MAM-A.1.1

The CBB believes that in order to achieve the basic objectives of securities regulation of ensuring investor protection and fairness, efficiency and transparency of the market, it is essential to ensure that prices of securities are determined by the collective judgment of uninterrupted market forces of supply and demand.

MAM-A.1.2

Market manipulation, misleading behaviour or conduct, insider trading and fraudulent or deceptive behaviour or conduct may distort the price discovery system and distort prices and thereby unfairly disadvantage the investors. While the CBB Law criminalizes the offence of market manipulation, the CBB seeks to maintain investor confidence on the integrity and fairness of the Kingdom's capital market by clearly laying down the various types of prohibited market behaviour or conduct to facilitate the understanding of the market participants in this regard.

MAM-A.1.3

The CBB's approach is to provide a strong and facilitative regulatory framework along with an effective enforcement of regulatory requirements. While the CBB favours an open and pragmatic approach to supervision within the boundaries set by the law and the CBB's regulations, and avoids a legalistic and confrontational style of supervision, it ensures effective enforcement of regulatory requirements.

MAM-A.1.4

The CBB seeks to clearly lay down the rules that will be applied transparently and consistently to ensure that the bona fide investors and market participants are not inconvenienced in their normal course of business, by enabling them to take all reasonable precautions and exercise due diligence to avoid their engagement in prohibited market behaviour or conduct. This is intended to drive the development and strategic positioning of the Kingdom's capital market and lay a strong foundation for further growth.

MAM-A.1.5

Article 3(4) of the Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions (CBB) Law requires the CBB to protect the interests of depositors and the customers of financial institutions, and enhance the Kingdom's credibility as an international financial centre. Article 4(10) mandates the CBB to safeguard the legitimate interests of licensees' customers against the risks associated with the financial services industry.

MAM-A.1.6

Article (38) (a) mandates the Governor of the CBB to issue necessary directives to ensure the implementation of the CBB Law and regulations and the achievement of the objectives of the CBB. Article (38) (b) provides the CBB with the power to issue necessary directives to ensure the implementation of CBB Laws and regulations that aim to formulate the understanding and implementation of the CBB Law.

MAM-A.1.7

Chapter 1 of Part 5 of the CBB Law (Articles 97 to 105) defines insiders, inside information and market information, prohibits abuse of inside information, and provides defences. Particularly, Article 99 provides the CBB with the power to issue regulations concerning the necessary procedures and controls of publishing market information, and Article 105 states that a person shall not be guilty of inside dealing if he proves that the dealing was completed in accordance with CBB's price policies.

MAM-A.1.8

Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the CBB Law (Articles 106 and 107) deals with violation of market dealings:

Article 106 states that: "In the application of this law a person is guilty of market manipulation if he:

Article 107 states that: "A person shall not be guilty of market manipulation if he proves that his reasons for engaging in the alleged conduct were legitimate and that he had acted in conformity with the accepted market practices in the market concerned, or that he had acted in conformity with any price stablization rules made by the Central Bank, or if he believed on reasonable grounds that his conduct did not violate Article 106 of this Law and that he had taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid behaving in any way against the said Article."

MAM-A.1.9

Part 11 of the CBB Law (Articles 160 — 172) provides for penalties for various contraventions and violations of the provisions of the CBB Law:

Article 167 specifically provides penalty for the offences of abuse of inside information and states that: "Without prejudice to any greater penalty prescribed in the Penal Code or under any law, a person who contravenes Article (100) of this Law, while he is fully aware, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and a fine not exceeding Bahraini Dinars (10,000), or either penalty".

Article 168 specifically provides penalty for the offence of market manipulation and states that: "Without prejudice to any greater penalty prescribed under the Penal Code or any other law, a person who contravenes Article (106) of this Law is guilty of an offence of market manipulation and shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months and a fine not exceeding Bahraini Dinars ten thousand (10,000), or either penalty".

MAM-A.1.10

This Module contains the CBB's Directive relating to the prohibition of market abuse and market manipulation and is issued under the powers available to the CBB under Article 38 of the CBB Law, read with the abovementioned provisions of the CBB Law. The Directive under this Module is applicable to all market participants and relevant persons, including but not limited to issuers of securities or any person acting on their behalf, licensed exchanges, licensed market operators, licensed clearing houses, depositories, investment firms, business trusts, listed companies, any person acting for or on behalf of listed companies, shareholders of listed companies, share registrars, lead managers, underwriters, professional advisors, listing agents, auditors, financial analysts and any other person who engages or encourages others to engage in any acts of commission or omission covered by the scope of this Module, irrespective of whether such person is a market participant or not. These rules are issued by way of a legally-binding Directive.

MAM-A.2.1

This Module was first issued in January 2009. Any material changes that are subsequently made to this Module are annotated with the calendar quarter date in which the change is made; Chapter UG-3 provides further details on Rulebook maintenance and version control.

MAM-A.2.2

The CBB's Disclosure Standards issued vide Circular No. ODG/407/03 dated 3^rd December 2003 and available at www.cbb.gov.bh, inter-alia, contain ongoing obligations of issuers, including immediate announcement of material information, rules governing transactions of directors and senior management and guidelines for trading by directors and senior management and their related parties. The principles contained in the CBB's Disclosure Standards will become part of Module DIS (Disclosure) on its issuance.

MAM-A.2.3

The BSE's Guidelines on Issuers' Key Person Dealing Policies and available at www.bahrainstock.com, contains rules for the prohibition of abuse of inside information and guidelines and procedures for monitoring, supervising and handling of insiders' issues, as well as insiders' duty to declare and restrict their dealings.

MAM-A.2.3A

The most recent changes made to this Module are detailed in the table below:

MAM-A.2.4

This Module supersedes the following provisions contained in circulars or other regulatory instruments:

MAM-A.4.5

All capital market service providers and listed companies in general, and members of the SROs in particular, must have the necessary infrastructure and systems to identify and report any irregular transactions or suspected cases of market abuse or market manipulation which they come across in the normal course of business to the CBB in the format given in paragraph MAM-A.4.6

MAM-A.4.6

Persons subject to the obligations to report irregular transactions to the CMSD shall report in the following standard format:

MAM-A.4.8

Where the information specified to be reported is not available at the time of reporting, the report shall include at least the reasons why the reporting persons suspect that the transactions might constitute insider dealing or market manipulation. All remaining information shall be provided to the CMSD as soon as it becomes available.

Persons making suspicious transactions reports therefore, do not need to have all the required information before contacting the CMSD. If the case is one which (the persons subject to the reporting obligation consider) needs to be brought to the attention of the CMSD urgently, then the person(s) concerned shall make the first contact quickly. This can be done by telephone if appropriate, giving the basic details and reasons for suspicion, followed by written confirmation. The other information can be supplied subsequently.