner in a timely fashion; and(c) The difference between the rate of depreciation of the physical asset and the rate of amortisation of the lease payments must not be so large as to overstate the CRM attributed to the leased assets.Apr 08CA-5.8.134
Leases that expose the bank to residual value risk will be treated in the following manner. Residual value risk is the bank's exposure to potential loss due to the fair value of the equipment declining below its residual estimate at lease inception:
(a) The discounted lease payment stream will receive a risk weight appropriate for the lessee's financial strength (PD) and CBB's or own-estimate of LGD, which ever is appropriate: and(b) The residual value will be risk-weighted at 100%.Amended: April 2011
Apr 0811. Calculation of Capital Charges for Equity Exposures
(i) The Internal Models Market-based Approach
CA-5.8.135
To be eligible for the internal models market-based approach a bank must demonstrate to CBB that it meets certain quantitative and qualitative minimum requirements at the outset and on an ongoing basis. A bank that fails to demonstrate continued compliance with the minimum requirements must develop a plan for rapid return to compliance, obtain CBB's approval of the plan, and implement that plan in a timely fashion. In the interim, banks would be expected to compute capital charges using a simple risk weight approach.
Apr 08CA-5.8.136
CBB will periodically develop detailed examination procedures to ensure that banks' risk measurement systems and management controls are adequate to serve as the basis for the internal models approach.
Apr 08(ii) Capital Charge and Risk Quantification
CA-5.8.137
The following minimum quantitative standards apply for the purpose of calculating minimum capital charges under the internal models approach:
(a) The capital charge is equivalent to the potential loss on the institution's equity portfolio arising from an assumed instantaneous shock equivalent to the 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval of the difference between quarterly returns and an appropriate risk-free rate computed over a long-term sample period;(b) The estimated losses should be robust to adverse market movements relevant to the long-term risk profile of the institution's specific holdings. The data used to represent return distributions should reflect the longest sample period for which data are available and meaningful in representing the risk profile of the bank's specific equity holdings. The data used should be sufficient to provide conservative, statistically reliable and robust loss estimates that are not based purely on subjective or judgmental considerations. Institutions must demonstrate to CBB that the shock employed provides a conservative estimate of potential losses over a relevant long-term market or business cycle. Models estimated using data not reflecting realistic ranges of long-run experience, including a period of reasonably severe declines in equity market values relevant to a bank's holdings, are presumed to produce optimistic results unless there is credible evidence of appropriate adjustments built into the model. In the absence of built-in adjustments, the bank must combine empirical analysis of available data with adjustments based on a variety of factors in order to attain model outputs that achieve appropriate realism and conservatism. In constructing Value at Risk (VaR) models estimating potential quarterly losses, institutions may use quarterly data or convert shorter horizon period data to a quarterly equivalent using an analytically appropriate method supported by empirical evidence. Such adjustments must be applied through a well-developed and well-documented thought process and analysis. In general, adjustments must be applied conservatively and consistently over time. Furthermore, where only limited data are available, or where technical limitations are such that estimates from any single method will be of uncertain quality, banks must add appropriate margins of conservatism in order to avoid over-optimism;(c) No particular type of VaR model (e.g. variance-covariance, historical simulation, or Monte Carlo) is prescribed. However, the model used must be able to capture adequately all of the material risks embodied in equity returns including both the general market risk and specific risk exposure of the institution's equity portfolio. Internal models must adequately explain historical price variation, capture both the magnitude and changes in the composition of potential concentrations, and be robust to adverse market environments. The population of risk exposures represented in the data used for estimation must be closely matched to or at least comparable with those of the bank's equity exposures;(d) Banks may also use modelling techniques such as historical scenario analysis to determine minimum capital requirements for banking book equity holdings. The use of such models is conditioned upon the institution demonstrating to CBB that the methodology and its output can be quantified in the form of the loss percentile specified under (a);(e) Banks must use an internal model that is appropriate for the risk profile and complexity of their equity portfolio. Banks with material holdings with values that are highly non-linear in nature (e.g. equity derivatives, convertibles) must employ an internal model designed to capture appropriately the risks associated with such instruments;(f) Subject to CBB's review, equity portfolio correlations can be integrated into a bank's internal risk measures. The use of explicit correlations (e.g. utilisation of a variance/covariance VaR model) must be fully documented and supported using empirical analysis. The appropriateness of implicit correlation assumptions will be evaluated by CBB in its review of model documentation and estimation techniques;(g) Mapping of individual positions to proxies, market indices, and risk factors should be plausible, intuitive, and conceptually sound. Mapping techniques and processes should be fully documented, and demonstrated with both theoretical and empirical evidence to be appropriate for the specific holdings. Where professional judgement is combined with quantitative techniques in estimating a holding's return volatility, the judgement must take into account the relevant and material information not considered by the other techniques utilised;(h) Where factor models are used, either single or multi-factor models are acceptable depending upon the nature of an institution's holdings. Banks are expected to ensure that the factors are sufficient to capture the risks inherent in the equity portfolio. Risk factors should correspond to the appropriate equity market characteristics (for example, public, private, market capitalisation industry sectors and sub-sectors, operational characteristics) in which the bank holds significant positions. While banks will have discretion in choosing the factors, they must demonstrate through empirical analyses the appropriateness of those factors, including their ability to cover both general and specific risk;(i) Estimates of the return volatility of equity investments must incorporate relevant and material available data, information, and methods. A bank may utilise independently reviewed internal data or data from external sources (including pooled data). The number of risk exposures in the sample, and the data period used for quantification must be sufficient to provide the bank with confidence in the accuracy and robustness of its estimates. Institutions should take appropriate measures to limit the potential of both sampling bias and survivorship bias in estimating return volatilities; and(j) A rigorous and comprehensive stress-testing programme must be in place. Banks are expected to subject their internal model and estimation procedures, including volatility computations, to either hypothetical or historical scenarios that reflect worst-case losses given underlying positions in both public and private equities. At a minimum, stress tests should be employed to provide information about the effect of tail events beyond the level of confidence assumed in the internal models approach.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08(iii) Risk Management Process and Controls
CA-5.8.138
Banks' overall risk management practices used to manage their banking book equity investments are expected to be consistent with the evolving sound practice guidelines issued by the Basel Committee and CBB. With regard to the development and use of internal models for capital purposes, institutions must have established policies, procedures, and controls to ensure the integrity of the model and modelling process used to derive regulatory capital standards. These policies, procedures, and controls should include the following:
(a) Full integration of the internal model into the overall management information systems of the institution and in the management of the banking book equity portfolio. Internal models should be fully integrated into the institution's risk management infrastructure including use in: (i) establishing investment hurdle rates and evaluating alternative investments; (ii) measuring and assessing equity portfolio performance (including the risk-adjusted performance); and (iii) allocating economic capital to equity holdings and evaluating overall capital adequacy. The institution should be able to demonstrate, through for example, investment committee minutes, that internal model output plays an essential role in the investment management process;(b) Established management systems, procedures, and control functions for ensuring the periodic and independent review of all elements of the internal modelling process, including approval of model revisions, vetting of model inputs, and review of model results, such as direct verification of risk computations. Proxy and mapping techniques and other critical model components should receive special attention. These reviews should assess the accuracy, completeness, and appropriateness of model inputs and results and focus on both finding and limiting potential errors associated with known weaknesses and identifying unknown model weaknesses. Such reviews may be conducted as part of internal or external audit programmes, by an independent risk control unit, or by an external third party;(c) Adequate systems and procedures for monitoring investment limits and the risk exposures of equity investments;(d) The units responsible for the design and application of the model must be functionally independent from the units responsible for managing individual investments; and(e) Parties responsible for any aspect of the modelling process must be adequately qualified. Management must allocate sufficient skilled and competent resources to the modelling function.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08(iv) Validation and Documentation
CA-5.8.139
Institutions employing internal models for regulatory capital purposes are expected to have in place a robust system to validate the accuracy and consistency of the model and its inputs. They must also fully document all material elements of their internal models and modelling process. The modelling process itself as well as the systems used to validate internal models including all supporting documentation, validation results, and the findings of internal and external reviews are subject to oversight and review by the CBB.
Apr 08Validation
CA-5.8.140
Banks must have a robust system in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of their internal models and modelling processes. A bank must demonstrate to CBB that the internal validation process enables it to assess the performance of its internal model and processes consistently and meaningfully.
Apr 08CA-5.8.141
Banks must regularly compare actual return performance (computed using realised and unrealised gains and losses) with modelled estimates and be able to demonstrate that such returns are within the expected range for the portfolio and individual holdings. Such comparisons must make use of historical data that are over as long a period as possible. The methods and data used in such comparisons must be clearly documented by the bank. This analysis and documentation should be updated at least annually.
Apr 08CA-5.8.142
Banks should make use of other quantitative validation tools and comparisons with external data sources. The analysis must be based on data that are appropriate to the portfolio, are updated regularly, and cover a relevant observation period. Banks' internal assessments of the performance of their own model must be based on long data histories, covering a range of economic conditions, and ideally one or more complete business cycles.
Apr 08CA-5.8.143
Banks must demonstrate that quantitative validation methods and data are consistent through time. Changes in estimation methods and data (both data sources and periods covered) must be clearly and thoroughly documented.
Apr 08CA-5.8.144
Since the evaluation of actual performance to expected performance over time provides a basis for banks to refine and adjust internal models on an ongoing basis, it is expected that banks using internal models will have established well-articulated model review standards. These standards are especially important for situations where actual results significantly deviate from expectations and where the validity of the internal model is called into question. These standards must take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability in equity returns. All adjustments made to internal models in response to model reviews must be well documented and consistent with the bank's model review standards.
Apr 08CA-5.8.145
To facilitate model validation through backtesting on an ongoing basis, institutions using the internal model approach must construct and maintain appropriate databases on the actual quarterly performance of their equity investments as well on the estimates derived using their internal models. Institutions should also backtest the volatility estimates used within their internal models and the appropriateness of the proxies used in the model. CBB may ask banks to scale their quarterly forecasts to a different, in particular shorter, time horizon, store performance data for this time horizon and perform backtests on this basis.
Apr 08Documentation
CA-5.8.146
The burden is on the bank to satisfy CBB that a model has good predictive power and that regulatory capital requirements will not be distorted as a result of its use. Accordingly, all critical elements of an internal model and the modelling process should be fully and adequately documented. Banks must document in writing their internal model's design and operational details. The documentation should demonstrate banks' compliance with the minimum quantitative and qualitative standards, and should address topics such as the application of the model to different segments of the portfolio, estimation methodologies, responsibilities of parties involved in the modelling, and the model approval and model review processes. In particular, the documentation should address the following points:
(a) A bank must document the rationale for its choice of internal modelling methodology and must be able to provide analyses demonstrating that the model and modelling procedures are likely to result in estimates that meaningfully identify the risk of the bank's equity holdings. Internal models and procedures must be periodically reviewed to determine whether they remain fully applicable to the current portfolio and to external conditions. In addition, a bank must document a history of major changes in the model over time and changes made to the modelling process subsequent to the last supervisory review. If changes have been made in response to the bank's internal review standards, the bank must document that these changes are consistent with its internal model review standards;(b) In documenting their internal models banks must:• provide a detailed outline of the theory, assumptions and/or mathematical and empirical basis of the parameters, variables, and data source(s) used to estimate the model;• establish a rigorous statistical process (including out-of-time and out-of-sample performance tests) for validating the selection of explanatory variables; and• indicate circumstances under which the model does not work effectively.(c) Where proxies and mapping are employed, institutions must have performed and documented rigorous analysis demonstrating that all chosen proxies and mappings are sufficiently representative of the risk of the equity holdings to which they correspond. The documentation should show, for instance, the relevant and material factors (e.g. business lines, balance sheet characteristics, geographic location, company age, industry sector and subsector, operating characteristics) used in mapping individual investments into proxies. In summary, institutions must demonstrate that the proxies and mappings employed:• are adequately comparable to the underlying holding or portfolio;• are derived using historical economic and market conditions that are relevant and material to the underlying holdings or, where not, that an appropriate adjustment has been made; and,• are robust estimates of the potential risk of the underlying holding.Amended: April 2011
Apr 0812. Disclosure Requirements
CA-5.8.147
In order to be eligible for the IRB approach, banks must meet the disclosure requirements that the CBB may set periodically. Failure to meet those requirements will render banks ineligible to use the relevant IRB approach.
Apr 08CA-6 CA-6 Credit Risk — Securitisation Framework
CA-6.1 CA-6.1 Scope and Definitions of Transactions Covered under the Securitisation Framework
CA-6.1.1
Banks must apply the securitisation framework for determining regulatory capital requirements on exposures arising from traditional and synthetic securitisations or similar structures that contain features common to both.
Apr 08CA-6.1.1A
A bank must meet all the requirements listed in the paragraph CA-6.1.1B below, to use any of the approaches specified in the securitisation framework. If a bank does not perform the level of the due diligence specified, it must deduct the amount of the securitisation (or re-securitisation) exposure from its regulatory capital using the approach outlined in the paragraphs CA-6.4.2 to CA-6.4.4.
Added: January 2012CA-6.1.1B
In order for a bank to use the securitisation framework, a bank must have the information specified below or deduct the exposure from regulatory capital:
(a) A bank must have a comprehensive understanding of the risk characteristics of its individual securitisation exposures, whether on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet, as well as the risk characteristics of the pools underlying its securitisation exposures;(b) A bank must be able to access performance information on the underlying pools on an on-going basis in a timely manner. Such information should include: exposure type, percentage of loans more than 30, 60 and 90 days past due, default rates, prepayment rates, loans in foreclosure, property type, occupancy, average credit score or other measures of creditworthiness, average loan-to-value ratio, and industry and geographic diversification. For re-securitisations, a bank must have not only information on the underlying securitisation tranches, such as the issuer name and credit quality, but also the characteristics and performance of the pools underlying the securitisation tranches; and(c) A bank must have a thorough understanding of all structural features of a securitisation transaction that would materially impact the performance of the bank's exposures to the transaction, such as the contractual waterfall and waterfall-related triggers, credit enhancements, liquidity enhancements, market value triggers, and deal-specific definitions of default.Added: January 2012CA-6.1.2
Since securitisations may be structured in many different ways, the capital treatment of a securitisation exposure must be determined on the basis of its economic substance rather than its legal form. Similarly, CBB will look to the economic substance of a transaction to determine whether it should be subject to the securitisation framework for purposes of determining regulatory capital. Banks are encouraged to consult with the CBB when there is uncertainty about whether a given transaction should be considered a securitisation. For example, transactions involving cash flows from real estate (e.g. rents) may be considered specialised lending exposures, if warranted.
Amended: January 2012
Apr 08CA-6.1.3
A traditional securitisation is a structure where the cash flow from an underlying pool of exposures is used to service at least two different stratified risk positions or tranches reflecting different degrees of credit risk. Payments to the investors depend upon the performance of the specified underlying exposures, as opposed to being derived from an obligation of the entity originating those exposures. The stratified/tranched structures that characterise securitisations differ from ordinary senior/subordinated debt instruments in that junior securitisation tranches can absorb losses without interrupting contractual payments to more senior tranches, whereas subordination in a senior/subordinated debt structure is a matter of priority of rights to the proceeds of liquidation.
Apr 08CA-6.1.4
A synthetic securitisation is a structure with at least two different stratified risk positions or tranches that reflect different degrees of credit risk where credit risk of an underlying pool of exposures is transferred, in whole or in part, through the use of funded (e.g. credit-linked notes) or unfunded (e.g. credit default swaps) credit derivatives or guarantees that serve to hedge the credit risk of the portfolio. Accordingly, the investors' potential risk is dependent upon the performance of the underlying pool.
Apr 08CA-6.1.5
Banks' exposures to a securitisation are hereafter referred to as "securitisation exposures". Securitisation exposures can include but are not restricted to the following: asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, credit enhancements, liquidity facilities, interest rate or currency swaps, credit derivatives and tranched cover as described in paragraph CA-4.5.11. Reserve accounts, such as cash collateral accounts, recorded as an asset by the originating bank must also be treated as securitisation exposures.
Apr 08CA-6.1.5A
A re-securitisation exposure is a securitisation exposure in which the risk associated with an underlying pool of exposures is tranched and at least one of the underlying exposures is a securitisation exposure. In addition, an exposure to one or more re-securitisation exposures is a re-securitisation exposure.
Added: January 2012CA-6.1.5B
Given the complexity of many securitisation transactions, licensees are encouraged to consult with the CBB when there is uncertainty about whether a particular structured credit position should be considered a re-securitisation exposure. The CBB will consider the exposure's economic substance when making a determination on whether a structured credit position is a re-securitisation exposure.
Added: January 2012CA-6.1.5C
Re-securitisation exposures include collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) of asset-backed securities (ABS) including, for example, a CDO backed by residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). Moreover, it also captures a securitisation exposure where the pool contains many individual mortgage loans and a single RMBS. This means that even if only one of the underlying exposures is a securitisation exposure, then any tranched position (such as senior or subordinated ABS) exposed to that pool is considered a re-securitisation exposure.
Added: January 2012CA-6.1.5D
Furthermore, when an instrument's performance is linked to one or more re-securitisation exposures, generally that instrument is a re-securitisation exposure. Thus a credit derivative providing credit protection for a CDO squared tranche is a re-securitisation exposure.
Added: January 2012CA-6.1.5E
The definition of re-securitisation also applies to ABCP programmes. The ratings based risk approach tables include weightings for both securitisation and re-securitisation exposures (see CA-6.4.8 onward).
Added: January 2012CA-6.1.6
Underlying instruments in the pool being securitised may include but are not restricted to the following: loans, commitments, asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, equity securities, and private equity investments. The underlying pool may include one or more exposures.
Apr 08CA-6.2 CA-6.2 Definitions and General Terminology
Originating Bank
CA-6.2.1
For risk-based capital purposes, a bank is considered to be an originator with regard to a certain securitisation if it meets either of the following conditions:
(a) The bank originates directly or indirectly underlying exposures included in the securitisation; or(b) The bank serves as a sponsor of an asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduit or similar programme that acquires exposures from third-party entities. In the context of such programmes, a bank would generally be considered a sponsor and, in turn, an originator if it, in fact or in substance, manages or advises the programme, places securities into the market, or provides liquidity and/or credit enhancements.Apr 08Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Programme
CA-6.2.2
An asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programme predominately issues commercial paper with an original maturity of one year or less that is backed by assets or other exposures held in a bankruptcy-remote, Special Purpose Securitisation Vehicle (SPSV).
Apr 08Clean-up Call
CA-6.2.3
A clean-up call is an option that permits the securitisation exposures (e.g. asset-backed securities) to be called before all of the underlying exposures or securitisation exposures have been repaid. In the case of traditional securitisations, this is generally accomplished by repurchasing the remaining securitisation exposures once the pool balance or outstanding securities have fallen below some specified level. In the case of a synthetic transaction, the clean-up call may take the form of a clause that extinguishes the credit protection.
Apr 08Credit Enhancement
CA-6.2.4
A credit enhancement is a contractual arrangement in which the bank retains or assumes a securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some degree of added protection to other parties to the transaction.
Apr 08Credit Enhancing Interest-Only strip
CA-6.2.5
A credit-enhancing interest-only strip (I/O) is an on-balance sheet asset that (i) represents a valuation of cash flows related to future margin income, and (ii) is subordinated.
Apr 08Early Amortization
CA-6.2.6
Early amortisation provisions are mechanisms that, once triggered, allow investors to be paid out prior to the originally stated maturity of the securities issued. For risk-based capital purposes, an early amortisation provision will be considered either controlled or non-controlled. A controlled early amortisation provision must meet all of the following conditions:
(a) The bank must have an appropriate capital/liquidity plan in place to ensure that it has sufficient capital and liquidity available in the event of an early amortisation;(b) Throughout the duration of the transaction, including the amortisation period, there is the same pro-rata sharing of interest, principal, expenses, losses and recoveries based on the bank's and investors' relative shares of the receivables outstanding at the beginning of each month;(c) The bank must set a period for amortisation that would be sufficient for at least 90% of the total debt outstanding at the beginning of the early amortisation period to have been repaid or recognised as in default; and(d) The pace of repayment should not be any more rapid than would be allowed by straight-line amortisation over the period set out in criterion (c).Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-6.2.7
An early amortisation provision that does not satisfy the conditions for a controlled early amortisation provision must be treated as a non-controlled early amortisation provision.
Apr 08Excess Spread
CA-6.2.8
Excess spread is generally defined as gross finance charge collections and other income received by the trust or SPSV (specified in paragraph CA-6.2.10) minus certificate interest, servicing fees, charge-offs, and other senior trust or SPSV expenses.
Apr 08Implicit Support
CA-6.2.9
Implicit support arises when a bank provides support to a securitisation in excess of its predetermined contractual obligation.
Apr 08SPSV
CA-6.2.10
An SPSV is a corporation, trust, or other entity organised for a specific purpose, the activities of which are limited to those appropriate to accomplish the purpose of the SPSV, and the structure of which is intended to isolate the SPSV from the credit risk of an originator or seller of exposures. SPSVs are commonly used as financing vehicles in which exposures are sold to a trust or similar entity in exchange for cash or other assets funded by debt issued by the trust.
Apr 08CA-6.3 CA-6.3 Operational Requirements for the Recognition of Risk Transference
CA-6.3.1
The following operational requirements are applicable to both the standardised and IRB approaches of the securitisation framework.
Apr 08Operational Requirements for Traditional Securitisations
CA-6.3.2
An originating bank may exclude securitised exposures from the calculation of risk weighted assets under paragraph CA-6.4.1, only if all of the following conditions have been met. Banks meeting these conditions must still hold regulatory capital against any securitisation exposures they retain:
(a) Significant credit risk associated with the securitised exposures has been transferred to third parties;(b) The transferor does not maintain effective or indirect control54 over the transferred exposures. The assets are legally isolated from the transferor in such a way (e.g. through the sale of assets or through sub-participation) that the exposures are put beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or receivership. These conditions must be supported by an opinion provided by a qualified legal counsel;(c) The securities issued are not obligations of the transferor. Thus, investors who purchase the securities only have claim to the underlying pool of exposures;(d) The transferee is an SPSV and the holders of the beneficial interests in that entity have the right to pledge or exchange them without restriction;(e) Clean-up calls must satisfy the conditions set out in paragraph CA-6.3.5; and(f) The securitisation does not contain clauses that (i) require the originating bank to alter systematically the underlying exposures such that the pool's weighted average credit quality is improved unless this is achieved by selling assets to independent and unaffiliated third parties at market prices; (ii) allow for increases in a retained first loss position or credit enhancement provided by the originating bank after the transaction's inception; or (iii) increase the yield payable to parties other than the originating bank, such as investors and third-party providers of credit enhancements, in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool.
54 The transferor is deemed to have maintained effective control over the transferred credit risk exposures if it: (i) is able to repurchase from the transferee the previously transferred exposures in order to realise their benefits; or (ii) is obligated to retain the risk of the transferred exposures. The transferor's retention of servicing rights to the exposures will not necessarily constitute indirect control of the exposures.
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Operational Requirements for Synthetic Securitisations
CA-6.3.3
For synthetic securitisations, the use of CRM techniques (i.e. collateral, guarantees and credit derivatives) for hedging the underlying exposure may be recognised for risk-based capital purposes only if the conditions outlined below are satisfied:
(a) Credit risk mitigants must comply with the requirements as set out in Chapter CA-4 of this Module;(b) Eligible collateral is limited to that specified in paragraphs CA-4.3.1 and CA-4.3.2. Eligible collateral pledged by SPSVs may be recognised;(c) Eligible guarantors are defined in paragraph CA-4.5.7. Banks may not recognise SPSVs as eligible guarantors in the securitisation framework;(d) Banks must transfer significant credit risk associated with the underlying exposure to third parties;(e) The instruments used to transfer credit risk may not contain terms or conditions that limit the amount of credit risk transferred, such as those provided below:• Clauses that materially limit the credit protection or credit risk transference (e.g. significant materiality thresholds below which credit protection is deemed not to be triggered even if a credit event occurs or those that allow for the termination of the protection due to deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying exposures);• Clauses that require the originating bank to alter the underlying exposures to improve the pool's weighted average credit quality;• Clauses that increase the banks' cost of credit protection in response to deterioration in the pool's quality;• Clauses that increase the yield payable to parties other than the originating bank, such as investors and third-party providers of credit enhancements, in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the reference pool; and• Clauses that provide for increases in a retained first loss position or credit enhancement provided by the originating bank after the transaction's inception.(f) An opinion must be obtained from a qualified legal counsel that confirms the enforceability of the contracts in all relevant jurisdictions; and(g) Clean-up calls must satisfy the conditions set out in paragraph CA-6.3.5.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-6.3.4
For synthetic securitisations, the effect of applying CRM techniques for hedging the underlying exposure are treated according to chapter CA-4. In case there is a maturity mismatch, the capital requirement will be determined in accordance with paragraphs CA-4.6.1 to CA-4.6.4. When the exposures in the underlying pool have different maturities, the longest maturity must be taken as the maturity of the pool. Maturity mismatches may arise in the context of synthetic securitisations when, for example, a bank uses credit derivatives to transfer part or all of the credit risk of a specific pool of assets to third parties. When the credit derivatives unwind, the transaction will terminate. This implies that the effective maturity of the tranches of the synthetic securitisation may differ from that of the underlying exposures. Originating banks of synthetic securitisations must treat such maturity mismatches in the following manner. A bank applying the standardised approach for securitisation must deduct all retained positions that are unrated or rated below investment grade. A bank applying the IRB approach must deduct unrated, retained positions if the treatment of the position is deduction specified in paragraphs CA-6.4.51 to CA-6.4.88. Accordingly, when deduction is required, maturity mismatches are not taken into account. For all other securitisation exposures, the bank must apply the maturity mismatch treatment set forth in paragraphs CA-4.6.1 to CA-4.6.4.
Apr 08Operational Requirements and Treatment of Clean-up Calls
CA-6.3.5
For securitisation transactions that include a clean-up call, no capital will be required due to the presence of a clean-up call if the following conditions are met:
(a) The exercise of the clean-up call must not be mandatory, in form or in substance, but rather must be at the discretion of the originating bank;(b) The clean-up call must not be structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancements or positions held by investors or otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement; and(c) The clean-up call must only be exercisable when 10% or less of the original underlying portfolio, or securities issued remain, or, for synthetic securitisations, when 10% or less of the original reference portfolio value remains.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-6.3.6
Securitisation transactions that include a clean-up call that does not meet all of the criteria stated in paragraph CA-6.3.5 result in a capital requirement for the originating bank. For a traditional securitisation, the underlying exposures must be treated as if they were not securitised. Additionally, banks must not recognise in regulatory capital any gain-on-sale, as defined in paragraph CA-6.4.3. For synthetic securitisations, the bank purchasing protection must hold capital against the entire amount of the securitised exposures as if they did not benefit from any credit protection. If a synthetic securitisation incorporates a call (other than a cleanup call) that effectively terminates the transaction and the purchased credit protection on a specific date, the bank must treat the transaction in accordance with paragraph CA-6.3.4 and paragraphs CA-4.6.1 to CA-4.6.4.
Apr 08CA-6.3.7
If a clean-up call, when exercised, is found to serve as a credit enhancement, the exercise of the clean-up call must be considered a form of implicit support provided by the bank and must be treated in accordance with the supervisory guidance pertaining to securitisation transactions.
Apr 08CA-6.4 CA-6.4 Treatment of Securitisation Exposures
Calculation of Capital Requirements
CA-6.4.1
Except as stated in paragraph CA-6.3.2, banks are required to hold regulatory capital against all of their securitisation exposures and re-securitisation exposures, including those arising from the provision of credit risk mitigants to a securitisation transaction, investments in asset-backed securities, retention of a subordinated tranche, and extension of a liquidity facility or credit enhancement, as set forth in the following sections. Repurchased securitisation exposures must be treated as retained securitisation exposures.
Amended: January 2012
Apr 08(i) Deduction
CA-6.4.2
When a bank is required to deduct a securitisation exposure from regulatory capital, the deduction must be taken 50% from Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 2 with the one exception noted in paragraph CA-6.4.3. Credit enhancing I/Os (net of the amount that must be deducted from Tier 1 as in paragraph CA-6.4.3) are deducted 50% from Tier 1 and 50% from Tier 2. Deductions from capital may be calculated net of any specific provisions taken against the relevant securitisation exposures.
Apr 08CA-6.4.3
Banks must deduct from Tier 1 any increase in equity capital resulting from a securitisation transaction, such as that associated with expected future margin income (FMI) resulting in a gain-on-sale that is recognised in regulatory capital. Such an increase in capital is referred to as a "gain-on-sale" for the purposes of the securitisation framework.
Apr 08CA-6.4.4
For the purposes of the EL-provision calculation as set out in Section CA-5.7, securitisation exposures do not contribute to the EL amount. Similarly, any specific provisions against securitisation exposures are not to be included in the measurement of eligible provisions.
Apr 08(ii) Implicit Support
CA-6.4.5
When a bank provides implicit support to a securitisation, it must, at a minimum, hold capital against all of the exposures associated with the securitisation transaction as if they had not been securitised. Additionally, banks would not be permitted to recognise in regulatory capital any gain-on-sale, as defined in paragraph CA-6.4.3. Furthermore, the bank is required to disclose publicly that (a) it has provided non-contractual support and (b) the capital impact of doing so.
Apr 08Operational Requirements for use of External Credit Assessments
CA-6.4.6
The following operational criteria concerning the use of external credit assessments apply in the standardised and IRB approaches of the securitisation framework:
(a) To be eligible for risk-weighting purposes, the external credit assessment must take into account and reflect the entire amount of credit risk exposure the bank has with regard to all payments owed to it. For example, if a bank is owed both principal and interest, the assessment must fully take into account and reflect the credit risk associated with timely repayment of both principal and interest;(b) The exteral credit assessments must be from an eligible ECAI as recognised by the CBB in accordance with section CA-3.4 with the following exception. In contrast with (c) of paragraph CA-3.4.1, an eligible credit assessment must be publicly available. In other words, a rating must be published in an accessible form and included in the ECAI's transition matrix. Consequently, ratings that are made available only to the parties to a transaction do not satisfy this requirement;(c) Eligible ECAIs must have a demonstrated expertise in assessing securitisations, which may be evidenced by strong market acceptance;(d) A bank must apply external credit assessments from eligible ECAIs consistently across a given type of securitisation exposure. Furthermore, a bank cannot use the credit assessments issued by one ECAI for one or more tranches and those of another ECAI for other positions (whether retained or purchased) within the same securitisation structure that may or may not be rated by the first ECAI. Where two or more eligible ECAIs can be used and these assess the credit risk of the same securitisation exposure differently, paragraphs CA-3.4.5 and CA-3.4.6 will apply;(e) Where CRM is provided directly to an SPSV by an eligible guarantor defined in paragraph CA-4.5.7 and is reflected in the external credit assessment assigned to a securitisation exposure(s), the risk weight associated with that external credit assessment should be used. In order to avoid any double counting, no additional capital recognition is permitted. If the CRM provider is not recognised as an eligible guarantor in paragraph CA-4.5.7, the covered securitisation exposures should be treated as unrated; and(f) In the situation where a credit risk mitigant is not obtained by the SPSV but rather applied to a specific securitisation exposure within a given structure (e.g. ABS tranche), the bank must treat the exposure as if it is unrated and then use the CRM treatment outlined in chapter CA-4 or in the foundation IRB approach of chapter CA-5, to recognise the hedge.Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-6.4.6A
A bank is not permitted to use any external credit assessment for risk-weighting purposes where the assessment is at least partly based on unfunded support provided by the bank. For example, if a bank buys ABCP where it provides an unfunded securitisation exposure extended to the ABCP programme (e.g. liquidity facility or credit enhancement), and that exposure plays a role in determining the credit assessment on the ABCP, the bank must treat the ABCP as if it were not rated. The bank must continue to hold capital against the other securitisation exposures it provides (e.g. against the liquidity facility and/or credit enhancement). The treatment described above is also applicable to exposures held in the trading book. A bank's capital requirement for such exposures held in the trading book can be no less than the amount required under the banking book treatment. Banks are permitted to recognise overlap in their exposures, consistent with CA-6.4.23. For example, a bank providing a liquidity facility supporting 100% of the ABCP issued by an ABCP programme and purchasing (for its own account) 20% of the outstanding ABCP of that programme could recognise an overlap of 20% (100% liquidity facility + 20% CP held – 100% CP issued = 20%). If a bank provided a liquidity facility that covered 90% of the outstanding ABCP and purchased 20% of the ABCP, the two exposures would be treated as if 10% of the two exposures overlapped (90% liquidity facility + 20% CP held – 100% CP issued = 10%). If a bank provided a liquidity facility that covered 50% of the outstanding ABCP and purchased 20% of the ABCP, the two exposures would be treated as if there were no overlap.
Added: January 2012Standardised Approach for Securitisation Exposures
(i) Scope
CA-6.4.7
Banks that apply the standardised approach to credit risk for the type of underlying exposure(s) securitised must use the standardised approach under the securitisation framework.
Apr 08(ii) Risk Weights
CA-6.4.8
The risk-weighted asset amount of a securitisation exposure is computed by multiplying the amount of the position by the appropriate risk weight determined in accordance with the following tables. For off-balance sheet exposures, banks must apply a CCF and then risk weight the resultant credit equivalent amount. If such an exposure is rated, a CCF of 100% must be applied. For positions with long-term ratings of B+ and below and short-term ratings other than A-1/P-1, A-2/P-2, A-3/P-3, deduction from capital as defined in paragraph CA-6.4.2 is required. Deduction is also required for unrated positions with the exception of the circumstances described in paragraphs CA-6.4.12 to CA-6.4.16.
The following risk weights are applied in the standardised approach.
Long term rating50 Securitisation Exposure Re-securitisation Exposure AAA to AA- 20% 40% A+ to A- 50% 100% BBB+ to BBB- 100% 225% BB+ to BB- 350% 650% B+ and below or unrated Deduction Deduction
Short term rating Securitisation Exposure Re-securitisation Exposure A-1/P-1 20% 40% A-2/P-2 50% 100% A-3/P-3 100% 225% All other ratings or unrated Deduction Deduction
50 The rating designations used in the following tables are for illustrative purposes only and do not indicate any preference for, or endorsement of, any particular external assessment system.
Amended: January 2012
Apr 08Recognition of Ratings on Below-investment Grade Exposures
CA-6.4.10
Only third-party investors, as opposed to banks that serve as originators, may recognise external credit assessments that are equivalent to BB+ to BB- for risk weighting purposes of securitisation exposures.
Apr 08Originators to Deduct Below-investment Grade Exposures
CA-6.4.11
Originating banks as defined in paragraph CA-6.2.1 must deduct all retained securitisation exposures rated below investment grade (i.e. BBB-).
Apr 08(iii) Exceptions to General Treatment of Unrated Securitisation Exposures
CA-6.4.12
As noted in the tables above, unrated securitisation exposures must be deducted with the following exceptions: (i) the most senior exposure in a securitisation, (ii) exposures that are in a second loss position or better in ABCP programmes and meet the requirements outlined in paragraph CA-6.4.15, and (iii) eligible liquidity facilities.
Apr 08Treatment of Unrated Most Senior Securitisation Exposures
CA-6.4.13
If the most senior exposure in a securitisation of a traditional or synthetic securitisation is unrated, a bank that holds or guarantees such an exposure may determine the risk weight by applying the "look-through" treatment, provided the composition of the underlying pool is known at all times. Banks are not required to consider interest rate or currency swaps when determining whether an exposure is the most senior in a securitisation for the purpose of applying the "look-through" approach.
Apr 08CA-6.4.14
In the look-through treatment, the unrated most senior position receives the average risk weight of the underlying exposures subject to CBB review. Where the bank is unable to determine the risk weights assigned to the underlying credit risk exposures, the unrated position must be deducted.
Apr 08Treatment of Exposures in a Second Loss Position or Better in ABCP Programmes
CA-6.4.15
Deduction is not required for those unrated securitisation exposures provided by sponsoring banks to ABCP programmes that satisfy the following requirements:
(a) The exposure is economically in a second loss position or better and the first loss position provides significant credit protection to the second loss position;(b) The associated credit risk is the equivalent of investment grade or better; and(c) The bank holding the unrated securitisation exposure does not retain or provide the first loss position.Apr 08CA-6.4.16
Where these conditions are satisfied, the risk weight is the greater of (i) 100% or (ii) the highest risk weight assigned to any of the underlying individual exposures covered by the facility.
Apr 08Risk Weights for Eligible Liquidity Facilities
CA-6.4.17
For eligible liquidity facilities as defined in paragraph CA-6.4.19 and where the conditions for use of external credit assessments in paragraph CA-6.4.6 are not met, the risk weight applied to the exposure's credit equivalent amount is equal to the highest risk weight assigned to any of the underlying individual exposures covered by the facility.
Apr 08(iv) Credit Conversion Factors for Off-balance Sheet Exposures
CA-6.4.18
For risk-based capital purposes, banks must determine whether, according to the criteria outlined below, an off-balance sheet securitisation exposure qualifies as an 'eligible liquidity facility' or an 'eligible servicer cash advance facility'. All other off-balance sheet securitisation exposures will receive a 100% CCF.
Apr 08Eligible Liquidity Facilities
CA-6.4.19
Banks are permitted to treat off-balance sheet securitisation exposures as eligible liquidity facilities if the following minimum requirements are satisfied:
(a) The facility documentation must clearly identify and limit the circumstances under which it may be drawn. Draws under the facility must be limited to the amount that is likely to be repaid fully from the liquidation of the underlying exposures and any seller-provided credit enhancements. In addition, the facility must not cover any losses incurred in the underlying pool of exposures prior to a draw, or be structured such that draw-down is certain (as indicated by regular or continuous draws);(b) The facility must be subject to an asset quality test that precludes it from being drawn to cover credit risk exposures that are in default as defined in paragraphs CA-5.8.63 to CA-5.8.70. In addition, if the exposures that a liquidity facility is required to fund are externally rated securities, the facility can only be used to fund securities that are externally rated investment grade at the time of funding;(c) The facility cannot be drawn after all applicable (e.g. transaction-specific and programme-wide) credit enhancements from which the liquidity would benefit have been exhausted; and(d) Repayment of draws on the facility (i.e. assets acquired under a purchase agreement or loans made under a lending agreement) must not be subordinated to any interests of any note holder in the programme (e.g. ABCP programme) or subject to deferral or waiver.Apr 08CA-6.4.20
Where these conditions are met, the bank may apply a 50% CCF to the eligible facility regardless of the maturity of the facility. However, if an external rating of the facility itself is used for risk-weighting the facility, a 100% CCF must be applied.
Amended: January 2012
Apr 08[Deleted]
Deleted: January 2012CA-6.4.21 [Deleted]
[This Paragraph has been deleted in January 2012].
Deleted: January 2012CA-6.4.22 [Deleted]
[This Paragraph has been deleted in January 2012].
Deleted: January 2012Treatment of Overlapping Exposures
CA-6.4.23
A bank may provide several types of facilities that can be drawn under various conditions. The same bank may be providing two or more of these facilities. Given the different triggers found in these facilities, it may be the case that a bank provides duplicative coverage to the underlying exposures. In other words, the facilities provided by a bank may overlap since a draw on one facility may preclude (in part) a draw under the other facility. In the case of overlapping facilities provided by the same bank, the bank does not need to hold additional capital for the overlap. Rather, it is only required to hold capital once for the position covered by the overlapping facilities (whether they are liquidity facilities or credit enhancements). Where the overlapping facilities are subject to different conversion factors, the bank must attribute the overlapping part to the facility with the highest conversion factor. However, if overlapping facilities are provided by different banks, each bank must hold capital for the maximum amount of the facility (see also Paragraph CA-6.4.6A).
Amended: January 2012
Apr 08Eligible Servicer Cash Advance Facilities
CA-6.4.24
If contractually provided for, servicers may advance cash to ensure an uninterrupted flow of payments to investors so long as the servicer is entitled to full reimbursement and this right is senior to other claims on cash flows from the underlying pool of exposures. A 0% CCF must be applied to such un-drawn servicer cash advances or facilities provided that these are unconditionally cancellable without prior notice.
Apr 08Treatment of Credit Risk Mitigation for Securitisation Exposures
CA-6.4.25
The treatment below applies to a bank that has obtained a credit risk mitigant on a securitisation exposure. Credit risk mitigants include guarantees, credit derivatives, collateral and on-balance sheet netting. Collateral in this context refers to that used to hedge the credit risk of a securitisation exposure rather than the underlying exposures of the securitisation transaction.
Apr 08CA-6.4.26
When a bank other than the originator provides credit protection to a securitisation exposure, it must calculate a capital requirement on the covered exposure as if it were an investor in that securitisation. If a bank provides protection to an unrated credit enhancement, it must treat the credit protection provided as if it were directly holding the unrated credit enhancement.
Apr 08Collateral
Guarantees and Credit Derivatives
CA-6.4.28
Credit protection provided by the entities listed in paragraph CA-4.5.7 may be recognised. SPSVs cannot be recognised as eligible guarantors. A bank must not recognise any support provided by itself (see also Paragraph CA-6.4.6).
Amended: January 2012
Apr 08(vi) Capital Requirement for Early Amortisation Provisions
Scope
CA-6.4.32
As described below, an originating bank is required to hold capital against all or a portion of the investors' interest (i.e. against both the drawn and un-drawn balances related to the securitised exposures) when:
(a) It sells exposures into a structure that contains an early amortisation feature; and(b) The exposures sold are of a revolving nature. These involve exposures where the borrower is permitted to vary the drawn amount and repayments within an agreed limit under a line of credit (e.g. credit card receivables and corporate loan commitments).Apr 08CA-6.4.33
The capital requirement should reflect the type of mechanism through which an early amortisation is triggered.
Apr 08CA-6.4.34
For securitisation structures wherein the underlying pool comprises revolving and term exposures, a bank must apply the relevant early amortisation treatment (outlined below in paragraphs CA-6.4.36 to CA-6.4.47) to that portion of the underlying pool containing revolving exposures.
Apr 08CA-6.4.35
Banks are not required to calculate a capital requirement for early amortisations in the following situations:
(a) Replenishment structures where the underlying exposures do not revolve and the early amortisation ends the ability of the bank to add new exposures;(b) Transactions of revolving assets containing early amortisation features that mimic term structures (i.e. where the risk on the underlying facilities does not return to the originating bank);(c) Structures where a bank securitises one or more credit line(s) and where investors remain fully exposed to future draws by borrowers even after an early amortisation event has occurred;(d) The early amortisation clause is solely triggered by events not related to the performance of the securitised assets or the selling bank, such as material changes in tax laws or regulations.Apr 08Maximum Capital Requirement
CA-6.4.36
For a bank subject to the early amortisation treatment, the total capital charge for all of its positions will be subject to a maximum capital requirement (i.e. a 'cap') equal to the greater of (i) that required for retained securitisation exposures, or (ii) the capital requirement that would apply had the exposures not been securitised. In addition, banks must deduct the entire amount of any gain-on-sale and credit enhancing I/Os arising from the securitisation transaction in accordance with paragraphs CA-6.4.2 to CA-6.4.4.
Apr 08Mechanics
CA-6.4.37
The originator's capital charge for the investors' interest is determined as the product of (a) the investors' interest, (b) the appropriate CCF (as discussed below), and (c) the risk weight appropriate to the underlying exposure type, as if the exposures had not been securitised. As described below, the CCFs depend upon whether the early amortisation repays investors through a controlled or non-controlled mechanism. They also differ according to whether the securitised exposures are uncommitted retail credit lines (e.g. credit card receivables) or other credit lines (e.g. revolving corporate facilities). A line is considered uncommitted if it is unconditionally cancellable without prior notice.
Apr 08(vii) Determination of CCFs for Controlled Early Amortisation Features
CA-6.4.38
An early amortisation feature is considered controlled when the definition as specified in paragraph CA-6.2.6 is satisfied.
Apr 08Uncommitted Retail Exposures
CA-6.4.39
For uncommitted retail credit lines (e.g. credit card receivables) in securitisations containing controlled early amortisation features, banks must compare the three-month average excess spread defined in paragraph CA-6.2.8 to the point at which the bank is required to trap excess spread as economically required by the structure (i.e. excess spread trapping point).
Apr 08CA-6.4.40
In cases where such a transaction does not require excess spread to be trapped, the trapping point is deemed to be 4.5 percentage points.
Apr 08CA-6.4.41
The bank must divide the excess spread level by the transaction's excess spread trapping point to determine the appropriate segments and apply the corresponding conversion factors, as outlined in the following table.
Controlled Early Amortisation Features
Uncommitted Committed Retail credit lines 3-month average excess spread Credit Conversion Factor (CCF)
133.33% of trapping point or more
0% CCF
less than 133.33% to 100% of trapping point
1% CCF
less than 100% to 75% of trapping point
2% CCF
less than 75% to 50% of trapping point
10% CCF
less than 50% to 25% of trapping point
20% CCF
less than 25%
40% CCF90% CCF Non-retail credit lines 90% CCF 90% CCF Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-6.4.42
Banks are required to apply the conversion factors set out above for controlled mechanisms to the investors' interest referred to in paragraph CA-6.4.37.
Apr 08Other Exposures
CA-6.4.43
All other securitised revolving exposures (i.e. those that are committed and all non-retail exposures) with controlled early amortisation features will be subject to a CCF of 90% against the off-balance sheet exposures.
Apr 08(viii) Determination of CCFs for Non-controlled Early Amortisation Features
CA-6.4.44
Early amortisation features that do not satisfy the definition of a controlled early amortisation as specified in paragraph CA-6.2.6 will be considered non-controlled and treated as follows.
Apr 08Uncommitted Retail Exposures
CA-6.4.45
For uncommitted retail credit lines (e.g. credit card receivables) in securitisations containing non-controlled early amortisation features, banks must make the comparison described in paragraphs CA-6.4.38 and CA-6.4.40.
Apr 08CA-6.4.46
The bank must divide the excess spread level by the transaction's excess spread trapping point to determine the appropriate segments and apply the corresponding conversion factors, as outlined in the following table.
Non-controlled Early Amortisation Features
Uncommitted Committed Retail credit lines 3-month average excess spread Credit Conversion Factor (CCF)
133.33% or more of trapping point
0% CCF
less than 133.33% to 100% of trapping point
5% CCF
less than 100% to 75% of trapping point
15% CCF
less than 75% to 50% of trapping point
50% CCF
less than 50% of trapping point
100% CCF100% CCF Non-retail credit lines 100% CCF 100% CCF Amended: April 2011
Apr 08Other Exposures
CA-6.4.47
All other securitised revolving exposures (i.e. those that are committed and all non-retail exposures) with non-controlled early amortisation features will be subject to a CCF of 100% against the off-balance sheet exposures.
Apr 08Internal Ratings-based Approach for Securitisation Exposures
(i) Scope
CA-6.4.48
Banks that have received approval from CBB to use the IRB approach for the type of underlying exposures securitised (e.g. for their corporate or retail portfolio) must use the IRB approach for securitisations. Conversely, banks may not use the IRB approach to securitisation unless they receive approval to use the IRB approach for the underlying exposures from CBB.
Apr 08CA-6.4.49
If the bank is applying the IRB approach for some exposures and the standardised approach for other exposures in the underlying pool, it should generally use the approach corresponding to the predominant share of exposures within the pool. The bank must consult with the CBB on which approach to apply to its securitisation exposures. To ensure appropriate capital levels, there may be instances where the CBB requires a treatment other than this general rule.
Apr 08CA-6.4.50
Where there is no specific IRB treatment for the underlying asset type, originating banks that have received approval to use the IRB approach must calculate capital charges on their securitisation exposures applying the standardised approach in the securitisation framework, and investing banks with approval to use the IRB approach must apply the RBA.
Apr 08(ii) Hierarchy of Approaches
CA-6.4.51
The Ratings-Based Approach (RBA) must be applied to securitisation exposures that are rated, or where a rating can be inferred as described in paragraph CA-6.4.60. Where an external or an inferred rating is not available, either the Supervisory Formula (SF) or the Internal Assessment Approach (IAA) must be applied. The IAA is only available to exposures (e.g. liquidity facilities and credit enhancements) that banks (including third-party banks) extend to ABCP programmes. Such exposures must satisfy the conditions of paragraphs CA-6.4.62 and CA-6.4.63. For liquidity facilities to which none of these approaches can be applied, banks may apply the treatment specified in paragraph CA-6.4.84. Exceptional treatment for eligible servicer cash advance facilities is specified in paragraph CA-6.4.86. Securitisation exposures to which none of these approaches can be applied must be deducted.
Apr 08(iii) Maximum Capital Requirement
CA-6.4.52
For a bank applying the IRB approach to securitisation, the maximum capital requirement for the securitisation exposures it holds is equal to the IRB capital requirement that would have been assessed against the underlying exposures had they not been securitised and treated under the appropriate sections of the IRB framework including section CA-5.7. In addition, banks must deduct the entire amount of any gain-on-sale and credit enhancing I/Os arising from the securitisation transaction in accordance with paragraphs CA-6.4.2 to CA-6.4.4.
Apr 08(iv) Ratings-Based Approach (RBA)
CA-6.4.53
Under the RBA, the risk-weighted assets are determined by multiplying the amount of the exposure by the appropriate risk weights, provided in the tables in paragraph CA-6.4.58 and CA-6.4.59.
Apr 08CA-6.4.54
The risk weights depend on (i) the external rating grade or an available inferred rating, (ii) whether the credit rating (external or inferred) represents a long-term or a short term credit rating, (iii) the granularity of the underlying pool and (iv) the seniority of the position.
Apr 08CA-6.4.55
For purposes of the RBA, a securitisation exposure is treated as a senior tranche if it is effectively backed or secured by a first claim on the entire amount of the assets in the underlying securitised pool. While this generally includes only the most senior position within a securitisation transaction, in some instances there may be some other claim that, in a technical sense, may be more senior in the waterfall (e.g. a swap claim) but may be disregarded for the purpose of determining which positions are subject to the "senior tranches" column.
Apr 08CA-6.4.56
Examples:
(a) In a typical synthetic securitisation, the "super-senior" tranche would be treated as a senior tranche, provided that all of the conditions for inferring a rating from a lower tranche are fulfilled;(b) In a traditional securitisation where all tranches above the first-loss piece are rated, the most highly rated position would be treated as a senior tranche. However, when there are several tranches that share the same rating, only the most senior one in the waterfall would be treated as senior; and(c) Usually a liquidity facility supporting an ABCP programme would not be the most senior position within the programme; the commercial paper, which benefits from the liquidity support, typically would be the most senior position. However, a liquidity facility may be viewed as covering all losses on the underlying receivables pool that exceed the amount of overcollateralization or reserves provided by the seller and as being most senior only if it is sized to cover all of the outstanding commercial paper and other senior debt supported by the pool, so that no cash flows from the underlying pool could be transferred to other creditors until any liquidity draws were repaid in full. In such a case, the RBA risk weights in the left-most column can be used. If these conditions are not satisfied or for other reasons the liquidity facility constitutes a mezzanine position in economic substance rather than a senior position in the underlying pool, then the "Base risk weights" column is applicable.Amended: January 2012
Amended: April 2011
Apr 08CA-6.4.57
The risk weights provided in the table in paragraph CA-6.4.58 apply when the external assessment represents a long-term credit rating, as well as when an inferred rating based on a long-term rating is available.
Apr 08CA-6.4.58
Banks may apply the risk weights for senior positions if the effective number of underlying exposures (N, as defined in paragraph CA-6.4.77) is 6 or more and the position is senior as defined above. When N is less than 6, the risk weights in column 4 of the first table below apply. In all other cases, the risk weights in column 3 of the first table below apply.
RBA risk weights when the external assessment represents a long-term credit rating and/or an inferred rating derived from a long-term assessment External Rating (Illustrative) Risk weights for senior positions and eligible senior IAA exposures Base risk weights Risk weights for tranches backed by non-granular pools AAA 7% 12% 20% AA 8% 15% 25% A+ 10% 18% 35% A 12% 20% A- 20% 35% BBB+ 35% 50% BBB 60% 75% BBB- 100% BB+ 250% BB 425% BB- 650% Below BB- and unrated Deduction Apr 08CA-6.4.59
The risk weights in the table below apply when the external assessment represents a short-term credit rating, as well as when an inferred rating based on a short-term rating is available. The decision rules outlined in paragraph CA-6.4.58 also apply for short-term credit ratings.
RBA risk weights when the external assessment represents a short-term credit rating and/or an inferred rating derived from a short-term assessment External Rating (Illustrative) Risk weights for senior positions and eligible senior IAA exposures Base risk weights Risk weights for tranches backed by non-granular A-1/P- 7% 12% 2 A-2/P- 12% 20% 3 A-3/P- 60% 75% 7 All other ratings/unrated Deduction Deduction Deduction Apr 08Use of Inferred Ratings