HC-5.4 HC-5.4 Standard for all Remuneration
HC-5.4.1
Remuneration ofapproved persons andmaterial risk-takers must be sufficient enough to attract, retain and motivate persons of the quality needed to run theconventional bank licensee successfully, but theconventional bank licensee must avoid paying more than is necessary for that purpose.Amended: January 2014
October 2010HC-5.4.2
While this Section applies to all
approved persons andmaterial risk-takers for the Bahrain operations, the rules on the proportion of fixed and variableremuneration (Paragraph HC-5.4.30) as well as those rules related to the deferral of variableremuneration (Paragraphs HC-5.4.31 and HC-5.4.32) and the obligation to have part of the variableremuneration in shares (Paragraphs HC-5.4.33 and HC-5.4.34) apply only to:(a)Approved persons ; or(b)Material risk-takers whose total annual
remuneration (including all benefits) is in excess of BD100,000, unless the board of directors requires the application of these Rules to all staff.Amended: January 2015
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.2A
The reference to 'Bahrain operations' in Paragraph HC-5.4.2 refers to any activities carried on from an establishment in Bahrain.
Added: April 2015HC-5.4.3
All policies for performance-based incentives should be approved by the shareholders, but the approval should be only of the plan itself and not of the grant to specific individuals of benefits under the plan.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.3A
As noted in Sections AU-3.6 and BR-4A.3, the external auditor or a CBB approved consultancy firm must undertake an annual review of the bank's compliance with the remuneration Rules outlined in this Chapter. The results of this review are to be submitted to the CBB within 3 months from the financial year end.
Amended: July 2015
Moved from HC-5.4.6 to HC-5.4.3A: January 2015
Added: January 2014Application to Overseas Conventional Banks
HC-5.4.4
Banks operating as
overseas conventional bank licensees in Bahrain must apply the most stringent set of remuneration rules to which they may be subject to. Such rules are:(a) The requirements imposed in Bahrain with respect to remuneration as outlined in Volume 1 CBB Rulebook; and(b) The requirements imposed by their home supervisor and head office.Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.5
[This Paragraph was deleted in January 2015.]
Deleted: January 2015
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.6
[Moved to Paragraph HC-5.4.3A in January 2015.]
Amended: January 2015
Added: January 2014Approved Persons in Risk Management, Internal Audit, Operations, Financial Controls, Internal Shari'a Review/Audit, AML and Compliance Functions
HC-5.4.7
The bank's
approved persons engaged in risk management, internal audit, operations, financial controls, internal Shari'a review/audit, AML and compliance functions must be independent, have appropriate authority, and be remunerated in a manner that is independent of the business areas they oversee and commensurate with their key role in the bank. Effective independence and appropriate authority of such staff are necessary to preserve the integrity of financial risk and management's influence on incentive remuneration.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.8
The performance measures of
approved persons referred to in Paragraph HC-5.4.7 must be based principally on the achievement of the objectives and targets of their functions.Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.9
The mix of fixed and variable remuneration for risk management, internal audit, operations, financial controls, internal Shari'a review/audit, AML and compliance functions personnel must be weighted in favour of fixed remuneration.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
Alignment of All Staff Remuneration with Compliance with AML/CFT Requirements
HC-5.4.9A
The performance evaluation and remuneration of senior management and staff of the
conventional bank licensees must be based on the achievement of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) relevant to ensuring compliance with AML/CFT requirements as specified in Paragraphs FC-2.1.3 and FC-2.1.4.Added: April 2020Effective Alignment of Remuneration with Prudent Risk-Taking
HC-5.4.10
Remuneration must be adjusted for all types of risks.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.11
In relation to Paragraph HC-5.4.10, two employees who generate the same short-run profit but take different amounts of risk on behalf of their bank should not be treated the same by the remuneration system.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.12
Both quantitative measures and human judgement must play a role in determining risk adjustments.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.13
Risk adjustments must account for all types of risk, including intangible and other risks such as reputation risk, liquidity risk and the cost of capital.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.14
Banks' remuneration policies and practices must be designed to reduce employees' incentives to take excessive and undue risk.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.15
Remuneration outcomes must be symmetric with risk outcomes.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.16
The mix of cash, equity and other forms of remuneration must be consistent with risk alignment. The mix will vary depending on the employee's position and role and the bank must be able to explain the rationale for its mix to the CBB.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.17
Existing contractual payments related to a termination of employment must be re-examined, and kept in place only if there is a clear basis for concluding that they are aligned with long-term value creation and prudent risk-taking. Prospectively, any such payments must be related to performance achieved over time and designed in a way that does not reward failure.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.18
Banks must ensure that their employees commit themselves not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements. Banks must ensure that appropriate compliance mechanisms are in place to monitor their employees commitment in this regard such as signed adherence by staff to the bank's code of ethics which should include the conditions outlined in this Paragraph.
Added: January 2014
Variable Remuneration
HC-5.4.19
Remuneration systems must link the size of the bonus pool to the overall performance of the bank.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.20
Employees' incentive payments must be linked to the contribution of the individual and business to such performance.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.21
As profits and losses of different activities of a bank are realised over different periods of time, remuneration payout schedules must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks and variable remuneration must therefore be deferred accordingly. Variable remuneration must not be finalised over short periods where risks are realised over long periods.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.22
The remuneration committee of the bank must question payouts for income that cannot be realised or whose likelihood of realisation remains uncertain at the time of payout.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.23
Banks must ensure that total variable remuneration does not limit their ability to strengthen their capital base. The extent to which capital needs to be built up must be a function of a bank's current capital position and its ICAAP.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.24
The size of the variable remuneration pool and its allocation within the bank must take into account the full range of current and potential risks, including:
(a) The cost and quantity of capital required to support the risks taken;(b) The cost and quantity of the liquidity risk assumed in the conduct of business; and(c) Consistency with the timing and likelihood of potential future revenues incorporated into current earnings.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014HC-5.4.25
Paragraph HC-5.4.24 focuses on the overall size of the variable remuneration, at the overall bank level, in order to ensure that the recognition and accrual of variable remuneration will not compromise the financial soundness of the bank.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.26
Bonuses must diminish or be deferred in the event of poor bank, divisional or business unit performance.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.27
Subdued or negative financial performance of the bank should generally lead to a considerable contraction of the bank's total variable remuneration, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus and clawback arrangements. Recognition of staff who have achieved their targets or better, may take place by way of deferred compensation, which may be paid once the bank's performance improves.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.28
If the bank and/or relevant line of business is incurring losses in any year during the vesting period, any unvested portions must be subject to
malus .Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.29
Accrual and deferral of variable remuneration does not oblige the bank to pay the variable remuneration, particularly when the anticipated outcome has not materialised or the bank's financial position does not support such payments.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.30
For
approved persons andmaterial risk-takers , other than those covered under Paragraphs HC-5.4.9 and Section HC-5.5, as their actions have a material impact on the risk exposure of the bank:(a) An appropriate ratio between the fixed and variable components of total remuneration must be set to ensure that fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and paid on the basis of individual, business-unit and bank-wide measures that adequately measure performance; and(b) The variable proportion of remuneration must increase significantly along with the level of seniority and/or responsibility.Amended: October 2016
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014HC-5.4.30A
The Level of the fixed component referred to in Subparagraph HC-5.4.30(a) should represent a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable component.
Amended: October 2016
Added: July 2014HC-5.4.31
For purposes of Paragraph HC-5.4.30:
(a) At least 40% of the variable remuneration must be payable under deferral arrangements over a period of at least 3 years; and(b) For the CEO, his deputies and the other 5 most highly paid business line employees, at least 60% of the variable remuneration must be payable under deferral arrangements over a period of at least 3 years.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.32
The deferral period referred to under Subparagraph HC-5.4.31(a) must be aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the employee in question. Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements should generally vest no faster than on a pro rata basis.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.33
As a minimum, 50% of variable remuneration (including both the deferred and undeferred portions of the variable remuneration) must be awarded in shares or share-linked instruments or where appropriate, other non-cash instruments.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.34
The remaining portion (other than that mentioned under Paragraph HC-5.4.33) of the deferred remuneration can be paid as cash remuneration vested over a minimum 3-year period.
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.34A
The only instance where deferred
remuneration can be paid out before the end of the vesting period is in the case of the death of the employee where the beneficiaries would receive any unpaid deferredremuneration .Added: July 2014HC-5.4.35
Banks must not provide any form of guaranteed variable remuneration as part of the overall remuneration package. Exceptional minimum variable remuneration must only occur in the context of hiring new staff and limited to the first year.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
Remuneration in the Form of Shares or Share-Linked Instruments
HC-5.4.36
Awards in shares or share-linked instruments must be subject to a minimum share retention policy of 6 months from the time the shares are awarded, unless the bank's policy requires a longer period.
Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014HC-5.4.37
For
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , where fixed or variable remuneration include common shares, banks must limit the shares awarded to an annual aggregate limit of 10% of the total issued shares outstanding of the bank, at all times.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.38
For
Bahraini conventional bank licensees , all share incentive plans must be approved by the shareholders.Amended: July 2014
Added: January 2014
Remuneration from Projects and Investments
HC-5.4.39
In reference to Paragraph HC-2.2.6, for greater certainty,
approved persons are not allowed to take any benefits from any projects or investments which are managed by theconventional bank licensee or promoted to its customers or potential customers except for board related remuneration (declared as per Paragraph HC-2.4.1) linked to their fiduciary duties to the investors of the project/investment. This Rule applies to allapproved persons including those appointed as members of the board of special purpose vehicles or other operating companies set up by theconventional bank licensee for projects or investments.Added: January 2014
HC-5.4.40
The reference to benefits in Paragraph HC-5.4.39 includes commission, fees, shares, consideration in kind, or other remuneration or incentives in respect of the performance of the project or investment
Added: January 2014