• Cyber Incident Detection and Management

    • OM-5.5.31

      Conventional bank licensees must implement cyber security incident management processes to ensure timely detection, response and recovery for cyber security incidents. This includes implementing a Security Information & Event Management “SIEM” system.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.32

      Licensees should consider the adequacy of the SIEM, keeping in view it should receive data on a real time basis from all relevant systems, applications, and network devices including operational and business systems. The monitoring system should be capable of identifying indicators of cyber incidents and initiate alerts, reports, and response activities based on the defined cyber security incident management process.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.33

      Licensees should retain the logs and other information from the SIEM for detecting cyber incidents, including "low-and-slow" attacks, in order to facilitate incident investigations, for 5 years or longer.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.34

      Once a cyber incident is detected, licensees should activate their containment measures, processes and technologies best suited to each type of cyber incident to prevent a cyber incident from inflicting further damage. This may involve, after considering the costs, business impact and operational risks, shutting down or isolating all or affected parts of their systems and networks as deemed necessary for containment and diagnosis.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.35

      Conventional bank licensees must establish a Security Operations Centre (SOC) that is tailored to the needs of the licensee to detect, identify, investigate and respond to cyber incidents that could impact the licensee’s infrastructure, services and customers. Capabilities for log collection and monitoring SIEM must be built into the SOC. The SOC must maintain the licensee’s asset inventory and network diagrams.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.36

      Conventional bank licensees must regularly identify, test, review and update current cyber security risk scenarios and the corresponding response plan. This is to ensure that the scenarios and response plan remain relevant and effective, taking into account changes in the operating environment, systems or the emergence of new cyber security threats. If any gaps are identified, the SIEM system must be updated with new use cases and rule sets which are capable of detecting the current cyber incident scenarios.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.37

      The cyber incident scenario tests should include high-impact-low-probability events and scenarios that may result in failure. Common cyber incident scenarios include distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, system intrusion, data exfiltration and system disruption. Licensees should regularly use threat intelligence to update the scenarios so that they remain current and relevant. Licensees should periodically review current cyber incident scenarios for the purpose of assessing the licensee’s ability to detect and respond to these scenarios if they were to occur.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.38

      Conventional bank licensees must ensure that critical cyber security incidents detected are escalated to an incident response team, management and the Board, in accordance with the licensee’s business continuity plan and crisis management plan, and that an appropriate response is implemented promptly. See also Paragraph OM-5.5.57 for the requirement to report to CBB.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.39

      Conventional bank licensees should clearly define the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for cyber incident detection and response activities to one or more named individuals that meet the pre-requisite role requirements. Potential conflicts of interest are minimised by ensuring a separation of implementation and oversight roles where possible. The roles should include:

      Incident Owner: An individual that is responsible for handling the overall cyber incident detection and response activities according to the incident type and services affected. The Incident Owner is delegated appropriate authority to manage the mitigation or preferably, removal of all impacts due to the incident.
      Spokesperson: An individual, from External Communications Unit or another suitable department, that is responsible for managing the communications strategy by consolidating relevant information and views from subject matter experts and the organisation’s management to update the internal and external stakeholders with consistent information.
      Record Keeper: An individual that is responsible for maintaining an accurate record of the cyber incident throughout its different phases, as well as documenting actions and decisions taken during and after a cyber incident. The record serves as an accurate source of reference for after-action reviews to improve future cyber incident detection and response activities.
      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.40

      For the purpose of managing a critical cyber incident, the licensee should operate a situation room, and should include in the incident management procedure a definition of the authorities and responsibilities of staff members, internal and external reporting lines, communication channels, tools and detailed working procedures. The situation room or a war room is a physical room or a virtual room where relevant members of the management gather to handle a crisis in the most efficient manner possible.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.41

      Licensees should record and document in an orderly manner the incidents that have been handled and the actions that were taken by the relevant functions. In particular, the licensee should maintain an "incident log" in which all the notifications, decisions and actions taken, in relation to cyber incidents, are documented, as close as possible to the time of their occurrence. It should also include the status of the issue whether it is open or has been resolved and person in charge of resolving the issue/incident. The logs should be stored and preserved in a secure and legally admissible manner.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.42

      Licensees should utilise pre-defined taxonomy for classifying cyber incidents according to, for example, the type of incident, threat actors, threat vectors and repercussions; and a pre-established severity assessment framework to help gauge the severity of the cyber incident. For example, taxonomies that can be used when describing cyber incidents:

      (a) Describe the cause of the cyber incident (e.g. process failure, system failure, human error, external event, malicious action);
      (b) Describe whether the cyber incident due to a third-party service provider;
      (c) Describe the attack vector (e.g. malware, virus, worm, malicious hyperlink);
      (d) Describe the delivery channel used (e.g. e-mail, web browser, removable storage media);
      (e) Describe the impact (e.g. service degradation/disruption, service downtime, potential impact to customers, data leakage, unavailability of data, data destruction/corruption, tarnishing of reputation);
      (f) Describe the type of incident (e.g. zero-day attack, exploiting a known vulnerability, isolated incident);
      (g) Describe the intent (e.g. malicious, theft, monetary gain, fraud, political, espionage, opportunistic);
      (h) Describe the threat actor (e.g. script kiddies, amateur, criminal syndicate, hacktivist, nation state);

      The cyber incident severity may be classified as:

      (a) Severity 1 incident has or will cause a serious disruption or degradation of critical service(s) and there is potentially high impact on public confidence in the licensee.
      (b) Severity 2 incident has or will cause some degradation of critical services and there is medium impact on public confidence in the licensee.
      (c) Severity 3 incident has little or no impact to critical services and there is no visible impact on public confidence in the licensee.
      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.43

      Licensees should determine the effects of the cyber incident on customers and to the wider banking system as a whole and report the results of such an assessment to CBB if it is determined that the cyber incident may have a systemic impact. Licensees may also share non-sensitive information on cyber incidents, effective cyber security strategies and risk management practices through malware information sharing platforms (MISP). Technical information, such as Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) or vulnerabilities exploited can be shared through MISP.

      Added: July 2021

    • OM-5.5.44

      Licensees should establish metrics to measure the impact of a cyber incident and to report to management the performance of response activities. Examples include:

      1. Metrics to measure impact of a cyber incident:
      (a) Duration of unavailability of critical functions and services;
      (b) Number of stolen records or affected accounts;
      (c) Volume of customers impacted;
      (d) Amount of lost revenue due to business downtime, including both existing and future business opportunities;
      (e) Percentage of service level agreements breached.
      2. Performance metrics for incident management:
      (a) Volume of incidents detected and responded via automation;
      (b) Dwell time (i.e. the duration a threat actor has undetected access until completely removed);
      (c) Recovery Point objectives (RPO) and recovery time objectives (RTO) satisfied.
      Added: July 2021